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ABSTRACT 
 Based on historical lessons learned from irregular warfare case studies, and 
internal organizational analysis, this thesis seeks to provide Marine Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC) with specific implementable recommendations based on Edward 
Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver. Luttwak defines relational maneuver as a style 
of warfare that requires a deep understanding of the threat and its operational 
environment to identify vulnerabilities, adapt, and exploit those weaknesses to destroy 
the enemy as a system. Luttwak argues that irregular warfare requires effective 
implementation of relational maneuver to achieve operational and strategic success. The 
U.S. military’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009 through 2016 have 
revealed insufficient use of relational maneuver, favoring, instead, employment of 
attrition warfare, which focuses on optimizing internal organizational efficiency without 
understanding, or adapting to, the threat or the operational environment. Through this 
research, the authors seek to influence MARSOC’s organizational strategy to more 
effectively wage irregular warfare. The final recommendations provide a possible path to 
MARSOC for overcoming institutional challenges inhibiting the employment of 
relational maneuver in irregular warfare. 
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The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) intends to reorient the U.S. military to 
competition with peer and regional adversaries. The NDS, however, also explains that this 
competition is taking place “below the level of armed conflict.”1 Instead of using 
traditional warfare, adversaries are employing “competition short of open warfare” through 
proxies and irregular warfare in operational environments such as Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan.2 So, while Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) may be less strategically 
important than the intensified threat from Russia, China, or Iran, the lines between state 
and nonstate competition, threats, and operational environments blend together. 
Furthermore, while the potential for traditional warfare with state adversaries has 
intensified, projections of the future indicate that irregular warfare will likely remain the 
predominant form of warfare.3 In current and future, mostly irregular, operational 
environments, the 2018 NDS states that the U.S. military must “compete more effectively 
below the level of armed conflict” against adversaries while also defeating VEOs and 
“defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion.”4 
Strategic success in irregular warfare, however, has eluded the U.S. military 
recently. Seventeen years into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Middle East 
operational environment is arguably worse than when the military launched its efforts 17 
years ago.5 Furthermore, strategic ineffectiveness in irregular warfare is not new for the 
U.S. military. The U.S. military’s efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan reveal 
trends that have inhibited operational effectiveness and strategic success. Analysis of 
                                                 
1 James Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s 
Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 6. 
2 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy, 3. 
3 Thomas Szayna et al., Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical 
Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections (RAND Corporation, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7249/
RR1063. 
4 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy, 7, 4. 
5 John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” Prism: A Journal of 
the Center for Complex Operations 7, no. 3 (2018): 119, http://search.proquest.com/docview/2059595949/. 
xxii 
Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) approaches in irregular warfare also reveals room for 
improvement to better align tactical-level actions with strategic objectives. 
The evidence suggests that the root of the U.S. military’s strategic failures in 
irregular warfare lies in ineffective implementation of what modern strategist Edward 
Luttwak defines as relational maneuver.6 Relational maneuver is a style of warfare that 
focuses on studying a threat to identify and exploit vulnerabilities to achieve strategic 
success. This style of warfare requires a deep understanding of the threat and operational 
environment and the adaptation to exploit threat vulnerabilities. In irregular warfare, 
adaptation and exploitation must occur through both political and traditional military 
competition. The U.S. military, including SOF, disproportionally applies maneuver 
through traditional military violence rather than political competition. 
This study draws upon the strategic context outlined by the 2018 NDS, the 
projected prevalence of future irregular warfare, credible research on irregular warfare, 
historical U.S. military lessons, and internal organizational analysis to produce 
implementable recommendations to the Marine Special Operations Command 
(MARSOC). These recommendations are intended to enhance MARSOC’s ability to wage 
irregular warfare and influence successful strategic outcomes in line with the 2018 NDS. 
Three intermediate arguments underpin the final recommendations. First, irregular warfare 
is fundamentally more complex, dynamic, and uncertain than doctrinally defined 
traditional warfare due to political competition that occurs at every level of warfare. 
Second, U.S. military strategic success in irregular warfare requires applying relational 
maneuver, which enables the necessary understanding and adaptation to identify and 
exploit threat vulnerabilities in uncertain operational environments. Third, SOF and 
MARSOC need to better apply relational maneuver through both political competition and 
military violence.  
                                                 
6 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare.” Parameters 13, no. 4 (Dec 1, 1983);Edward 
N. Luttwak, “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance,” Survival 21, no. 2 (March 1979): 
57–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396337908441800; Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and 
Peace, Rev. and enl. ed (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 113–55. 
xxiii 
Therefore, MARSOC should focus its organizational strategy on employing 
indirect irregular warfare approaches to support national-level objectives against 
prioritized threat networks within select operational environments. The advocated strategy 
contains seven nested recommendations so MARSOC can provide greater direct strategic 
utility to the Department of Defense, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command. 
Ultimately, MARSOC’s utility to the 2018 NDS lies in applying the principles of relational 
maneuver to influence strategic objectives in irregular warfare. 
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If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
—Sun Tzu1 
A. CONTEXT AND PROBLEM 
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) reorient the U.S. military on great power competition with revisionist and rogue 
powers who threaten U.S. interests and the international order.2 The 2018 NDS explains 
that these particular adversaries will likely use “other areas of competition short of open 
warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy 
operations, and subversion). These trends, if unaddressed, will challenge our ability to deter 
aggression.”3 The history of great power competition supports this assertion. During the 
Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China fought a series of proxy wars 
that spanned the globe across Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan, and many more 
venues. These proxy wars often took place within irregular warfare contexts where 
intrastate social-political turmoil provided opportunity for competition among both great 
and regional powers. The history of proxy wars, often within the context of irregular 
warfare, often included the same irregular methods that the current defense strategy 
describes as “corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, 
proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.”4 The history 
of the Cold War echoes the current strategic environment where the current defense 
strategy asserts that:  
                                                 
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Open Road Media, 2014), 23. 
2 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 
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Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018). 
3 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy, 3. 
4 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy, 5. 
2 
China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within 
the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its 
principles and “rules of the road.” Both revisionist powers and rogue 
regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased 
efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, 
violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately 
blurring the lines between civil and military goals.5  
The 2018 NDS’ description of “competition short of armed conflict” and 
“competition short of open warfare” refers to revisionist powers’ and rogue regimes’ 
competition directly with the United States. Although short of open and traditional warfare, 
competitors like Russia and Iran are waging irregular warfare against the United States and 
allied partners to disrupt and tilt the current global order in their favor.6 These competitors 
are waging this irregular warfare through non-state actor proxies by exploiting and 
exacerbating intrastate social-political turmoil created by local insurgencies and terrorism: 
In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of 
influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-
sponsored terrorist activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile 
program to achieve its objectives.7 
Not only are Middle Eastern powers like Iran exploiting intrastate turmoil and 
waging irregular warfare, Russia is also currently waging irregular warfare in Ukraine. A 
2015 study argues that “the evidence that [conflict in Ukraine] is a Kremlin-directed war 
is overwhelming.”8 The study goes on to explain that “Russian soldiers on active duty have 
fought and died in Ukraine only to return to their families in unmarked coffins.”9 
Therefore, although the 2018 defense strategy emphasizes a return to great power 
competition between Russia, China, and the United States, it also reveals that irregular 
warfare and non-violent competition below traditional warfare will represent the most 
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prevalent and likely form of conflict. This prevalence of irregular warfare is not new and 
represents the most common form of warfare since at least 1945.10 As of 2017, 49 conflicts 
persisted around the world, with only one of the 49 occurring between two nation states, 
Pakistan and India (over the Kashmir region).11 
Although irregular warfare has been pervasive, modern strategist Edward Luttwak 
argues that the U.S. military has generally considered low-intensity conflict, or irregular 
warfare, a “lesser-included case of ‘real’ war”—interstate traditional warfare—and has 
therefore largely overlooked the necessity of preparing for and conducting such warfare.12 
Instead, the predominant American way of war focuses on preparing for and fighting 
firepower-driven, technologically enabled, high-intensity warfare directly against other 
uniformed militaries. Although well suited for engaging in principally traditional warfare 
during World War II, the Korean War, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom I (OIF I), the traditional way of war proved insufficient in the irregular operational 
environment in Vietnam—and more recently in Afghanistan since 2001. 
In the Art of War, Sun Tzu famously stated that success in battle depends on 
knowing the enemy as well as oneself.13 Expanded beyond the tactical battle, Sun Tzu 
asserts that success in war does not occur without first recognizing and understanding the 
threat and its contextual operational environment, then adapting to overcome the threat. 
The history of war and warfare suggests that irregular wars, such as waging or countering 
insurgency, require a better discernment of the adversary and its contextual operational 
environment, unlike traditional interstate conflict in which the U.S. military can primarily 
focus on the adversary’s military force and merely the contextual geographic environment. 
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Studies like RAND’s Paths to Victory indicate that in irregular war the destruction of the 
adversary’s military force, while important, is only one of several supporting efforts 
requisite for success.14 Irregular warfare, then, requires a more comprehensive 
understanding of the operational environment. In addition to the same requirements for 
waging traditional warfare, irregular warfare requires understanding politically fragmented 
operational environments influenced by complex, dynamic, and uncertain socio-cultural, 
violence, economic, and information factors across a range of threatening, neutral, and 
friendly participants. 
Although the U.S. military pays lip service to understanding the operational 
environment, the historical record from Vietnam to El Salvador to Afghanistan reveals that 
the U.S. military has not always effectively understood, confronted, and overcome its 
irregular threats. Many of the core problems that led to the United States’ military and 
political failures in Vietnam continue to reveal themselves in more recent and ongoing 
irregular wars. As participants in these conflicts, this study’s authors have observed and 
experienced some of these failures first-hand. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, conventional 
and Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) operational approaches have often gravitated toward 
attritional short-term lethal effects at the expense of implementing long-term approaches 
to inform, influence, execute, and achieve political-military strategy and objectives.  
The military’s ineffective understanding of the contextual political core of 
operational environments in irregular warfare fuels ineffective attritional approaches. This 
is evident in historical irregular warfare engagements and persists today, proving that the 
U.S. military is not adapting to succeed. Success in irregular warfare requires that adaptable 
task-organized forces develop a deeper understanding of the operational environment, 
construct and implement unified political-military strategy, and adjust operational 
approaches to overcome the threat(s) they face. The inconclusiveness, or as retired general 
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officer and author Daniel Bolger argues, the failure of modern U.S. efforts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq indicates a gap of effectiveness in waging irregular warfare.15 
The U.S. military’s challenges in irregular warfare should concern U.S. political-
military leaders because revisionists, rogues, and violent extremist organizations (VEO) 
have used, and will continue to employ, irregular warfare to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities 
and to threaten U.S. interests. In the two decades since September 11, 2001, author and 
irregular warfare expert John Arquilla argues that the U.S. military’s ineffectiveness in 
irregular warfare has contributed to destabilizing the international order and producing 
more irregular threats than existed before the attacks on 9/11.16 
Furthermore, a wide range of analysis of both SOF and the military writ large 
indicates that the U.S. military has treated irregular wars as opportunities to maintain or 
advance organizational or individual bureaucratic interests rather than committing to long-
term solutions and threat resolution.17 The evidence suggests that underpinning these 
shortfalls is a lack of dedicated personnel, resources, and study focusing on the external 
threat and overall operational environment. In place of externally orienting and focusing 
on the operational environment, the military allows and enables internal administrative 
organizational constraints and considerations to outweigh its operational effectiveness. 
This internal orientation suggests that the U.S. military has typically gravitated toward 
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what Luttwak defines as an internally focused attritional style of warfare that substitutes 
nuanced understanding and adaptation with overwhelming military force and firepower.18 
In place of attrition, Luttwak describes and proposes a style, or philosophy, of 
warfare—relational maneuver—better suited to understanding and countering irregular 
threats and waging irregular warfare. In irregular warfare, relational maneuver requires an 
external focus on the threat, an adaptive conceptual understanding, a unified political-
military strategy, and flexible internal organizational design to ultimately produce and 
apply operational warfare approaches to exploit weaknesses within the threat system.19 
Both Luttwak and history unequivocally demonstrate that irregular warfare’s inherent 
political complexity, instability, and uncertainty require relational maneuver to confront 
and overcome the threat.20 
Within the U.S. military, SOF’s core activities and agility in comparison with 
conventional forces should make SOF the nation’s leading experts in irregular warfare and 
advocates of relational maneuver. In reality, SOF have historically experienced mixed 
success in irregular warfare. Although the nation’s ostensible experts in waging irregular 
warfare, SOF have often implemented narrow, kinetically attritional approaches at the 
expense of understanding the operational environment and ensuring that lethal attrition is 
balanced against more holistic approaches. Furthermore, while SOF claim to be agile and 
adaptive, their agility has been largely confined to employment of military violence on the 
battlefield. Instead, SOF, like the broader military, have allowed themselves to 
disproportionally focus internally on developing and advertising tactical-level capabilities 
at the expense of implementing relational maneuver to confront and overcome irregular 
threats. SOF, like the military writ large, have not consistently applied relational maneuver 
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to develop a conceptually deeper understanding of the operational environment, to 
influence or support an effective political-military strategy, to tailor their organizational 
design to the operational environment, or to implement adaptive operational approaches. 
This study closely explores how Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 
can and should transform to better implement relational maneuver. As MARSOC and 
Naval Special Warfare special operations officers, the authors have observed successes and 
failures over the last decade and have vested interests in their respective organizations’ 
ability to contribute to strategically successful outcomes against irregular threats. While a 
pure attritional style of warfare may play a more important role in confronting adversaries 
in traditional wars, it is not the focus of this research. Fighting traditional warfare is the 
primary responsibility of conventional or general-purpose forces, with SOF in a supporting 
role. U.S. military conventional forces are generally designed to employ large-scale violent 
force on the physical battlefield. In contrast, SOF should have a strategic advantage in 
waging irregular warfare given SOF’s relative advantages. 
Relational maneuver depends on understanding the operational environment and 
adapting to protect and exploit vulnerabilities. U.S. SOF commonly state their 
organizational desire for agility, adaptation, and innovation. For example, as stated in its 
recently released organizational vision, MARSOF 2030, MARSOC seeks to achieve 
organizational agility to confront the current and future complex operational 
environment.21 This study’s research directly applies to MARSOC’s desire for agility and 
provides specific recommendations for MARSOC to operationalize MARSOF 2030 by 
connecting and applying the concepts of relational maneuver. 
History provides the only evidence by which to understand the current irregular 
threat environment and to imagine the future thereof. As historian Williamson Murray 
advocates in The Past as Prologue, this study will examine history to explore how 
relational maneuver applies to MARSOC in the current and future environment. This 
history includes three of the most important U.S. irregular warfare experiences since World 
War II, including Vietnam, El Salvador and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Analysis 
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of each case assesses the pertinent U.S. military forces’ conceptual understanding of the 
operational environment, political-military strategy, organizational design, and 
implementation of operational irregular warfare approaches to achieve success. 
While historical analysis clarifies the external irregular threats, critical analysis of 
MARSOC will determine how to transform and enhance their internal organizational 
effectiveness. To that end, and following Sun Tzu’s guidance to know oneself, this study 
will also conduct an open systems analysis of MARSOC’s operational elements using 
organizational design principles. Comparing the external irregular operational environment 
against MARSOC’s internal environment will provide holistic insight and 
recommendations for how MARSOC can more effectively employ relational maneuver to 
wage irregular warfare and influence politically succesful outcomes against current and 
future threats. 
B. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS, QUESTIONS, AND THESIS 
Fundamentally, this thesis uses several basic assumptions. The first is that SOF’s 
very nature requires the employment of relational maneuver principles to be effective due 
to inherent size and reource constraints. Second, all military units should desire to enhance 
their organizational effectiveness. Third, since the 2018 NDS outlines specific irregular 
warfare threats from revisionist, rogue and VEO adversaries, the entire Department of 
Defense (DoD), Special Operational Command (SOCOM), and MARSOC should more 
effectively understand the challenges of confronting and overcoming these irregular threats 
to operationalize many of the concepts within the NDS. 
This study’s fundamental question asks, how can MARSOC employ relational 
maneuver to wage irregular warfare more effectively and achieve strategically 
successful outcomes? The four primary principles that distinguish relational maneuver’s 
effectiveness in irregular warfare provide the basis and analytical framework for this study. 
Taken together, these principles and related questions dictate how MARSOC should 
conceptually understand relational maneuver’s employment in irregular warfare: 
9 
1. How important is it to conceptually gain a Deep Understanding of the 
Operational Environment in irregular warfare, and what factors enable 
the comprehension necessary to employ relational maneuver?  
2. How important is Political-Military Strategy for confronting and 
overcoming irregular threats? 
3. What kind of Organizational Design enables relational maneuver against 
irregular threats?  
4. What relational maneuver-based Operational Irregular Warfare 
Approaches have been historically successfully employed? 
Because the answers to these questions will only provide general utility to the U.S. 
military at large, further questions must assist in specifically determining how MARSOC 
can implement these solutions in the present. Answering the following questions will assist 
in translating general insights directly to MARSOC: 
1. In comparison to conventional forces, what are SOF’s general relational 
maneuver advantages in waging irregular warfare? 
2. What inhibitors exist within MARSOC organizational design which 
undermine the employment of relational maneuver within irregular 
operational environments?  
This study determines that, to employ relational maneuver effectively, MARSOC 
should develop a deeper understanding of operational environments; inform, influence, 
support, and implement political-military strategy; tailor internal organizational design to 
meet the challenges of unique irregular operational environments; and implement advisor-
centric operational irregular warfare approaches. Together, these four principles can enable 
MARSOC to identify and exploit the threat vulnerabilities necessary to influence and 
achieve strategically successful outcomes in irregular warfare. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Currently, due to MARSOC’s organizational youth, no literature directly addresses 
how MARSOC should wage irregular warfare and confront irregular threats. Furthermore, 
no literature applies Edward Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver to MARSOC. This 
research intends to fill this gap and to make an argument that MARSOC can fill critical 
gaps in historical U.S. military capabilities, current Marine Corps warfighting capabilities, 
and better supplement U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) capabilities by 
specializing in applying relational maneuver to irregular warfare and specific irregular 
threats and operational environments. 
1. MARSOC’s Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare 
The prevalence of irregular warfare (especially since 1945), the projection of future 
irregular warfare, the U.S. military’s and SOF’s mixed record of effectiveness in irregular 
warfare, and MARSOC’s persistent engagement in irregular warfare establishes the 
relevance for this research study. Historian Max Boot’s accounts of irregular warfare, 
including The Savage Wars of Peace and Invisible Armies,22 provide context for the 
prevalence of irregular warfare throughout history both around the world and for the U.S. 
military. More focused from 1945 to the present, Research and Development (RAND) 
Corporation’s 2017 study Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers23 and the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) recent 2018 study “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017”24 are 
two credible and representative analyses that reveal the predominance of irregular warfare 
versus traditional warfare in the recent past. 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) recent 2018 NDS25 is the most recent and 
critical literature that explains the current, and projects the future, prevalence of irregular 
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warfare, described within the context of competition below the level of direct or open 
warfare. The National intelligence Council’s 2012 Global Trends 203026 and RAND’s 
2017 and PRIO’s 2018 analyses affirms the likelihood for the predominance of irregular 
warfare into the foreseeable future. 
Substantial literature also exists that questions the U.S. military’s effectiveness in 
irregular warfare. Historically, Edward Luttwak’s “Notes on Irregular Warfare”27 
criticizes the U.S. military’s style of warfare in Vietnam. Research from the Vietnam War 
further contains a significant number of accounts that criticize U.S. abilities in waging 
irregular warfare, including various articles by Edward Lansdale,28 Andrew Krepinevich’s 
critique The Army and Vietnam,29 Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie,30 and many others. 
More recently, one of the most circumspect analyses of the U.S. military’s challenges in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Richard Hooker and Joseph Collin’s edited volume Lessons 
Encountered: Learning from the Long War31 closely analyzes the challenges confronted 
and mistakes made by the U.S. military. Retired General officer Daniel Bolger’s Why We 
Lost,32 and John Gentry’s How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military 
Power33 further assess many of the strategic related U.S. failures associated with waging 
irregular warfare. This study also draws extensively from Colin Gray’s analyses of the U.S. 
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military’s failures in strategically waging irregular warfare in the modern era.34 Finally, 
this study draws from the authors’ own experiences and observations of U.S. military 
ineffectiveness as well as from interviews with subject matter experts and military 
practitioners across case study analyses. 
Within the genre questioning general military effectiveness in irregular warfare 
exists a narrower critique of Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) effectiveness in irregular 
warfare. The core of the argument confronting SOF effectiveness in irregular warfare 
consists of SOF’s overemphasis on the tactical employment of direct-action kinetic skills 
versus a strategic employment of indirect approaches that harness SOF’s abilities to work 
with and through indigenous partners to achieve lasting political and military objectives. 
RAND’s study, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare,35 retired Army Special 
Forces officer Scott Mann’s Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists,36 
Linda Robinson’s One Hundred Victories37 and Future of U.S. Special Operations,38 and 
retired Special Forces officer and author Hy Rothstein’s “A Tale of Two Wars”39 all explore 
SOF-related failures in operating strategically in irregular operational environments. 
Finally, open source reporting and the authors’ personal experiences reveal that in 
its organizational history since 2006, MARSOC has been persistently engaged in irregular 
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warfare in the Philippines, Africa, and the Middle East.40 Whether officially identified as 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Stability Operations, Security 
Force Assistance (SFA), virtually all of MARSOC’s historical, current, and projected 
missions relate to waging irregular warfare directly or assisting other partners in waging 
irregular warfare. 
2. Irregular Warfare: Definitions and Effectiveness 
The literature on irregular warfare and identifying how to wage irregular warfare 
effectively and counter irregular threats is broad. Due to its purpose to influence MARSOC, 
an operational military organization, this study uses current joint military doctrine to define 
irregular warfare as well as key terminology thereof, such as the participants, the activities, 
and the operational environment.41 Although utilizing current doctrine to define 
terminology, this study also draws extensively from historical literature from classic 
studies including Carl von Clausewitz’s On War42 to define war, the Marine Corps’ 1940 
Small Wars Manual,43 and C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars.44 
Building from doctrine and classic analysis of irregular warfare, this study 
examines and synthesizes a wide range of the most pertinent studies on the character and 
effective practices in irregular warfare. While not exhaustive, these relevant studies 
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include: David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare,45 David Kilcullen’s 
Counterinsurgency,46 John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,47 Kalev Sepp’s 
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,”48 RAND’s Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern 
Insurgency,49 Joint Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency,50 Mao Tse-Tung’s On 
Protracted War51 and On Guerilla Warfare,52 Joint Publication 3–05.1, Unconventional 
Warfare,53 Roger Trinquier’s, Modern Warfare a French View of Counterinsurgency,54 
Robert Taber’s, War of the Flea,55 and Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor’s edited 
volume Hybrid Warfare.56 These and a host of other studies inform this research’s analysis 
of the character of as well as the common effective practices in irregular warfare. Together, 
these studies depict complex, dynamic, and uncertain operational environment where 
political factors are as or more important than the traditional military employment of 
violence. 
Due to the centrality of politics in all war, but especially in irregular operational 
environments, this study especially focuses on the role of political competition and its 
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implications to relational maneuver effectiveness in irregular warfare. Afghanistan veteran 
and scholar Emile Simpson’s illuminating analysis of political competition, based on a 
Clauswitzian foundation of war and warfare, plays a significant role in shaping this study’s 
examination of the political complexity of irregular warfare.57 RAND’s recent study 
Modern Political Warfare58 as well as George Kennan’s classic thinking on political 
warfare also serve to shape this study’s analysis and supports the criticality of relational 
maneuver in understanding and waging political competition in irregular warfare.59 The 
uncertainty in political and violent competition in irregular warfare leads to the requirement 
to employ an adaptive philosophy or style of warfare to effectively wage irregular warfare, 
relational maneuver. 
3. Relational Maneuver and Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare 
The core of this study is the application of relational maneuver in irregular warfare 
to MARSOC. Edward Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver is articulated as a national 
style of warfare and applied in his writings towards the U.S. military at large. Edward 
Luttwak defines relational maneuver and provides the conceptual principles to build an 
analytical framework to enable the adaptability necessary to succeed in irregular warfare. 
This study employs his elements of relational maneuver to examine historical U.S. military 
experiences in irregular warfare and the irregular operational environment, examine SOF’s 
relational maneuver advantages in irregular warfare, and internally examine MARSOC’s 
organizational design.60 In multiple works since the 1970s, Edward Luttwak has argued 
that effectiveness in irregular warfare necessitates adapting to the requirements of the 
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operational environment and exploiting threat vulnerabilities.61 Relational maneuver 
requires understanding the threat and operational environment both cognitively and 
physically, building strategy that accounts for both political and violent competition, 
tailoring internal organizational design to align to the environment, and operationally 
maneuvering to adapt and exploit weaknesses to defeat the adversary’s system of 
defense.62  
While no existing literature applies relational maneuver directly to MARSOC, its 
parent service possesses substantial literature applying aspects of relational maneuver to 
the Marine Corps. Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps’ application of relational 
maneuver. The Marine Corps codified Maneuver Warfare into Doctrine in the 1980s under 
Marine Commandant General A.M. Gray, which was then refined by General Charles 
Krulak in 1997 with the publication of the current Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 
(MCDP 1) Warfighting.63 Warfighting is currently the guiding philosophy to the Marine 
Corps’ way of war.  
Warfighting’s way of warfare closely mirrors Luttwak’s relational maneuver; 
however, Warfighting also focuses nearly exclusively on the traditional battlefield, 
employment of military violence, and the traditional conception of the separation of 
political and violent competition. Warfighting explains that “at the highest level, war 
involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear 
against another. These include, for example, economic, diplomatic, military, and 
psychological forces. Our primary concern is with the use of military force.”64 This study’s 
examination of relational maneuver’s application in irregular warfare indicates that a 
different philosophy is required. One where the primary concern for MARSOC, and all 
U.S. military elements in irregular operational environments should be political 
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competition. Veteran and author Emile Simpson’s analysis in War From the Ground Up 
exposes the character of irregular warfare where all levels of warfare require integrating 
all elements of power.65 Essentially, this study’s exploration of relational maneuver argues 
that Warfighting’s philosophy of Maneuver Warfare is not adequate for success in irregular 
warfare and that MARSOC should build and expand on Warfighting’s conception of 
Maneuver Warfare by better integrating Luttwak’s elements of relational maneuver in 
direct application to irregular warfare. 
Aside from Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver and external to the Marine 
Corps, other variations of maneuver warfare exist. Political scientist John Gentry’s 2012 
book How Wars Are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power closely relates to 
relational maneuver.66 Gentry defines military power as the “ability to consistently 
favorably influence strategic military outcomes” and argues that national and military 
success depends on identifying vulnerabilities in an opponent, exploiting those 
vulnerabilities, and protecting internal vulnerabilities.67 Learning and adapting therefore 
better explain strategic success over time than strictly material strength, or what Luttwak 
defines as an attrition style of warfare that pits strength against strength. Gentry’s book 
reinforces Luttwaks’ concepts of relational maneuver but also applies these concepts to the 
national level of warfare. 
In “How the Weak Win Wars,”68 Ivan Arreguín-Toft provides a similar argument 
to relational maneuver that contends that a stronger actor must match the weaker actor’s 
strategy to win. This implies that in irregular war, the United States and SOF must match 
the weaker adversary and employ relational maneuver to succeed. Toft’s argument also 
focuses on national strategic application. 
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More directly similar to the application of relational maneuver to MARSOC, in 
2017 United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) published a series of 
white papers that included “Expanding Maneuver in the Early 21st Century Security 
Environment.”69 In this article, the author outlines this expansion from purely physical 
maneuver to both physical and cognitive maneuver. This series of white papers examine 
the implications of cognitive maneuver, especially within the human domain and its 
implications for USASOC in the 21st Century. These papers contain many of the principles 
of Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver, especially pertaining to the requirement to 
deeply understand the operational environment to identify vulnerabilities and maneuver to 
exploit those vulnerabilities. This study’s exploration and application of relational 
maneuver differs from USASOC’s concepts in several important ways. First, this study 
focuses application specifically on irregular warfare operational environments. Second, it 
more definitively focuses on the centrality of political competition in irregular warfare. 
Third, this study identifies specific recommendations to adapt MARSOC’s organizational 
design to better align to irregular operational environments. 
4. Case Studies: Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan 
To examine how the U.S. military has historically employed relational maneuver 
in irregular warfare, this study surveys literature of the U.S. military’s irregular warfare 
efforts in Vietnam (1954–1973), El Salvador (1979–1992), and Afghanistan (2001–2018). 
Since the literature on these conflicts is vast, research will be limited to the most relevant, 
comprehensive, and well-regarded studies on each conflict. The U.S. military’s irregular 
warfare efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan are three of the most critical 
irregular warfare experiences since World War II. These three experiences span nearly 50 
of the last 73 years since the end of World War II, took place on three separate continents, 
and include the full range of military operations in diverse operational environments. These 
three cases are especially apropos given that they involved Marine conventional and special 
operations forces and that they all have had profound impacts on U.S. military efforts in 
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irregular warfare. In particular, MARSOC’s formative years, starting in 2006, occurred in 
the context of Afghanistan. Together, these cases enable this study to use its relational 
maneuver analytical framework to validate the character of irregular warfare and 
operational environments, to confirm the necessity of employing relational maneuver to 
wage irregular warfare, and to identify the challenges the U.S. military, SOF, and 
MARSOC have faced in employing relational maneuver in irregular operational 
environments. 
5. SOF’s Relational Maneuver Advantages in Irregular Warfare 
To determine SOF’s comparative relational maneuver advantages in irregular 
warfare, this study employs a breadth of literature from subject matter experts and credible 
research. These experts and credible studies include Thomas Adams U.S. Special 
Operations Forces in Action,70 Linda Robinson’s The Future of U.S. Special 
Operations,71 Susan Marquis’ Unconventional Warfare,72 Eliot Cohen’s Commandos and 
Politicians,73 Mark Moyar’s Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America’s Special Operations 
Forces,74 and David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb’s United States Special Operations 
Forces.75 These and other studies enable assessments of SOF’s general advantages 
applicable to relational maneuver effectiveness in irregular warfare.  
6. Organizational Design and Open Systems Analysis 
The examination of MARSOC’s organizational design through open systems 
analysis employs recognized literature on organizational design and open systems analysis 
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primarily from Henry Mintzberg’s “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,”76 Richard 
Daft’s Organization Theory and Design,77 and concepts from Retired General Stanley 
McChrystal’s Team of Teams.78 Together, these sources enable an internal analysis of 
MARSOC’s operational elements to determine alignment with relational maneuver and 
irregular operational environments. 
7. Literature on MARSOC 
The academic literature on MARSOC is sparse. To examine MARSOC’s 
organizational design, this study draws from the authors’ personal experiences, 
unpublished official and unofficial organizational documents, limited published articles 
and books, and the recently published organizational vision, MARSOF 2030.79 Of these 
sources, the authors’ subject matter expertise, interviews with organizational members, and 
MARSOF 2030 are the key source documents for analysis. Additional sources that provide 
MARSOC’s primary organizational inputs from the DoD, SOCOM, and the larger Marine 
Corps will also assist internal organizational analysis. 
8. MARSOC: Applying Relational Maneuver in Irregular Warfare 
To produce the ultimate organizational recommendations to MARSOC, this study 
synthesizes literature across a wide range of subjects, each with its own particular literature. 
While the breadth of literature is vast regarding broad military and SOF-specific lessons 
learned in irregular warfare, there is a dearth of literature on how specific SOF 
organizations can and should implement these lessons to more effectively wage irregular 
warfare and link tactical and operational effects to strategic outcomes. To fill this gap, this 
study applies Edward Luttwak’s concept of relational maneuver to MARSOC in irregular 
warfare. To do so, this study constructs a relational maneuver analytical framework, 
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applicable to analyze any case study or organization interested in or responsible for waging 
irregular warfare. Lastly, synthesizing the literature that exposes gaps in U.S. military, 
Marine Corps, and SOF effectiveness in irregular warfare, this study produces an argument 
that MARSOC should specialize in irregular warfare and applying the tenets of relational 
maneuver to achieve politically successful outcomes. 
D. METHODS 
To produce the ultimate recommendations to MARSOC, this thesis employs a 
mixed-methods approach to research. The relational maneuver analytical framework 
enables case study analysis of Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. Internal analysis of 
MARSOC employs organizational design theory through open systems analysis to provide 
organizational recommendations that MARSOC can implement in the present. Finally, 
interviews of subject matter experts and the authors’ personal experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq supplements traditional academic and official literature.  
To enable analysis, Chapter II constructs an analytical framework primarily from 
Luttwak’s conceptual principles but also influenced by the range of literature on war, 
irregular warfare, effectiveness therein, and irregular operational environments. To enable 
the adaptability that relational maneuver demands to identify and exploit threat 
vulnerabilities, the analytical framework consists of four primary components. First, 
relational maneuver demands a deep understanding of the irregular operational 
environment, including the threat and the threat context. Second, it requires balancing 
political and violent competition to inform, influence, and implement a unified political-
military strategy. Third, relational maneuver entails tailoring internal organizational 
design, particularly of tasks, structures, and its people, to adapt to the needs of the 
operational environment. Finally, relational maneuver produces adaptive irregular 
operational approaches that exploit vulnerabilities within the threat operational 
environment to reach strategic objectives. The entire process requires constant evolution 
and adaptation to effectively implement. This analytical framework, constructed in Chapter 
II, enables external analysis of irregular warfare case studies as well as internal analysis of 
MARSOC’s organizational design. 
22 
To conduct the internal analysis of MARSOC, this study employs recognized and 
accepted organizational design theory to conduct an open systems analysis of MARSOC’s 
operational units and levels of command. Open systems analysis will focus on how well 
MARSOC aligns to the principles of relational maneuver to be operationally effective and 
to directly support strategic outcomes in irregular warfare. The study’s analytical 
framework provides the measures of effectiveness to examine the internal characteristics 
of MARSOC. Comprehensively, organizational design theory, the defined irregular 
operational environment, and the relational maneuver analytical framework enable an open 
systems goals-based approach to assess organizational alignment with irregular operational 
environments and to determine areas where MARSOC can better apply relational 
maneuver. 
To supplement case study and organizational design analysis, this study also 
employs interviews of academic subject matter experts and SOF practitioners. These 
interviews with individuals such as retired Marine Corps Commandant, General A.M. Gray 
(Ret), USASOC Commander Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland (Ret), current Special 
Operations Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Freedom (SOJTF-OIR) Commander 
Major General Patrick Roberson, Major General Ray Smith (Ret), Colonel Gerald Turley 
(Ret), active duty and retired participants from each case study, current MARSOC 
organizational leadership, and academic subject matter experts enable insights into the 
application of relational maneuver in irregular warfare to MARSOC otherwise unavailable. 
The authors’ personal experiences in irregular warfare across the Middle East further 
supplement application of theory, traditional historical research, and interviews. 
E. RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis is broken into three parts and eight chapters modeled 
after Sun Tzu’s conditions for success in war: to know one’s enemy and oneself.80 Part 1: 
“To Know One’s Enemy” contains chapters II through V. Chapter two builds a conceptual 
foundation for irregular warfare and relational maneuver and constructs the study’s 
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analytical framework. Chapters III through V take this foundation and framework and 
apply them to Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. Overall, Part 1 examines the external 
irregular operational environment, analyzes a variety of irregular threats, and identifies 
general U.S. military challenges in employing relational maneuver to wage irregular 
warfare and overcome irregular threats. 
Part 2: “To Know Oneself” contains chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI examines 
SOF relational maneuver advantages in irregular warfare compared to conventional forces. 
This chapter reveals how SOF are uniquely suited for the complexity, instability, and 
uncertainty of irregular warfare. Chapter VII then conducts an open systems analysis of 
MARSOC’s operational elements to identify areas to improve organizational alignment 
with irregular operational environments and to enable the employment of relational 
maneuver. 
Part 3: “Success in Irregular Warfare” contains chapters VIII and IX, which apply 
the study’s analysis to MARSOC. Chapter VIII synthesizes the externally oriented 
historical case study analysis and the internally oriented organizational design analysis to 
produce tailored recommendations for MARSOC. Chapter VIII also contains two sections. 
Section A consolidates the primary overarching challenges inhibiting MARSOC. These 
challenges are synthesized from the external and internal analysis across case study and 
organizational analysis and apply across the U.S. military and SOF. Section B then applies 
these challenges to MARSOC and outlines specific recommendations to overcome these 
challenges. Altogether, Chapter VIII synthesizes the challenges identified throughout the 
study and applies recommendations directly to MARSOC. Chapter IX concludes by 
discussing unexpected discoveries, research disclaimers, and further research to implement 
conclusions from this study as well as expand into topics that this study’s scope did not 
allow.  
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses primarily on the U.S. military to provide analytically and 
historically based organizational recommendations to MARSOC. Since the scope of this 
study is already large, certain limitations preclude the consideration of some relevant 
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material. Most importantly, the scope of this project limited the number of relevant case 
studies to three of the U.S. military’s most critical irregular warfare experiences between 
World War II and the present. This thesis explores each irregular warfare effort broadly 
especially at the theater-strategic and operational levels of warfare, to include U.S. 
interagency as well as military efforts to avoid limiting analysis to normative traditional 
military activities. Because of this broad approach, analysis will remain broad to identify 
trends within the U.S. military’s institutional efforts and deficiencies in applying the 
principles of relational maneuver to achieve strategic success. Moreover, because this 
thesis seeks to provide MARSOC organizationally strategic recommendations, analysis 
primarily focuses on organizations, specifically the U.S. military and MARSOC, and the 
group level rather than individuals. Certain individuals during analysis, however, will be 
more thoroughly discussed since their leadership and actions are representative for 
organizational propensities. This intentional limitation towards individual analysis does not 
disregard the individual’s importance in the U.S. military or within irregular warfare, rather 
it merely recognizes that strategic success, or failure, in prolonged irregular warfare efforts 
does not typically occur due a single individuals’ competence or failings, but due to teams, 
groups, and organizations that apply strategy and approaches to achieve success. 
Also, this study only explores the role of technology in the most cursory manner. 
The literature on irregular warfare, especially for the United States, predominantly argues 
that the U.S. military tends to overly rely on technology in irregular warfare.81 The same 
literature argues that the causes of success or failure in irregular warfare lies within the 
employment of technology, since technology it only as effective as the strategy and 
approaches that guide its employment. The mere fact that technologically inferior irregular 
adversaries have defeated materially superior state governments suggests that technology, 
while important, is often not decisive. Due to time and scope, this study leaves the 
examination of technologies role in irregular warfare to other research. 
Finally, this study will not cover classified material. This gap limits the depth of 
discussion and analysis of intelligence and clandestine capabilities within the current 
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environment. An essential element of irregular environments, future research should build 
on this analysis and carefully examine the conclusions obtained from a sensitive materials 
perspective. Ultimately, keeping the conclusions declassified will enable the broadest 
ability to interact with a variety of perspectives and enable thorough and accessible review 
for implementation by MARSOC leaders and personnel. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter outlines the context, purpose of research, literature 
review, methods, structure, and scope that guide this study. It is critical for MARSOC, 
SOF, and the U.S. military to closely study the historical and internal challenges that have 
undermined effectiveness and success in irregular warfare. The most cursory study of the 
U.S. military’s experiences in irregular warfare exposes profound and repetitive challenges 
since at least the Vietnam conflict. Furthermore, projections of the likely future threats to 
the United States, whether from revisionists, rogues, or violent extremists, reveal a 
predominantly irregular future threat environment. 
Through studying the theory and history of irregular warfare, and the U.S. 
military’s challenges therein, this thesis seeks to enhance MARSOC’s direct organizational 
contributions to overcoming the challenges associated with irregular warfare. The concept 
of relational maneuver guides this study. Although it is an old concept to which most U.S. 
military organizations publicly subscribe, this study indicates that the employment of 
relational maneuver exists mainly within the traditional domain on physical battlefields. 
This study argues that physical maneuver on the battlefield represents the most rudimentary 
element of relational maneuver, and that more sophisticated applications should integrate 
the intellectual thought, strategy, organizational design, and operational approaches 
especially necessary to succeed in irregular warfare. Although some reading the 2018 NDS 
may too narrowly focus on the sections describing the risks that exist for possible direct 
interstate conflict between the U.S. and a revisionist or rogue competitor, the indisputable 
fact is that revisionists, rogues, and global and local insurgent VEOs are waging irregular 
warfare against the United States right now. Part of the global SOF network charged with 
understanding, confronting, and overcoming the nation’s irregular threats, MARSOC can 
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contribute to this effort by better aligning its organization to the requirements of irregular 
warfare and better applying the principles of relational maneuver.
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II. RELATIONAL MANEUVER: AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
There are some militarists who say: “We are not interested in politics but 
only in the profession of arms.” It is vital that these simple-minded 
militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics 
and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political 
goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is 
impossible to isolate one from the other.  
—Mao Tse-tung.88 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its history, and especially since 1945, the United States has faced 
numerous irregular warfare threats both directly from irregular non-state groups as well as 
indirectly from proxies sponsored and supported by other state governments.89 More 
generally, analysis of war since 1945 illustrates that insurgent, revolutionary, 
unconventional, and proxy wars have vastly outnumbered traditional or conventional wars 
directly between state governments.90 During the Cold War between the Soviet Union and 
United States, most interstate military competition occurred within the context of intrastate 
conflict in locations like Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Vietnam waged by proxies funded 
or supported by the great powers.91 This competition and conflict also spilled over into 
Marxist revolution and, later, Islamic Jihadist global terrorism and insurgency. Current 
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research and analysis forecast that irregular warfare will continue to be the most prevalent 
form of war in the foreseeable future.92 
Although irregular warfare has been pervasive, modern strategists Colin Gray and 
Edward Luttwak argue that the U.S. military has not effectively waged irregular warfare 
or produced strategically successful outcomes in irregular operational environments.93 The 
status of irregular warfare conflicts across the Middle East supports assertions of military 
ineffectiveness. While exceptions exist, historical and current military experience across 
U.S. military irregular warfare efforts indicates that, institutionally, the U.S. military often 
narrowly and disproportionally focuses on the physical battlefield and equates tactical 
victories with strategic success. In 1988, Retired Army Colonel and author, Harry 
Summers, recounted a conversation from 1975: “America’s fighting forces did not fail us. 
‘You know, you never beat us on the battlefield,’ I told my North Vietnamese counterpart 
during negotiations in Hanoi a week before the fall of Saigon. He pondered that remark a 
moment and then replied, ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.’”94 Colonel Summers 
relayed this discussion to argue that the U.S. military did “not deserve…[the] blame… for 
what went wrong there.”95 In Colonel Summers’ and Retired General Frederick Weyand’s 
rendition of the Vietnam War, it was the “deep-seated strategic failure: the failure of policy-
makers to frame tangible, obtainable goals.”96 
The problem with the narrative as reported by Colonel Summers and General 
Weyand is that it does not account for the inherently complex political-military character 
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of irregular warfare in general, nor of the complexity in Vietnam specifically. Their 
narrative seems to assume that the policy makers in Washington possessed a clear picture 
of the operational environment in Vietnam and suggests that the U.S. military clearly 
conveyed clear and accurate assessments of that situation as well as proposed strategy and 
approaches that would achieve U.S. interests. Analysis of the war suggests otherwise and 
demonstrates that the U.S. military predominantly viewed Vietnam through a traditional 
warfare lens that advocated either committing unlimited forces or not committing at all.  
Presently, it is of great consequence to recognize and acknowledge that in addition 
to the responsibility that falls on the policy makers for historical failures, the U.S. military 
bears a substantial burden of responsibility for failing to understand the realities of irregular 
warfare and adapt its strategy, organizational design, and approaches to achieve success. 
In irregular warfare, the U.S. military is often the only force with the access, placement, 
and capabilities to understand the operational environment and to inform, influence, and 
implement political-military strategy at every level of warfare. 
This chapter re-exposes the historically evident truth that the employment of 
violence cannot unilaterally produce successful strategic outcomes. The U.S. military, 
institutionally, either does not understand or does not accept this concept or its implications 
for U.S. military; that in irregular warfare, the U.S. military must engage in direct political 
competition and employ violence in support of politics. Specifically, the evidence suggests 
that the U.S. military has not adapted itself properly to understand irregular operational 
environments; inform, influence, and implement political-military strategy; tailor its task 
organization to the environment; and ultimately execute the operational approaches 
required to produce strategic success. Instead, the historic record reveals that the U.S. 
military institutionally clutches to a predominantly attritional way of war to “close with the 
enemy and destroy him with fire and maneuver.”97 Some of the most comprehensive 
examples that reveal the U.S. military’s challenges in irregular warfare include the 
American experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador, and in the ongoing irregular conflict in 
Afghanistan. 
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Framing the historical irregular challenges in present day, the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy and intelligence projections describe how U.S. peer and regional 
adversaries, like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are pursuing competition “short of 
armed conflict” and “short of open war” to undermine U.S. interests and global stability.98 
Across places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, adversarial efforts ‘short of open 
war’ interact with irregular warfare operational environments, and state actors, terrorists, 
insurgents, violent extremist organizations (VEO), and proxies blend together.  
Although U.S. adversaries openly seek to take advantage of these irregular 
operational environments, the U.S. military focuses on preparing for traditional major 
combat operations against existential peer-revisionist adversaries following periods of 
irregular warfare.99 Although the U.S. military may confront peer-revisionist adversaries 
in high-intensity, traditional warfare in the future, revisionist, rogue, and non-state actors 
are waging irregular warfare against U.S. interests now. Therefore, to succeed now, the 
U.S. military must reorient its current focus, integrating past insights to inform present-day 
engagements. Unfortunately, in both historical and current irregular warfare conflicts, the 
U.S. military has demonstrated institutional “difficulty in adapting what fairly may be 
termed the traditional American way of war in a manner such that it can be effective against 
unlike, or asymmetrical, enemies.”100 
Since the general lessons for success in irregular warfare are well documented, the 
U.S. military’s ineffectiveness in waging irregular warfare and producing strategic 
outcomes is even more concerning and reveals an inability to learn from history and to 
apply lessons to the present. A mountain of research and this study’s authors’ experiences 
in Afghanistan and Iraq expose troubling gaps in the U.S. military’s organizational 
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understanding of irregular threats and warfare, a lack of coherent political-military strategy, 
flawed organizational design, and ineffective implementation of operational irregular 
warfare approaches. Ineffective employment of Edward Luttwak’s principles of relational 
maneuver is the primary cause of the U.S. military’s institutional failures in irregular 
warfare.  
To contribute to the wider effort to improve U.S. military effectiveness, this study 
holistically examines how Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) can 
better implement relational maneuver to wage irregular warfare more effectively and 
help achieve strategically successful outcomes. As the newest member of the U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), MARSOC’s organizational youth and 
development provide an opportunity to break away from traditional attritional paradigms. 
To ultimately produce implementable recommendations to MARSOC, this chapter builds 
a conceptual foundation for war and irregular warfare and produces a relational maneuver 
analytical framework for further case study and organizational analysis. 
The analytical framework identifies four primary components of relational 
maneuver’s application to irregular warfare that enables the adaptation to exploit threat 
vulnerabilities.101 Together, these four components comprise a deeper understanding of 
the requirements to succeed in irregular operational environments. After defining the terms 
essential to this study, the subsequent section explains relational maneuver’s first 
component: a requirement to deeply understand the relevant threats and their operational 
environments. The second component builds on this requirement and outlines the necessity 
of informing, influencing, and implementing coherent political-military strategy to 
overcome the threat. The third component explores the critical, but often overlooked, role 
of organizational design to adapt to and overcome irregular threats. This section 
emphasizes the necessity of appropriately tailoring a U.S. military force to wage irregular 
warfare in specific irregular environments. Finally, the fourth component investigates the 
adaptive operational approaches, which includes the use embedded advisors to achieve 
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success. These four major components require external orientation on known threats to 
identify weaknesses and strategically adapt to dismantle the adversary’s system.  
B. CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING: WAR, WARFARE, AND STYLES 
OF WARFARE 
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind 
of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to 
turn it into, something alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic 
questions and the most comprehensive. — Carl von Clausewitz102 
Synthesized analysis of Carl von Clausewitz and modern strategists Colin Gray and 
Edward Luttwak indicates that strategic effectiveness in war depends on conceptually 
understanding what war is, the differences between traditional and irregular warfare, and 
the philosophies or styles of waging warfare.103 To construct the analytical framework that 
guides this study, this chapter establishes these concepts, exposes the U.S. military’s 
propensity toward attrition warfare, and defines and describes the core components of 
relational maneuver. For the U.S. military, strategic success in irregular warfare depends 
on how well it employs the principles of relational maneuver. 
1. War 
The probable character and general shape of any war should mainly be 
assessed in the light of political factors and conditions. 
—Carl von Clausewitz104 
Carl von Clausewitz provides a well-known definition of war. According to 
Clausewitz, war is competition in which violent force is used to bend an adversary to one’s 
will.105 Clausewitz further explains that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true 
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political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. 
What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means.”106 Therefore, 
organized violence, used for a political purpose, distinguishes war from general political 
competition. Within Clausewitz’s definition of war, all warfare is inherently political 
regardless of ethnic, religious, or other considerations. In terms of strategy in war, violence 
is the primary means and the objective is to influence a certain distribution of power. In 
this sense, the inherent composition of all war includes political and organized violent 
competition (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Clauswitzian War 
According to Clausewitz, the purpose of war is to achieve political objectives. Cold 
War–era foreign policy expert Robert Osgood explains that objectives in war can be broken 
into two simple categories: limited and total war.107 In total war, the political objective is 
the complete overthrow and destruction of the enemy’s political system and military forces 
through the mobilization and use of all of a nation’s resources. In contrast, the objectives 
in limited war are less than complete overthrow and destruction without employing all of 
a nation’s resources.108 
2. Irregular Warfare, Threats, and the Operational Environment 
We think we can improve our understanding of a subject as diffuse and 
richly varied as irregular warfare and insurgency by hunting for the most 
precise definition and subdefinitions. The results all too often are official 
definitions that tend to the encyclopaedic and are utterly indigestible. Or we 
discover a host of similar terms, each with its subtly distinctive meaning 
and probably its unique historical and cultural baggage. So, are we talking 
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about irregular warfare, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, guerrilla 
warfare, terrorism, and so forth? The answer is yes, and more than those. 
—Colin Gray, 2007109 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) definition of warfare depends on who the 
participants are, the methods employed, and the targeted political audience. The DoD 
defines two forms of warfare, traditional and irregular. Traditional warfare is a “form of 
warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the 
objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making 
capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government 
or policies.”110 Joint doctrine defines irregular warfare as a “violent struggle among state 
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”111 
Figure 2 synthesizes doctrinal terminology related to warfare and serves as a roadmap for 
this section. 
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Figure 2. Framework of Warfare112 
Currently, U.S. military doctrine categorizes the internationally recognized groups 
that wage war as either state or non-state actors. In traditional warfare, the participants are 
state actors and warfare occurs between ‘regulated militaries.’ In irregular warfare, 
however, the participants are more nebulous and broadly defined to include both state and 
non-state actors. The inclusion of non-state actors opens the spectrum of participants to 
                                                 
112 Adapted from Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine Library,” accessed October 22, 
2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/DoD-Terminology/; Joint Chiefs of Staff,  Stability; Department of the 
Navy, Warfighting.; Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare. 
38 
forces outside of regulated militaries and can include conventional, special operations, and 
paramilitary or irregular forces.113 
The modes and methods of waging war also differentiates traditional and irregular 
warfare. In traditional warfare, conventional forces primarily conduct major combat 
operations, campaigns, and battles to “defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an 
adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory.”114 In contrast, the methods 
characteristic of irregular warfare are nebulous and violent, aiming to influence targeted 
populations.115 Joint doctrine further specifically describes irregular warfare as “a 
deviation from the traditional form of warfare where actors may use non-traditional 
methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and 
insurgency for control of relevant populations.”116 As opposed to more clearly defined 
traditional warfare methods, irregular warfare subsumes an eclectic and unregulated mix 
of nontraditional and traditional tactics and activities. 
As with the participants and the methods, the targeted political audience is 
significantly more nebulous in irregular warfare than in traditional warfare. In traditional 
warfare, the targeted audience is a clearly defined state government and its regulated 
military. In irregular warfare, the target audience(s) are relevant populations whose role 
completely depends the war’s unique set of circumstances and may include a diverse array 
of participating state governments and non-state terrorist, insurgent, religious, ethnic, or 
other relevant political groups. The current joint doctrinal stability publication, JP 3–07, 
provides six categories of irregular warfare participants: enemies, adversaries, belligerents, 
opportunists, neutrals, and friendlies.117 Joint doctrine explains that these categories are 
often difficult to distinguish and evolve over time. Whereas traditional warfare contains 
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clearly defined political audiences at the level of state governments, the relevant 
populations in irregular warfare can be challenging to identify and categorize. 
Regardless of the classification of warfare, state and non-state actors in traditional 
and irregular warfare both employ violence and political competition to wage war. 
Therefore, as Colin Gray explains, the nature of war remains the same, but the character 
can radically differ based on the participants, modes and methods of warfare, as well as the 
targeted political audience.118 Political competition outside of war includes the use of 
information—through diplomacy and psychological manipulation—and economics—
through trade, sanctions, and assistance—and potentially deterrence, the threat of violence 
to achieve objectives. Inside war, all the same tools of political competition exist, but war 
also includes the use of organized violence to achieve either limited or total political goals. 
Finally, the character of war has also changed due to technological innovations. 
Warfare can occur across all domains of time and space (e.g., physical and cognitive) at 
the doctrinal tactical, operational, and strategic levels.119 Technological advancements in 
transportation, communications, and weaponry have caused the operational environment 
to expand the number of available domains, expanded war’s physical and cognitive effects 
over time, and compressed leaders’ time for decisions. The same factors have also 
increasingly pushed the traditional strategic level of warfare down toward the tactical level 
of warfare due to the proliferation of information and economic tools of competition 
formerly reserved for state governments.120 
a. The Operational Environment: Determining the Kind of Threat 
As Clausewitz explains, it is imperative for policy makers and senior military 
leaders to determine the “kind of war on which they are embarking.”121 Clausewitz further 
explains that correct determination requires recognizing war as an “instrument of policy” 
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and understanding the motivations and root causes of the war.122 The way the U.S. military 
determines the kind of war and against whom, how, and where the violent and political 
competition will occur is through understanding the operational environment. Joint 
doctrine defines the operational environment as the “composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the 
decisions of the commander.”123 The operational environment contains all considerations 
globally, regionally, and locally of threat, neutral, and friendly forces that will impact a 
war and the accomplishment of U.S. political and military objectives across all physical 
and cognitive domains (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The Operational Environment124 
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Joint Publication 3–25, Countering Threat Networks, explains that “there are three 
general types of networks found within an operational area: friendly, neutral, and hostile/
threat networks.”125 Doctrine further expounds that these networks evolve and that “for a 
threat network to survive political, economic, social, and military pressures, it must adapt 
to those pressures.”126 These networks become complex, dynamic, and ambiguous across 
enemy, adversary, belligerent, opportunist, neutral, and friendly participants, especially in 
irregular warfare, which includes state actors and ill-defined non-state organizations and 
groups.  
The way to assess the traditional or irregular character of a threat is to understand 
the operational environment in relation to U.S. interests. Traditional threats are limited to 
interstate competitions between state militaries.127 History exposes that this form of 
warfare, strictly defined, is seldom found in war. Even a war such as World War II, 
predominantly characterized by traditional warfare between the great powers, included 
numerous irregular warfare efforts across Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the China 
and Southeast Asia theater of operations.128 Conversely, an irregular warfare conflict, such 
as the American war in Vietnam, can include significant elements of traditional warfare. 
The Viet Cong’s (VC) main force units and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in Vietnam 
would often fight in traditional or irregular ways depending on the year and phase of the 
war. This mix-and-match of warfare methods and the types of actors involved is often 
defined as hybrid warfare.129 Given the trend toward irregular warfare, most threats in the 
modern era can best be characterized as irregular threats that utilize hybrid characteristics 
of both traditional and irregular warfare.  
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Joint doctrine also provides an analytical framework to understand the internal 
considerations that comprise each participant in an operational environment. The political, 
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) characteristics of the 
operational environment form this framework, which sheds light on the relevant threat and 
threat eco-system, including neutral and friendly participants, that allows the threat to exist 
and develop. Analysis of the operational environment and relevant networks must 
encompass all participants at all levels of warfare and across all domains. 
 
Figure 4. PMESII130 
Based on the inherent complexity and uncertainty within war, a PMESII analysis 
should constantly reassess and evolve, since the operational environment is not static and 
participants will adapt based on the conflictual pressures on their perceived interests and 
ultimate individual, group, or national physical and ideological survival. Since war 
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typically contains both traditional and irregular elements of warfare, warfare is better 
thought of as a spectrum of conflict rather than in binary categories. Figure 4 depicts 
PMESII’s relationship to the operational environment as the sub-elements that compose a 
threat network. Joint Doctrine depicts this spectrum across the range of military options 
between peace and war, seen in Figure 5.131  
 
Figure 5. Operations across the Spectrum of Conflict132 
b. The Character of Irregular Warfare: Politics at all Levels of Warfare 
Synthesizing joint doctrine and historical analysis of strategy and irregular warfare, 
the U.S. military primarily distinguishes the irregular operational environment from the 
traditional operational environment by four interactive variables.133 These variables 
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include: 1) complex and dynamic political competition between participants and networks; 
2) employment of irregular methods; 3) the level of direct threat to national, or group, vital 
interests; and 4) uncertain information. The consolidated interaction between these four 
variables requires an externally attuned understanding of the irregular operational 
environment that only relational maneuver can provide. The four primary variables of the 
irregular operational environment produce important implications for the U.S. military in 
irregular warfare. 
(1) Complex and Dynamic Political Competition  
The potentially immense number of political groups and networks in irregular 
warfare creates complex and dynamic political competition between participants in 
fragmented irregular warfare conflicts, such as Vietnam between 1954–1975, El Salvador 
1979-1992, and Afghanistan between 2001–2018, relevant political actors and networks 
spanned individual villages, tribes, subtribes, clans, ethnicities, religions, political 
affiliations, and state governments. The sheer number of political actors and their dynamic 
interaction create complexity and challenges that impede understanding and identifying 
proper objectives and solutions. 
(2) Irregular Methods  
Joint doctrine explains that irregular warfare includes “non-traditional methods 
such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and 
insurgency for control of relevant populations.”134 This irregularity in methods is related 
to disparities in material strength between the irregular forces, such as terrorist or insurgent 
groups, and state governments, which normally possess regulated militaries and police 
forces.135 Terrorists and insurgents often employ irregular tactics because they do not have 
the human and material strength to operate in a traditional manner; or, in the case of a proxy 
warfare effort such as the U.S. unconventional warfare support to the Mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, a nation state may use irregular methods to weaken an adversarial 
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state without provoking a direct traditional warfare confrontation.136 In either case, for a 
state or non-state actor with limited or unlimited objectives, the disparities in material 
strength and reduced risk of traditional warfare incentivize the use of irregular methods. 
Although participants in irregular warfare employ irregular and hybrid modes, 
participants also employ traditional or conventional warfare. Mao Tse-tung explains in On 
Protracted War that his ultimate political objective in China was to mobilize political and 
military support so that, in his third phase (the “strategic counteroffensive”), Chinese forces 
would employ traditional “mobile” and “positional” warfare to defeat the Japanese.137 
Moreover, military historians Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor reveal in Hybrid 
Warfare the prevalence of mixing traditional and irregular forms of warfare throughout 
history.138  
The history of irregular warfare also reveals, however, what happens when irregular 
forces improperly employ traditional forms of warfare against a materially stronger 
government force. Robert Taber’s history of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, War of the 
Flea, describes how communist insurgents in Greece in the late 1940s fatally decided to 
employ traditional forms of warfare by holding and seizing terrain rather than employing 
previously successful forms of guerrilla warfare.139 Exposed to the materially stronger 
government forces, the communist insurgency was quickly crushed by the government 
through traditional attritional firepower and maneuver. Similarly, in 1968 the communist 
Viet Cong (VC) insurgency in South Vietnam massed forces during the Tet offensive to 
seize and hold key terrain across South Vietnam. As in Greece, the South Vietnamese and 
U.S. military crushed the VC uprising and virtually destroyed the active guerrilla forces 
across South Vietnam.140 Unlike Greece, however, the military defeat of the VC also 
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achieved a decisive political victory in the communist effort to force the U.S. to end their 
support for South Vietnam.141 
Political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft argues that strategic interactions between 
strong and weak actors determine the outcome of wars.142 He contends that asymmetric 
strategic approaches favor the weaker actor while symmetrical approaches favor the 
stronger actor. This asymmetry, he suggests, contributed to the United States’ defeat in 
Vietnam, where the “the U.S. military could never reconcile itself to the demands of a 
COIN war” to combat the communist’s irregular asymmetric strategy in South Vietnam.143 
Together, the importance of irregular and asymmetric methods differentiate irregular 
warfare from traditional warfare. 
(3) Level of Threat to U.S. Vital Interests 
Because of asymmetries in power in the current global environment, irregular 
warfare operational environments tend to threaten U.S. vital interests more indirectly than 
traditional warfare.144 In his article, “The Role of the United States in Small Wars,” 
political scientist Carnes Lord argues that the United States faces three types of threats to 
its national security interests: “direct threats to the United States itself and to its citizens 
and assets abroad; threats to the security and well-being of its allies and friends; and threats 
to world order.”145 He asserts that small, irregular, wars are mostly confined to the most 
indirect level of threat, those against the world order. Even for terrorist threats such as al 
Qaeda, who do directly threaten U.S. citizens and assets, the threat is not existential in 
comparison to a nuclear state actor, such as China or Russia. 
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In line with Lord’s analysis of the relationship between irregular warfare and U.S. 
vital interests, author Andrew Mack argues that asymmetry in interests and willpower was 
the determining factor in the U.S. loss in Vietnam.146 Whereas the communist forces in 
South Vietnam faced a war of survival directly against North Vietnam’s vital interests and 
total political objectives, the U.S. faced an indirect threat to the global order and against a 
questionable ally in South Vietnam as part of the Containment Strategy limiting the 
expansion of Communism from China and the Soviet Union.147 This asymmetry in 
interests and willpower made the U.S. effort in Vietnam vulnerable due to the great 
expenditure of human and material resources incommensurate to the level of the threat to 
U.S. interests. Therefore, as Lord and Mack explain, irregular threats to U.S. interests are 
generally more indirect and uncertain than traditional warfare threats. The interrelation 
between the level of threat to U.S. interests, its associated impact on national willpower, 
and connected uncertainty imply that the United States, and its military, should pursue 
objectives while not overspending beyond the level of national interests and commensurate 
willpower.  
(4) Uncertain Operational Environments 
Political complexity and instability, irregular methods, and indirectness of the 
threat to U.S. interests create highly uncertain irregular operational environments. Because 
of the number of political actors and their dynamic interaction between state and non-state 
groups, the political objectives and factors influencing the political decision making are 
uncertain. Within Afghanistan’s operational environment between 2002 and 2018, the 
threat network has included a wide range of interconnected groups. These groups have 
included hardline al Qaeda enemies, a range of Taliban-led and affiliated adversaries, 
proxies from Pakistan and Iran who have acted as opportunists, belligerents, or outright 
adversaries, local warlord and criminal opportunists, and the local neutral population that 
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have acted in opportunist, belligerent, neutral, or friendly ways to ensure their own 
survival. 
Together these factors produce uncertainty regarding the status of individual and 
group participation and political objectives. This uncertainty inhibits the U.S. military from 
holding relevant groups politically accountable and opens opportunities for third-party 
proxy warfare and exploitation. While the status and objectives for clearly defined enemies 
and friendly forces, such as al Qaeda and NATO coalition partners in Afghanistan, are 
clear, the status and objectives for the majority of the participants in Afghanistan are 
uncertain and blend together. This uncertainty in identifying political groups and their 
intentions makes it difficult to use political and violent force to bend those groups to U.S. 
policy objectives. How can the U.S. directly, or indirectly through local partner forces, 
influence or coerce indigenous groups if the U.S. cannot properly identify or understand 
them? Uncertainty, in turn, allows outside state and non-state groups to exploit the 
operational environment according to their own political objectives. This use of proxy 
warfare to exploit national interests is illustrated by the U.S. covert effort to assist the 
Mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan war during the 1980s, the Soviet and Chinese assistance 
to North Vietnam between the 1960s and 1970s, and current Iranian efforts within Iraq and 
Syria. 
In addition to the uncertainty obscuring identification of the relevant political 
actors, the internal factors influencing political decisions among the participants are also 
uncertain. Joint Doctrine’s PMESII framework can assist in determining the primary 
factors influencing political decision-making in irregular warfare. Each relevant state and 
non-state political group has its own internal set of factors that influence its political 
decision-making, including political, military (control of violence), economic, social, 
information, and infrastructure components.  
c. Implications of the Irregular Operational Environment 
The uncertain character of the irregular warfare environment produces several 
important implications. First, and most importantly, as the body of doctrine, academic 
research, and experience in irregular warfare illustrate, political and violent competition 
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occurs at every level of warfare.148 The uncertainty regarding the relevant participants 
prevents easy identification of who is part of the threat network and how violence, 
information, and economics can be used to achieve success. Even more fundamental, in 
irregular warfare it is unclear which groups can and will align with U.S. objectives and 
which participants will undermine or compete against U.S. objectives. U.S. Joint Doctrine, 
illustrated in Figure 6, effectively depicts how irregular threat networks include violent and 
political competition across all levels of warfare.149 
 
Figure 6. Political and Violent Competition at All Levels of 
Irregular Warfare150 
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Unlike traditional warfare, where political competition is confined to the strategic 
interaction between state governments, irregular warfare requires political, non-violent 
interaction with local tribal, ethnic, religious, military, criminal and other political leaders 
to determine how to meet political objectives and employ violence to reach those 
objectives. In irregular operational environments in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last two 
decades, political and military competition has blended together to the point where it 
becomes indistinguishable. Commonly, local political leaders across Afghanistan, 
ostensibly part of, or aligned to, the Afghan Government, have employed violence directly 
against the government or U.S. forces as a negotiation tactic to better support that group’s 
or leader’s political-economic interests within a region.151 This blend of political and 
violent competition is not unique and has reoccurred in irregular warfare throughout 
history.152 By the nature of an irregular threat’s complex local, regional, global social-
political context, military violence will often not decisively achieve the ultimate political 
objective. Instead, as depicted in Figure 7, irregular warfare requires meshing violent and 
political competition at all levels of warfare.153 
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Figure 7. Political Competition across All Levels of Warfare in 
Irregular Warfare 
The second implication, in addition to political competition at all levels of warfare, 
of the uncertainty of irregular operational environments is that it increases the political 
restraints on the use of U.S. military violence. This restraint does not apply to all nations 
in irregular warfare, or even the United States in the Indian Wars of the 19th Century, in 
which indiscriminate violence was often prevalent.154 In the modern era, however, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, significant constraints contained in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
are intended to prevent unnecessary harm to non-combatants. In irregular warfare, where 
control and influence of relevant populations determine success, reducing unintended 
indigenous casualties is vital, whereas indiscriminate violence is considered immoral, 
violates the internationally recognized law of war, and undermines the legitimacy of the 
U.S. political-military effort.155 The history of U.S. wars since World War II supports the 
assertion that political constraints restricting violence tend to be higher in irregular warfare 
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than in traditional warfare. At one extreme, during World War II, the U.S. faced clear 
enemies that directly threatened U.S. vital interests, and the U.S. military employed 
firebombing and nuclear weapons that produced indiscriminate harm against non-
combatants. On the other end of the spectrum, during the U.S. assistance to El Salvador 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. government restricted its military efforts to non-
combat advising and financial and political assistance. In between these two extremes, 
illustrated in Figure 8, lies a spectrum of restrictions on the employment of violence closely 
related to the characteristics of traditional versus irregular warfare. 
 
Figure 8. Political Restraint on the Use of Violence in U.S. Wars 
Third, irregular warfare operational environments are conducive to proxy warfare 
and exploitation by both state and non-state actors. The uncertainty in these environments 
often allow outside states and groups to provide assistance or engage in overt and covert 
methods to influence the conflict according to their own interests and to the detriment of 
their adversaries. Political scientist Andrew Mumford explains that proxy warfare allows 
a state or group to pursue its interests while reducing the risks of direct escalation with an 
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adversary as well as the risk of expending more human and material resources than national 
interests warrant.156 Modern irregular warfare environments in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Syria readily expose these tendencies and opportunities to exploit uncertain operational 
environments.  
Fourth, and lastly, uncertainty in irregular warfare elevates the importance of 
understanding the threat eco-system more than in traditional warfare. C.E. Callwell’s 
classic study Small Wars and the USMC 1940 Small Wars Manual both explain that small, 
irregular, wars occur in inherently unique, complex, and uncertain operational 
environments.157 They further explain that the “fundamental causes of the condition of 
unrest may be economic, political, or social” and require close study and “knowledge of 
the theater of war” to identify the political solution as well as the political and military path 
to reach that solution.158 The requirement to study and understand the context of the 
threat’s eco-system, which allows or exacerbates the threat to U.S. interests, is greater than 
in traditional warfare, where the contextual understanding focuses on the state actor and its 
regulated military forces. 
3. Styles of Warfare: Attrition and Relational Maneuver 
Those that seek to practice relational maneuver must subordinate their own 
preferences to develop whatever capabilities they believe can best exploit 
enemy weaknesses. 
—Edward Luttwak, 2001159 
Edward Luttwak explains that, independent of who wages warfare, two opposing 
conceptual styles, or philosophies, of warfare exist: attrition and relational maneuver.160 
Fundamentally, attrition warfare is an inward-looking style of warfare that seeks to enhance 
organizational capabilities independent of knowledge of the threat or its operational 
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environment. Conversely, relational maneuver is fundamentally an externally focused 
philosophy of warfare that depends on understanding the operational environment to 
identify threat vulnerabilities and to enable systematic exploitation and success. In reality, 
both styles of warfare are theoretical and do not exist in their pure abstract form.161 
Luttwak clarifies that attrition warfare best suits a materially superior force confronting a 
weaker force on the traditional battlefield, while relational maneuver best suits the 
requirements of irregular warfare or a materially weaker force.162 
a. Attrition Warfare and the Traditional American Way of War 
Modern strategists Edward Luttwak and Colin Gray argue that the United States 
military employs a predominantly attrition style of warfare.163 Edward Luttwak explains 
that “attrition warfare is industrial warfare [in which the] enemy is an array of targets [and] 
victory is achieved through superior destructive firepower and material strength.”164 In 
attrition warfare, “process replaces the art of war.”165 The operational environment matters 
little except to identify where the enemy is so that mass and firepower can destroy the 
target. Since the enemy is reduced to targets, its capabilities can be understood based on 
technical ranges and lethality of its weapon systems. 
Trench warfare during World War I and General Dwight Eisenhower’s “broad 
front” approach during World War II provide excellent examples of the application of 
attritional warfare.166 In these examples, Luttwak argues that great powers in World War 
I and the United States in World War II on the western front primarily chose to employ a 
strategy and operational approach that sought to overwhelm the enemy strength with mass 
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and firepower directly rather than identify and exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
within the threat system.  
Colin Gray’s more recent assessment of the predominant American way of war also 
suggests that the United States employs an attrition style of warfare more readily suited 
toward traditional warfare.167 Attrition warfare fits relatively well with the traditional 
concept of warfare where the outcome of the war is primarily decided by the military on 
the battlefield. Some battlefield maneuver may occur, but this maneuver is relegated to 
traditional employment of military violence. The political competition in traditional 
warfare occurs primarily at the strategic level, where senior military leadership, such as the 
Secretary of Defense and Joints Chiefs, advise and plan with the National Security Council 
and President.  
Colin Gray argues that the U.S. military primarily views military force as apolitical 
and argues that the U.S. military “has shown a persisting strategy deficit.”168 The 
American military’s prevailing apolitical mindset determines that war occurs once political 
diplomacy has failed.169 Once war occurs, this view claims that politics should take a 
“backseat” and allow the military to set the conditions for negotiations to occur from a 
better position of advantage.170 This perspective may align with traditional warfare, in 
which political competition occurs primarily at the strategic level of warfare, but it defies 
the political character of irregular threats and warfare.171  
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Figure 9. Colin Gray’s Characteristics of the American Way of War172 
Strategy occurs by linking political-diplomatic, economic, information, and 
military power projection methods to meet national interests and political objectives.173 
The predominant U.S. military conception of strategy seeks to narrowly apply military 
force, while avoiding the political and economic challenges, or integrating the effects of 
military force to achieve political objectives.174 While applicable to traditional interstate 
military threats, bifurcating the military and other means of power projection in irregular 
warfare is doomed to fail in irregular operational environments. In irregular warfare, the 
political character of the operational environment includes the contextual social, economic, 
and military distributions of power, and relegates the military component as merely one of 
several supporting efforts.175 
Colin Gray’s descriptive list of America’s way of war, displayed in Figure 9, aligns 
with Luttwak’s definition of attrition warfare.176 In addition to Gray’s descriptions, 
Luttwak also adds that the U.S. attritional way of war prioritizes attention on internal 
administration and bureaucracy.177 This rigid bureaucratic way of war further inhibits 
external study and learning requisite to adaptation in irregular warfare. While all of Gray’s 
points apply to the difficulties in confronting irregular threats, at the heart of this attritional 
American way of war articulated by both Gray and Luttwak lies an internally focused 
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military largely devoid of strategic perspective outside of military considerations and 
limited in its ability to adapt to highly uncertain irregular operational environments.178 
As the next chapters’ series of case studies reveal, the U.S. military’s overall 
propensity toward an inwardly-oriented style of attrition warfare is not effective in waging 
irregular warfare in politically complex and uncertain operational environments. Edward 
Luttwak explains that effectively confronting complexity, instability, and uncertainty in 
irregular warfare demands an externally oriented style of warfare that can understand and 
adapt to the operational environment.179 
4. Relational Maneuver: An Analytical Framework 
The guerilla thus is a relational maneuver response to superior strength.  
— Edward Luttwak, 2001180 
The core of relational maneuver is adaption. “Manoeuvre [sic] describes ‘relational’ 
action—that is, action guided by a close study of the enemy and of his way of doing 
things—where the purpose is to muster some localized or specialized strength against the 
identified points of weakness of an enemy that may have superiority overall.”181 
Comparing this style of warfare to the complexity and uncertainty of irregular warfare, it 
is easy to understand why, short of extermination of entire populations, attrition warfare 
will not resolve politically complex and uncertain environments that require nuanced 
understanding to recognize and exploit threat vulnerabilities through politics and the use 
of violence. Luttwak further explains that “in relational maneuver, as in attrition, the goal 
is to incapacitate enemy weapons, structures or forces—or indeed the whole enemy entity, 
but in a radically different way: instead of cumulative destruction, the desired process is 
systemic disruption—where the ‘system,’ may be the whole array of armed forces, some 
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fraction thereof or indeed technical systems.”182 Essentially, relational maneuver does not 
seek to overwhelm the enemy through mass; rather, it overwhelms the enemy through 
identifying, adapting, and exploiting threat vulnerabilities.183 
While a materially stronger adversary can choose between attrition or relational 
maneuver styles of warfare, human and material asymmetries in irregular warfare naturally 
force the weaker actor to employ relational maneuver. Luttwak even goes so far as to say 
that “the guerilla thus is a relational maneuver response to superior strength.”184 If the 
weaker adversary chooses to place strength directly against strength in an attritional 
contest, disaster will likely result, as evidenced by Greece in the 1940s, the VC during the 
Tet Offensive in 1968, or, more recently, Saddam Hussein conventionally confronting the 
U.S. and coalition militaries during both Operation Desert Storm and during the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. 
Although others have described similar concepts, Luttwak provides the best 
explanation of the principles of relational maneuver as well as their application to irregular 
warfare. The most original maneuver theorist was likely Sun Tzu, who famously stated that 
success depends on knowing your enemy as well as yourself.185 Sun Tzu further advocated 
for a way of war that exploited weakness both militarily and politically to succeed.186 More 
recently, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) published Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication 1 (MCDP 1) Warfighting, which builds on the theories of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, 
and Luttwak to operationalize the concepts of maneuver. While USMC maneuver warfare 
is rooted in its conceptual nature, in practice the Marine Corps mostly focuses maneuver 
against traditional military threats.187 Most recently, the United States Army Special 
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Operations Command (USASOC) also published their own concept, “Cognitive 
Maneuver,” that emphasizes the human and conceptual nature of maneuvering to defeat an 
enemy.188 While each of these concepts outline critical components of maneuver, 
Luttwak’s relational maneuver most comprehensively encapsulates the way of thinking 
necessary for overcoming irregular threats both physically and conceptually. 
As opposed to other descriptions of maneuver, relational maneuver requires four 
primary components that represent the most holistic conceptual understanding of adaptive 
maneuver in irregular warfare: 1) developing an externally focused deep understanding of 
the operational environment; 2) developing and implementing a political-military strategy 
based on a deep understanding of the operational environment; 3) properly adapting 
internal organizational design to confront that environment; and 4) implementing adaptive 
operational approaches to exploit threat vulnerabilities. Listed in numerical order, this 
process should be considered cyclical and interactive rather than linear, though the two 
most important elements are understanding and adaptability. All other components are 
biproducts thereof to exploit external opportunities and protect internal friendly force 
vulnerabilities. 
The contextually unique complexity, instability, and uncertainty of irregular 
warfare operational environments requires equally unique and dynamic style of warfare. 
Short of unacceptable, illegal and immoral, genocidal attritional approaches, strategic 
success in irregular warfare depends on the employment of relational maneuver. As Figure 
10 depicts, in irregular warfare, strategic success lies in achieving the proper balance in 
styles of warfare and forms of competition. The U.S. military’s zone of effectiveness in 
irregular warfare lies in employing both political and violent competition and 
predominantly through relational maneuver. Ultimately, U.S. strategy and approaches must 
push competition into the zone of non-violent competition to achieve lasting success. The 
following sections develop the analytical framework to examine and assess the U.S. 
military’s employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare.  
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Figure 10. Zone of Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare 
a. Deep Understanding of the Operational Environment 
The difficulties which arise from this ignorance of the conditions under 
which the regular army will be operating really divide themselves into two 
main headings; difficulties arising from want of knowledge of the theater of 
war, and difficulties consequent upon the doubt that exists as to the strength, 
the organization, and the fighting qualities of the enemy. Of these the former 
may be said upon the whole to be the most important as a rule. For it is 
perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of small wars as compared 
with regular hostilities conducted between modern armies, that they are in 
the main campaigns against nature. 
—C. E. Callwell, 1896189 
Relational maneuver depends on an intimate knowledge of the operational 
environment, including both the threat, neutral, and friendly networks at all levels of war. 
Every threat, irregular or otherwise, is unique; however, irregular threats compound the 
number of variables that must be considered to effectively confront and overcome the 
threat. In irregular warfare, the complexity extends far beyond military means and centers 
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on the political domain, which includes religious, economic, and political variables down 
to the tactical level of war.190 Employment of relational maneuver requires a 
comprehensive PMESII analysis to understand the threat and develop the strategy, 
organizational design, and approaches to inform, influence, and meet U.S. political 
objectives. 
Understanding the operational environment in irregular warfare follows an 
evolutionary process that takes dedicated time, attention, and adaptation. In U.S. military 
terms, the understanding necessary to overcome an irregular threat does not occur in a 
single seven-month deployment; as the forthcoming case studies reveal, this deep 
understanding often requires years and multiple deployments to the same operational area. 
As understanding evolves and deepens, a military force must also continually adapt its 
strategy and operational approaches.191 In irregular warfare, this adaptation must be built 
into the fabric of the strategic and operational approach. While a military force develops 
an understanding of the threat, that threat also evolves and adapts. The military force must 
then adapt its understanding of the evolved environment, the developed strategy, the 
organizational design and structure of the forces, and the operational approaches while 
confronting the adversary. Unlike traditional warfare, which requires that military forces 
outmaneuver the enemy conceptually and physically on the battlefield, relational maneuver 
requires a deep understanding of the operational environment to politically and militarily 
outmaneuver the threat across the entire operational environment.192 
The context of this conceptual understanding includes the international and local 
social-political environment across all levels of war; it is an evolutionary process that 
requires time, attention, and adaptation. Legitimate conceptual understanding has occurred 
when a military force can adequately distinguish between traditional and irregular threats 
and the forms of warfare best suited to confront those threats. Figure 11 depicts the 
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framework that will be used to determine the level of deep and effective understanding of 
an irregular threat in the case studies. An effective deep understanding of the threat enables 
the development and implementation of a coherent political-military strategy. 
 
Figure 11. Analytical Framework to Determine Deep Understanding of Irregular 
Operational Environment193 
b. Political-Military Strategy 
This deficit [political centrality into military strategy] results in part from a 
tendency to focus on tactical issues, troop levels, and timelines, rather than 
the strategic factors that will determine a successful outcome. The U.S. 
military has also been reluctant to grapple with the political aspect of war, 
in the belief that it is either not part of war or entirely up to the civilians to 
address. Yet an intervention is unlikely to produce lasting results without a 
strategy that addresses the political factors driving the conflict and provides 
for enduring postwar stability. Implementing that strategy is likely to 
involve a combination of military and political means by the United States 
and local partners acting in concert—such as elections, negotiations, and 
power-sharing.  
—RAND, 2014194 
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In irregular warfare, application of relational maneuver requires blending political-
military strategy at every level of warfare to overcome the threat within the greater 
operational environment. This political-military strategy uses a deep understanding of the 
operational environment enabled by PMESII and a nuanced understanding of the range of 
threat, neutral, and friendly networks. Next, a military force must package this 
understanding into an overarching strategy that balances resources and political-military 
approaches to meet the political goals. Since irregular warfare is inherently political, 
perhaps the greatest flaw in military strategy in irregular warfare is the absence of 
integrating effective political-military strategy down to the tactical level. All wars require 
a political-military strategy, but in irregular warfare, this political-military strategy must 
pervade down to the most tactical level of warfare. As with every facet of relational 
maneuver, this strategy must not remain static; as understanding evolves, so too must the 
strategy evolve. 
Strategy consists of the interaction of means (the resources at a force’s disposal) 
and ways to implement an actionable approach to meet the ends (the political-military 
objective).195 The construction of strategy occurs within a particular context, operational 
environment, and against a specific threat. Strategy enables balancing risk according to 
what national interests are at stake. At the operational level of war, the U.S. military refers 
to strategy as operational design.196 Operational design uses strategic thinking to connect 
national strategy to the tactical employment of forces. This study uses strategy as opposed 
to operational design since, especially in irregular warfare, it expresses the same principles. 
As previously discussed, the U.S. military has a “strategy deficit.”197 Colin Gray 
highlights this deficit in his analysis of the American way of war and its failures against 
irregular enemies.198 This study’s authors have observed and experienced the fragmented 
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and disjointed political-military strategies in both Afghanistan and Iraq.199 Part of this 
deficit of strategy includes a lack of “strategic dialogue” between the policy makers and 
military leaders at the national strategic level and with individuals and units at the tactical 
level of warfare.200 Strategy should evolve based on the understanding of the threat, which, 
due to irregular warfare’s uncertain character, requires comprehensive understanding of 
the political operational environment down to the most local district or village. This 
understanding should then inform the construction of strategy, influence the adaptation of 
strategy, and implement the adapted strategy. As the case study analyses will reveal in the 
succeeding chapters, the U.S. military conducts this strategic dialogue ineffectively. In 
Vietnam, the U.S. military did not implement a political-military strategy properly aligned 
to the operational environment until 1969, 14 years after it began providing military 
assistance and advisors to South Vietnam. In Iraq, a more effective political-military 
strategy did not occur until 2007, four years after the insurgency began, and in Afghanistan, 
it did not occur until between 2009 and 2010, eight years after the war began. 
The centrality of the political competition and necessity to ensure that violence and 
politics are fused together at every level of irregular warfare requires that the U.S. military 
inform, influence, and implement political-military strategy. Veteran and author Emile 
Simpson explains that in contemporary irregular warfare, political and military competition 
occurs at all levels of warfare.201 Unified political-military strategy elevates the 
importance of the operational level of war and the necessity to integrate the use of 
economic, informational, and violent competition over time and space.202 The political 
character of irregular operational environments forces the integration of politics and 
violence, normally associated with the strategic level of warfare, down to the tactical level 
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of warfare. For example, a squad, platoon, or SOF team assigned to stabilize a remote 
village in Afghanistan, becomes part of the operational level of war through the necessity 
to integrate both political and violent competition among indigenous partners, neutral 
villagers, and against threat networks to achieve intermediate political objectives that align 
with theater-strategic objectives. Figure 12 provides the framework to analyze the 
effectiveness of strategies employed through history. 
 
Figure 12. Analytical Framework to Determine Effectiveness of the Political-
Military Strategy203 
c. Organizational Design  
Manoeuvre [sic] warfare cannot be fought by standard, general-purpose 
forces shaped by traditional preferences and bureaucratic priorities. Instead, 
one must deploy forces especially tailored to cope with a specific enemy—
that is, forces which are configured to exploit his particular weaknesses, 
rather than to maximize all-round capabilities. One allows the enemy to 
dictate one’s force-structure and tactics; the ‘organizational initiative’ is 
conceded in order to seize the operational advantage.  
—Edward Luttwak, 1979204 
In irregular warfare, relational maneuver requires adaptation of organizational 
design to effectively confront and overcome irregular threats. Organizational design 
represents the third critical component of relational maneuver’s application to irregular 
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warfare, the U.S. military’s effective application of which requires more research, 
discussion, and debate. Organizational design subject matter expert Richard Daft defines 
organizational design theory as “a way of thinking about organizations and how people and 
resources are organized to collectively accomplish a specific purpose.”205 In his article, 
“Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Edward Luttwak argues that the “organizational 
arrangements” of general purpose forces are not adequate in irregular warfare.206 Luttwak 
notes that the excessive bureaucracies in general purpose forces create environments where 
leadership often becomes more focused on internal organizational processes and politics 
rather than on confronting the threats that the military must overcome.207 The high level 
of uncertainty inherent to irregular warfare requires continuous adaptation that conflicts 
with the rigid hierarchy, bureaucratic structures, and processes of conventional forces. 
Conventional, internally focused, attritional organizational design places a premium on 
organizational promotion cycles (especially among officers), logistical considerations, and 
technological capabilities to employ firepower and physical maneuver on the battlefield as 
efficiently as possible.208  
The political complexity and uncertainty of irregular warfare requires dedicated 
individuals and units to gain an understanding and ability to effectively influence the 
operational environment. Edward Luttwak argues that “low-intensity wars, on the other 
hand, usually require the persistent application of one-place, one-time expertise, embodied 
in specific individuals with unique attributes. Thus, the normal practices of rotation cannot 
apply.”209 This assertion starkly contrasts with the U.S. military’s practices of rotating 
individuals and units through billets and operational environments based on internal 
organizational considerations rather than strategically aligning to achieve operational 
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success. The U.S. military typically considers its internal parts interchangeable and rotates 
its personnel and units in a machine-like manner.210 
Edward Luttwak argues that in irregular warfare, the U.S. military must adapt its 
organizational design to fit the operational environment. While no single organizational 
design can adequately confront the full range of irregular threats that the U.S. military will 
confront, an effectively designed military force will employ four basic principles that 
balance the unity of effort required to implement the strategy and adaptability required to 
succeed. First, adaptability requires tailored organizations that simplify and streamline its 
bureaucracy to the minimal level necessary to accomplish the task. The larger and more 
complex the bureaucratic structure, the less flexible it will be. Second, an adaptable 
military organization must decentralize its authority to the maximum extent possible to 
enable flexibility and responsiveness at all levels. Third, to enable this decentralization, an 
organization must employ the appropriate professional political-military leadership and 
practitioners that possess intelligence, flexibility, maturity, competence, and experience. 
Professionalization enables decentralization and adaptability and mitigates the risk of 
authorizing tactical level commanders to wage both political and military competition. 
Finally, the unique character of irregular warfare requires embedding advisors into partner 
forces’ political-military structures. For the U.S. military, the partner political-military 
apparatus will determine ultimate success or failure in confronting irregular threats. 
Embedded advisors enable the U.S. to maintain the best possible understanding of complex 
evolving contexts, inform and influence adaption of the current political-military strategy, 
and enable the operational approaches necessary to achieve strategic objectives. Figure 13 
depicts the framework to determine the effectiveness of the U.S. force’s organizational 
design. 
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Figure 13. Analytical Framework to Determine Effectiveness of 
Organizational Design211 
d. Operational Irregular Warfare Approaches  
‘Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed 
forces, are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict.’ ‘We 
know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional 
support of a population’ ‘we are not up against just a few armed bands 
spread across a given territory, but rather against an armed clandestine 
organization whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. 
Victory will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that 
organization.’ 
—Roger Trinquier, 1961212 
A deep understanding of the operational environment, coherent political-military 
strategy, and tailored organizational design produce effective operational approaches. The 
term ‘operational approach’ is used in this study to convey the idea of implementation of 
strategy and doctrinally in the execution of “tasks and actions required to accomplish the 
mission.”213 This section explores the historically proven elements that typically exist 
within effective operational irregular warfare approaches and produces a framework to 
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assess historical approaches. An effective U.S. led irregular warfare approach requires 
balancing the use of violence and political competition within the operational environment 
against the threat network and social-political context. For the U.S. military in irregular 
warfare, advisors embedded into strategic political-military units and organizations should 
represent the decisive effort to achieve strategic outcomes.  
(1) Classic Research on Irregular Warfare 
Some of the most historically influential studies on irregular warfare include 
Colonel C.E. Callwell’s seminal work, Small Wars, the subsequent USMC Small Wars 
Manual, Mao Tse-tung’s writings, David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice, Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare, Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea, 
and Edward Lansdale’s writings.214 These authors and studies record irregular warfare 
experiences from the late 19th century, through World War II, including the period of anti-
colonialism and Marxist movements in Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and U.S. experiences 
particularly in Vietnam and El Salvador. More recently, subject matter expert practitioners 
and scholars, such as John Nagl, David Kilcullen, Kalev Sepp, Hy Rothstein, John Arquilla, 
current military joint doctrine, and various studies by the RAND Corporation have 
recirculated classic irregular warfare lessons and synthesized them with their more recent 
individual experiences and insights. Cumulatively, this genre provides a significant supply 
of knowledge and analysis to aid this study’s goal of producing relevant recommendations 
to enhance MARSOC’s effectiveness in implementing effective operational approaches in 
irregular warfare. 
Internal state resistance, or insurgency, represents the primary venue for irregular 
warfare.215 This insurgency may be transregional, as in the case of al Qaeda’s war against 
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the United States and the West, or it may be a local insurgency, as in the case of a local 
militia group in Afghanistan. Or, as in El Salvador and Vietnam, the insurgency may be 
tied to a larger proxy war between global or regional powers. Doctrinally, through 
unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense, U.S. military may provide support to 
the insurgent, as in 2001 to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, or it may provide support 
to a partner government as it did to Afghanistan, once the Taliban regime was overthrown. 
As earlier discussed, irregular threats often do not directly jeopardize U.S. vital 
national interests.216 Therefore, as RAND’s study on Limited Intervention indicates, 
“limited stabilization” through advisor-led light footprint approaches can provide an 
effective way to meet national interests while keeping human and material resource costs 
to an acceptable level.217 As Andrew Mack states in his article, “Why Big Nations Lose 
Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” the irregular adversary is typically 
fighting an existential war of survival and is prepared to suffer immense human and 
material cost. In contrast, the United States’ does not face existential fights for survival in 
conflicts in Vietnam, El Salvador, or Afghanistan.218 In the context of these wars with 
limited objectives, the U.S. military should keep its costs, both human and material, 
balanced in relation to the risk imposed towards national interests or run the risk of pay a 
price beyond the threat posed to U.S. interests. 
RAND defines limited stabilization intervention for irregular conflicts as “small-
scale military operations conducted by ground forces (typically supported by airpower) 
intended to terminate a conflict, either by helping the supported government win or by 
enforcing a negotiated settlement on terms that are at least acceptable (if not favorable) to 
the government.”219 Although RAND defines limited stabilization within the context 
foreign internal defense (FID) campaigns, the same logic applies to a UW effort. In 
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America’s current context, any UW effort to destabilize or overthrow a government would 
likely occur within the larger strategic context of achieving a future better and stable 
balance of power in in line with U.S. interests. Given the projected future prevalence of 
irregular conflict, the United States may choose to conduct massive counterinsurgency 
operations, similar to its efforts in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 and in Afghanistan between 
2002 and 2014; however, this research supports that “the enormous costs and uncertain 
returns of U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to a widespread 
aversion to conducting similarly costly interventions in the future.”220 
This study emphasizes the operational level of warfare but argues that, in irregular 
warfare, this level extends into the the doctrinally considered tactical domain. Edward 
Luttwak explains that “the decisive level of warfare in the relational-maneuver manner is 
the operational, that being the lowest level at which the different elements can be brought 
together in an integrated scheme of warfare.”221 Military doctrine emphasizes levels of 
warfare to distinguish breadth of command, authority, and responsibility.222 In irregular 
warfare, however, the operational level of war extend to the lowest units in the battlespace. 
Because of the highly political nature of irregular threats and warfare, the lowest tactical 
elements must synthesize political, military, economic, and social-cultural considerations 
to create an operational approach to overcome the local threat.223 By integrating this 
scheme at the most tactical level, it becomes part of the operational level of warfare. 
Essentially, this operational approach requires developing and implementing a strategy for 
each unique operational environment. For this study, the tactical level of warfare is limited 
to individual interactions and single kinetic engagements with the enemy.224 
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The U.S. military has historically supported both insurgents and counterinsurgents. 
While the United States, in the modern era, most often supports counterinsurgents, the U.S. 
military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have also supported insurgents across 
Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Support to a foreign government typically can take the 
form of U.S. doctrinal COIN, FID, U.S. led major combat operations (MCO), and security 
force assistance (SFA).225 Ultimately, FID and UW represent two sides of the same 
political irregular warfare challenge. Therefore, the relational maneuver analytical 
framework produced here applies to both U.S. military efforts to support or suppress an 
insurgency. Specific application, of course, will differ in implementation depending on the 
operational environment and desired political objectives. 
(2) A Framework to Assess Operational Irregular Warfare Approaches 
RAND’s study on Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies heavily 
influences this analysis on effective operational approaches in irregular warfare.226 
Effective operational irregular warfare approaches use five overarching principles to 
balance political and violent competition against the operational environment’s threat(s) 
and context. First, the U.S. military force must implement a political-military approach to 
ensure unity of vision and effort among the military and other relevant partners.227 Second, 
a military force must prioritize intelligence to pursue a deep understanding of the 
operational environment. Third, to enable the understanding of the context and effectively 
influence the partner forces actions, the military should employ embedded advisors within 
the partner forces’ political-military structure. Fourth, the force must balance the risk 
towards the mission to achieve U.S. national interests against the risk to the U.S. forces 
participating. Finally, the U.S. force should adapt to exploit adversarial weakness and 
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adjust to evolutions in the operational environment.228 Adaptation will enable the U.S. 
force to maintain the initiative both politically and militarily. 
Using the five overarching principles, an effective operational approach balances 
political competition and violence against the threat(s) and context across four quadrants 
(See Figure 14). The first quadrant attacks the threat to U.S. interests indirectly through 
controlling the relevant population(s) and geography. The purpose of this quadrant is to 
establish control over the population and geographic area of operations to gather 
information, gain support of the population, and deny the adversary information and 
support. Actions in this quadrant include geographically sub-dividing the area of operations 
and assigning forces to control each sector. Traditional examples of this have included the 
Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam and more recently the Village Stability 
Program (VSP) in Afghanistan, but also include more unconventional examples when U.S. 
Army Special forces infiltrated into Afghanistan to link up with the Northern Alliance in 
2001 and later in Northern Iraq to link up with Kurdish forces in 2003.229 For the 
counterinsurgent, this includes border control and checkpoints to deny material support to 
the adversary. For the insurgent, activities include organizing all phases of resistance, 
exerting control over territory, and to bolster legitimacy and support both locally and 
internationally.  
The second quadrant directly targets the threat through violence. This quadrant 
includes traditional military activities and operations such as guerrilla and counter-guerilla 
operations, advising and assisting major and hybrid combat operations. For the 
counterinsurgent, it is critical to defeat the insurgents in open pitched battle and force the 
guerilla to resort to guerrilla tactics.230 For the insurgent, as Mao describes in his three 
phases of protracted war, the guerilla must properly identify when and how to employ his 
military forces given the context and strength of the counterinsurgent forces and to blend 
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and balance all forms of warfare.231 Massing force improperly will result in catastrophic 
destruction, and conversely, not exploiting success will also undermine the insurgent’s 
potential chances for ultimate victory. 
Quadrant three directly targets the threat through political competition. Here both 
the insurgent and counterinsurgent seek to directly undermine the others’ cause and will to 
fight. This quadrant can include reintegration efforts, infiltration and insider threats, and 
deception operations. 
Finally, the fourth quadrant uses political competition to indirectly attack the 
threat(s) through influencing the threat’s eco-system. This quadrant includes efforts to 
establish legitimacy among the local population and international audience as well as 
undermine or magnify grievances. This effort will deny or deter military and political 
recruitment efforts both locally and globally.  
 
Figure 14. Operational Approach Schematic232 
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Success in irregular warfare ultimately depends on implementing adaptive and 
effective operational approaches that achieve political objectives. The operational 
approach implements the military’s conceptual understanding, or lack thereof of the threat. 
Conceptual understanding of the threat to U.S. interests, in turn, shapes strategy. Even if 
conceptual understanding, strategy, and organizational design are well formulated, poor 
implementation will still prevent success. Here, Clausewitz’s adage that “everything in war 
is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” rings true.233 Properly identifying the 
threat through gaining a deep understanding of the operational environment, developing an 
effective political-military strategy, appropriately tailoring the operational force to 
confront the threat does not matter if the force cannot effectively execute. The principles 
outlined here synthesize decades of study on irregular warfare. In 1906, C.E. Callwell 
captured many of these points in the context of Great Britain’s colonial era. Less than 40 
years later, the U.S. Marine Corps published its Small Wars Manual, and its lessons still 
apply today. Finally, RAND’s insightful study, Paths to Victory, produces a relevant 
framework that this study adapts to explore effectiveness in irregular warfare for MARSOC 
in the present. Figure 14 schematically depicts the balance of approaches and principles 
necessary to develop an effective operational irregular warfare approach. Figure 15 then 
presents the analytical framework to interrogate historic case studies.  
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Figure 15. Analytical Framework to Determine the Effectiveness of an 
Operational Approach234 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of 
fighting is often so peculiar, and the theaters of operations present such 
singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a 
method totally different from the stereotyped system. 
—C. E. Callwell, 1896235 
Sequential analysis of war, warfare, and the available styles of warfare reveals the 
necessity of employing relational maneuver to succeed within highly uncertain irregular 
operational environments. The requirement for relational maneuver in irregular warfare 
extends far past simple maneuver on the physical battlefield and into the domain of both 
political and violent competition at all levels of warfare. The politically complex character 
of irregular operational environments elevates the importance of political competition 
across all levels of warfare as opposed to traditional warfare. The elevated importance of 
political competition in irregular warfare occurs across a diverse array of participants that 
blends between the spectrum of threat, neutral, and friendly networks. 
The importance of relational maneuver in irregular warfare conflicts with 
assessments of the U.S. military’s predominant disposition toward attrition warfare. This 
potential misalignment between the United States’ prevailing style of warfare and the needs 
of the operational environment suggests a need to better balance the U.S. military, or at 
least specific military units, toward relational maneuver. Given the pervasive nature and 
trend toward irregular warfare in the modern era, relational maneuver should play a central 
role in confronting and overcoming the irregular threats the U.S. military faces. 
Relational maneuver requires an externally focused and adaptive style of warfare 
with four primary components that enables the agility to identify and exploit threat 
vulnerabilities. The first component requires a deep and comprehensive understanding of 
the operational environment to identify exploitable weaknesses within the threat network. 
The second component requires a coherent political-military strategy built on an 
understanding of the operational environment and the level of threat to U.S. interests. Since 
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strategy guides the use of political and military resources to achieve political objectives, 
the decision to employ attritional versus maneuver principles is inherently strategic. Colin 
Gray and Edward Luttwak’s analysis of the U.S. military’s broad strategy and approaches 
toward irregular warfare indicates a general lack of strategic thinking, particularly in 
synchronizing political and military efforts at all levels of warfare. A strategic deficiency 
has troubling implications for U.S. efforts in irregular warfare, where the essence of the 
threat within the operational environment is political, and the U.S. military way of war 
prefers a clear distinction between the use of violence and politics.  
Furthermore, the third component adapts internal organizational design to match 
the operational environment to most effectively understand and overcome irregular threats. 
Edward Luttwak argues that inflexibly structured general-purpose forces tend to falter 
against highly adaptable adversaries due to those forces’ propensities to favor an attritional 
style of warfare that focuses on internal organizational efficiency rather than effectiveness 
against the operational environment.236 Finally, the output of understanding the 
operational environment, coherent political-military strategy, and tailored organizational 
design is the operational approach that exploits weaknesses within the threat network. 
Relational maneuver approaches in irregular warfare use five overarching principles to 
balance violence and political competition both directly and indirectly against the 
adversary and revolve around the role of the advisor. 
The conceptual foundation of war, irregular warfare, and styles of warfare that this 
chapter presents enables examination and analysis of U.S. irregular warfare efforts. 
Relational maneuver provides the analytical framework, depicted in Figure 16, to enable 
this analysis. Furthermore, this relational maneuver framework allows internal 
examination of SOF, generally, and MARSOC specifically, to assess the historic and 
organizational challenges and opportunities that exist in employing relational maneuver in 
irregular warfare. Ultimately, this relational maneuver framework will inform the final 
recommendations to MARSOC to achieve greater adaptability and effectiveness in 
irregular warfare.  
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Figure 16. (cont.) Relational Maneuver Analytical Framework 
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INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others’ 
experience… ‘History is universal experience’ the experience not of 
another, but of many others under manifold conditions. 
—Liddell Hart, 1967237 
The future has no place to come from but the past, hence the past has 
predictive value. Another element is recognition that what matters for the 
future in the present is departures from the past, alterations, changes, which 
prospectively or actually divert familiar flows from accustomed channels, 
thus affecting the predictive value and much else besides. A third 
component is continuous comparison, an almost constant oscillation from 
present to future to past and back, heedful of prospective change, concerned 
to expedite, limit, guide, counter, or accept it as the fruits of such 
comparison suggest. 
—Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, 1986238 
Harvard professors and authors Richard Neustadt and Ernest May argue for the 
inescapable connection of the future and present to the past and the necessity for studying 
the past to understand the present and predict the future.239 In 17 years of combined service 
in the Navy and Marine Corps, this study’s authors have observed that studying the history 
of politics, war, and warfare deserves more attention in the development of the modern 
professional military. Although short and intermittent periods of professional military 
education (PME) may emphasize history to varying degrees (based on the level of PME, 
the individual’s branch of service, and resident versus distance-learning status), military 
members actually spend little time studying military history in general or as it relates to 
specific operational environments.240 The Marine Corps has proven to be an exception to 
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this standard in its treatment of history; however, it disproportionately focuses on internal 
organizational history to maintain its unique cultural identity.241 The next three chapters’ 
exploration of U.S. military irregular warfare efforts since 1954 across Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan provide a testament to the dangers of failing to adequately learn 
from the breadth of history of irregular warfare. Current irregular warfare efforts across 
Africa, Middle East, and Asia as well as the projected future prevalence of irregular warfare 
suggest that the U.S. military should closely study history and adapt to achieve future 
strategic success. 
Circumspect study of historical irregular warfare allows Marine Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC) to pursue Sun Tzu’s prerequisite for success—to know the enemy 
and oneself. Part Two, ‘Know Your Enemy,’ examines three of the most important U.S. 
military irregular warfare experiences since 1945: Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. 
Synthesized analysis across these cases provide insights into the character of irregular 
warfare, the U.S. military’s use of relational maneuver in these environments, and lessons 
to apply to MARSOC’s pursuit of organizational effectiveness and strategic utility to 
national defense. 
Relational maneuver provides the analytical lens to investigate historic U.S. 
military irregular warfare experiences that can inform MARSOC’s current and future 
decisions. Chapter II, “Relational Maneuver: An Irregular Warfare Analytic Framework,” 
created and outlined a relational maneuver analytical lens to conduct case study analysis. 
At its core, relational maneuver employs ones’ strength to adapt and exploit vulnerabilities 
and dismantle the threat system. In irregular warfare, identifying and exploiting 
vulnerabilities depends on holistically orienting on and understanding the operational 
environment and relevant threats. Due especially to irregular warfare’s intrinsic political 
character, relational maneuver also requires a coherent political-military strategy that fuses 
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both political and violent competition together at all levels of warfare. Application further 
demands an appropriate organizational design to confront the threat by tailoring 
organizational tasks, structures, and people to the needs of the environment. Lastly, 
relational maneuver requires operational irregular warfare approaches that exploit 
adversarial weakness and achieve desired political-military objectives.  
Analysis of the U.S. military’s efforts in Vietnam (1954–1975), El Salvador (1979–
1992), and Afghanistan (2001–2018) provides cases to employ the analytical framework 
to assess U.S. military effectiveness in irregular warfare. These cases also serve to validate 
both the analytical framework as well as Chapter II’s description of irregular warfare and 
irregular operational environments. Lastly, the U.S. military’s efforts and the environments 
assessed provide building blocks to continue internal analysis of SOF and MARSOC. 
Each case analyzed will include an initial overview of each conflict to include 
primary participants, general sequence of events, and ultimate outcomes. Following the 
introduction, each case will use this study’s relational maneuver analytical framework to 
assess the relative effectiveness of the U.S. military’s efforts to confront each case’s 
respective threats through relational maneuver. The chapter’s conclusion ties each case 
together through noting significant common trends in effectiveness that the U.S. military 
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III. CASE STUDY: VIETNAM, AN INEFFECTIVE EVOLUTION 
TOWARD RELATIONAL MANEUVER 
Three allies and much of our international authority were lost in the 
Vietnam War as well as much blood and treasure, and yet delusions of 
adequacy persist. Because of the characteristic ambiguities of that war, the 
Nation, although roundly defeated, has nevertheless been denied the 
customary benefit of military defeat. Little therefore was learned from the 
experience.  
—Edward Luttwak, 1983242 
The United States’ experience in the 1954–1975 Vietnam War scarred the U.S. 
military and remains controversial to this day. Unfortunately, “military leaders chose not 
to learn from experiences in Vietnam,” and instead fostered a mindset of “no more 
Vietnams” without studying what happened to learn from their mistakes and successes.243 
Another military tendency has been to blame the participating politicians, like then-
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, as well as the 
institutional military leadership, such as the Joint Chiefs, for the failures that occurred.244 
While political-military mismanagement contributed to the failures in Vietnam, decisions 
in DC do not universally explain the failures by both the leaders and subordinates fighting 
the war in Vietnam.  
Comprehensive analysis across a wide range of credible histories illustrates the U.S. 
military’s attritional tendencies against irregular threats in Vietnam.245 While the U.S. 
political and military effort in Vietnam failed to accomplish the desired strategic political 
objective, Historian Lewis Sorley’s description of the U.S. military in Vietnam reveals that, 
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over time, the U.S. military did adapt in Vietnam, albeit slowly, to implement some 
principles of relational maneuver.246 Nonetheless, the combination of the American 
military’s insufficient understanding of the threat and operational environment in Vietnam 
with its slow and ineffective establishment of a unified political-military strategy, 
organizational design, and advisor-centric operational approach resulted in an overall 
failure to implement relational maneuver in total.247 
Bernard Fall’s acclaimed history Street Without Joy describes the beginnings of the 
U.S. political and military failure to stabilize South Vietnam and prevent Communist 
expansion across Southeast Asia, which can be traced to the first Indochina War between 
France and the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh.248 Prior to the war between the French 
and the Viet Minh, the United States had supported Ho Chi Minh’s guerrillas during the 
Second World War in their fight against the Japanese.249 Following the end of World War 
II, however, the United States ignored Ho Chi Minh’s pleas to support Vietnam’s 
independence and instead allowed France to resume control in Indochina.250 
Some accounts begin analysis of the U.S. military’s experience in the Vietnam War 
between 1961 and 1962, when the U.S. military increased its level of aid and advisors to 
Vietnam.251 The actual roots of America’s involvement against Ho Chi Minh and the 
communists, however, date back to 1950 after China fell to Mao Tse-Tung and the 
communists in 1949, which initiated Chinese support to the Viet Minh as they fought the 
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French.252 Between 1950 and 1954, the United States steadily escalated its economic and 
material aid to the French during the First Indochina War to prevent the spread of 
monolithic communism.253 Chinese and Soviet support of North Korea during the Korean 
War had solidified this monolithic mentality and also influenced U.S. strategy and 
objectives to prevent China’s direct military intervention later in Vietnam.254 During the 
First Indochina war, France unsuccessfully waged its war on the Viet Minh insurgency 
which culminated in its defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954.255 The resulting 
settlement in Geneva forced France to withdraw from all of Indochina and partitioned 
Vietnam at the 17th parallel, leaving Ho Chi Minh and the communists in control of North 
Vietnam. In South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem and the Vietnamese French Catholics retained 
control.256 
Following the partition of Vietnam in 1954, approximately one million Vietnamese 
fled the North, while the Communists either embedded or infiltrated nearly one hundred 
thousand of its cadre into the South to support the future communist unification of 
Vietnam.257 Between 1954 and 1959, the regimes in North and South Vietnam 
consolidated their rule. In the North, the communists violently purged all would-be 
resisters and established the political and military infrastructure to continue what General 
Vo Giap described as People’s War in the south.258 By 1955, the United States had 
replaced the French as the benefactors of South Vietnam and was providing military and 
political advisors to bolster Diem’s government and military.259 The U.S. military began 
its advisory effort in 1954 when it established the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
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(MAAG) in Vietnam.260 This evolution of U.S. support to South Vietnam would 
eventually encompass five U.S. Presidents including Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. More 
significant military support began with President Kennedy, who in June 1956 claimed that 
South Vietnam represented the linchpin that held Southeast Asia together and that the 
United States bore direct responsibility for South Vietnam’s survival.261 While the United 
States increased aid to Saigon, Diem’s regime oppressively consolidated political 
control.262 During this time, low-level insurgency and general political unrest festered 
throughout South Vietnam. 
In 1959, having consolidated its control in the north, the Communist Vietnam 
Workers Party Central Committee officially decided to pursue war to unify Vietnam.263 
This decision also created the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the People’s 
Revolutionary Party (PRP) as Hanoi’s cover for an organic independent communist 
movement in the south.264 In 1959, Hanoi expanded its infiltration of communist cadre 
across South Vietnam to build the NLF’s political infrastructure, wage insurgency, and 
facilitate future major combat operations. Earlier, in 1956, the United States had relabeled 
the Viet Minh as the Viet Cong (VC) in an attempt to separate previous Vietnamese 
nationalist resistance against the French from the Communist resistance against Diem’s 
regime in Saigon.265 By 1960, although the U.S. military and South Vietnamese Army 
called the NLF guerillas VC, the communist insurgents, and the villagers throughout 
Vietnam still referred to the guerrillas as the Viet Minh or Giai Phong (liberation army).266 
Between 1959 and 1961, Hanoi rapidly expanded its strength in the south so that by 1961, 
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approximately 16,000 guerillas were waging active insurgency.267 In 1962, the level of 
instability in South Vietnam convinced President Kennedy to increase military aid and 
advisors to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and to replace the MAAG with the Military 
Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV).268 This elevated the military’s influence and 
control in South Vietnam and increased military-centric assistance to the GVN, raising the 
12,000 U.S. advisors in 1963 to more than 23,000 advisors by the end of 1964.269 
The political instability in South Vietnam, especially between 1960 and 1964, 
changed the course and character of the U.S. support in South Vietnam. While the NLF 
became increasingly strong and aggressive, Diem’s government in Saigon floundered.270 
The unrest caused by the NLF, the internal corruption and incompetence, and Diem’s 
repressive actions crushing internal resistance alienated many South Vietnamese as well 
U.S. political advisors to Diem.271 As a result, many in the State Department, including 
then Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., lost faith in Diem’s ability to unify 
the country and advocated for Diem’s replacement.272 President Kennedy ultimately 
allowed the CIA to support a coup initiated by several of Diem’s generals to move 
forward.273 In November 1963, Diem’s assassination plunged South Vietnam into nearly 
five years of political chaos and reoccurring coups.274 Simultaneously, the United States 
faced its own radical political changes when President Kennedy was assassinated less than 
a month later, thrusting Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson into power. Hanoi recognized 
the opportunities from this political turmoil and launched aggressive offensives to inspire 
popular revolution across South Vietnam.275 Communist insurgency mixed with political 
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turmoil in Saigon to threaten a complete governmental collapse in 1964; when the Gulf of 
Tonkin incidents occurred in early August 1964, President Johnson mobilized Congress to 
pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized the President “to take all necessary 
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
further aggression” in Southeast Asia.276 
President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara used the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution to rapidly escalate the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War.277 By 
March 1965, the U.S. military had surged conventional ground combat forces into South 
Vietnam and initiated a mounting bombing campaign, Operation ROLLING THUNDER, 
against North Vietnam.278 U.S. strategic leadership, President Johnson, and Robert 
McNamara intended these bombings to convince Hanoi to cease its support to the southern 
insurgency and stop infiltration of conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units into 
South Vietnam.279 However, as recorded in the Pentagon Papers, the “bombing effort 
seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi’s backbone.”280 Between 1965 and 1968, the 
MACV Commander, General William Westmoreland, led the U.S. military in a “search 
and destroy” campaign to targeting the main force VC and NVA units in South Vietnam 
while leaving the South Vietnamese to pacify the insurgency and secure the populace.281 
By 1968, the U.S. military had surged more than 500,000 troops to Vietnam, which would 
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later top out in 1969.282 Ultimately, between 1965 and 1968, the U.S. military, under 
General Westmoreland’s leadership, transformed the U.S. assistance to South Vietnam into 
an American-led war.283 
Although the U.S. administration and General Westmoreland reported progressive 
successes in Vietnam, combat footage on the evening news of the Viet Cong’s 1968 Tet 
offensive “caused a shock in the United States.”284 The Viet Cong achieved some initial 
victories during the Tet offensive in Saigon and by capturing Hue City for more than a 
month; however, militarily, Tet proved to be a disaster for the communists. In 1968, Hanoi 
lost more than 160,000 communist forces in South Vietnam, which degraded the NLF’s 
ability to wage insurgency in the South for the remainder of the war.285 The military defeat 
of the VC, ironically, resulted in a decisive political victory for Hanoi over the United 
States. The violence and destruction portrayed in the media did not match the promises of 
steady progress and imminent victory by General Westmoreland, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, and President Johnson.286 Instead, the violence of the Tet offensive bolstered 
the U.S. anti-war movement, caused President Johnson to cancel his bid for re-election, 
and forced the U.S. military to begin withdrawing its forces from Vietnam.287 
Richard Nixon’s election to the U.S. Presidency in 1968 and his promise of “peace 
with honor” reflected the impact of the Tet offensive on U.S. policy and set the U.S. 
military on the path of total withdrawal from Vietnam by 1973.288 Under President Nixon 
and General Westmoreland’s replacement, General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. political 
and military leadership changed its policy to ‘Vietnamization’ to force the GVN to re-
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shoulder responsibility for fighting the war and to enable the United States to steadily 
withdraw its troops.289 Operationally, between 1968 and 1972, MACV changed its 
emphasis on “search and destroy” to a “one war” approach that gave higher priority to 
pacifying rural Vietnam, protecting and controlling the populace, and improving and 
advising South Vietnam’s conventional and irregular military forces.290 This improved 
approach gave greater precedence to efforts started years before by the Marines through 
the Combined Action Program (CAP) to secure the local populace. When North Vietnam 
launched a conventional offensive against South Vietnam in the 1972 Easter Offensive, 
few U.S. combat troops remained in Vietnam;291 the only U.S. forces available to assist 
the South Vietnamese units under attack consisted of embedded advisors, airpower, and 
naval forces.292 The South Vietnamese did repel the NVA, though with distinctly mixed 
results, including the wholesale surrender or even abandonment of positions and equipment 
prior to being attacked.293 Although the South defeated the Easter Offensive, the 
communists retained significant swaths of territory in South Vietnam that they had 
occupied during the offensive. The Easter Offensive also induced the United States and 
Saigon to sign the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam” 
with representatives from Hanoi in Paris on January 27, 1973.294 This agreement, which 
the United States, led by former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, pressured Saigon to 
sign, allowed more than 160,000 communists troops to openly remain in South Vietnam, 
withdrew U.S. military and political support and sealed South Vietnam’s eventual fate.295 
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By the end of March 1973, the U.S. military had withdrawn all forces not assigned 
to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.296 As a final death knell, U.S. Congress enacted legislation 
eliminating all U.S. combat support to South Vietnam and, by 1975, had reduced economic 
aid in general.297 By March 1975, the communists launched a final conventional offensive 
that, in the absence of U.S. support, destroyed the weakened Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) and achieved Hanoi’s objective to unify Vietnam under communist 
rule.298 In total, the United States suffered more than 58,000 killed and over 300,000 
soldiers wounded, and expended upwards of $111 billion, equivalent to $738 billion as of 
2011.299 Vietnam’s collapse to communism was quickly followed by the collapse of both 
Laos and Cambodia by 1977.300 Although significantly abridged, this synopsis of the 
major events and overall outcome of America’s involvement in Vietnam allows for a closer 
analysis of the U.S. military’s employment of relational maneuver. 
A. EXTERNAL ORIENTATION: DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may 
well be the last chance to ensure eventual success. “Victory” can only be 
achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural 
peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The 
critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial 
levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the 
object which lies beyond it must be won. 
—Department of the Army, 1966301 
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In 1972, the former head of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS) program, Robert Komer, argued that the U.S. military failed as an 
institution to understand and adapt to the operational environment in Vietnam.302 This lack 
of understanding, both for the general character of irregular warfare and for Vietnam’s 
operational environment, was the foundation for the U.S. military’s failure to achieve 
strategic policy objectives in Southeast Asia. Coming from successes in World War II and 
experiences in Korea, both of which depended predominantly on attrition-based material 
and firepower advantages, General Westmoreland epitomized the military’s attritional 
mindset in Vietnam, focusing on the NVA and Viet Cong main forces and relegating 
pacification to the South Vietnamese and other U.S. organizations.303 Failing to learn from 
the French, who also attempted to wage traditional attrition warfare against an irregular 
threat, the United States set itself on a costly path of strategic failure in Vietnam.304  
Instead of recognizing that the operational environment in Vietnam consisted of a 
wide range of participants across the spectrum of threats, neutrals and friendlies, the 
military chose to focus predominantly on the overt and most traditional military enemies, 
the NVA and VC main force units. In reality, the threats in Vietnam consisted of the NVA 
regulars that infiltrated from the North throughout the conflict and the VC main forces that 
operated in safe havens throughout South Vietnam and the neighboring countries of Laos 
and Cambodia; the local VC guerillas that conducted low-level hit and run terrorist attacks 
throughout the countryside as well as in urban areas; and the VC infrastructure (VCI) that 
provided the political and military leadership and guidance to the violent activities 
throughout the South from Hanoi. Global threats influencing the operational environment 
in Vietnam included both the Chinese and the Soviet adversaries who supported Hanoi for 
the duration of the war in their effort to spread Communism and undermine the United 
States. In January 1961, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, overtly publicized this 
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global state-sponsored irregular proxy-war effort.305 Although Vietnam’s operational 
environment contained a wide range of relevant threats, until 1968, General Westmoreland 
led MACV in an attritional effort to defeat the Main Force VC and NVA units while leaving 
the local VC and VCI as problems for the Vietnamese to solve.306 Prior to 1968, other 
design approaches provided the opportunity to gain the necessary understanding of both 
political and traditional military threats. Early in the war, General Westmoreland changed 
the Army Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) mission to pacify the 
mountain tribesmen to more traditional offensive military strike-force operations. 
Similarly, General Westmoreland actively sought to shut down the Marine Corps’ CAP.307 
Both the Special Forces’ CIDG mission and CAP provided locally attuned options to 
understand the operational environment and adapt that understanding to implement 
approaches to exploit the VC and NVA political and military vulnerabilities.308 General 
Westmoreland leadership, reflective of post World War II mainstream thinking, and design 
choice to atrite the military threats without understanding the local social and political 
environment missed the opportunities presented. By disproportionally focusing on the 
overt traditional military threats, the U.S. military mostly ignored and, therefore, failed to 
develop an adequate understanding of the underlying political competition within the 
operational environment that spawned the NVA and VC threats. 
In addition to MACV’s over-prioritization of the most apparent military threats—
the main force VC and NVA—military leaders from General Westmoreland down to 
tactical level commanders also failed to understand the interrelation between the overt 
military threats and the social-political context in Vietnam or how to approach these 
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challenges.309The conflict in Vietnam after 1954 included a civil war between the 
governments in Saigon and Hanoi, the Soviet- and Chinese-sponsored proxy war against 
both Saigon and the United States, the Hanoi-sponsored insurgency, organic resistance 
movements such as the Buddhists’ protests in 1963 and from Vietnamese warlords, and 
coups from the South’s own military leadership. The inspiration for many of these 
underlying internal threats came from the corruption, oppression, and incompetence within 
the GVN, the anti-colonial movement of the time, and efforts by external state actors 
including the United States, Soviet Union, and China. Moreover, Saigon’s regime retained 
characteristics of the former French colonization and opened Saigon up to accusations of 
puppet status under the United States.310 Saigon struggled to overcome this narrative, and 
the U.S. exacerbation of this political turmoil between 1963 and 1968, by enabling the coup 
against Diem, significantly contributed to the lack of Vietnamese military and political 
willpower to unify and politically and militarily resist the communists. 
Although numerous U.S. military official reports identified many of the interrelated 
social, political, and military problems in Vietnam, the U.S. military actions in Vietnam 
largely ignored the social-political ecosystem in which the military threats existed.311 
Instead, MACV, led initially by Generals Paul Harkins and William Westmoreland, gave 
primacy to directly combating the military threat—the VC and NVA.312 Some capable 
political and military advisors correctly diagnosed and recommended viable solutions to 
overcome Vietnam’s uncertain operational environment. Both Edward Lansdale and John 
Paul Vann spent significant time in South Vietnam as U.S. military and or political 
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advisors.313 Lansdale and Vann’s prolonged investment of time and effort enabled them 
to more effectively understand the range of threats and recommend appropriate solutions. 
As early as 1955, Lansdale diagnosed the primary issues as political in nature.314 Later in 
1965, after initially considering Vietnam’s problems mostly military in nature, Vann’s 
understanding evolved and he proposed a political-military strategy by “harnessing the 
Revolution in South Vietnam” to prioritize the contextual threats while simultaneously 
confronting the direct military threats posed by the VC and VCI.315 Ultimately, the top 
military and political leaders in Saigon and Washington, General Harkins, General 
Westmoreland, Ambassadors Lodge and Maxwell Taylor, the Joint Chiefs, and Secretary 
McNamara, virtually ignored these recommendations, as well as those advocated for in the 
1966 Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam 
(PROVN). Only the political defeat brought about by the 1968 Tet offensive forced a 
changeover of leadership who began to implement earlier recommendations. Even then, 
the U.S. military only slowly adapted and implemented the new strategy approved by 
General Abrams.316 
MACV’s failure to effectively understand, diagnose, and properly balance the 
political and military threats in Vietnam’s operational environment led to misidentifying 
the necessary operational approaches or timeframe, for confronting the threat and 
achieving success.317 At all levels of command, the U.S. military struggled to identify and 
exploit available political and military threat vulnerabilities due to a fixation on traditional 
methods of warfare.318 As late as 1967, U.S. military leadership still promised positive 
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near-term improvements and impending success.319 In doing so, they wrongly assessed 
the depth of the internal weaknesses of South Vietnam’s political and military forces. 
Furthermore, General Westmoreland’s search and destroy operational approach ignored 
the necessity for establishing control of the rural populace who provided critical 
intelligence and logistical support, voluntarily or by force, to the NVA and VC main force 
units. This support enabled both guerilla and large-scale attacks throughout the South.320 
In 1967, the military’s search and destroy strategy had left the rural populace under the 
control of the VC. The essence of the U.S. military’s failure in Vietnam lay in a design 
failure which prevented proper understanding, and application of that understanding to 
effectively support the South Vietnamese in establishing functional political-military 
control from Saigon down to the village level which would ultimately determine internal 
political success in South Vietnam. The U.S. military did not appreciably recognize and 
adapt to confront the reality of political competition at all levels of warfare in Vietnam 
until the 1968 Tet offensive forced course corrections.321 The literature on Vietnam 
reveals, however, that these U.S. military course corrections mattered little by that point, 
because, although they suffered defeat on the battlefield in 1968, the communists had won 
a decisive psychological and political victory against the United States.322 Although, the 
better U.S. political-military effort after 1968 slowly improved the situation in South 
Vietnam, after 1973 when the U.S. Congress cut off all military, and most financial aid, 
North Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union and China, successfully defeated South 
Vietnam through conventional military force.323 
Synthesized analysis from Bernard Fall, Edward Lansdale, Neil Sheehan, John Paul 
Vann, Andrew Krepinevich, Guenter Lewy, and others indicates that the U.S. military 
failed to learn from the French Indochina War, failed to recognize that the traditional 
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operational environments of World War II and the Korean War were distinct from the 
irregular operational environment in Vietnam, and failed to follow the recommendations 
of U.S. advisors who did possess a better understanding of the operational environment.324 
Instead, their internal attritional tendencies stunted the development of an effective 
understanding of the highly complex, dynamic, and uncertain operational environment and 
delayed the steps necessary to confront and overcome the various threats in Vietnam. 
Although certain individuals within the U.S. military recognized the range of threats and 
political nature that existed in Vietnam, their understanding did not translate into the 
necessary relational adaptation until 1968. Even when General Abrams and other theater-
strategic leaders listened to the recommendations of those who possessed better 
understanding of and insights into the operational environment, the evidence suggests that 
the U.S. military’s ingrained attritional perception of Vietnam only transformed slowly 
over the course of several years, and under the U.S. domestic pressures to remove U.S. 
troops from Vietnam.325 Credible research indicates that the deficiencies in understanding 
Vietnam’s complex and uncertain operational environment by the early senior MACV 
Commanders, but also institutionally throughout the U.S. Marines and soldiers fighting at 
all levels in Vietnam, inhibited the development and implementation of unified political-
military strategy necessary for achieving strategic success.326 
B. FAILURES IN POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY 
Corruption was the clear enemy from within. It was a cancer eating away at 
the Vietnamese government. Corruption violated the people’s hope for fair 
treatment under their laws and made them cynical about the legitimate needs 
of the government. Corruption helped create a necrotic culture for the germ 
of revolution, and the major inoculation of honesty required from the Saigon 
government was never administered. 
—David Donovan, 1985327 
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The U.S. military, led by MACV Commanders General Harkins and 
Westmoreland, failed to inform, influence, or implement effective political-military 
strategy in Vietnam.328 U.S. theater-strategic leadership, General Abrams, CORDS 
Director William Colby, and Ambassador Bunker, did not implement a better relational 
maneuver strategy in support of U.S. policy until after 1968, 14 years after U.S. military 
advisors arrived and three years after conventional military units deployed to the 
country.329 Even after formulating an effective strategy, it took nearly two years to actually 
implement that strategy.330 For those who argue that the political leaders in DC were 
responsible for this gap in strategy, the publicly-stated political objectives for Vietnam 
remained mostly constant from 1954 through withdrawal of the U.S. military in 1973. 
President Johnson clearly stated these objectives in his “Peace Without Conquest” speech 
in April 1965: 
Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of 
Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a 
regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and 
has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a 
nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. 
The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes… 
Why are we in South Vietnam? We are there because we have a promise to 
keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the 
people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to 
defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help 
South Vietnam defend its independence. And I intend to keep our 
promise… We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, 
from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the 
belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to 
its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an 
American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The result 
would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war… Our 
objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from 
attack. We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people of South Viet-
Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do 
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everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is 
absolutely necessary.331 
President Lyndon Johnson set clear objectives for the political-military mission in 
Vietnam to ensure the self-determination and independence of South Vietnam. These 
objectives had remained virtually unchanged from more than a decade prior. President 
Johnson’s speech explained that Vietnam fit into the larger effort to limit the aggressive 
and subversive spread of communism, stabilize the global order, and prevent “wider 
war.”332 Responsibility for the failure to construct and implement an effective political-
military strategy fell on the U.S. political-military leadership, ranging from Secretary of 
Defense McNamara to the Ambassadors to Vietnam, but most centrally on the military 
leadership led by MACV down to tactical level commanders in Vietnam. Across much of 
South Vietnam, military personnel were the only U.S. forces who had personal contact 
with the Vietnamese people and who could determine the achievability of military or 
political objectives.333 
The Pentagon Papers records General Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition as “the 
defense of military bases, the conduct of offensive operations against VC forces and bases, 
the conduct of clearing operations as a prelude to pacification, provision of permanent 
security for areas earmarked for pacification, and the provision for reserve reaction 
forces.”334 The papers go on to state that General Westmoreland directed U.S. military 
forces to hunt down and destroy the enemy’s main forces while leaving the task of 
pacification to Vietnamese regular and paramilitary units. While rightly seeking to “search 
and destroy” communist main force units, General Westmoreland failed to establish 
political and military unity of effort between the numerous interagency components, 
including the CIA, Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the United States Information Service (USIS); nor did General 
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Westmoreland effectively emphasize advising South Vietnamese military forces or 
synchronizing efforts.335 Instead, while the U.S. military rapidly expanded and pushed the 
Vietnamese military units out of the way, the South Vietnamese allowed the U.S. military 
to shoulder the primary warfighting burden and shifted their efforts to pacify the rural areas 
essential to the communist insurgency.336 
While MACV, led by General Westmoreland, directed the war of attrition in 
Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s exclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) from the decision-making process prevented the development of sound political-
military strategy in Washington, DC.337 Even though, as author and former National 
Security Advisor H.R. McMaster explains, the Joint Chiefs recommended many courses of 
action that may have better confronted the traditional warfare threats posed by North 
Vietnam, there is little evidence that the service chiefs considered or recommended a 
unified political-military strategy to simultaneously wage political and violent competition 
at each level of warfare in the operational environment.338 Instead, The chiefs focused on 
estimates of traditional military mass and firepower. 
Both Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson, and Marine Commandant, 
General Wallace Greene, estimated in 1965 that success in Vietnam would take up to 
700,000 men and would last approximately five years.339 McMaster further explains that, 
in 1965, “there was virtually no discussion of how the additional troops would be employed 
or how their actions might contribute to achieving policy goals.”340 These estimates and 
accompanying deficiency in strategic thought for employment, and General 
Westmoreland’s claim that the “enemy ‘was too deeply committed to be influenced by 
anything but [the] application of overpowering force,’” indicate that the U.S. military 
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national and theater-strategic leadership viewed Vietnam through a traditional warfare 
attritional lens, reinforcing the flawed premise that mere presence of overwhelming 
American force and firepower would secure victory.341  
Ultimately, although better synchronization between the senior military leadership, 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, and President Johnson would have likely established a 
more unified political-military strategy, there is little evidence that this alternative strategy 
would have better addressed the irregular political challenges in South Vietnam. Instead, 
the strategies proposed would have likely either resulted in following Under Secretary of 
State George Ball’s recommendations to “cut and run” or in immediately escalating the 
war in 1965 to the troop levels seen in 1969 at the height of the military’s involvement.342 
Although McMaster claims that “the relationship between the president, the secretary of 
defense, and the Joint Chiefs led to the curious situation in which the nation went to war 
without the benefit of effective military advice from the organization having the statutory 
responsibility to be the nation’s ‘principle military advisers [the Joint Chiefs],’” the 
efficacy of the Joint Chiefs’ advice, even if there was proper civilian and military strategic 
integration, is uncertain.343  
The Joint Chiefs’ recommendations essentially bifurcated the situation in Vietnam 
into two options: either commit to an unlimited use of force to achieve military victory 
through annihilating the enemy, or do not engage military force at all. Both options 
epitomized an attritional mindset and either ignored the real interests that the U.S. pursued 
in Vietnam or overestimated Vietnam and the region’s political worth.344 Given a dearth 
of nuanced relational maneuver options from his military advisors, President Johnson’s 
strategy reflected the realities of domestic politics.345 He escalated the war using the 
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military’s attritional mindset to attempt to convince Hanoi that the price of militarily 
intervening in the South was not worth the attritional cost they would incur.346  
As political scientist Andrew Mack explains, President Johnson and Robert 
McNamara miscalculated North Vietnam’s level of commitment to its cause.347 Ho Chi 
Minh, General Vo Giap, and the Communists fought a people’s war with total objectives 
for what they perceived to be national survival.348 In contrast, notwithstanding Johnson’s 
presidential rhetoric the United States would “do everything necessary to reach that 
objective,” the United States fought a limited war by limited means, with limited political 
objectives, and with limited political willpower. Between the birth of MACV in 1962 until 
General Westmoreland’s departure in 1968, neither McNamara nor the senior military 
leaders, between the Joint Chiefs and MACV, offered strategic relational maneuver options 
that balanced an understanding of the realities of Vietnam’s operational environment with 
the true level of U.S. political interests. The United States’ strategy defaulted to escalating 
military attrition. Those in power, politically and militarily, up to 1968 did not adequately 
heed the voices arguing for a relational maneuver strategy that would address the political 
and military challenges and exploit the communists’ vulnerabilities. 
Relational maneuver recommendations voiced by Edward Lansdale, John Paul 
Vann, and USMC Lieutenant General Victor ‘Brute’ Krulak began to gain traction in 1967 
when MACV established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS) program.349 CORDS, led initially by Robert Komer and followed by former 
CIA station chief William Colby, merged all civilian and military pacification efforts as a 
deputy command within MACV.350 Even after establishing CORDS, General 
Westmoreland continued to pursue his attrition strategy to reach a “cross over point” where 
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Hanoi could not sustain its military losses.351 This attrition strategy had long ago been 
proven as impractical and self-defeating by Lieutenant General Krulak, whose 1965 
“Strategic Appraisal” noted the futility and errors of an attritional strategy in Vietnam.352  
U.S. leadership in Washington and Saigon did not establish an effective political-
military strategy until the 1968 Tet offensive spurred a chain of events that contributed to 
a changeover of both political and military leadership, including President Johnson, 
General Westmoreland, CORDS director Robert Komer, and Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge Jr. In their places, President Nixon, General Abrams, William Colby, and 
Ambassador Bunker forged a unified strategy that correctly identified and prioritized the 
primary threats and sought to overcome both adversarial and contextual threats. Even 
pursuing a more unified strategy later articulated in the 1969 MACV Objectives Plan, the 
U.S. military only slowly adapted to implement the improved strategy.353 From the 
historical accounts of the U.S. military between 1969 and 1973, it appears that a primary 
forcing function for adaptation was the politically mandated withdrawal of conventional 
forces.354 While the withdrawal may have incentivized the U.S. military to better adapt to 
the environment, the U.S. withdrawal under enemy pressure in 1969 likely also had 
detrimental impacts to the confidence and morale of the South Vietnamese populace, 
military, and government.355  
The new U.S. political-military strategy in Vietnam between 1969 and 1973 
retained the original overt objectives for an independent South Vietnam; however, history 
proves that the true political objective became to completely withdraw from Vietnam while 
retaining as much domestic and international credibility as possible.356 The means and 
ways to reach this political objective transitioned during this time as well. The withdrawal 
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of military forces and the “Vietnamization” approach, to turn the war back over to the 
South Vietnamese, forced the U.S. military to more heavily prioritize CORDS and the 
military advisory effort to assist the Vietnamese in politically and militarily competing with 
the communists.357 The U.S. military-led effort in Vietnam only implemented a coherent 
political-military strategy 15 years after the first advisor arrived. Political defeat and the 
revelation of grave errors leading up to the Tet offensive initiated the U.S. military’s 
adaptation. While the U.S. military ways and means had better adapted to the operational 
environment, the real political objectives for Vietnam had changed. The U.S. military had 
failed Clausewitz’s most important task for the statesman and military commander: to 
recognize the true level of U.S. political interests in Vietnam and to understand the nature 
of the war in which they were involved.358 The U.S. military adapted over time, but not 
before the communists had politically defeated the United States. The next section explains 
how U.S. military organizational design flaws, institutionally and within MACV, directly 
undermined the U.S. military’s ability to understand the operational environment and adapt 
that understanding to inform, influence, and implement a relational maneuver political-
military strategy to succeed in Vietnam. 
C. FLAWS IN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
The army bureaucracy tended to view Vietnam as an educational exercise 
and rationalized the six month rule as a way of seasoning more officers for 
the “big war” yet to come with the Soviets in Europe and for more of these 
“brushfire wars.” The real reason, which held true for the Marine Corps too 
and which explained why the practice was derisively called “ticket 
punching,” was a mechanistic promotion process and the bureaucratic 
impetus this created. 
—Neil Sheehan, 1988359 
In 1972, Robert Komer argued that the U.S. political and military institutions 
engaged in Vietnam failed to adapt to the complexities of the operational environment.360 
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Synthesized analysis of the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam from Robert Komer, 
Guenter Lewy, Neil Sheehan, Victor Krulak, Edward Lansdale, John Paul Vann, Andrew 
Krepinevich, and Lewis Sorely reveals that the overarching tasks and structures were not 
aligned to the uncertainties of Vietnam’s operational environment. This misalignment 
inhibited the understanding necessary to develop proper strategy or implement proper 
approaches to overcome the political and military threats.361 The cumulative effect 
produced Robert Komer’s “gap between policy and performance.”362 
A cross-comparison between the character of general irregular operational 
environments and the conduct of the U.S. military in Vietnam reveals that, institutionally, 
the U.S. military forces viewed their role too narrowly. With limited exceptions from the 
Army Special Forces, the Marine Corps’ CAP, elements of MACVSOG, and later CORDS, 
the U.S. military at all levels of command pursued a predominantly traditional task in 
Vietnam: to ‘search and destroy’ through mass and firepower.363 The uncertain character 
of Vietnam’s operational environment, however, demanded tasks that developed an 
understanding of the environment to compete politically and militarily across all levels of 
warfare. 
The experiences and writings from Edward Lansdale, John Paul Van, Colonel (Ret) 
Gerald Turley, USMC, and Major General (Ret) Ray Smith, USMC illustrate that the best 
way to enable the understanding and competition necessary for Vietnam and irregular 
warfare lie in the role of the political and military advisors.364 When employed properly, 
these advisors understood the operational environment, assisted partner-nation forces, and 
ensured unity of effort between the United States and the partner nation. Advising 
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represents an inherently relational maneuver activity; it recognizes the necessity to sacrifice 
organic organizational advantages and work with and through another nation’s forces.365  
In Vietnam, from the mid-1950s, the military employed advisors including 
Lansdale, Vann, the USMC’s CAP, Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 
(ODA) teams, the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), MACV Studies and Observations Group 
(MACVSOG), and the CORDS program, which included both Provincial Advisor Teams 
(PAT) and the Phoenix Program.366 These units and programs represent some of the most 
effective organizational design elements of the military’s involvement in Vietnam. These 
units allowed military and civilian advisors to embed directly with their Vietnamese 
counterparts and the civilian population to develop an externally oriented deep 
understanding of the environment and to influence their counterparts to adapt and 
overcome both conventional NVA forces and irregular VCI threats. The decisive role that 
U.S. advisors could have played throughout the entire war is best illustrated by Army and 
Marine advisors enabling the South Vietnamese to defeat the communist invasion during 
the 1972 Easter Offensive.367 If the advisors had not been present to leverage U.S. 
supporting naval and aviation assets, South Vietnam may have collapsed as early as 1972, 
as intended by General Giap.368 
The histories of Robert Komer, Andrew Krepinevich, Max Boot, and others 
indicate that, institutionally, the U.S. military never appropriately understood or valued the 
role of the advisor in Vietnam.369 Even between 1955 and 1964, when advisors ostensibly 
led the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, the U.S. military did not grasp the full range of 
responsibilities for advisors in irregular warfare, did not intentionally select advisors, and 
did not heed warnings from advisors such as Edward Lansdale and John Paul Vann. Both 
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Lansdale and Vann attempted to inform and influence MAAG, MACV, and other strategic 
leadership toward more effective employment of advisors, a better understanding of 
Vietnam, and better operational approaches.370 Even at the height of U.S. direct 
engagement, when more than 500,000 U.S. troops fought in Vietnam, only 14,300 civilian 
and military advisors were in Vietnam, of which only a mere 3000 were combat 
advisors.371 In 1969, these 14,300 advisors were responsible for advising approximately 
897,000 regular and territorial Vietnamese forces as well as approximately two million 
local peoples self-defense forces (PSDF), an extraordinary ratio considering the size of the 
U.S. presence.372  
With the exception of the advisory period up to 1965, and the Army Special Forces, 
Andrew Krepinevich explains that advisory duties did not enhance military careers.373 Of 
the Army’s advisors in Vietnam, less than 25% were volunteers while the rest were 
assigned to their duties.374 Furthermore, the level of preparation for advisory assignments 
represented a mixed bag with less than one-third of advisors receiving specialized training 
to prepare for their mission.375 By and large, the military viewed advisors as an unfortunate 
requirement and distraction from real soldiering within conventional U.S. units.376 
Furthermore, relatively few advisors were selected due to their potential to work with a 
foreign force effectively, nor were they provided adequate training to prepare them for their 
responsibilities.377 Especially up to the late 1960s, advisors were selected, trained, and 
assigned on an ad hoc basis with correspondingly mixed results in the execution of their 
assignment.378 
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In addition to the military’s failures to understand and value advisory tasks, 
historical analysis reveals inherent flaws in the U.S. military’s structure and task 
organization in Vietnam.379 The military’s inability to implement a coherent political-
military strategy in Vietnam directly related to the lack of a unified theater-strategic 
command structure.380 Without a coherent structure, the U.S. effort could not achieve unity 
of vision and effort between political goals and the use of military violence based on an 
effective and common understanding of the threat in Vietnam. The U.S. political-military 
effort did not achieve cohesion until 1968, when General Abrams and William Colby better 
unified CORDS’ and MACV’s efforts under the ‘one war’ approach.381 
Aside from the theater-strategic structural problems, MACV and the military 
services’ rotational policies degraded the military’s ability to understand the operational 
environment and influence and implement effective political-military strategy.382 The 
Army and the Marine Corps viewed fighting in Vietnam as a short-term distraction from 
preparing to fight a far more important war with the Soviets in Europe.383 This attitude, 
combined with MACV’s decision to rotate personnel individually rather than as units, 
further degraded cohesion and damaged morale.384 The military instead treated Vietnam 
as an opportunity to gain experience and rotate officers through command and combat 
positions to ensure competitiveness for promotions to advance their careers.385 U.S. 
military personnel coveted combat leadership of conventional U.S. military units because 
these positions made the individual officer competitive for the next command 
responsibility, reportedly regardless of the officer’s effectiveness in command.386  
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Guenter Lewy explains that since the military services did not consider Vietnam as 
a truly important war, and progress and competence were more difficult to measure than in 
more traditional wars like World War II or Korea, few commanders were held accountable 
for sub-par performance.387 The cumulative effect became that the military, which failed 
to properly understand the nature of the war it fought and failed to implement a coherent 
political-military strategy until late in the war, did not adequately adapt to organize itself 
to confront the irregular and conventional threats within the operational environment. 
While the communists presented a massed conventional threat during the Tet 
Offensive in 1968 and the Easter Offensive in 1972, the core of South Vietnam’s problems 
lay in their internal political vulnerabilities which Hanoi exacerbated and exploited.388 
After the VC suffered debilitating losses to their guerrilla forces due to their massed attacks 
and holding terrain, MACV’s one war approach and CORDS efforts degraded the 
communists’ internal insurgency in the South by the end of 1970.389 By 1972, the Easter 
Offensive was almost purely a traditional conventional attack in which significant gains 
occurred when entire ARVN units abandoned their equipment, fled, and surrendered before 
the attacks were repulsed with U.S. advisory assistance. In 1975, when the Communists 
seized Saigon, the offensive once again was a conventional military attack.390 
When the U.S. military structured its efforts to combat both conventional and 
irregular threats, success followed. Early programs, such as the CIA-sponsored CIDG led 
by SF ODA teams, saw success between 1961 and 1963 prior to MACV’s attrition strategy 
pulling the program in a different direction that decreased its effectiveness.391 Early 
individual advisors like Lansdale and Vann embedded with their counterparts and began 
to develop a real grasp of the war’s complexities, which fostered creative recommendations 
that were ultimately belatedly implemented. The Marines created and implemented the 
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CAP combined unit program to embed Marine squads with territorial forces in villages to 
assist in pacification. The Marines even employed CAP after Westmoreland instructed 
General Walt, Commander of Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) 1, later renamed Military Region 
(MR) 1, to direct his attention to the destruction of the enemy main force units.392 Although 
never adequately supported within MACV or the Marine Corps itself, CAP represented 
one of the most effective models for understanding and countering the complex and 
uncertain threats in Vietnam. Also highly cost effective, the MAU consistently, although 
in small numbers, advised their partner Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) units from 
1954 until their departure in 1973. Their consistent advising contributed to the VNMC’s 
reputation as one of the elite GVN military units. The MAU’s efforts made critical impacts 
late in the war in delaying and ultimately stopping the Easter Offensive attacks in 1972. 
MACVSOG represented another innovative approach to structural design in 
Vietnam, but one that MACV under General Westmoreland and the military services in 
Washington strove to limit to a conventional employment of special operations 
capabilities.393 Initially a project developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after 
the Bay of Pigs failure in Cuba, the military assumed control over the covert paramilitary 
programs in Vietnam by 1964.394 A unique military program, SOG’s chain of command 
bypassed Westmoreland and MACV and led straight to the newly formed Special Assistant 
for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in Washington, DC395 Formally 
established in November 1963 under Operations Plan 34 Alpha (OPLAN 34A), SOG was 
composed of Army Special Forces, SEALs, and Marine Reconnaissance personnel as a 
compartmentalized program designed for the “conduct of covert operations that would 
convince Hanoi that its support and direction of the conflict in the South and its violation 
of Laotian neutrality should be reexamined and halted.”396  
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In its tenure between 1963 and 1973, SOG worked with South Vietnamese 
indigenous forces to primarily conduct reconnaissance missions along the borders of South 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to identify and disrupt the communists’ infiltration along 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.397 Additionally, SOG conducted a host of other operations 
including personnel recovery, deception and psychological operations, raids, quick 
reaction force responses, and, along with the CIA, managed the failed effort to infiltrate 
and control Vietnamese resistance and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.398 
SOG’s relational maneuver contributions reveals a mixed legacy in Vietnam. 
Although a fractional element of the entire U.S. military effort in Vietnam, SOG produced 
a tremendous kill ratio against communist fighting force of more than 100:1, reportedly 
tied down significant communist forces in rear areas, and, although suffering high casualty 
rates, only represented a small cost measured against the casualties inflicted upon the 
enemy.399 SOG’s attritional success against the communists, however, are 
counterweighted against its difficulties. Analysis of SOG’s efforts reveals that the U.S. 
military leadership, led by MACV in Vietnam and the Joint Chiefs in the United States, 
never intended for SOG to pursue efforts other than traditional military practices to search 
and destroy the enemy.400 Within this attritional mindset, only the basic reconnaissance 
mission that SOG predominantly executed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail “seemed to fit into 
the American command structure’s view of operational utility.”401 The other lines of effort 
for waging irregular warfare through psychological operations and winning the political 
competition across South Vietnam or in Laos and Cambodia were underdeveloped. While 
SOG tactical operations provide many excellent examples of tactical and physical 
relational maneuver against large-scale North Vietnamese forces, due to a convoluted chain 
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of command and an attritional military mentality within MACV and in DC, SOG “failed 
to achieve the goals that its masters set for it.”402 
Arguably, CORDS was structurally the most successful relational maneuver 
program executed in Vietnam. The CORDS program, which contained both Provincial 
Advisor Teams (PAT) and the more compartmentalized Phoenix Program, made 
substantial contributions to quelling the internal insurgency in South Vietnam and 
preventing its resurgence following the 1968 Tet Offensive.403 PAT represented a similar 
program to CAP and established an advisory structure from the central government in 
Saigon down to the district and village levels.404 Within the larger CORDS effort, the 
controversial Phoenix Program advised the GVN and Vietnamese Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units (PRU) in targeting the VCI through reintegrating, imprisoning, or 
killing key communist personnel and leaders.405 Aside from the more militaristic 
programs, CORDS also led the reform and reconstruction efforts to strengthen the GVN, 
wage psychological and political warfare, and address grievances through reform, 
including the Land to the Tiller program that addressed the long-standing land reform.406 
While each unit or program did not achieve universal success, they did represent elements 
of more effective structural alternative to the heavy-handed U.S. unilateral and more 
traditional military approach of merely destroying the communist military threats.  
When compared to North Vietnam’s design, led by Vo Nguyen Giap, and use of 
relational maneuver to exploit U.S. reliance on technology and firepower and South 
Vietnam’s political vulnerabilities, the U.S. military’s design in Vietnam adapted too 
slowly and ultimately failed. As authors’ John Arquilla and Nancy Roberts explain in their 
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2017 monograph, “Design of Warfare,” the U.S military design in Vietnam failed to 
adequately locate the communist political and military threats, failed to halt the flow of 
communist manpower and supplies into the South, and failed to seize the initiative from 
the Communists in the south through programs like CAP, early versions of the CIDG, and 
later through CORDS and the Phoenix Program.407 The design failures from the U.S. failed 
to enable the understanding and adaptation to exploit communist vulnerabilities while 
sumlutaneously leaving the U.S. and South Vietnamese exposed to exploitation by resolute 
leadership through Giap and others.408 Overall, and especially early in the war, the serious 
flaws in the military’s design in Vietnam severely crippled the military’s ability to 
implement effective operational irregular warfare approaches. 
D. OPERATIONAL APPROACHES DOMINATED BY ATTRITION 
Shift the thrust of the GVN and U.S. ground effort to the task of delivering 
the people from guerilla oppression, and to protecting them adequately and 
continually thereafter; meanwhile, seeking out and attacking main force 
elements when the odds can be made overwhelmingly in our favor.  
—General Victor Krulak, 1965409 
According to Guenter Lewy and others, MACV’s operational approaches in 
Vietnam generally displayed an attritional style of warfare. The military’s inability to 
understand, diagnose, and appropriately prioritize the threats it faced laid the foundation 
for its faulty approaches. Until 1968, the military predominantly focused on the overt 
military VC and NVA adversaries and underprioritized the political warfare effort. This 
approach is most adequately illustrated by MACV’s desire to mass U.S. forces and 
firepower against the enemy’s main forces.410 Demonstrating the misalignment of this 
predominant attrition strategy within a highly uncertain irregular operational environment, 
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even at the height of the search and destroy phase between 1965–1969, the communists 
still initiated combat the majority of the time.411  
The search and destroy strategy tied down significant resources as they were 
diverted to unpopulated areas, leaving the enemy with significant freedom of maneuver 
until 1969.412 This freedom of maneuver derived from the majority of the unattended 
populace, whom the communists exploited for information and sustenance.413Instead of 
studying the enemy as a political-military system and identifying and exploiting 
weaknesses to dismantle that enemy, an attritional operational approach—overwhelming 
the enemy through mass and firepower—consumed U.S. strategy in Vietnam. 414 Even 
under a more effective strategy and organizational design after 1968, the U.S. military still 
naturally tended toward attritional application of military force.415 
South Vietnam, assisted by MACV, did not control the population or geographic 
area of operations in Vietnam until nearly 1971, and then with only limited effectiveness. 
Irregular warfare requires controlling the populations who support either the government 
or insurgent both materially and with information. The military’s failure to prioritize 
population control resulted in a lack of timely intelligence prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive 
and enabled the VC to mass and seize significant territory, contributing to the 
psychological and political defeat of the United States. Furthermore, the political and 
military failure to counter and deny the communists’ safe havens in Cambodia, Laos, and 
North Vietnam, until 1970 and 1971, further contributed to the GVN’s lack of geographic 
and political control.416  
When the military did pursue effective pacification strategies to control the 
populace within South Vietnam, U.S. military ethnocentric attitudes often undermined 
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positive implementations of more effective approaches.417 Difficulties in effectively 
interacting and building rapport with the local populace and among partnered Vietnamese 
units represented a widespread problem among Army and Marine Corps units.418 Many 
advisor units and personnel did, however, effectively interact and influence their 
counterparts throughout the war. For individuals like Edward Lansdale and John Paul 
Vann, cultural aptitude occurred through their own natural inclination. Units like the Army 
Special Forces, who specially selected, educated, and trained irregular warfare advisors, 
cultivated the criticality of developing relationships with the partner forces and local 
populations in order to meet political-military objectives. In sum, geographic and 
population control approaches did improve after the 1968 Tet Offensive; however, the 
military continued to falter when operating with the local populace or partner forces on a 
widespread basis. 
Between 1961 and 1968, U.S. military units, at nearly every level of command, 
consistently prioritized military violence over solving underlying political threats in South 
Vietnam.419 Aside from the limited employment of the early CIA and Army Special 
Forces’ CIDG program, the Marine Corps’ CAP, and later CORDS program, the U.S. 
military units in Vietnam fought with the methods in which they had been trained, to find 
and destroy the enemy.420 Given the U.S. political decision to fight a limited defensive 
war in South Vietnam, the unbalanced attritional approach failed to confront the political 
problems to create a politically stable South Vietnamese government. If the U.S. leadership 
had decided to conduct a ground invasion of North Vietnam, the attritional approach may 
have produced strategic success. Based on the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, 
however, President Johnson and his advisors feared that a direct ground invasion of North 
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Vietnam would again risk direct Chinese intervention.421 Nonetheless, given the U.S. 
decision to fight in South Vietnam, the attritional operational approach prevented the total 
collapse of the GVN, while failing to achieve U.S. theater political objectives.  
Westmoreland’s search and destroy offensive approach epitomized this imbalance. 
He assessed that the U.S. military could unilaterally reach a “crossover point” where, 
through air and ground maneuver and firepower, the military could kill more communists 
than Hanoi could replace.422 The problem was that the center of gravity for the enemy 
threat in South Vietnam was the VCI, who functioned as the brain to guide military and 
political action, recruit and intimidate the local populace and undermine the GVN’s 
political stability.423 While defeating the VC Main Forces and NVA in conventional battle 
represented an important facet of the Vietnam War, military victories between 1965 and 
1969 only prolonged inevitable defeat because of the internal social-political instability. 
Furthermore, General Westmoreland’s approach called for the GVN forces, with little U.S. 
assistance, to defeat the VCI.424 This approach fundamentally failed to recognize the 
critical shortfalls of the GVN political and military forces, which faced widespread 
corruption and incompetence especially from the residual politically destabilizing effects 
of the 1963 Coup.425 Advisors like Lansdale and Vann had preached about South 
Vietnamese failings for more than a decade and recommended that the U.S. must assist, 
influence, and carefully guide the GVN to correct their failings and eliminate the VCI.426 
Accounts of effective political-military advisors like Lansdale and Vann, and programs 
such as CIDG, CAP, and PAT, illustrate that U.S. advisors often became respected and 
trusted individuals who could effectively influence the local populace and partner forces, 
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These individuals and programs strengthened the Vietnamese political and military forces 
to pursue effective operational approaches while still leading the war effort. 
Instead of placing the greatest priority on advisor-centric operational approaches 
throughout the war, MACV overused violence through establishing free-fire zones in 
civilian-populated areas and assisting South Vietnamese forces in forcibly removing 
civilians from ancestral homes, creating widespread internally displaced refugees.427 
These practices were employed, in part, because the GVN and U.S. forces focused on large-
scale offensive operations, maneuvering through populated and unpopulated areas to attack 
communist forces that often maintained complete control over the local populace. In 
reference to this approach, a U.S. military commander allegedly argued that “it became 
necessary to destroy the town to save it.”428 VC control of much of the South Vietnamese 
populace up to 1969 led to general perceptions that whole villages were VC sympathizers 
and collaborators and thus could be treated (often with indiscriminate firepower) as 
combatants.429 The indiscriminate action and immature responses from both the GVN and 
U.S. forces indicated a fundamental lack of understanding and resulted in inappropriate 
approaches to dealing with the VC insurgency and the South Vietnamese populace. The 
history of irregular warfare indicates that whichever side—government or insurgent—
establishes physical and cognitive control will typically benefit from the population’s 
forced or voluntary support and will achieve eventual victory. 
Later, as Guenter Lewy explains, the political-military Vietnamization and MACV 
Strategic objectives plan established under President Nixon, General Abrams, CORDS 
director William Colby, and Ambassador Bunker improved military operational 
approaches and began to enable the U.S. military to better adapt to and confront the 
operational environment.430 From 1969 until the departure of U.S. forces in 1973, the 
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military prioritized the pacification of the populace. Under CORDS, the PAT and Phoenix 
programs made discernable progress in prioritizing the elimination of the VCI and 
establishing control over the populace.431 Better prioritization of improving the GVN 
political and military forces strengthened the GVN political position, and in conjunction 
with communist casualties, between the 1968 Tet Offensive and the attacks of Tet 1969, 
prevented the reconstitution of the insurgent threat and forced Hanoi to change its 
operational approach to conventional warfare.432  
As part of this improved operational approach, in line with the nature and character 
of the threat in South Vietnam, General Abrams guided his subordinates to more carefully 
apply violence by limiting indiscriminate firepower and avoiding antagonization of the 
local populace.433 Unfortunately, although progressive steps were taken in the later parts 
of the war, the overall U.S. political priority became the withdrawal of troops rather than 
the stabilizing of Vietnam. This withdrawal of U.S. forces occurred under direct pressure 
from communist forces still infiltrating the South from across the DMZ as well as from 
Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, starting in 1969, the rapid withdrawal of forces 
undoubtedly played a critical role in undermining the GVN’s political and military morale 
even as progress and stabilization occurred between 1970 and 1971.434 
In addition to the success achieved by CORDS, U.S. military and CIA efforts within 
SOG had considerable potential for relational maneuver success in Vietnam. SOG’s 
employment of small teams of special operations forces partnered with indigenous South 
Vietnamese forces produced significant tactical relational successes in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia.435 The impact of these successes could have been far greater, with far less cost 
to the United States, had the military integrated and utilized military strategy, political 
competition, and violence in concert with its partners in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  
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According to Guenter Lewy, the U.S. political and military leadership never 
effectively competed politically against the communist forces in Vietnam.436 Early after 
the defeat of the French, Edward Lansdale and the CIA led an effort to infiltrate teams into 
North Vietnam to foment a resistance movement and to psychologically attack communist 
morale.437 While this effort did reportedly facilitate a mass migration of Vietnamese to the 
south in fear of the new communist regime, the migration may have also assisted the 
communists in solidifying their control over the North.438 Furthermore, all U.S. CIA and 
military efforts to infiltrate and support teams into North Vietnam failed. By 1968, it was 
clear that all infiltrated teams had either been killed, captured, or were controlled by 
Hanoi.439 Although SOG continued to attempt to exploit previous infiltration attempts by 
transmitting false communications signals to fictitous ghost teams in North Vietnam using 
fictitious radio stations and programs to transmit false or deceptive propaganda into North 
Vietnam, it is unclear whether any of these efforts achieved any meaningful impact.440  
Later, under the successful CORDS and Phoenix Program, MACV incorporated 
some of John Paul Vann’s recommendations from “Harnessing the Revolution in South 
Vietnam” and Edward Lansdale’s proposed principles for success.441 These efforts, in 
tandem with the atrocities committed by the Communists during Tet Offensive of 1968 in 
Hue City, served to alienate the South Vietnamese populace and politically undermined the 
communist narrative of widespread resistance in South Vietnam.442 The CORDS program 
stands as the line of effort that most closely adapted and employed an operational approach 
to confront the communists politically as well as militarily. CORDS politically competed 
with the communists by advising Vietnamese military and political counterparts in 
bettering the lives of the populace, countering VC propaganda, and disrupting VC activities 
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across South Vietnam.443 While political competition played a more significant role in the 
U.S. military’s operational approaches in the latter parts of the war, the U.S. military 
largely continued to conduct business as usual and focused on its traditional activities.444 
In contrast, Hanoi placed political competition at the center of its strategy and 
operational approaches. In an editorial published in Hanoi in February 1973, a high-level 
member of the communist Vietnamese Workers Party(VWP) Central Committee praised 
the unity in political-military efforts as the key to forcing the U.S. military withdrawal from 
South Vietnam.445 Among the factors the communists listed as responsible for defeating 
the United States were the weakening of political will and internal dissension inside the 
United States that undermined the war effort.446 Interviews with General Giap and 
documentation of communist efforts throughout the war indicate that the communists 
placed a premium on employing violence in a way that aligned with their own propaganda 
and ultimate political goals. Examples of this prioritization include the Tet Offensive of 
1968, in which the communists won the decisive political victory by convincing the U.S. 
population and political leaders that the war was unwinnable and that the United States 
needed to withdraw its forces and support from South Vietnam, even though the Tet 
Offensive was a military defeat for the communists.447  
Long before the 1968 Tet Offensive, dating back to the aftermath of World War II, 
Ho Chi Minh borrowed extensively from the U.S. Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution to psychologically appeal to the U.S. leadership to support Vietnamese 
independence from the French.448 Later, the communists’ political maneuvers throughout 
the war contrasted with the inability of the U.S. or GVN to politically compete. This 
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political warfare success for the communists and corresponding defeat for the United States 
was ultimately seen in the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973, which removed American 
forces from Vietnam in exchange for the promise to cease aggression against South 
Vietnam.449 
In addition to successfully politically competing against the United States and the 
government of South Vietnam, the communists successfully waged political competition 
toward an international audience. In South Vietnam, the communists created the NLF as a 
front organization separate from the communist VWP in North Vietnam.450 Although 
merely a front for the VWP, the NLF was successful enough in appearing as an organic 
political resistance movement in the South that it was allowed to participate in the Parris 
accords of 1972 and 1973 as a distinct entity from Hanoi’s control.451 Furthermore, the 
communists attempted to exploit and influence the internal anti-war movement in the 
United States and help break the political will to remain engaged in Vietnam.452 
Furthermore, Hanoi’s ability to label the United States as neo-colonists that had merely 
replaced the French to continue to control and exploit Vietnam undermined the political 
will internal and external to South Vietnam.453 
Throughout the Vietnam war, and especially until 1969, MACV forces 
overemphasized the traditional warfare characteristics of Vietnam. While this attritional 
approach produced tactical military victories when U.S. military forces were able to mass 
on enemy units, it failed to produce desired U.S. political outcomes and, in the process, 
expended significant blood and treasure. Throughout the majority of the war, the U.S. 
military either misunderstood or ignored the centrality of political competition across all 
levels of the operational environment. This misunderstanding, ignorance, or negligence 
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contributed to failures in unifying political-military strategy, command, and approaches to 
the U.S. political-military effort as well as between the United States and the GVN.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps Americans will never learn the simplicity of fighting a political 
war. As our forefathers knew so well in the American Revolution and even 
in the Civil war. Maybe our schooling in power politics… and our marriage 
to the computer have disabled us from acting within our own heritage.  
—Edward Lansdale, as quoted by Max Boot, 2018454 
The U.S. military’s efforts in Vietnam reveal a strong tendency toward attrition 
warfare as well as the consequences of this style of warfare in irregular operational 
environments. Although early advisors, including Edward Lansdale and John Paul Vann, 
among others, clearly articulated a more accurate understanding of the irregular political-
military threats in South Vietnam, organizational predispositions toward traditional 
structure, military violence, and material strength left over from World War II and Korea 
set the U.S. military on poorly framed and executed political-military strategy and 
approaches. Although President Johnson and other high-level political leaders retain 
ultimate responsibility, the military is responsible for transforming political objectives into 
achievable military objectives. The military’s poor understanding and prioritization of 
threats within the operational environment caused it to prioritize the overt military threats 
at the expense of strengthening and stabilizing the GVN both politically and militarily. 
Furthermore, the military did not establish an effective organizational design in the 
interagency CORDS program to wage political competition until 1967 and did not start 
implementing more effective approaches until closer to 1969. 
Throughout the war, the military did apply various relational maneuver approaches 
to the range of complex and uncertain threats in Vietnam. Advisors as far back as 1954 
recognized that South Vietnamese political and military forces would ultimately decide the 
fate of an independent South Vietnam, the primary proximate U.S. political-military 
objective in Southeast Asia The CIA and Special Forces CIDG pacification effort among 
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minority groups in the Vietnamese highlands saw significant success between 1961 and 
1963 in preventing the communists from establishing control over these tribes. When 
MACV took over command of the CIDG program from the CIA, however, Special Forces’ 
efforts were quickly reoriented on more traditional military tasks. Even then, SF units 
successfully employed the CIDG forces and other Vietnamese irregular and special forces 
units as guerrilla and long-range raid forces, which achieved significant success relative to 
their cost.455 Later, between 1965 and 1971, the Marine Corps implemented CAP with 
Vietnamese territorial forces, which also achieved some significant, albeit limited, success 
in pacifying regions within Military Region 1. When the primary communist threats did 
morph into conventional NVA forces by 1972, the advisory effort paid significant 
dividends in halting the Hanoi’s conventional invasion during the Easter Offensive. Lastly, 
the successful CORDS effort, which contained the Phoenix program, made progress in 
degrading the critical VCI threat and preventing the recovery and resurgence of an internal 
threat in South Vietnam following the Tet Offensive in 1968. The advisor programs 
employed in Vietnam represent the most successful relational maneuver practices the U.S. 
military employed. The early MAAG advisors, MAU, CIDG, CAP, and CORDS programs 
all produced significant successes relative to their human and material investment and 
facilitated deeper understanding of the operational environment as well as the flexibility to 
adapt to the threat and needs of the environment.  
The immediate central goal in Vietnam was to stabilize the GVN to enable their 
independence from communism and to prevent communist expansion in South East Asia. 
This goal required prioritizing assisting the GVN without creating a dependence on the 
United States, a difficult task in the best of circumstances. The U.S. military simultaneously 
failed to stabilize the GVN or prevent dependency on the United States. In Americanizing 
the war and over-prioritizing the NVA and VC military threats, the United States overspent 
in blood and treasure while failing to meet its political objectives.  
                                                 
455 Patrick Roberson, Understanding Advisory Roles in Large Scale Counterinsurgencies (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a547904.pdf. 
126 
If the U.S. military, at every level of command, had better implemented relational 
maneuver through political and violent competition, it would not have guaranteed U.S. 
political-military success by stabilizing South Vietnam under a Nationalist Government. It 
would, however, have likely produced a better outcome at far less cost than what actually 
occurred. The U.S. military’s failures in Vietnam did not merely occur at the political 
strategic level in Washington or at the theater-strategic level at MACV in Saigon, but 
pervaded the most tactical levels where regimental, battalion, company, and platoon 
leadership often defaulted to implementing military solutions for inherently politically-
centric problems. Recognizing the centrality of the political nature of the threat down to 
the most tactical level reveals that perhaps the military, or at least certain military units, 
must better prepare to confront these reoccurring problems by refocusing on the principles 
of relational maneuver in irregular warfare. Figure 17 depicts the approximate balance of 
styles of warfare and modes of competition by the U.S. military before and after the 1968 
Tet Offensive in Vietnam. While the U.S. military adapted and better employed relational 
maneuver, its earlier attritional deficiencies, particularly in properly advising the South 
Vietnamese to politically compete, significantly contributed to the political defeat of the 
United States, and the total defeat of the South Vietnamese. 
 
Figure 17. U.S. Military Adaptation in Vietnam 
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IV. EL SALVADOR: “NOT A MILITARY WAR”456 
Despite the American near obsession with learning the lessons of Vietnam 
and applying them to low-intensity conflict doctrine and practice in El 
Salvador, perhaps U.S. officials once again allowed their efforts to be 
influenced by an assumption that had proven to be a principal source of our 
frustration in Vietnam: namely, that it is relatively easy to ensure that an 
ally does what American policymakers deem necessary to eliminate an 
insurgency. This has once again proved false. In El Salvador as in Vietnam, 
our help has been welcome, but our advice spurned. 
 —Benjamin C. Schwarz, 1991457 
In 1981, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff J-5 directorate charged Brigadier General 
(BGEN) Frederick Woerner to assess the insurgency in El Salvador.458 He recommended 
strong support for the Salvadoran government and the necessity to defeat the Marxist-
Leninist Frente Farabundo Martí para Liberación Nacional (FMLN).459 The goal of the 
United States was an indisputable victory for the existing Salvadoran regime.460 
Unfortunately, the ends, ways, and means were ill-defined, which led to a prolonged effort 
without commitment to a coherent, defined strategy. 
A successful Marxist-Leninist revolution in Nicaragua made the U.S. fearful that 
the Sandinistas threatened stability in Central America.461 The fear generated by 
Nicaragua led to analogous anxiety about the situation in El Salvador. El Salvador would 
become the site of the United States’ most important and extensive “low-intensity” conflict 
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since the Vietnam War462—that is, if 75,000 Salvadorans killed and nearly 1,000,000 
displaced over ten years can be considered “low-intensity.”463 The U.S. military’s irregular 
warfare effort in the Salvadoran conflict would also be the longest for the U.S. military 
since Vietnam and, until the Persian Gulf conflict, the costliest financially: nearly $6 billion 
over 10 years.464  
As per Brigadier General Woerner’s recommendation, a U.S. Military Group 
(MILGRP) was sent to El Salvador to advise on the expansion of the El Salvadoran Armed 
Forces’ (ESAF) to create a force capable of defeating the insurgency.465 The MILGRP 
was composed of a colonel in command, with a small operations staff. The MILGRP’s 
advisors and trainers were made up of a roughly ten-man medical team, twenty-man 
national-advisor team, and six three-man Operations Planning and Training Teams 
(OPATTs).466 Despite the 55-man limit on U.S. trainers, it did not prevent them from 
quickly increasing the size and capability of ESAF.467 
An analyst of the Salvadoran conflict, RAND researcher Benjamin Schwarz, 
highlighted the difficulties with the Salvadoran military, including “a disengaged officer 
corps, a garrison mentality, forced service by conscripts with little will to fight, excessive 
reliance on firepower and helicopters for resupply rather than on group troops to hold 
territory, and a highly motivated enemy.”468 
U.S. strategists, policymakers, and advisors focused their approach in El Salvador 
in two key areas: supporting the Salvadoran armed forces to counter the insurgents in 
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combat, and supporting democratic political development to diminish the FMLN’s claims 
of political legitimacy.469 As Schwarz wrote in his 1991 RAND study, American 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, “America urged the government and armed 
forces of El Salvador to provide what the guerrillas could only promise: a just and equitable 
society.”470 This would be no small task, as the government and ESAF were both guilty 
of numerous injustices and crimes over the years. In order to achieve a just and equitable 
society, Schwarz notes the U.S. effort focused on influencing El Salvador in three specific 
aspects: “the reform of the Salvadoran armed forces, land redistribution, and 
democratization.”471 
After years of initially working to stabilize the military situation, American 
advisors worked to convince their counterparts that they had to address the grievances of 
the Salvadoran people to provide legitimacy to their government, which was the underlying 
issue.472 However, implementation of necessary practices to address the principle causes 
of turmoil were met with resistance, and ESAF continued to focus on violence against the 
FMLN.473 As of the 1988 publishing of the American Military Policy in Small Wars: The 
Case of El Salvador, written by four Army Lieutenant Colonels and dubbed the “Colonels’ 
Report,” it seems that the fixation on killing guerrillas had not waned, and there was no 
Salvadoran strategy for winning the war or popular support.474  
While not explicitly stated in U.S. policy, according to a 1989 survey, individuals 
associated with the American effort in El Salvador agreed that “the U.S. wanted to achieve 
three things: a measure of peace, the respect for human rights, and the institutionalization 
of democratic process,” all of which the survey participants saw as failed objectives.475 
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The U.S. military, executive and congressional branches, as well as the Salvadoran 
government and military displayed a lack of relational maneuver principles during the civil 
war, particularly prior to 1985. Effort was rightly put toward traditional military objectives 
during the early stages of the war but too slowly shifted toward addressing the endemic 
political issues and objectives. With a better understanding of the environment, both the 
United States and El Salvador could have implemented more effective military and 
political strategies that may have been able to bring the civil war to an end years sooner 
and with much less violence. Instead, despite lessons learned in previous irregular and 
small wars, too much emphasis was put on the wrong objectives, and too little was put on 
strategies that exploited police and military threat vulnerabilities and that were necessary 
for waging irregular warfare. 
A. EXTERNAL ORIENTATION: DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Despite their appreciation that winning popular support remains the 
ultimate strategic aim in a counterinsurgency, American officials have yet 
to devise adequate mechanisms to achieve that aim…. The United States 
has yet to grasp fully what it will take to win such a contest and how to go 
about doing it. Failure to solve that riddle will condemn Americans to 
recurring frustration in future small wars. 
—A.J. Bacevich, James Hallums, Richard White, Thomas Young, 
1988476 
At the beginning of the conflict, U.S. government officials displayed only a cursory 
understanding of the situation in El Salvador. This lack of even surface-level knowledge, 
let alone deep comprehension of the Salvadoran people and the issues they faced, was a 
major contributing factor to the lackluster performance and efficiency of the U.S. effort. 
Schwarz called attention to this deficiency, particularly regarding the acknowledgment of 
human rights violations committed by members of ESAF and the Salvadoran government. 
He wrote, “…in the early years of the Reagan administration some officials had what could 
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most charitably be described as a callous disregard of the sources, intent, and consequences 
of rightist violence in El Salvador.” 477 
Finding aspiring, competent U.S. service members to serve in El Salvador was 
difficult at the onset of the war. In the 1988 “Colonels’ Report,” the analysis indicates that 
there was no incentive for talented military personnel to view service in El Salvador 
positively, as all of the prestige was placed on participation in “big war.”478 Furthermore, 
the report’s authors explained that “the services showed limited interest in developing 
officers with the regional expertise relevant to the conduct of small wars.”479 Just as 
irregular warfare analysists Edward Luttwak, Colin Gray, Susan Marquis, and others have 
argued, the “Colonels’ Report” specifies that the U.S. military’s education on small wars 
is deficient, and that counterinsurgency is still not taught sufficiently in military schools.480 
However, they do make an exception for the Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, 
remarking that the contextual understanding FAOs can provide was a “priceless 
advantage.”481 First-hand accounts of how valuable a FAO, with a profound grasp of their 
surrounding culture, can be to strategy makers and executors are not new. This lesson of 
the necessity for specific cultural knowledge of the operational environment has been 
learned and relearned time and again throughout the U.S. military’s experiences in irregular 
warfare. 
Schwarz details how the Salvadorans could easily misinterpret the strategic policy 
message sent from America. His point was that by taking a strong stance against the leftist 
FMLN in El Salvador and providing $6 billion in government and military aid, the 
Salvadoran government would likely view that as an endorsement of its status quo of 
fighting the insurgents with oppressive violence.482 The U.S. government’s inability or 
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unwillingness to understand how deeply this malpractice was ingrained in the political 
culture of the Salvadorans explains why the United States was bewildered by the continued 
savagery of the government and military in El Salvador.  
In an interview special with the New York Times, then MILGRP commander 
Colonel John Waghelstein acknowledged the political culture of El Salvador and how it 
led to political tension among its citizens. He surmised that “the reason there was an 
insurgency is because there were deep-rooted social, political, and economic 
imbalances.”483 This recognition of political volatility was missed by U.S. strategists in 
Washington who failed to integrate a thorough political warfare campaign that targeted the 
underlying instability in El Salvador. 
 By 1991, failure to address political grievances and bring the civil war to a close 
unfortunately generated more Salvadorans who believed that “radical policies and 
solutions” were the only means for stability.484 The absence of broad and extensive 
understanding of the operational environment combined with a lack of progress led 
strategists away from what should have been the obvious course: a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy aligned with correcting the political deficiencies in El Salvador. 
In 1991, more than 10 years after the U.S. became involved, it was still unclear 
whether they would achieve what the U.S. military considered success. Schwarz concluded 
his assessment of the counterinsurgency effort noting the continued lack of political 
stabilization: “Despite the prospect of an externally imposed settlement, too many 
Salvadorans remain all too eager to kill each other rather than to compromise in the 
Assembly. If the U.S. goal in El Salvador is still, despite the end of the Cold War, to alter 
this fundamental fact, the American project there is a long way from over.”485 
OPATT personnel were largely an exception to the lack of deep understanding. In 
Cecil Bailey’s 2004 article for Special Warfare magazine, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF 
Advisers in El Salvador,” he outlined the selection for OPATT operators, noting that “most 
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OPATT officers were hand-picked to ensure they had the maturity and leadership skills 
required to operate alone in the countryside for months on end.”486 Language proficiency 
was also a requirement for OPATT personnel.487 However, not all training for OPATT 
personnel was created equal. In a 1997 interview with Scott Moore, retired Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeff Cole was critical of the training he received as a Marine officer before being 
tasked as an OPATT advisor. Cole entered an on-the-job training scenario while working 
with the almost exclusively SF OPATT. Cole stated, “the OPATTs were supposed to be 
training the ESAF. Marines are less suited for that. SF guys are trained to be the trainer.”488 
In comparison to the SF who provided weapons and tactics training, the Marine Corps 
advisors focused on “influencing the larger political-military strategy.”489 After his tour 
with OPATT, Cole would serve a second tour in the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador as the 
Naval Attaché. At the risk of diverting from the standard career path, and forgoing future 
promotions, he elected to return to El Salvador (not a priority of the Marine Corps), to 
support the Salvadoran’s cause, in which he had personally invested.490  
Moore goes on to explain the importance of the cross-cultural communication skills 
for which SF are specifically trained. Many non-SF U.S. personnel were shut out of 
communications for trying to “cut to the chase” too early with the Salvadorans, who 
preferred to talk about food, family, or the weather prior to any “agenda” items.491 SF 
personnel training specifically to cultivate a deep understanding of their environment 
proved more effective than the approaches taken by other, untrained U.S. military 
personnel. Because of their training to understand and work in irregular operational 
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environments, OPATTs were able to adequately train counterinsurgency forces in El 
Salvador and defeat the FMLN to a greater degree.492  
OPATT personnel’s capacity to understand the environment improved in 1985 
when they transitioned from six-month to one-year assignments. This was deemed a 
“tremendous improvement” as the continuity allowed for deeper knowledge of the 
environment, improved relationship building, and enhanced operational effectiveness.493 
Not all U.S. personnel had command of the nuanced environment in El Salvador. 
This gap created frustration among OPATT, who understood how the subtleties of the 
environment affected their missions. One OPATT advisor criticized a MILGRP staff 
officer, stating, “he does not understand. I am on the practical level of trying to figure out 
how to get things done, he is talking theory.”494 Bailey, a retired Special Forces officer 
who served two tours in El Salvador, wrote of counterpart relations in El Salvador, “the SF 
maxim about the necessity of establishing rapport with one’s counterpart in order to be 
effective was never truer than for brigade advisers in El Salvador.”495 
B. FAILURES IN POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY 
Even when militarily defeated on all fronts, an insurgency continues to 
operate from the sanctuary of the minds of citizens who feel aggrieved.  
—LtCol Jeffrey Cole, 1989496 
Before acting on the recommendations of Brigadier General Woerner, the U.S. 
ought to have tempered their fear of a Central American state government collapsing to 
communism, further developed an objective perspective of the situation, and come to a 
rational decision regarding whether or not to provide assistance. Instead, the U.S. 
prematurely committed effort in support of the Salvadoran regime. With their ill-conceived 
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efforts, Schwarz suggests that “…both sides have succeeded…in systematically destroying 
the political center.”497 
 Writing from a counterinsurgency perspective, Schwarz details the importance of 
a comprehensive analysis of the host government before committing assistance. He wrote,  
if a regime is incapable of governing…it then becomes necessary to 
question not only whether that regime will survive but whether indeed it 
deserves to survive. If political development in El Salvador requires that the 
regime must be coached by foreigners in how to treat its own people, then 
perhaps low-intensity conflict doctrine’s pursuit of its noble goal can only 
be described as quixotic.498 
To assess a regime’s survivability, Schwarz points to its “ability to deal effectively 
with internal unrest by the discriminate application of force and the amelioration of 
conditions that engender it.”499 Whether or not this assessment was conducted became 
irrelevant in 1979 as the U.S. political leadership committed to assisting El Salvador. 
Facing reelection in 1980, President James (Jimmy) Carter felt pressured by 
Republican candidates to act in El Salvador for the “loss” of Nicaragua to Communism.500 
The hurried origin of U.S. involvement in El Salvador can explain the initial lack of an 
adequate irregular warfare strategy, but the prolonged absence of a coherent strategy 
represents a collective failure from the U.S. executive and legislative political branches as 
well as the U.S. military leadership. 
According to the “Colonels’ Report,” there was no “overarching strategic vision” 
in El Salvador from the beginning. The colonels wrote that “American involvement in the 
Salvadoran war took shape without well-defined objectives, a comprehensive plan of 
action, or a clear appreciation of the resources likely to be required. Unable to see the war 
as a whole, Americans improvised addressing problems in isolation as they appeared.”501 
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While there were many effective U.S. programs in El Salvador, in general, they were only 
effective locally and did not all drive toward a singular end. 
Despite financial support from Congress, U.S. military leaders in El Salvador did 
not feel like Washington was taking the problem in El Salvador seriously.502 The lack of 
whole-hearted commitment was unhelpful to waging a winning war and handicapped the 
advisors in the country.  
While the capability to employ military violence to kill insurgents existed, those 
serving in El Salvador recognized that political, social, and economic reform remained the 
under-addressed action necessary for winning the war.503 American advisors sought to 
persuade ESAF that, despite their newfound tactical ability, the path to victory lay in 
respecting human rights and winning popular support.504 The longstanding “authoritarian 
culture, economic structure, and political practices” of El Salvador were held in place by 
the very malpractice of their judicial system, land distribution, and lack of advocacy for 
human rights. Political success would rely upon resolution of these challenges.505 Because 
of this, American advisors sought to develop a new generation of ESAF not corrupted by 
the traditions of the senior officer corps.  
Although U.S. presence undoubtedly had a positive impact on the 
professionalization of ESAF, there remained exceptions among the ESAF who continued 
to carry out unlawful acts of violence that hindered Salvadoran progress. Many of the most 
egregious human rights violations were carried out by foolhardy U.S.-trained ESAF 
officers who politically aligned with the extreme right.506 Perhaps the training they 
received once again led to perceived justification for their actions. Additionally, the slow 
progress of judicial reform and punishment for human rights violations allowed the cruelty 
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to continue. The U.S. did eventually prioritize these reforms, acknowledging that “the rule 
of law is a cornerstone of democracy.”507 
Outside of efforts within ESAF and the Salvadoran government, the U.S. military 
also pursued reconciliation between the general population and the regime. The U.S. 
financed civil-military pacification programs that undermined the FMLN and portrayed 
ESAF and the Government of El Salvador as having the public’s best interests in mind. 
However, these programs reportedly failed due to the public’s lack of trust in ESAF.508 
This mistrust was likely due to the lack of focused political warfare efforts by both the U.S. 
and Salvadorans. 
The need for a strategy that emphasized the primacy of political competition over 
violence was evident in El Salvador, just as it was in Vietnam. The similarities between 
the conflicts are identified in Schwarz’ analysis: “the creation of responsive, legitimate 
government and the winning of the voluntary support of the population through 
redistribution and reform – and not main-force military operations – were perceived to be 
the keys to success in the Vietnam conflict, just as they are today in El Salvador.”509 Every 
conflict is unique, and there are always new lessons to be learned. However, the general 
concepts have remained the same for generations. To win/reach conflict resolution in 
irregular conflicts, emphasis must eventually be placed within the political spectrum. 
One of the successes in U.S. political-military strategy within the conflict was 
OPATT. In 1983 Colonel John Waghelstein, MILGRP commander, commissioned Major 
Peter Stankovich, SF team leader, to organize a task force in support of the National 
Campaign Plan to accelerate the “reconstruction of Salvadoran public services and 
infrastructure,” and improve popular support for the government.510 The effects of 
Stankovich’s 10-man Joint Task Force on the progress of the National Campaign Plan 
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generated confidence for the employment of advisor practices in El Salvador, which would 
ultimately lead to the creation of OPATT.511 
Beginning in 1984 and lasting nearly eight years, OPATT was one of the most 
enduring facets of the 12-year U.S. military’s participation in the Salvadoran Civil War.512 
OPATT helped transition ESAF from a static defense force, protecting critical 
governmental and economic sites, into a potent counterinsurgency force while also 
reducing their incidence of human-rights violations.513 However, the OPATT maintained 
its limited size throughout the conflict and could only help to better ESAF to the extent of 
its authorized force limitations.  
C. FLAWS IN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
The American foundation for conducting small wars is defective. Prominent 
among the defects is the American difficulty in accepting the requirement 
to fight small wars during what is ostensibly peacetime.  
—A.J. Bacevich, James Hallums, Richard White, Thomas Young, 
1988514  
The “Colonels’ Report” brings attention to the fact that “in El 
Salvador…congressional mandate requires that military policy and U.S.-supported 
development programs remain separate.”515 Additionally, the components of the U.S. 
Country Team (CIA, AID, USIA, and MILGRP) all reported to the Ambassador as well as 
to their respective parent commands, which led to mixed guidance (see Figure 18).516 This 
bureaucratic barrier created a dangerous situation for USAID and limited the effectiveness 
of the U.S. military on the ground, as well as ESAF, who were knowledgeable of the 
situation and capable of supporting the development programs. The report continues,  
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in organization terms, this means that in an insurgency-wracked country 
where the military represents the closest thing to an effective national 
institution, the Agency for International Development (AID) is expected to 
carry on as if neither the war nor the military existed. All of the 
philosophizing about popular support and praise for civic action as a 
counterinsurgent tactic counts for little when Congress enjoins American 
officials fighting small wars from using the local military force to help 
implement U.S. development programs.517  
The congressional mandate essentially eliminated the possibility of adherence to 
counterinsurgency doctrine and practices. 
 
Figure 18. U.S. Military Group (USMILGRP), El Salvador from 
Moore Thesis518 
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Due to the rapid expansion of ESAF, from 10,000 to 40,000 in five years, most 
battalion commanders were captains rather than lieutenant colonels and were also lacking 
experienced non-commissioned officers.519 While the U.S. effort helped to grow the force 
through recruitment and training, experience and professionalization would take more 
time. 
Another flaw was the lack of control of both funds and policy regarding security 
assistance. Security assistance funding and policy belongs to the host nation. Funding 
provided by the U.S. for security assistance was appropriated to and immediately available 
to El Salvador; the DoD was not allowed to control those funds. In addition, while 
Commander in Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) and the MILGROUP 
commander and advisors provided guidance, the responsibility was ultimately that of the 
Salvadorans, who made decisions, without, or against the advice provided. 520 
The confusing organizational decisions led to efforts being wasted on fixing 
structure in lieu of being put toward operational objectives. “Rather than questioning and 
testing the assumptions that underlie the doctrine, there is a constant tinkering with 
techniques and organizational charts,” Schwarz wrote.521 He continued, describing 
America’s involvement in El Salvador and Vietnam as “self-flagellation,” but does offer 
that “the cures offered are as familiar and simplistic as the diagnosis: ensure that low-
intensity conflict is not relegated to the periphery of military education, or manipulate the 
organization of the “country team” to guarantee interagency coordination.”522 
The “Colonels’ Report” also outlined the distraction caused by organizational 
shortcomings,  
Overlapping lines of civil and military authority within the theatre caused 
friction between the ambassador and the responsible unified commander, 
impeding coordination until senior officials with a fortuitous ‘personal 
chemistry’ arrived on the scene. Perhaps the most irritating to those serving 
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in El Salvador, a cumbersome, unresponsive intensely bureaucratized 
system of security assistance hampered American efforts to supply ESAF 
what they needed and reduced the utility of what might otherwise have 
provided an important source of American leverage.523  
Poor unity of command can create parallel efforts, and more projects and processes 
that receive little attention or are abandoned altogether due to lack of communication.  
A further organizational design failure was molding ESAF in the image of the U.S. 
military. The “Colonels’ Report” points out that over the course of the war, “structurally, 
ESAF emerged as a force better suited for conventional war than counterinsurgency.”524 
During the early stages of the war this tactical ability helped to shift the power balance 
toward ESAF, but once the battle became a true insurgency, ESAF’s efforts began to 
flounder. The U.S. advisors would later try to sway ESAF from the conventional preference 
they instilled, but were unable to succeed; ESAF was capable at fire and maneuver, while 
deficient in politically competing with the FMLN.525 
A lack of access to chain-of-command and reinforcement of what their mission 
statement was left some OPATT advisors to rely solely on the information and lessons their 
predecessors passed down to them. 526 Bailey notes that “it is rare to find a brigade adviser 
who recalls having seen what he considered a mission statement” and that in one particular 
instance, an advisor still had not met the MILGRP commander after the first 100 days of 
his assignment.527 The lack of communication and uncertainty of strategic purpose limited 
the effectiveness of U.S. advisors in El Salvador. 
In terms of Salvadoran organizational design flaws, the tanda system utilized by 
ESAF promoted all officers of each graduating class of the military academy together 
regardless of performance.528 This system not only made military proficiency irrelevant 
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among ESAF officers, but also allowed the corruption and criminal behavior to continue 
unchecked as these officers joined the entitled association of senior ESAF officers. While 
not all senior ESAF officers acted unprofessionally, unethical behavior was endemic to 
much of the corps. Corruption among Salvadoran officer corps included “commanders 
collecting the salaries of nonexistent ‘ghost soldiers,’ selling goods at inflated prices to 
their men, siphoning funds from food and clothing budgets, and leasing their troops as 
guards and laborers [which] served to vitiate the morale and fighting effectiveness of the 
Salvadoran military.”529 
D. OPERATIONAL IRREGULAR WARFARE APPROACHES 
A counterinsurgency effort must be fought with equal fervor throughout the 
country as part of a coordinated civil-military campaign. It must be waged 
at every level of the contested society. 
—LtCol Jeffrey Cole, 1989530 
Despite frequent comparisons to the Vietnam War and other small wars, the 
“Colonels’ Report” points out that “U.S. policy toward El Salvador represents an attempt 
to formulate a new approach to a painfully familiar problem.”531 The new approach was 
to provide weapons, ammunition, equipment, economic aid, intelligence, strategic counsel, 
and tactical training “while preserving that the war remains ultimately theirs to win or 
lose.” 532 They would reinforce this principle by restricting U.S. footprint and activities. 
Washington insisted that it was “peacetime” and, because of this, did not give the 
Salvadoran problem appropriate attention.533 Dean Hinton, ambassador to El Salvador 
from 1981-1983, claimed that many policymakers were hesitant to employ methods that 
made the situation look similar to Vietnam, including the use of local defense forces.534 
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The principles of relational maneuver were understood, but not put into practice. 
The “Colonels’ Report” stated that “American officers in the field recognized that the 
solution to the Salvadoran problem was not to be found strictly in military terms.” 535In El 
Salvador, and irregular warfare in general requires overlapping lines of effort in combat 
operations, civic action, psychological operations, stability operations, and civil defense 
force integration – all driven by intelligence – to achieve success.536 A relational maneuver 
style of warfare enables these overlapping lines of effort. 
Many viable political approaches were left unused by the United States for years, 
including assistance from the United Nations. Schwarz reveals that “until 1990, America 
did not seek a compromise brokered by the United Nations but pressed for a clear victory 
through a combination of military and reform measures. In these terms, American policy 
failed.”537 The feared instability in Central America and civil war in El Salvador was a 
perfect scenario for UN assistance whose principal goal is “the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”538 
In Schwarz’s evaluation, the U.S. efforts and “low-intensity conflict policy has 
merely achieved a prolonged and costly stalemate.”539 In El Salvador, just as in Vietnam, 
inadequate application of relational maneuver led to a drawn-out conflict with 
overemphasis on battlefield performance and underachievement in socio-political warfare/
endeavors, leaving the situation no closer to conflict resolution. 
The U.S. effort to create local defense forces began in 1983 with the Civil Defense 
program.540 The Civil Defense force would be composed of campesinos (peasant farmers) 
who lacked any prior formalized military training and would be led by ESAF NCOs.541 
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Recruitment was difficult as the campesinos were fearful of retribution from the guerrilla 
forces.542 Due to the continued size limitation of MILGRP, they utilized a “train the 
trainer” approach in the Civil Defense program, which led to a lackluster quality of the 
local defense forces.543 In addition, the Civil Defense personnel were composed of lower-
class locals who were barely able to meet their basic subsistence necessities, making it 
improbable that they would ever succeed as a proper defense force.544  
There is also evidence that neither ESAF nor the Salvadoran government ever truly 
supported Civil Defense. Duarte’s personal mistrust for Civil Defense dates back to the 
1970s when he was arrested and tortured by ORDEN (Order), a former local defense 
organization that maintained similar membership to Civil Defense.545 ESAF units also 
failed to provide adequate quick reaction force for the Civil Defense units.546 While there 
was little support from the Salvadorans, the Central Intelligence Agency did assist Civil 
Defense to a degree. In the event of Civil Defense forces being killed in action, the CIA 
provided a “death benefit” to the member’s family.547 However, this support could do 
nothing to make up for the lack of trust by the Salvadoran regime. 
 Local defense forces were never meant to replace the military or police, but rather 
to supplement them by slowing the advance of insurgents and notifying the appropriate 
authorities who can respond with force. Some Salvadoran military officer recognized this, 
stating that Civil Defense should be “informers not combatants,” yet their advice was never 
heeded.548 The ESAF trainers further contributed to limiting the capability of Civil 
                                                 
542 Cole, “Assisting El Salvador,” 63. 
543 Long et al., Locals Rule, 99. 
544 Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds, El Salvador at War: An Oral History of the Conflict from 
the 1979 Insurrection to the Present (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 337, 
cited in: Long et al., Locals Rule, 99. 
545 Jose Napoleon Duarte, Duarte: My Story (New York: Putnam, 1986), cited in: Long et al., Locals 
Rule, 103. 
546 Long et al., Locals Rule, 104. 
547 Moore, “Gold, Not Purple,” 66. 
548 Interview with Colonel Sigfredo Ochoa Perez in BDM International, 1988, Vol. 6, p. 15, cited in: 
Long et al., Locals Rule 105. 
145 
Defense by stockpiling boots, rifles, and ammunition that were meant for issue to Civil 
Defense units. ESAF units were holding the equipment for themselves in the event that the 
U.S. abandoned El Salvador.549 It was also the sporadic nature of congressional funding, 
not knowing if more money was en route or if the U.S. would pull out, that led to increased 
stockpiling. Instead of funds being strategically focused, they were spent on items that 
would sustain the force for a prolonged time, rather than those that would increase 
effectiveness and drive success.550 
While there are some examples of Civil Defense successes, the majority of the 
assessments range from skeptical to negative.551 A 1986 examination of Civil Defense 
units revealed that only 30 percent were rated as being in “good condition.”552 The result 
of limited and localized success of Civil Defense sustained the mistrust by ESAF and the 
government.553 In their RAND study, Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local 
Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond, Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce 
Loidolt, and Todd C. Helmus point out that due to the mistrust of other Salvadorans, the 
valuable intelligence accessible to Civil Defense went unutilized.554 Local defense forces 
are crucial to maintaining stability in counterinsurgency environments, but must be 
supported by their nation’s government and military to provide tangible benefits, otherwise 
they remain disconnected from the main effort. There needs to be a mutual relationship 
between supporting and supported elements as depending on the circumstances, these roles 
will transition. 
The OPATT mission of ESAF expansion between 1984 and 1985 focused on 
creating a tactically proficient force that would be “capable of preventing an FMLN 
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victory.”555 Helicopters and close-air-support aircraft were provided to the Salvadoran Air 
Force by the U.S. military, and training focused on the battlefield component of 
counterinsurgency. Despite enhancing ESAF tactical ability, the OPATTs found it difficult 
to maintain credibility with ESAF due to restrictions on U.S. personnel accompanying 
ESAF operations.556 OPATT disagreed with these restrictions, but Congress felt they were 
necessary to prevent a “full engagement of American forces in a ground war in Central 
America.”557. These restrictions displayed U.S. policymakers’ lack of appreciation for the 
significant role advisors and rapport-building can play. This failure was reinforced by 
guests from SOUTHCOM, the Pentagon, and Congress, who would routinely show up to 
El Salvador without a comprehensive understanding of the situation on the ground.558 
Advisors need to prove their resolve for the mission to their partners continually, and 
leadership by example is a powerful method for achieving such ends. 
After improving the tactical ability of ESAF and preventing a military coup by the 
FMLN, American advisors sought to convince their ESAF counterparts that “winning 
popular support” should become their new primary focus.559 This operational shift by the 
advisors came with little support from the Salvadorans or the U.S. The Salvadoran regime 
was now capable of defending itself against the FMLN militarily, and the U.S. still had not 
implemented a comprehensive political-military strategy. This left the small number of 
American advisors as the driving force for the stabilizing effort. 
Had U.S. strategy makers or the Salvadoran regime understood relational maneuver 
or had studied past irregular wars, they would have recognized the necessary transition 
away from violence and toward a stabilizing political effort. The historical precedent of the 
U.S. efforts in Vietnam display that success in irregular warfare depends on establishing 
legitimate control of the population, not simply attrition of enemy forces. More 
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specifically, political reform of principle grievances may be necessary to undermine the 
insurgency and gain popular support.560 
With this in mind, the U.S. political efforts sought to “deprive the FMLN of its 
appeal.”561 After ESAF battlefield victories, they would target guerrilla forces with 
psychological operations campaigns, distributing pamphlets and posters of guerrillas killed 
in action to the guerrilla camps that were “carefully worded not to provoke anger, but rather 
feelings of remorse and hopelessness.”562 In certain circumstances, these pamphlets led to 
the surrender of guerrilla fighters who would be exploited for the target of additional 
guerillas.563 
State Department officials agreed with the assessment in the 1984 Kissinger 
Commission report that the decisive factor for success in El Salvador was a fair and 
functional judicial system and stable democratic establishments, such as labor unions and 
the press.564 As long as the lack of accountability for the death squads and other human 
rights violations remained a constant, El Salvador would remain locked in civil disputes 
between opposing factions. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created the Municipios 
en Acción (MEA/Municipalities in Action) program in 1987 to make development funds 
directly accessible to local mayors.565 Mayors would hold town meetings to prioritize 
projects and request funding from the Salvadoran government’s National Commission for 
Area Restoration (CONARA), which acquired funding from USAID. MEA was generally 
considered a success but, like other programs, was not without its downsides. MEA 
succeeded in fulfilling the locals’ priority projects and many Salvadoran officials noted a 
positive correlation between municipalities with a Civil Defense force and MEA success, 
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bolstering support for both programs.566 However, others are skeptical, citing that the 
insurgents were unlikely to disrupt projects requested by locals, that there was no 
improvement to Civil Defense after MEA was introduced, and that the definition of 
“success” was skewed because completion of MEA projects did not lead to trust and 
support of the Salvadoran government or military.567 
E. CONCLUSION 
Look beyond the functions of security assistance, training, and advice. Call 
it war, and having done so, act accordingly.  
—A.J. Bacevich, James Hallums, Richard White, Thomas Young, 
1988568 
The combined lackluster U.S. and Salvadoran partner effort prolonged a conflict 
that could have been alleviated had relational maneuver been better implemented. 
However, despite the poor understanding and lack of unified effort by President Ronald 
Reagan’s administration, Schwarz reminds those assessing the conflict that they “must also 
recognize, however, that it is impossible to imagine any point in the past decade or in the 
future when El Salvador would not be a far more violent and unjust place, but for the 
American effort.”569 Some place the blame solely on the Salvadorans as it was their war 
to win or lose. Schwarz provides a valid rationale for this argument: “In tracing the 
frustrations of the efforts to reform El Salvador, it would seem that the fault lies not in 
ourselves, but in the Salvadorans. El Salvador’s rightists and its military have often rejected 
the reforms that America deems necessary to counter the insurgency, and the United States 
has time and again been met with frustration as El Salvador’s armed forces adopt 
Washington’s language even as they ignore its principles.”570 
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By 1989, those in El Salvador agreed that political reforms to fix the broken justice 
system and redistribute land were needed to stabilize the country and end the decades-long 
civil war.571 Many people unfairly place the blame on the United States, citing a perceived 
lack of effort and commitment.572 The Colonels’ Report also cites that “the U.S. 
government as a whole mustered enough commitment only to prevent El Salvador’s 
demise.”573 The truth is that U.S. strategy failed to find a way to solve the endemic political 
instability in El Salvador. 
Once the U.S. government was no longer fearful of Central America collapsing to 
communism, it turned over the responsibility of mediation to the UN.574 Although the U.S. 
military advisors in El Salvador recognized that establishing legitimate control of the 
relevant population was the necessary criteria for victory in irregular warfare, the larger 
U.S. military was yet to implement strategies that align to these ends. Bacevich believes 
that this mismatch of understanding and practice “will condemn Americans to recurring 
frustration in future small wars.575 
Those who oppose the U.S. view small wars as high-stakes, and they apply 
maximum effort to them.576 On the importance of “commitment,” the Colonels’ Report 
explains that it is not a commitment of scale, but rather a commitment of intensity. As was 
the case in Vietnam, the guerillas in El Salvador were wholly and unequivocally 
determined to wage and win their war, for which ‘small’ never equated to 
‘inconsequential’. This enemy recognized and capitalized on the reality that force could be 
used “as a legitimate political instrument,” a lesson the United States still had not 
internalized.577 
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Despite MILGRP and Congress not clearly conveying the mission or the means to 
accomplish it, OPATT were of notable excellence and effect during the Salvadoran Civil 
War.578 A small band of SF and Marine advisors cultivated a deep understanding of their 
environment and were able to execute a counterinsurgency campaign with minimal 
guidance or interference. While the lack of interference allowed advisors to rapidly adapt, 
the lack of guidance left the military effort detached from national political objectives and 
strategic leadership. Retrospective analyses have concluded that OPATT was the principal 
source for ESAF’s improvements, both tactically and civilly.579 OPATT’s influence was 
confirmed by FMLN commander Joaquin Villalobos who, upon reflection, noted that 
American advisors played the largest role in the deterioration of the FMLN. OPATT’s 
professionalization of ESAF, particularly in minimizing their abuses, served to undermine 
FMLN propaganda and as a result, their recruitment dwindled.580 Cecil Bailey puts 
OPATT’s impact into perspective, noting that between 1985 and 1992 “just over 140 SF 
officers and NCOs served as advisors to a 40-battalion army of 40,000 men scattered across 
the country in 14 garrisons with responsibilities for the security of dozens of critical sites 
and hundreds of civil-defense units.”581 A small number of advisors made a tremendous 
impact that led to the demobilization of the FMLN, displaying a remarkable return on 
investment. However, this did not come without a cost. OPATT advisors served one-year 
assignments and many returned to El Salvador for multiple tours. 
Bailey concluded his article writing, “It was one of those rare assignments that 
attracted SF Soldiers because they believed the mission was important and that it was 
“theirs” to accomplish. They knew that they could make a difference, and they were willing 
to pay the price to do it.”582 Waging irregular war effectively should include utilization of 
advisors similar to OPATT. Given that OPATT received little support from Congress and 
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minimal direction from MILGRP, their performance is a testament to the effectiveness of 
the advisory practice. 
When questioned about lessons learned during the Salvadoran insurgency, General 
Woerner, then Commander-in-Chief of United States Sothern Command, said “my gut 
feeling is that there is nothing new.”583 To reiterate, the recommendations from the 
“Colonels’ Report,” which states that they hardly seem noteworthy or groundbreaking but 
bear noting due to failure of implementation, are as follows: 
• Make room for the study of small wars in military schools. 
• Clarify organizational responsibilities for fighting small wars, in 
Washington and the field. 
• Overhaul the procedures governing security assistance. 
• Before undertaking any intervention, establish a vision of what you hope 
to accomplish and a consensus of political support to sustain that vision. 
• Put someone in charge, vesting that official with real authority. 
• Send your first team and permit its members the latitude needed to get the 
job done. 
• Foster institutional change only where it will make a difference.  
• Avoid inappropriate technology. 
• Weight the “other war” as the tougher part of the proposition.584 
These recommendations embody relational maneuver. The argument can be made 
that it is commitment that matters most. If the United States political leadership decides to 
go to war, small or big, to achieve its ends, it should do so understanding the nature of the 
operational environment, assess the level of threat in relation to U.S. interests, and align its 
level of support appropriately to achieve its objectives. The level of commitment should 
not be disproportional to the level of interests at stake; however, war and warfare require 
the dedication of specific personnel and resources who can employ relational maneuver by 
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developing an appropriate understanding of the environment; informing, influencing, and 
implementing political-military strategy; tailoring the force’s organizational design; and 
applying the appropriate operational approaches led by embedded advisors. In El Salvador, 
although not expending excess blood and treasure as in Vietnam, the U.S. military still 
failed to adequately apply the principles of relational maneuver. 
Just as in Vietnam, it took years of U.S. involvement in El Salvador to transition 
toward the principles of relational maneuver. Figure 19 depicts the style of warfare and 
modes of competition during the Salvadoran Civil War. Violence and attrition were 
necessary early on to prevent an insurgent coup, but lasted far too long due to the lack of 
understanding of the Salvadoran environment and failure to develop a sound political-
military strategy to address the core grievances of the Salvadorans. However, by the end 
of the conflict, U.S. advisors were advocating for the appropriate policies and actions that 
would lead to stability in El Salvador. However, in comparison to the excessive cost, both 
financially and of human life by MACV, the congressionally mandated restraints in El 
Salvador through an adaptive small footprint approach produced much better strategic 
outcomes than in Vietnam. 
 
Figure 19. U.S. Military Adaptation in El Salvador 
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V. AFGHANISTAN: “STILL A QUESTION MARK”585  
We had no idea of the complexity of Afghanistan—tribes, ethnic groups, 
power brokers, village and provincial rivalries. So our prospects in both 
countries were grimmer than perceived, and our initial objectives were 
unrealistic. And we didn’t know that either. Our knowledge and our 
intelligence were woefully inadequate. We entered both countries oblivious 
to how little we knew.  
—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 2014586 
Al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11th, 2001, galvanized the United States to a 
degree unknown since December 7th, 1941. Osama Bin Laden’s attack also launched the 
United States into a global war that began in the mountains of Afghanistan. While then-
President George W. Bush described the new war as one of good versus evil that echoed 
World War II and the fight against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the war in 
Afghanistan quickly proved to be radically different, composed of a complex network of 
threats that the United States has struggled to effectively understand, confront, and 
overcome.587 The U.S. military has played a leading role in Afghanistan and has met both 
success and failure in its quest to defeat al Qaeda, deny terrorist safe-havens, and leave 
behind a legitimate form of self-sustaining governance. Ultimately, however, the U.S. 
military’s struggles to effectively employ relational maneuver mirror many of its struggles 
30 years prior in the jungles and highlands of Vietnam.588 Unlike Vietnam, the final verdict 
in Afghanistan has not been reached. Applying this study’s analytical framework to the 
U.S. military’s irregular warfare effort in Afghanistan since 2001 reveals that it has failed 
to adequately understand the complex network of threats in Afghanistan, failed to 
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implement an effective political-military strategy until nine years after its initial invasion, 
failed to appropriately tailor its organizational design to overcome the confronted threats, 
and overemphasized attritional operational approaches at the expense of addressing root 
political problems within Afghanistan and the region.589 As retired Foreign Service officer 
and author Todd Greentree explains, “as in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in 
adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy.”590 
A. BACKGROUND 
The literature on the U.S. military’s effort in Afghanistan reveals five general 
phases from 2001 until the present day.591 As with the previous Vietnam and El Salvador 
case studies, relational maneuver provides the analytical framework to examine and assess 
the effectiveness of the U.S. irregular warfare effort in Afghanistan. While the U.S. 
military, and especially special operations forces (SOF), did adapt over time and implement 
some effective relational maneuver principles based on understanding Afghanistan’s 
operational environment and the relevant threats, overall, the U.S. political-military 
irregular warfare efforts in Afghanistan reflect unbalanced tendencies toward attritional 
warfare that have proved detrimental to producing desired strategic outcomes. 
Phase One began immediately following the attacks on 9/11, with the overthrow of 
Mullah Omar’s Taliban Regime, and lasted until the military shifted to planning and 
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executing the invasion of Iraq in the Spring of 2003. Phase Two spanned from the shift in 
priority to Iraq until President Barak Obama took office and authorized a change in strategy 
for Afghanistan in 2009. Phase Three included President Obama’s surge of forces and 
resources and lasted until mid-2011 when U.S. forces began to withdraw. Phase Four 
started with the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ended when the U.S. mission changed from 
Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation Freedom Sentinel and the NATO-led Operation 
Resolute Support in January 2015.592 Currently in Phase Five, the United States continues 
to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) within 
Operation Freedom Sentinel. 
1. Phase 1: Invasion 
Following the attacks on 9/11, President George W. Bush and his administration 
quickly identified that al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, had orchestrated the attacks from 
its safe-haven in Afghanistan.593 On 7 October 2001, the U.S. military began bombing al 
Qaeda and Taliban positions in Afghanistan.594 Shortly after, initial Army Special Forces 
teams linked up with CIA elements across Afghanistan, including the Northern Alliance as 
well as Pashtun leaders in the south such as Hamid Karzai.595 The subsequent destruction 
of al Qaeda and Taliban forces occurred rapidly, as less than 100 CIA and 350 SOF 
personnel, along with aviation assets, supported Afghani partners in seizing Mazar-i-
Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, and Kabul by mid-November.596 The rapid collapse of the Taliban 
Government most visibly culminated when the Mullah Omar abandoned the capital of 
Kandahar and fled to Pakistan in December 2001.597 From December through March 2002, 
                                                 
592 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Reconstructing the Afghan Defense and 
Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA, 2017), 109; NATO, 
“NATO and Afghanistan,” accessed 30 July, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm. 
593 Bolger, Why We Lost, 32–33; “President George W. Bush’s Speech”112–121. 
594 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 91. 
595 Schroen, First In, 209–244; Coll, Directorate S, 98–102. 
596 Hooker and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 444; Doug Tanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary 
Story of a Band of U.S. Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan, large print ed. (Detroit, MI: 
Thorndike Press, 2009), 671. 
597 Hooker and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 445. 
156 
the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban retreated to the eastern mountains between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and fought a series of battles at Tora Bora and later in the Shah-
i-Kot Valley as part of Operation Anaconda.598 Although suffering tremendous losses, 
much of al-Qaeda and Taliban senior leadership escaped into Pakistan and would later 
reconstitute.599 
Meanwhile, between November 2001 and June 2002, the United Nations (UN) 
facilitated a meeting in Bonn, Germany, between non-Taliban Afghan political leaders to 
form an interim Afghan government.600 After the Afghan leaders agreed to establish this 
interim government, the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1383 and 1386, which 
formed the foundation to support the new government in Afghanistan.601 During this same 
time, the newly-formed Afghan Interim Authority in December 2001, followed later in 
June 2002 by the Loya Jirga, chose Hamid Karzai to lead the interim Afghan government 
and provided a two-year mandate to oversee the reconstruction of Afghanistan and an 
initial series of presidential and constitutional elections.602 In April 2002, following 
Operation Anaconda, President Bush announced that the United States would invest in 
Afghanistan through a Marshall Plan-like strategy to allow the Afghan people to 
rebuild.603 Although President Bush stated his intent to implement a reconstruction plan, 
the National Security Council (NSC), State Department, and Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) did not actually request the funding from Congress necessary to carry out 
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such a plan.604 Instead, the majority of the funding actually requested went to the 
military.605  
Within the NSC, a debate also raged between Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell regarding the proper levels of force required 
to accomplish U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.606 Secretary Powell argued for the 
application of overwhelming force in line with what was known as the “Powell Doctrine” 
and similar to former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s requirements for the 
application of U.S. military force.607 Secretary Rumsfeld, meanwhile, argued and 
ultimately succeeded in employing a light-footprint approach. The invasion and subsequent 
insurgency in Iraq, however, soon overwhelmed any consideration of the situation in 
Afghanistan. 
2. Phase 2: Prioritization of Iraq, Lack of Direction, and a Growing 
Insurgency 
After the U.S. military achieved rapid military success by overthrowing the Taliban 
regime and driving al Qaeda from Afghanistan, the U.S. political-military leadership, led 
by President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary Rumsfeld, 
quickly shifted attention toward regime change in Iraq.608 Within hours after the 9/11 
attacks, Secretary Rumsfeld had begun looking for connections between the attack and Iraq 
and, by November 2001, had ordered the military to begin developing options for invading 
Iraq.609 Even before the decision to invade Iraq became public, the administration’s and 
military’s priorities had shifted to Iraq by the end of 2002.610 While the American military 
and political efforts in Afghanistan proceeded, the U.S. military launched Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom (OIF) in March 2003. Less than 45 days later, in remarks to reporters in Kabul, 
Rumsfeld announced the end of major combat operations in a secured Afghanistan that had 
moved toward stability and reconstruction.611 Later that same day, President Bush 
announced the end of combat operations in Iraq.612  
The history of Afghanistan and Iraq immediately following Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld’s and President Bush’s announcements that major combat operations had ended 
reveals a significant gap in understanding of actual conditions within Afghanistan’s and 
Iraq’s operational environments. Instead of the end of war and combat, insurgency and 
widespread violence began to grow in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Between 2003 and 2005, 
Afghanistan saw initial progress toward establishing a central government.613 Hamid 
Karzai handily won the nation’s first elections in 2004, while the international coalition 
worked to disarm the warlords and militias that had overthrown the Taliban.614 
Simultaneously, however, al Qaeda and the Taliban had reconstituted in Pakistan and had 
begun to re-infiltrate and reorganize in southern and eastern Afghanistan in traditional 
Pashtun tribal areas to conduct low-level insurgency and regain control of the populace.615 
Since U.S. and coalition efforts primarily focused on the urban seat of government around 
Kabul, as well as the border areas with Pakistan, the resurgence of the Taliban across the 
rural south and east of Afghanistan went virtually undetected and unaddressed due, in part, 
to the the coalition and Afghan leaders’ disproportional focus on establishing centralized 
governance in the larger urban centers around Kabul.616 By 2005, the Taliban began to 
openly amass conventional company- and battalion-sized forces to attack and overrun 
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poorly prepared Afghan security forces, and violence began to spill over into the larger 
population centers.617 
In the summer of 2003, NATO officially assumed leadership of the International 
Security Assistance Force mission and gradually expanded ISAF’s centralized footprint 
from Kabul to the more rural areas.618 Simultaneously, the U.S. military faced mounting 
casualties from an aggressive insurgency in Iraq and placed mounting pressure on the 
NATO coalition to provide more forces and take more direct ownership for security on the 
ground in Afghanistan.619 While ISAF gradually expanded its ownership of Afghanistan’s 
operational environment, the growing insurgency nearly tripled the number of foreign 
security forces killed from 58 in 2004 to 129 in 2005.620 In response, ISAF leadership 
surged more forces to the south and particularly into the heartland of the insurgency in 
Helmand and Kandahar provinces.621  
The increased ISAF pressure forced the insurgents to revert to more traditional 
guerrilla tactics by the end of 2007.622 The Taliban significantly increased their use of 
improvised explosive devices (IED), previously rare suicide attacks, assassinations, and 
harassment attacks between 2005 and 2009.623 While both civilian and coalition military 
casualties mounted, the U.S. and coalition leadership in Afghanistan struggled to confront 
and reverse the Taliban’s momentum, which threatened a complete collapse of Karzai’s 
fragile government.624 By the end of 2008, a strategic review of Afghanistan ordered by 
President Bush had revealed that major changes in Afghanistan needed to occur to avoid 
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complete failure.625 With the U.S. presidential election looming in 2008, however, 
President Bush decided to withhold the public release of his review, enabling the new 
administration to determine the path forward.626 
3. Phase 3: A More Unified Effort and the Surge 
President Barack Obama proceeded to order his own strategic review of 
Afghanistan, which confirmed the requirement of providing additional forces and 
resources as well as new leadership to oversee the effort.627 General Stanley McChrystal 
arrived in Afghanistan in 2009 and soon assessed that additional troops would be necessary 
to reverse the insurgency’s momentum.628 The ensuing policy and strategic debate lasted 
nearly a year, after which President Obama surged an additional 30,000 troops and 
bolstered the level of civilian support.629 These additional personnel and resources 
provided relief but came with the controversial public caveat that these forces would begin 
to withdraw in the summer of 2011.630  
As Phase Three of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan continued, the new 
strategy, bolstered by a more unified political-military leadership, moved the additional 
forces into the rural Taliban strongholds, especially in Kandahar and Helmand.631 By 
moving into these Taliban strongholds, the U.S. and coalition forces intended to reverse 
the Taliban momentum and buy time for the developing Afghan National Security Forces 
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(ANSF) to take the lead in security and reconstruction.632 This phase reversed many of the 
Taliban’s gains through severe attritional force, but it did not break the insurgency.633 
4. Phase 4: Force Reductions and the “End” of Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
In June 2011, President Obama ordered the U.S. military to withdraw 33,000 troops 
by the summer of 2012 and a complete transition to Afghan authority by the end of 
2014.634 As ordered, the U.S. military began the steady withdrawal of forces, which lasted 
until the end of 2014. At the height of the surge in 2011, the U.S. military had nearly 
100,000 troops in Afghanistan; by the end of 2014, that number reduced to approximately 
10,000.635 During the retrograde, conventional and SOF military forces worked feverishly 
to train, advise and assist their ANSF partners to expand security and control of key districts 
in advance of timed withdrawal.636 By the end of 2014, most coalition military bases had 
been handed over to Afghan counterparts, and U.S. and coalition forces had withdrawn to 
only a few remaining bases, mostly to the east near Kabul and Kandahar, acting as a 
residual counterterrorism force as well as provide mentorship for select ANSF units.637 
5. Phase 5: Operation Resolute Support/Freedom Sentinel 
Phase Five began on January 1, 2015, when OEF transitioned to Operation Freedom 
Sentinel.638 By the beginning of 2015, following the withdraw of U.S. combat troops, 
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Taliban forces launched significant offensives across Afghanistan.639 While suffering 
significant casualties, the ANSF successfully fended off these assaults and reclaimed major 
population centers that the Taliban had temporarily seized.640 The residual U.S. and 
NATO military forces and supporting assets have since enabled the ANSF and the 
government in Kabul to hang on, but the future stability of Afghanistan remains very much 
in doubt as of 2018. Since taking office, President Donald Trump affirmed an indefinite 
U.S. commitment to securing a stable Afghanistan and preventing a safe-haven for terrorist 
operations against the United States.641 This brief synopsis of the major milestones in the 
opening and continuing front of the global war on terror enables a deeper analysis of the 
U.S. military’s employment of the principles of relational maneuver in Afghanistan.  
B. MISUNDERSTANDING THE THREAT: THE FOUNDATION FOR 
FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN 
Neither national-level figures nor field commanders fully understood the 
operational environment, including the human aspects of military 
operations. To fight, in Rupert Smith’s term, war among the people, one 
must first understand them. We were not intellectually prepared for the 
unique aspects of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both conflicts, ethnic, 
religious, and cultural differences drove much of the fighting. Efforts to 
solve this problem—Human Terrain Teams and the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Hands Program, for example—came too little and too late. Our intelligence 
system was of little help here primarily because the Intelligence Community 
did not see this as its mission. The need for information aggregation stands 
as an equal to classical all source intelligence. Our lack of understanding of 
the wars seriously retarded our efforts to fight them and to deal with our 
indigenous allies, who were often more interested in score-settling or 
political risk aversion than they were in winning the war.  
—Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, 2015642 
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The initially successful unconventional warfare effort led by the CIA and U.S. 
Army Special Forces to overthrow the Taliban Regime in 2001 belied a lack of 
understanding of the operational environment in Afghanistan. Claims from Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld and military practitioners who participated in this military victory 
ignored the underlying political complexities that allowed the U.S. military to unify Afghan 
warlords to overthrow the Taliban.643 Once the Taliban and al Qaeda had fled by early 
2002, shared interests of uniting Afghans ostracized or oppressed by the Taliban began to 
dissipate, revealing the shallowness of the original military victory.644 Not only did the 
military not understand the complexity of the threats going into Afghanistan, as described 
by Secretary Gates, institutionally, the military has failed to develop and maintain a deep 
understanding of the myriad of threats in the social-political context rife with interwoven 
religious, ethnic, tribal, economic, foreign and domestic variables.645 History indicates that 
the U.S. military forces deployed and assigned to overcome the challenges in Afghanistan 
have never adequately understood the operational environment or threats in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the military has been largely unable to produce effective ways to overcome 
those threats. The root of this institutional gap in understanding has been the failure to 
grasp the political nature and character of the war and operational environment in 
Afghanistan or how the U.S. military needed to adapt to succeed strategically.646 This gap 
in understanding appears to remain in 2018. 
As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained in his personal memoir, the 
U.S. political and military leadership lacked a comprehensive understanding of the 
operational environment in Afghanistan.647 This gap became readily apparent immediately 
after 9/11. When it became evident which organization had orchestrated 9/11, al Qaeda 
became the focal point for retaliation and the prevention of future attacks. Since al Qaeda 
operated under the umbrella of the Taliban government’s protection, President Bush 
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quickly demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and the other al Qaeda leaders, 
shut down all extremist training camps, and allow U.S. forces to physically inspect these 
camps for compliance.648 When Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, a personal friend of bin 
Laden, did not immediately comply with U.S. demands, the Taliban quickly became part 
of the group that were “with the terrorists.”649 This linkage between the Taliban and al 
Qaeda soon became a central point of contention for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan that 
continues into 2018. Throughout the war, the majority of the U.S. military and political 
leaders in DC and in Afghanistan understood neither the character and breadth of the 
relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, nor the exploitable gaps in that 
relationship.650 Due in large part to this lack of understanding, the political and military 
leaders, at all levels of command in Afghanistan, could not effectively maneuver to 
develop, adapt, or implement unified and effective strategic approaches to exploit 
vulnerabilities between or internal to either group to produce the desired political outcomes 
in Afghanistan.651 
Fueling this lack of understanding, in 2001 the military possessed little expertise or 
resident knowledge of Afghanistan.652 Instead the CIA, with their relationships dating 
back to members of the Northern Alliance who had fought the Soviets in the 1980s and the 
Taliban in the 1990s, provided the only resident local and regional expertise within the 
initial U.S. response to 9/11.653 After the collapse of the Taliban in December 2001, the 
U.S. military, and especially SOF, did not prioritize Afghanistan aside from 
counterterrorism efforts.654 These counterterrorism efforts translated to high-value kill or 
capture missions as the CIA targeted al Qaeda along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
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(Af-Pak).655 The military’s lack of understanding of the operational environment severely 
hampered America’s political-military efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.656 While 
the military saw al Qaeda as a threat, it did not appropriately understand or prioritize the 
complex social-political rifts between the political groups in Afghanistan.  
Exacerbating the fragmented social-political situation in Afghanistan, the 
international community and Interim Afghan Government determined to construct a 
centralized democratic government, even though no precedent existed for this model of 
government in a country like Afghanistan.657 Although other opportunities existed to 
restore the Afghan monarchy or explore options for a decentralized federalized systems, 
the U.S. and international political leadership rejected these options for a the revolutionary 
option to rapidly institute western-style democracy.658 The lack of precedent for a 
centralized-democratic-capitalistic form of government compounded with deep ethnic 
divisions entrenched by the brutality imposed by the predominantly Pashtun-led Taliban 
government during the mid-to-late 1990s.659 The Taliban was especially ruthless in its 
oppression and alienation of ethnic minorities across Afghanistan, including the Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtun tribal outgroups.660 Further stressing the strained ethnic 
divisions, Afghanistan’s complex web of social-political power consisted of an array of 
tribe, subtribe and clan relationships and alliances that extended across arbitrarily created 
national borders.661 Certain tribes and clans in Afghanistan’s austere Hindu Kush 
mountains had remained ungoverned by central Afghan power for centuries and possessed 
a long tradition of resisting outsiders’ attempts to rule dating back to Alexander the Great, 
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the British, and, most recently, the Soviets in the 1980s.662 These factors complicated the 
social-political power structure and presented a highly dynamic and uncertain political 
environment to the U.S. military. 
Throughout the conflict, one of the U.S. political and military leaders’ most 
significant gaps in understanding in Afghanistan has been the difficulty in adequately 
understanding the degree to which Pakistan’s domestic and foreign interests overlapped 
with conflict resolution in Afghanistan.663 Steve Coll and Ahmed Rashid’s histories of the 
conflict in Afghanistan has exposed that Pakistan has wittingly and unwittingly provided 
the primary safe-haven to insurgent-terrorists since 2001.664 The most public 
representation of this safe-haven occurred in 2011 when U.S. special operations forces 
killed Osama bin Laden in a raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan. This challenge of safe-haven in 
Pakistan still undermines U.S. strategy in 2018.665 Within America’s covert 
unconventional warfare support of the mujahideen in the 1980s, the vast amount of 
American support funneled through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.666 
The extent of Pakistan’s intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as its 
relationship with India, should have better informed the present-day U.S. military and 
political effort in Afghanistan. Instead, the U.S. political, military, and intelligence 
leadership seemed ready to accept Pakistan’s pledges of support to defeat both al Qaeda 
and the Taliban at face value.667 Since 2002, each U.S. president and senior U.S. military 
commander in Afghanistan has unsuccessfully attempted to deny the Afghan insurgency 
safe-haven in Pakistan.668 Thus far, the U.S. strategy and approaches in Afghanistan have 
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not aligned the interests of the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.669 This conflict 
with Pakistani interests has created steady support and safe-havens to Pashtun insurgent 
groups focused on overthrowing a Kabul government that has friendly inclinations toward 
India. Fundamentally, Pakistan appears committed to ensuring that government power in 
Afghanistan supports its interests in countering India and providing an outlet for Pakistani 
Islamists.670 
In addition to ineffectively confronting the ever-present Pakistani safe-haven for 
Afghan insurgents, the U.S. military has not institutionally developed a comprehensive 
understanding of the operational environment’s relevant participants inside Afghanistan. 
The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan started as early as 2002 and came from the 
traditional Pashtun areas that originally facilitated their seizure of power in Afghanistan in 
the mid-1990s.671 This Pashtun base of power extended past the artificial Durand border 
with Pakistan and into the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Balochistan in 
western Pakistan.672 The Arab and, especially, Saudi financial and Jihadist support to these 
areas during the Soviet-Afghan war created a fertile area for Salafi Jihadists to plot both 
global and local insurgencies against Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir-India, and the United 
States. Although each insurgent group possessed many unique characteristics, many of 
these factions also formed relationships that were strengthened and united by America’s 
invasion of Afghanistan and the perceived illegitimate emplacement of an apostate regime 
in Kabul.673 The United States’, and particularly its military’s, inability to distinguish 
between hardline insurgent groups and locally inspired insurgents severely degraded the 
military’s ability to identify exploitable weaknesses between factions within the Taliban-
led insurgency. Without a nuanced understanding, the U.S. military generally followed a 
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blunt-instrument approach to find and destroy the most readily identifiable insurgents.674 
This deficiency appeared to pervade the military, from the highest theater-level 
commanders to the most junior military personnel on the ground.675 
Institutionally, the U.S. military possessed a relatively shallow institutional 
understanding of the complex operational environment, which extended to the spectrum of 
threats to U.S. interests, including the enemies, adversaries, belligerents, and opportunists 
in Afghanistan.676 While the high-level al Qaeda leadership, known as al Qaeda Central, 
resided in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Quetta Shura, Afghan Taliban, led the overall 
insurgency, numerous other interconnected threat networks also existed. Dating back to 
their resistance days against the Soviets, individual tribal, clan and political groups, such 
as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani family and network, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistani Taliban, and most 
recently ISIL, have created an uncertain picture, the recognition of which is essential to 
understanding the overall environment and relevant threats.677 Beyond this array of active 
insurgent groups, other belligerents and opportunists range from local warlords that helped 
overthrow the Taliban, such as Ismail Khan in Herat, the drug and criminal network, and 
active direct participation from both Pakistani and Iranian agents.678 These disparate 
participating groups contained overlapping yet divergent agendas that could have been 
exploited to various degrees; yet the U.S. military’s limited or often non-existent 
understanding of these differences relegated much of the war to a kinetic war of attrition 
against the simplistically labeled Taliban or, more narrowly, against al Qaeda and its most 
direct affiliates.679 
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Irregular warfare expert David Kilcullen argues that U.S. political-military leaders 
missed an opportunity to reconcile with various Taliban factions after the fall of the Taliban 
Regime.680 This missed opportunity did not result from an official policy, but rather 
occurred due to a lack of understanding and “naiveté.”681 The policy of no-reconciliation 
issued by Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney ensured a united Pashtun-
Taliban insurgency.682 As the Taliban regime collapsed in the winter of 2001-2002, 
various former Taliban leaders attempted to reconcile with the newly formed Karzai-led 
government.683 Their reconciliation efforts were not exploited by U.S. leaders. In fact, 
some Taliban leadership were arrested while attempting to reintegrate into Karzai’s newly 
formed government.684 The U.S. military, led by SOF, instead of developing a 
comprehensive appreciation for the contextual environment, chose to employ a simplistic 
and heavy-handed counterterrorism direct action approach to capture and kill al Qaeda and 
Taliban leadership.685 This attritional mindset prevailed and dominated until 2009, eight 
years after the initial invasion. More recently, in 2017, 16 years after invasion, returning to 
this attritional mindset, President Trump stated in his updated Afghanistan strategy, “We 
are not nation building again. We are killing terrorists.”686 
The U.S. military did eventually develop a deeper understanding and adapt to the 
operational environment in Afghanistan. By 2009, ISAF Commander, General 
McChrystal, recognized that stabilization in Afghanistan could only occur by 
comprehensively addressing the roots of the insurgency in rural Pashtun Taliban-controlled 
areas.687 McChrystal and his successor, General David Petraeus, employed historical 
lessons recently relearned in Iraq and determined that the decentralized violent social-
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political problems could only be effectively addressed through controlling the population 
across the heartland of the insurgency.688 During this same time, SOF commander, then-
Brigadier General Miller, created the Afghanistan and Pakistan Hands (Af-Pak Hands) 
program to institutionalize critical cultural knowledge necessary to understand and 
confront the complexity of the operational environment and threat networks throughout the 
region.689 Although achieving only limited success, the effort represented an institutional 
attempt to adapt and develop the deep level of understanding necessary to overcome the 
complex irregular warfare challenges in Afghanistan.690 
Although military leaders, such as Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, improved 
the military’s institutional understanding of the operational environment over time, the 
military personnel waging the war typically only possessed a superficial understanding of 
Afghanistan’s complex social-political problems at the root of the insurgency.691 These 
root-problems centered on power and control that spanned the various tribal, ethnic, 
regional, religious, and general cultural dimensions in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the U.S. 
military’s inability to truly recognize and understand the major power brokers’ interests 
and goals, and lack of appreciation for the centrality of political warfare, prevented 
effective policies and theater strategy to adapt and achieve U.S. interests in the region.692 
Between 2009 and 2013, some military personnel, especially from SOF units that had 
deployed multiple times within the same region, gained a deep understanding of the 
operational environment through relationships with the various power brokers, but 
adequate understanding proved to be the exception, rather than the norm.693 
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In summary, the U.S. military in Afghanistan did not adequately meet relational 
maneuver’s foundational requirement to develop a deep understanding of Afghanistan’s 
operational environment, including both the relevant threat, neutral, and friendly 
participants internal to Afghanistan and within the regional context. Fundamentally, this 
lack of understanding translated into uncertainty as to who the adversaries were and how 
the U.S. political-military leadership should develop a strategy to overcome these 
adversaries. Specifically, the uncertainty regarding the connection between the various 
factions of the Taliban, as well as their relationship with al Qaeda, led to fundamental flaws 
in assuming that the United States could focus on al Qaeda while ignoring the Taliban early 
in the conflict.  
The U.S. military also failed to recognize the politically centered core of the 
irregular threat in Afghanistan. This failure further included the attempt to implement an 
unprecedented centralized form of government across a fragmental socio-political 
landscape and across areas traditionally governed only at the village or local level.694 
Moreover, the military did not acknowledge that the primary resistance to a stable 
Afghanistan would come from the recently disempowered Pashtun-Taliban and affiliated 
groups, supported by Pakistan. Not recognizing the Taliban’s and their affiliates’ 
resurgence and insurgency across the south and east of Afghanistan constituted an 
unmitigated failure of understanding on the part of U.S. military leadership at every level 
of command in Afghanistan. Finally, the United States failed to comprehend that the 
primary threat facing any Afghan government, in any form, would most likely come both 
from internal sources of instability and subversion from Pakistan.695 
Instead of studying and understanding Afghanistan’s operational environment as it 
actually existed, Presidents Bush and Obama, the NSC, the U.S. military, and coalition 
U.N. and NATO partners chose to focus on building the Afghanistan that they wanted to 
exist.696 In line with the attempts to build a centralized central government, the U.S. 
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military under General Eikenberry began a military assistance effort to create an Afghan 
military that mirrored the U.S. military.697 This effort has created one of the world’s most 
ineffective armies encumbered by military technology that Afghanistan realistically cannot 
maintain, field, or employ.698 Except for a brief improved period between 2009 and 2013, 
the U.S. political-military leadership—from the theater-strategic to tactical level—failed 
to effectively orient within the operational environment or gain a deep understanding of 
Afghanistan’s context, its threats, or the inherent political nature of the conflict. The 
military’s comprehensive failure to grasp the adversarial and social-political context in 
Afghanistan laid the foundation for the ensuing failures to establish coherent political-
military strategy, which suffered from negligent organizational design and fueled a wide 
range of both effective and ineffective operational approaches over 17 years of war. 
C. POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 
The United States was often unable to knit its vast interagency capabilities 
together for best effect. The implementation of national decisions by 
various agencies and departments was a continuing problem for senior 
officials. The inability to integrate, direct, prioritize, and apply capabilities 
in the optimal manner diminished success as much as any faulty strategy or 
campaign plan. The converse is also true: our greatest successes were those 
pockets of interagency collaboration stimulated by innovative leaders.  
—Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, 2015699 
The evidence indicates that the attempts of the United States, UN, and NATO to 
construct and implement a political-military strategy in Afghanistan lacked unity of effort 
and have not produced the intended stable democratic nation or government.700 In the 
aftermath of the attacks on 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter and the United 
Nations adopted Resolution 1368, calling for swift justice against “the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for 
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aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will 
be held accountable.”701 Even long-time U.S. adversaries, such as Iran, condemned the 
attack and expressed support for U.S. reprisals.702 While internationally widespread 
support aided and legitimized American efforts to respond in Afghanistan, when the United 
States, and particularly the military led by Secretary Rumsfeld, abdicated its leadership 
role in Afghanistan, it created a chaotic environment of conflicting national command 
authorities and lines of effort.703 Since, 40 individual nations participated in stabilization 
and reconstruction underneath the umbrella of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), the NATO-led ISAF Command, and the U.S. unilateral efforts to target al 
Qaeda leadership, disunity, corruption, and ineffectiveness prevailed.704 To make matters 
worse, equally significant disunity prevailed within just the internal U.S. efforts. The 
Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the CIA, U.S. conventional military, and SOF all pursued disaggregated lines of effort that 
satisfied each organization’s individual interpretation of the mission and priorities.705  
The international community’s incoherent assistance to Afghanistan prevented 
Afghan officials or its newly-established military from developing competence and 
legitimacy.706 Furthermore, this chaotic environment enabled Afghan corruption that 
exploited the assistance provided.707 As financial and material assistance poured into 
Afghanistan, no system of accountability existed to ensure the legitimate use of that 
assistance. Strategic incoherence from the National Security Council (NSC) and President 
Bush also significantly contributed to the strategic chaos inside Afghanistan. Although the 
Department of Defense (DoD) had already begun to shift priorities toward planning for 
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invading Iraq as early as January 2002, the President’s speech in April 2002 expressed an 
expansive set of goals for Afghanistan that included the creation of a westernized 
democracy.708 On the ground in Afghanistan, however, the U.S. military pursued a narrow 
strategic approach to find, capture, and kill al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.709 Even when the U.S. officially handed over responsibility for Afghanistan’s 
future to NATO-led ISAF, the CIA and U.S. military retained forces independent of ISAF 
to unilaterally hunt and attrite al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.710 
For a short period between 2003 and 2005, Afghan expert Seth Jones argues that 
the U.S. Ambassador and native-born Afghan Zalmay Khalizad and senior U.S. military 
commander in Afghanistan, U.S. forces commander Lieutenant General David Barno, 
pursued a unified U.S. political-military strategy, centered on countering the developing 
insurgency and strengthening Afghanistan’s governance.711 This strategy, encapsulated in 
Khalizad’s “accelerating success” focused on strengthening Afghan governance and 
reducing the strength of the warlords and residual militias throughout Afghanistan.712 
Although notable, this strategy never actually united U.S. political-military efforts within 
Afghanistan, and only met limited success in strengthening the central government while 
virtually leaving the rural countryside exposed to Taliban control.713 Furthermore, this 
effort did not unify or reflect the greater UNAMA or ISAF efforts.714 In 2005, both 
Khalizad and General Barno rotated out of Afghanistan, thereby undermining the 
continuity in relationships and the progress they achieved during their period of 
leadership.715 
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Political-military strategic coherence improved when General Stanley McChrystal 
assumed command of all U.S. and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan in 2009, but implementation 
of a unified political-military strategy did not occur until General Petraeus took command 
a year later.716 And, when political goals and strategy did align, President Obama had 
fundamentally undermined its strength by publicly announcing a pre-set timeline for 
withdrawal of U.S. forces.717 Accounts of the insurgency’s and Pakistan’s responses to 
President Obama’s withdrawal timeline signify the seriousness of this mistake.718  
In his 2009 speech at West Point, President Obama explained that America’s core 
goals in Afghanistan were to defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to stabilize 
the region to ensure that nuclear weapons would not fall into the hands of terrorists: “We 
must deny al Qaeda a safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it 
the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of 
Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for 
Afghanistan's future.”719 President Obama further explained that to achieve those goals, 
the United States would pursue “three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to 
create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an 
effective partnership with Pakistan.”720 Although this strategy clearly directed the U.S. 
political-military effort to confront the situation in Afghanistan, President Obama 
jeopardized its political strength when he announced that the United States would “begin 
the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.”721 Intended to inspire the 
Afghans to take ownership of their conflict and assure the U.S. public that the United States 
would not expend more than what national interests demanded, the publicly-announced 
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withdrawal timeline instead reinforced the narrative of America’s weak political resolve to 
the Afghans and Pakistanis and bolstered the insurgency’s will to outlast the United 
States.722 
Although the U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan finally reached a more 
coherent political-military strategy, the time allotted, shallow understanding of the 
operational environment, and organizational design flaws produced primarily military 
gains while not developing or supporting the requisite paths to political resolution.723 
During this same time, the transition between presidential administrations and leaks of 
classified documents effectively destroyed the relationship between Hamid Karzai and 
much of the senior U.S. political-military leadership.724 This broken relationship became 
publicly exposed as Karzai ranted over coalition-caused civilian casualties and ill-
conceived tactical techniques such as SOF night raids.725  
Simultaneously, while U.S. military forces surged across Afghanistan, taking over 
leadership in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, military forces expanded security through 
applied lessons from the military surge in Iraq, but often did so in rushed and formulaic 
ways that made no lasting contributions to political success.726 Without an appreciation 
for the unique complexities in Afghanistan to affect the political challenges, merely adding 
more military forces in Afghanistan only provided temporary stabilizing effects.727 
In Helmand Province, Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 8th Marines deployed just 
south of the Musa Qala District Center between 2010 and 2011 to clear, hold, and allow 
the Afghan local security forces to build within the area of operations.728 While the 
Marines fought to expand security, the lack of in-depth knowledge or effective partners, 
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combined with the relatively short deployment cycle, produced few lasting results.729 
While the security bubble expanded as of May 2011, no credible Afghan security forces or 
local officials were able to bolster meaningful support toward the central, or even local, 
Afghan government. In 2010, one talented Marine platoon commander, First Lieutenant 
(1stLt) (Ret) Robert Rain, earned the trust and respect of the local Pashtun villagers and 
leadership and established local security in one of the most violent areas in the district. 
This relationship only extended to 1stLt Rain’s Marines and not to the squad-sized 
contingent of poorly trained and motivated Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers at the 
Marines’ platoon patrol base.730 After fighting hard to expand the security bubble around 
Musa Qala in line with the theater strategy, the Marines knew that only a few months later, 
forces across Afghanistan would begin to withdraw, leaving no lasting political or military 
stabilization in Musa Qala.731 The status of those villagers who collaborated with the 
Marines south of the Musa Qala district center is unknown since insurgent forces reportedly 
possessed complete control of the district in 2017.732 
Military and civilian advisors did innovate by countering the Afghan insurgency at 
the village and local level. By 2010, a combination of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT), Village Stability Platforms (VSP) and Local Defense Force Afghan Local Police 
(ALP) initiatives along with District and Provincial Advisory Teams (DAT/PAT) sought 
to expand and connect governance across Afghanistan in a systematic manner.733 
Although producing mixed levels of success across areas ranging from Kunar, Urzgan, 
Herat, and Baghdis Provinces, these efforts were intended to produce enduring security 
and stable governance by developing deeper understanding of local problems and 
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solutions.734 While significant, since these efforts only operationally expanded in 2010, 
and began to slowly retract in 2011, much of the progress achieved merely dissipated once 
coalition forces withdrew from areas not sustainable by the ANSF.735 Furthermore, aside 
from the SOF-led VSP program, none of the other advisor programs were ever given 
precedence by the services that provided the manning personnel.736 Like in Vietnam, non-
standard advisory billets were outside of the military’s standardized career path and 
considered inconvenient and temporary requirements.737  
By the end of 2013, the military strategy primarily focused on withdrawing forces 
and turning over responsibility to ANSF partners.738 Furthermore, the U.S. military forces 
remaining in Afghanistan in 2013 mostly reverted to a kinetic attrition strategy, which 
provided time and space for the withdrawing forces and secured the Afghan national 
elections in the spring of 2014.739 Guidance provided to the SOF in Afghanistan mirrored 
the guidance 12 years before: find, capture, or kill al Qaeda and its affiliates in 
Afghanistan.740 While some continued to advise and assist their Afghan partners after most 
U.S. forces departed, other SOF leadership spoke openly of how Afghanistan was no longer 
a priority and how the military and SOF should turn their attention toward new missions in 
other regions.741 Once OEF ended and the U.S. Operation Freedom Sentinel and NATO 
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Resolute Support began, the U.S. military limited its strategy to counterterrorism 
operations and limited advising of Afghan units.742 
Overall, the U.S. military’s superficial understanding of the social-political 
operational environment, and of irregular warfare in general, prevented institutional 
recognition of the U.S. military’s role in informing, influencing, or implementing a 
political-military strategy in Afghanistan.743 Throughout the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
military provided the majority of the ISAF forces, and were often the only international 
forces present throughout much of Afghanistan, in the U.S. military bears the 
preponderance of responsibility for the application of strategy in Afghanistan.744  
Finally, even when coherent strategy was developed and approved at the strategic 
level, the U.S. military demonstrated only limited ability to effectively implement the 
strategy in concert with other coalition and interagency partners inside Afghanistan. This 
implementation was mostly dominated by the traditional application of military violence 
and did not attend enough to political competition within the war.745 After 2013, the 
successes achieved to-date were virtually abandoned, and the U.S. military pursued other 
missions. The military’s evolution toward unity of effort and command in Afghanistan 
reveals a lack of institutional capability to develop and implement effective political-
military strategy in irregular warfare operational environments. One description of the lack 
of effective strategy in Afghanistan argued that “our greatest, most persistent, most 
deleterious implementation problem was our inability to integrate the vast capabilities 
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resident in the national system for best effect. Indeed, we were not even able to achieve 
unified command of all military forces in Afghanistan until 10 years of war had passed.”746 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ADAPTATION 
Upon taking command in Afghanistan in 2009, General Stanley McChrystal 
made the rounds of his subordinate units and asked each of us, ‘What would 
you do differently if you had to stay until we won?’ At the time I was in 
charge of operations for a brigade in the middle of tough fight in eastern 
Afghanistan. It was absolutely the right question, but in retrospect it was 
also a trick question. The answer was to get the right people into the fight, 
keep them there long enough to develop an understanding of the 
environment, and hold them accountable for progress, but that was not 
something the military was interested in doing. Instead, we stuck with a 
policy that rotated leaders through the country like tourists. 
—Jason Dempsey, 2016747 
The U.S. military’s inability to influence and implement a coherent political-
military strategy directly resulted from not adequately tailoring its organizational design to 
overcome the threats in Afghanistan’s operational environment.748 Four primary 
deficiencies exposed the lack of appropriate design for the forces tasked with confronting 
the threats in Afghanistan. First, the complex international and U.S.-internal chains of 
command prevented unity of command and unity of effort for much of the conflict.749 
Second, the rotation of forces, based on internal bureaucratic constraints rather than the 
needs of the operational environment, delayed understanding the threats and conceiving 
potential solutions.750 Third, military forces under-prioritized intelligence collections and 
overemphasized traditional military threats rather than understanding the political 
                                                 
746 Hooker and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 243. 
747 Thomas E. Ricks, “Our Generals Failed in Afghanistan: The United States Displayed a Failure of 
Leadership in Afghanistan;” Foreign Policy, October 18, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/18/our-
generals-failed-in-afghanistan/. 
748 Hooker and Collins, Lessons Encountered, 9–10, 173; 244–249. 
749 Irwin, Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means, Ch. 6. 
750 Hooker and Collins, Lessons Encountered, Ch. 3; Greentree, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,” 337–
338.; Major Bailey’s deployment experience in both conventional and SOF Marine units. 
181 
framework and context that produced and enabled the traditional threats.751 Lastly, while 
the military effort did evolve toward employing embedded political-military advisors, this 
evolution took far too long to become effective and, even then, did not adequately 
emphasize the political role of the advisor in irregular warfare.752 
The lack of U.S political-military leadership, both strategic and operational, 
undermined strategic objectives in Afghanistan.753 After the fall of the Taliban Regime in 
2002, Afghanistan experienced a short-lived respite from violence and a measure of peace 
and stability. During this early phase and throughout the entire conflict, the U.S. military 
deployed the largest number of forces to Afghanistan even while the UNAMA and ISAF 
mission expanded and NATO took the lead.754 As a wide range of military and civilian 
partners and non-governmental aid organizations arrived, no coherent chain of command 
existed to direct the aid or advise the newly appointed Afghan civilian and military 
leadership.755 In Afghanistan, the United States and its military, based on its available 
personnel and resources, was the only nation that could have unified assistance to the 
Afghans. 
Not until 2010 did unity of command and effort begin to improve in a meaningful 
way.756 Furthermore, unity among SOF efforts did not occur until Major General Thomas 
assumed command of the newly constructed Special Operations Joint Task Force 
Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) in 2012. Major General Thomas unified all SOF missions 
including: U.S. special missions units, ISAF SOF, and Combined Forces Special 
Operations Component Command Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) conducting combat advising 
missions across Afghanistan.757 Even after improvements better unified command and 
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synchronized efforts, as forces withdrew in 2013, the complex U.S. and international 
chains of command continued to contribute to uncertainty, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness 
in pursuit of theater objectives.758 The high levels of internal bureaucracy elevated priority 
of time and attention toward managing internal coalition relationships and command 
approvals rather than focusing on the partner force Afghans or understanding and 
confronting the adversaries throughout the areas of operation.759 
Exacerbating Lewis Irwin’s description of America’s “disjointed ways and 
disunified means” in Afghanistan, the lack of continuity due to short deployment rotations 
and the U.S. military’s institutional failure to dedicate individuals and units to resolve the 
challenges in Afghanistan perpetuated a cyclical model of relearning old lessons and 
rebuilding relationships, all of which ultimately undermined effectiveness.760 The most 
comprehensive analysis of the U.S. failures in Afghanistan, Lessons Encountered 
explained that “in Afghanistan, neither generals nor sergeants had much time for on-the-
job learning and even less for reflection. The lack of information on local people and 
conditions hampered counterinsurgency efforts, which were further complicated by troop 
rotations.”761 
For military forces, unit tours lasted between three to fifteen months, with the 
longer tours being the exception rather than the rule, over the course of 17 years of war.762 
A typical eight-month deployment required nearly three months to gain an adequate basic 
appreciation for the threats, relationships, and partners—essentially relearning what the 
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last unit knew. In the following three months, the deployed unit would reach its max 
operational effectiveness, while it spent the last two months preparing to turn over to the 
next unit and redeploy.763 Unless a specific unit happened to possess experienced 
individuals who had previously deployed to that specific area of operations, its 
effectiveness in understanding the geography, partners, threats, and its own chain of 
command, let alone influencing long-term outcomes, remained limited and repeated itself 
on a cyclical basis with every new unit that arrived.764 With certain exceptions among 
coalition and U.S. SOF, especially from Army Special Forces (SF), U.S. military units 
rarely deployed to the same location or with the same partner forces, and if they did, the 
U.S. unit had often faced dramatic turnover in leadership and personnel, which contributed 
to gaps in understanding and effectiveness.765 
Another deficiency in organizational design, the U.S. military only slowly 
prioritized intelligence efforts over time and mostly overemphasized collections against 
the most superficial military insurgent targets. Early in OEF, the military saw its mission 
narrowly as a counterterrorist mission.766 This narrow view meant that understanding the 
basic social-political system across Afghanistan was generally not important. Therefore, 
by 2010, in areas like Musa Qala, Afghanistan, where U.S. and coalition forces had 
operated since 2006, basic counterinsurgency tasks, such as conducting a census, were left 
unattended.767 Furthermore, even when the military leadership did instruct and supervise 
its subordinates to gain an understanding of the power and social dynamics in the area of 
operations, it often produced marginal results. Within one Marine rifle company, 50% of 
the company’s platoon and squad officer and enlisted leadership made only superficial 
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efforts to appear to follow the company commander’s orders to closely integrate with their 
partner force and develop an understanding of the local social-political environment.768  
While in theory more mature and better trained for understanding more than just 
the enemy on the battlefield, SOF were not immune to a kinetically attritional mindset. 
This mindset pervaded both tactical senior enlisted leadership and officers. Some SOF 
teams in Afghanistan made negligible efforts to engage with or understand the political 
dynamics within their areas of operations, since it was not a specific task for their team.769 
Other units and programs did incentivize intelligence collections beyond the basic 
requirement to find and destroy the enemy on the battlefield. The Village Stability 
Operations (VSO) program represents one such program that did prioritize the necessary 
intelligence to succeed politically and militarily across Afghanistan’s unique geopolitical 
landscape through embedding at the most local level with Afghan partners and the 
populace. In 2010, while directing all U.S. intelligence collections in Afghanistan, Major 
General Michael T. Flynn wrote: 
Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is 
only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the 
overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower 
on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer 
fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied 
forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local 
economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how 
they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various 
development projects and the level of cooperation among villagers, and 
disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid 
workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do 
little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the 
knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful 
counterinsurgency.770 
The fourth major design flaw in Afghanistan consisted of the military’s 
underappreciation for the criticality of the advisory role. This underappreciation was 
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epitomized by not recognizing the political role of military advisors in irregular warfare in 
shaping and influencing both indigenous military and political partners. This gap in concept 
and execution inhibited the military’s understanding of the context as well as its ability to 
achieve strategic objectives. Although historical experiences make clear the requirement 
for effective advisors to train, advise, assist, and accompany partner nation forces in 
irregular warfare, the U.S. military did not properly incentivize or provide enough capable 
advisors to improve the capabilities of Afghan partner forces to confront the relevant 
threats in Afghanistan.771 Instead, the U.S. military attempted to build an Afghan military 
in its own image, which has resulted in an Afghan National Army (ANA) unable to sustain 
itself and barely able to retain defensive positions.772 Afghanistan does possess some 
more-capable SOF units, but similar to the U.S. SOF who trained them, most, such as the 
Special Operations Kandak’s (SOK), are designed to conduct light infantry raids and 
conventional combat and do not understand the necessity of waging political and violent 
competition to overcome the insurgency.773 Another side effect of molding Afghan 
security forces in the image of the U.S. military was the production of a military that could 
not sustain itself. By 2014, the SOKs’ logistical system was almost completely dependent 
on U.S. financial, contractor, and military systems. The units’ motor pools were more like 
junk yards than functioning support centers. Additionally, the dependence on U.S. systems 
and support was reflected throughout the larger Afghan government, threatened by collapse 
without external U.S. political backing. 
In February 2010, when President Obama surged thirty thousand additional forces 
into Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) had only filled 1,810 
out of the requisite 4,083 trainers.774 Furthermore, at the same time, the United States only 
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contributed 13% of the total NATO training effort.775 Another example of the inattention 
to critical advisory efforts included the lack of development of the Afghan National Police 
(ANP). When the initial plan for military assistance was established in 2002, Germany took 
the lead in building the Afghan police system.776 By 2003, the United States grew 
impatient with Germany’s lack of progress in developing the national police force and 
assumed primary responsibility, but contracted training out to DynCorp.777 When this 
failed to produce a quality police force, the U.S. military assumed total responsibility for 
police development. In 2010, the Afghan police remained incompetent and corrupt.778  
Beyond the purely training mission, U.S. military forces often did not properly 
prioritize the advise and assist role with partnered Afghan units, the very role that is 
fundamentally essential for long-term strategic success in U.S. irregular warfare missions. 
U.S. conventional forces especially struggled due to lack of education, training, and 
experience in these missions. In Helmand Province between 2010 and 2011, Marine 
infantry squads and platoon patrolled and operated with local ANSF, but not typically due 
to the necessity of the mission or an understanding of the long-term desired strategic end 
states. Rather, these units worked together due to the mandatory requirement that Afghan 
partners accompany every operation.779 Although the more mature leaders in these units 
understood the intent behind these requirements, and built the necessary relationships to 
facilitate success, an equal or greater number of U.S. military forces displayed open disdain 
for their Afghan partners and made only marginal efforts to advise and assist.780 These 
forces preferred instead to take the lead in combat, either for the sake of the thrill of combat 
or merely because direct combat operations constituted the extent of their knowledge of 
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warfare, and they believed that killing the enemy could directly translate to mission 
success.781  
Although typically more effective in advising and assisting their partners, SOF 
units demonstrated varied levels of effectiveness in bridging kinetic violence and political 
effects throughout Afghanistan.782 After 2009, like Vietnam’s Combined Action Program 
(CAP), the VSO/ALP program, led by Brigadier General Austin Miller, made headway in 
designing a framework that focused on advising partner forces and achieving strategic 
objectives in Afghanistan.783 Although VSO is most famous at the tactical level, its 
program extended through District and Provincial Augmentation Teams (DAT/PAT), 
which connected to Village Stability Coordination Centers (VSCC) that were designed to 
manage regional stabilization efforts across Afghanistan’s most critical districts.784 These 
VSCCs in-turn reported up to the theater command in Kabul.785 Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT) also existed to facilitate reconstruction and stability efforts and had mixed 
effects based on assigned leadership, individual national caveats, and short rotational 
assignments.786 The net effect of all these political-military advisory efforts never 
achieved full potential. Aside from various SOF units that prioritized the VSO mission 
between 2010 and 2013, the U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan never fully invested 
in adequately partnering with or advising the indigenous civilian and military forces to 
politically compete at all levels of warfare in Afghanistan.787  
Overall, the U.S. military has never adequately tailored its organization to the needs 
of the campaign in Afghanistan. Like Vietnam, in Afghanistan, the U.S. military displayed 
an apparent inability to adapt and appropriately tailor its organizational structure to 
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overcome the conflict. Lack of unity of command and effort, lack of continuity, insufficient 
and misallocation of intelligence, and failure to prioritize the advisory effort severely 
undermined the entire effort and contributed to ineffective operational approaches. 
Christopher Lamb’s and Megan Franco’s analysis in 2015 encapsulates the design failures 
in Afghanistan: “the U.S. national security system is not well organized to conduct 
extended irregular warfare missions. The departments and agencies dislike irregular 
warfare and resist creating organizations and programs to provide capabilities tailored to 
its demands.”788 
E. OPERATIONAL IRREGULAR WARFARE APPROACHES: THE 
GRAVITATIONAL PULL TOWARD ATTRITION 
When conventional warfare or logistical skills were called for in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Armed Forces generally achieved excellent results. At the 
same time, the military was insensitive to needs of the postconflict 
environment and not prepared for insurgency in either country. Our lack of 
preparation for dealing with irregular conflicts was the result of a post-
Vietnam organizational blindspot.  
—Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, 2015789 
Overall, the operational approaches employed by the U.S. military in Afghanistan 
between 2001 and 2018 have ranged from highly ineffective to highly effective. Generally, 
however, the U.S. military, as well as SOF, gravitated toward an attritional approach that 
emphasized traditional military kinetic actions and the destruction of the enemy at the 
expense of the approaches necessary to balance political and violent competition and 
achieve acceptable political outcomes.790 At the root of this flawed approach lay a 
widespread fundamental lack of understanding of the politically complex irregular 
environment and threat networks in Afghanistan. This lack of understanding prevented the 
employment of relational maneuver principles to identify and exploit adversarial military 
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and political weakness through advisory roles that fused political-military objectives and 
approaches down to the tactical level of warfare. 
After toppling the Taliban Regime in 2001, history indicates that the U.S. military 
failed to establish or facilitate adequate control over the population in Afghanistan or along 
its borders.791 During this time, the relative stability in the aftermath of the major fighting 
in early 2002 may have allowed small teams of U.S. or coalition advisors spread throughout 
the country to facilitate control through locally available Afghan partners.792 Early in the 
Afghanistan war, polls indicated that most Afghans had positive perceptions of the 
international mission in Afghanistan and would not have resisted light-footprint advisory 
approaches spread throughout the countryside.793 If the U.S. military had better cooperated 
with partner Afghan forces to gain control over vulnerable areas in southern Afghanistan 
and combined this effort with enhanced border security, especially along Pakistan, it may 
have mitigated the widespread insurgency that went unchecked in most of the south and 
east until 2006. 
Later, by 2009, when the Afghan government faced collapse due to the insurgency, 
the U.S. military adapted but was forced to surge a large number of troops in a deteriorated 
situation to attempt to establish control with undertrained and poorly motivated Afghan 
partners.794 Nonetheless, the surge of trainers and combat troops did facilitate seizing 
control of many areas previously under Taliban control.795 In many cases, however, this 
control was only temporary, and when U.S. forces left by 2015, the ANSF were often 
incapable or unwilling to retain control.796 Furthermore, even at the height of the surge in 
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2011, the U.S. military never effectively controlled the borders of Afghanistan, especially 
along Pakistan, which acted as the primary insurgent safe-haven and material support 
base.797 This vulnerability allowed the insurgency to freely move weapons, equipment, 
and personnel between Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout the conflict. 
From 2001 until late 2009, the U.S. military’s kinetic approach in Afghanistan 
sought to find and destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda. In early 2002, these operations 
consisted of large-scale operations to mop up resistance from al Qaeda and the Taliban 
along the border with Pakistan in Tora Bora followed later by Operation Anaconda.798 
Later between 2002 and 2005, the primary operations consisted of SOF raids along the 
border with Pakistan as well as targeted operations inside Afghanistan.799 Once the 
coalition recognized how large the insurgency had become, especially in areas like 
Kandahar and Helmand, Canadian and British forces moved into smaller outposts and 
conducted large sweeping operations with only temporary success.800 The U.S. military, 
in places like the Korengal Valley in the mountains along eastern Afghanistan, attempted 
to secure segments of the populace and target the Taliban’s, the Haqanni network’s, and al 
Qaeda’s attempts to infiltrate into Afghanistan and wage insurgency.801 Most of these 
efforts possessed neither sufficient partner forces nor the right U.S. or coalition forces to 
fight the irregular threats they confronted. To compensate for lack of understanding or 
sheer numbers, the U.S. and coalition forces tended to rely on aviation or supporting 
firepower to overwhelm enemy attacks.802As a result, this period saw the numbers of 
civilian casualties caused by coalition forces escalate, and the early positive perceptions of 
international assistance from many Afghans began to erode.803 
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Later in 2009, when General McChrystal took command of ISAF, he significantly 
changed the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to prioritize protecting the populace, even if it 
meant conceding tactical victories to the enemy.804 Some felt that his restrictions placed 
undue risk on the tactical forces and damaged the credibility of coalition forces, since they 
would concede to the enemy to prevent civilian casualties.805 Once General Petraeus 
assumed command, the overemphasis on preventing casualties rebalanced. Between 2010 
and 2013, U.S. forces emphasized local-level security and stabilization operations to 
facilitate control of the population. During this time, SOF continued to conduct both 
targeted raids as well as drone strikes across the border into Pakistan to attempt to stem the 
flow of lethal aid into Afghanistan.806 By 2013, U.S. forces limited civilian casualties and 
still effectively targeted the active insurgency.807 Throughout the war in Afghanistan, the 
U.S. military, and especially SOF, grew increasing tactically competent and lethal in 
destroying or disrupting identified insurgents.808 
That said, between 2001 and 2018, the U.S. military, at all levels of command, has 
not effectively politically competed against the insurgent threats in Afghanistan.809 Dating 
back to between 2001 and 2002, the U.S. military and political leadership ignored the 
opportunities to coopt the fragmented Taliban leadership.810 Instead, the military 
overemphasized attrition against insurgent fighters, kinetically targeting those 
individuals.811 Although at the national-strategic level attempts were later made in the 
conflict to negotiate with the Taliban, these attempts were mostly ineffective and were 
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conducted at odds with the other primary stakeholders who were necessary to implement a 
political resolution, namely the Afghanistan Government and Pakistan.812 
At a more tactical level, some units, especially among SOF, were able to identify 
and exploit rifts between various disenchanted Taliban leaders.813 In some cases, these 
efforts contributed to intra-insurgent violence or the reconciliation of former Taliban 
Commanders along with their local fighting force.814 One notable high-level defection 
occurred in 2016 when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar overtly changed allegiance from the Taliban 
to the Afghan Government.815Although notable examples of success occurred, the 
understanding and sensitivity required to work with the appropriate Afghan partners and 
effectively exploit these opportunities did not align with the force rotation model in 
Afghanistan.816 Recently in 2018, at a time where military stalemate may have been 
reached and recognized from both the Government and Taliban insurgency, negotiations 
have taken place.817  
Like the deficiencies in competing directly against the Taliban and other threats, 
the U.S. political-military leadership, at all levels, has not waged effective political 
competition among the relevant stakeholders within the operational environment. These 
struggles contrasted sharply with America’s success in uniting the members of the UN and 
NATO to build the largest coalition effort since the first Gulf War.818 While the narrative 
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of providing freedom, secular democracy, and human rights resonated among many nations 
around the world, the same narrative conflicted with the social and political reality in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.819 Furthermore, when early promises of economic development 
and reconstruction were replaced with corruption, a return of the Taliban and violence, and 
escalating civilian casualties, hopeful sentiments within Afghan society became replaced 
by negativity or outright hostility toward the central Afghan government and coalition 
forces.820 
In Afghanistan, much of the population embraced the initial overthrow of the 
Taliban and the promise of aid and development to stop the continuous oppression and 
fighting that had occurred since 1979. This optimism proved short-lived since the Taliban 
returned virtually unimpeded and expanded its influence throughout the country. Even in 
areas controlled by the government and coalition forces, the corruption and extortion 
imposed by the ANSF alienated the population and undermined efforts to bolster the 
population’s support to the central government.821 Moreover, the traditional 
decentralization within much of the rural Afghan countryside often conflicted with 
attempts by the ANSF and the coalition to bolster a centralized government controlled by 
politicians or security forces representing outside ethnicities that were often perceived as a 
foreign occupation force.822 
Since the military did not understand the context in Afghanistan, U.S. military and 
political forces failed to develop or implement locally attuned influencing narratives.823 
Typically, these U.S. narratives only extended as far as developing simplistic pamphlets 
for distribution among the local populace with no associated process for determining 
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measures of effectiveness for desired influence objectives.824 Overall, since U.S. military 
forces in Afghanistan predominantly focused on attritional kinetic operations, political 
competition to influence local populations on an operational scale remained unrealized. 
Furthermore, many of the strategic influence efforts that were employed were not 
connected to local tribal, religious, or military leaders who could appropriately tailor the 
message to influence the populace.825 Since political competition in counterinsurgency 
often begins by establishing physical or geographic control, the U.S. military did not pursue 
an operational approach that enabled political control of the operational environment until 
between 2009 and 2010, under Generals McChrystal and Petraeus.826 
Like the U.S. political-military failure to influence the internal Afghan population 
to support political objectives, the U.S. Ambassadors and other political leadership also 
failed to use political competition to influence critical regional power brokers to align with 
U.S. interests. While the U.S. successfully negotiated agreements with several of the 
central Asian states, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. failed to manage the 
relationships with Iran and Pakistan necessary to achieve U.S. interests.827 Although 
openly adversarial since the hostage crisis in 1979, Iran initially expressed sympathy and 
indirect support to the United States following the attacks on 9/11.828 Throwing away a 
potential opportunity, President Bush’s label of Iran as part of the “axis of evil” destroyed 
any chance to cooperate in Afghanistan.829 Instead, Iran has provided steady material aid 
to insurgent elements along western Afghanistan.830 
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More significantly, slow recognition and underestimation of Pakistan’s role within 
Afghanistan continues to undermine U.S. stability objectives in Afghanistan.831 
Immediately following 9/11, the United States gave Pakistan an ultimatum that Pakistan 
was either with the United States or with the terrorists.832 Pakistan affirmed its public 
support to the United States internationally but then pursued its own national interests 
domestically.833 These interests centered on Pakistan’s struggle with India for regional 
power and influence. Pakistan did see and still sees, India’s economic and political 
expansion into Afghanistan as a direct attempt to destabilize Pakistan.834 To confront this 
threat, Pakistan has pursued active support to the U.S. efforts to target al Qaeda and other 
foreign terrorist organizations while simultaneously supporting Pashtun Taliban insurgents 
intent on destabilizing Afghanistan and regaining power.835 The U.S. political-military 
leadership in both Washington and in Afghanistan only slowly grasped the extent of 
Pakistan’s duplicitous commitment to pursuing their domestic national interests while 
publicly maintaining support to the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan. Throughout the 
conflict, Pakistan has provided the primary insurgent safe-haven from Baluchistan and the 
FATA.836 U.S. political efforts to engage and influence Pakistan to take positive actions 
toward stability in Afghanistan have failed to significantly decrease insurgent support at 
least up to 2018.837 Until U.S. political-military leaders can better account for and engage 
Pakistan’s vital interests in the region, stability in Afghanistan will not likely occur.838 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. military establishment, with civilian leaders’ acquiescence, 
organized for wars military leaders wanted to fight—not those actually 
underway. In Vietnam, most obviously, the generals maintained the 
conventional force structure and tactics they developed to fight the Warsaw 
Pact and tightly controlled forces well equipped for counterinsurgency 
operations—like Army Special Forces. Military leaders chose not to learn 
from experiences in Vietnam, only to find themselves in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in unwanted counterinsurgency wars they again were 
unprepared to fight. U.S. government leaders in general, including senior 
military officers, in the last five cases learned and adapted more slowly than 
most of their adversaries—with negative consequences for the wars’ 
strategic outcomes.  
—John Gentry, 2012839 
Analysis of the U.S. military’s irregular warfare efforts in Afghanistan reveals 
significant gaps in employing relational maneuver against irregular threats within a 
contemporary operational environment. The foundation for the U.S. political-military 
flaws is a pervasive lack of understanding of the operational environment and threat 
networks. Afghanistan’s operational environment has included a wide range of threats and 
a complex and dynamic contextual threat eco-system. Based on flawed understanding, the 
U.S. military has largely pursued a disjointed political-military strategy that initially 
simplistically focused on al Qaeda without recognizing that denying Afghanistan as a 
terrorist safe-haven required addressing the array of politically destabilizing factors. Even 
when the U.S. military largely unified the political-military chain of command by 2012, 
serious flaws in understanding, strategy, and design remained. Furthermore, the U.S. 
military only possessed a relative minority of units that were designed to confront the type 
of uncertain political-military threats present in Afghanistan. 
Overall, even by the time military force began to draw down in Afghanistan in 
2011, the military remains poorly organized to pursue advisor-led operational approaches 
to overcome the threats in Afghanistan. The military did elevate its prioritization of 
advisors, both political and military; however, many advisory billets remained unfilled, let 
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alone filled with competent personnel. Furthermore, even as the SOF adapted to confront 
the irregular political challenges through the VSO program, its rushed implementation met 
with mixed results. Even among SOF, lack of understanding and continuity among leaders 
and individual units diminished success. Echoing the challenges and failures from Vietnam 
more than 30 years before, it took military leadership nearly a decade to develop a depth 
of understanding, implement a more unified political-military strategy, adapt its 
organization, and employ effective operational approaches. Even then, earlier military 
ineptitude had eroded U.S. domestic political confidence to resolve the conflict. After 
improving its strategy and operational approaches in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013, 
the U.S. military has reverted to predominantly an attritional strategy and approach.840 
Figure 20 depicts the U.S. military’s trends in blending relational maneuver across political 
and violent competition between 2001-2018. 
Just as in Vietnam, the fundamental U.S. lack of understanding of the operational 
environment and its inability to adapt to exploit threat vulnerabilities through political and 
violent competition has led to more than 2,300 U.S. service members killed, 20,000 
wounded, and $686 billion spent without achieving U.S. political objectives to deny 
terrorists safe-havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan or stabilize the region.841 Analysis of 
the U.S. efforts in the contemporary irregular warfare environment reveals the U.S. 
military’s failures to focus dedicated personnel and resources on accomplishing strategic 
objectives. Without focused attention, the military’s employment of relational maneuver 
has been, at best, limited to the tactical employment of violence. 
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Figure 20. U.S. Military Adaptation in Afghanistan 
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VI. SOF ADVANTAGES—INTRODUCTION 
Our “new normal” is a persistently engaged, forward‐based force to prevent 
and deter conflict and, when needed, act to disrupt and defeat threats. Long‐
term engagement is a hedge against crisesthat require major intervention, 
and engagement positions usto better sense the environment and act 
decisively when necessary. The “new normal,” however, translates into 
increased demand for SOF.The pace of the last ten years is indicative of 
what we expect for the next ten years.842 
—Admiral William H McRaven, 2011 
This study presents a multi-faceted argument involving relational maneuver’s 
application in irregular warfare. Part 1: “To Know One’s Enemy” explained the necessity 
of applying relational maneuver in irregular warfare in general and established an 
analytical framework to better understand the components that enable the application of 
relational maneuver. Part 1 further applied this framework to the U.S. military’s irregular 
warfare experiences in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. 
Case study analysis revealed persistent U.S. military institutional deficiencies in applying 
relational maneuver to succeed in irregular warfare. Together, Part 1 examined the nature 
and character of the irregular warfare operational environment, the threats the U.S. military 
has faced in these environments, and exposed deficiencies in military strategic 
effectiveness.  
Part 2 builds on the foundation and analysis constructed in Part 1 and now focuses 
internally to examine Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to identify 
deficiencies in the application of relational maneuver. Chapter VI examines the 
comparative relational maneuver advantages that Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess 
in comparison to conventional forces, before examining MARSOC through an 
organizational design analysis in Chapter VII. Part 1’s analysis, which reveals the 
military’s institutional deficiencies in irregular warfare, and Chapter VI’s examination of 
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SOF advantages explain why MARSOC should organizationally specialize in applying 
relational maneuver to irregular warfare.  
SOF’s organizational strengths better align with relational maneuver requirements 
to succeed in uncertain irregular operational environments, more so than those of 
conventional forces. Case study analysis of SOF in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan 
illustrates these strengths and advantages, but also reveals inhibitors and disadvantages to 
SOF’s relational maneuver effectiveness both internally and within the larger U.S. military. 
Chapter VI is broken into three sections using relational maneuver’s analytical framework 
depicted in Figure 21. Section A briefly discusses SOF’s relational maneuver evolution 
since World War II as the force of choice in irregular warfare. Section B then highlights 
eight relational maneuver advantages that SOF generally possess to effectively confront 
irregular warfare. Section C identifies disadvantages of employing SOF in irregular 
warfare. Chapter VI closes highlighting the relative relational maneuver advantages SOF 
possess compared to conventional forces, drawing from the challenges conventional forces 
have faced in Vietnam and Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 21. Relational Maneuver Analytical Framework 
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A. SOF AS THE FORCE OF CHOICE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
SOF are less model for information-age transformation of conventional 
forces than they are a model for how to fight irregular warriors with 
discrimination, at low cost, and through emphasis on indirect. 
—David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, 2007843 
Author Thomas Adams argues that ‘Modern’ SOF began in June 1952, when Major 
General Robert McClure recruited Colonel Arron Bank, an Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) officer during WWII, to become the first commander of the 10th Special Forces 
Group (SFG).844 General McClure, who at the time was serving as Commander, Office of 
the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), believed that ‘psychological warfare’ 
included much more than had been previously utilized, which primarily consisted of simply 
handing out leaflets. Colonel McClure believed that commando raids, partisan support, 
covert and clandestine activities are all part of ‘psychological warfare’ and should be 
included in strategic efforts.845 Led by former OSS officers, the 10th SFG would become 
the first Army peacetime unit dedicated to special operations and irregular warfare. The 
‘psychological warfare’ tactics they incorporated fall under today’s political warfare 
spectrum. The 10th SFG set the precedent for using a combination of direct and indirect 
approaches to affect strategic outcomes that continues today. 
Adams later explains that Unconventional Warfare (UW) and guerrilla warfare had 
been largely ignored by Army doctrine, despite lessons learned in World War II and Korea, 
until it was incorporated in Special Forces training in the early 1960s.846 Army Special 
Forces were specifically identified and designed to counter irregular threats, for which 
conventional forces were not well suited.847 During Vietnam, President Kennedy and 
Secretary McNamara recognized the need for smaller units capable of effectively waging 
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irregular warfare.848 The U.S. Army also began to see the need for a unit that could operate 
along the same lines as Great Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS).849  
Throughout their evolution, SOF’s advantages have remained critical to the U.S. 
military’s ability to wage irregular warfare; however, no easy consensus exists on what 
constitutes Special Operations or who Special Operations Forces are. In the history of the 
United States, SOF have fought in both traditional and irregular wars, using both direct and 
indirect approaches spanning from unilateral direct action violent raids to covert and 
clandestine political operations. The vast employment of SOF has led to flexible, adaptable 
organizations, but has also created misconceptions about how SOF should be employed. In 
his 1978 book Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, 
Eliot Cohen posed four questions; What is the purpose of a SOF unit; political, military, or 
both? What are the political and military costs of SOF units? How do national character 
and security predicaments affect a common phenomenon of civil-military relations? What 
should U.S. policy be with respect to SOF units?850 Cohen assesses that what makes SOF 
different from general purpose is simply that SOF fulfill “specialized function[s]” that “are 
non-technical but different from those of the ordinary soldier – reconnaissance and raiding, 
for example.”851 In addition to military justifications, Cohen also states that SOF must 
offer some sort of political benefits to justify its existence.852 
Regarding the political and military cost of SOF, Cohen answers his questions by 
explaining that SOF provide “superior quality and performance” and serve as symbols of 
military strength; but that their advantages come with risks, such as “misallocation and 
misuse of manpower,” “demoralization of non-elite troops,” “skimming off the cream,” 
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and the potential for “inappropriate use of elite units.”853 National character and security 
can have dramatic effects on the utilization, size, authorities, and trust of SOF. Cohen 
provides case studies that illuminate how SOF can fall into or out of favor depending on 
the political and security climate within individual nations. In general, the less secure a 
nation is, the less comfortable its government will be with its SOF units.854 In order for 
the U.S. to safely reap the most benefit from SOF, Cohen recommends strictly defining 
what missions SOF should be given, limiting SOF’s “institutional autonomy,” and keeping 
publicity and size to the minimum necessary.855 
Modern strategist and author Colin Gray wrote in his 1999 article “Handful of 
Heroes on Disparate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?” that “the American 
way of war has not accommodated SOF as an important strategic instrument.”856 Gray 
argues that the strategic culture in the United States has not always understood or embraced 
the advantages of SOF in waging irregular conflicts and generating long-term success. 
Gray points out that because of misunderstandings by policymakers, “SOF can find 
themselves misused as shock troops…or wasted on missions that make no strategic 
sense.”857 Authors David Tucker and Christopher Lamb support Luttwak and Cohen with 
their conclusions in their 2007 study, United States Special Operations Forces. Tucker and 
Lamb assess that “irregular threats are the proper strategic focus for SOF and the area 
where SOF can provide the greatest strategic value.”858  
Just as conventional forces are trained specifically to wage traditional warfare, 
Edward Luttwak argues that irregular warfare needs specially trained forces to achieve 
strategic success.859 T.L. Bosiljevac, author of SEAL: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam, 
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reiterates Luttwak’s point using Vietnam as a case study. He points out that in Vietnam, 
SOF has proved itself as the ideal force for guerrilla warfare, whereas U.S. general purpose 
forces were not trained to wage irregular war or face the guerrilla tactics in Vietnam.860 
Luttwak wrote that the United States needs a force wholly dedicated to irregular warfare, 
specifically trained to utilize the relational maneuver, stating that “it is unprofessional to 
try to fight low-intensity war with forces structured and built for the opposite 
requirement.”861 He continues, that in low-intensity warfare, “the keys to success are first 
the ability to interpret the external environment in all its aspects…and then to adapt one’s 
own organizational formats, operational methods, and tactics to suit the requirements of 
the particular situation.”862 Analysis of SOF’s advantages reveals that SOF is well tailored 
to meet the demands of applying relational maneuver in low-intensity, irregular 
environments. 
Luttwak describes why general purpose forces, what he calls “attrition forces,” are 
not ideal for irregular, “low-intensity,” warfare and why relational maneuver focused 
forces are ideal: Attritional forces optimize for standard operating procedures, but low-
intensity conflicts are unique and require skilled operating procedures unique to the 
environment; Attritional forces do not meet the unique requirements of operations in 
irregular environments; Attritional forces are mostly trained to employ violence while 
adhering to political guidance, whereas irregular environments are political in nature with 
a smaller militaristic element; Attrition forces rely on logistics and upkeep to maintain 
effectiveness, but irregular wars cannot be won via these means, instead often relying upon 
generation of local forces with minimal capability to acquire even the most basic military 
and subsistence requirements.863 
Luttwak continues, “The sublime irony is, of course, that the United States already 
has such a dedicated body, although not sufficiently autonomous to offer a separate career 
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track. By nature “relational,” by nature adaptive, the Special Forces should be exactly what 
we need. Their very existence is an implied recognition that low-intensity war is not a 
lesser-included case…”864 SOF’s advantage in irregular warfare has been recognized for 
years, but are still not fully actualized in current irregular wars. Both SOF organizations 
and U.S. strategy makers should understand SOF’s relational maneuver advantages in order 
to maximize their impact moving forward. 
Luttwak provides additional reasoning for the importance of using relational 
maneuver in low-intensity warfare, citing that “between armed forces of equal competence, 
the closer they stand to the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum, the greater will be 
their effectiveness.”865 Relational maneuver provides a refined method that complements 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s theory of strategic interaction. Arreguín-Toft proposes that the strong 
actor should adopt the approach of the weak actor to achieve victory, which, in the case of 
low-intensity conflict, is the indirect approach.  
The aim of Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction Thesis is to provide a theory of 
asymmetric conflict that explains when and why weak actors are capable of defeating 
strong actors. Arreguín-Toft first defined direct and indirect strategies for strong actors 
(direct attack and barbarism) and weak actors (direct defense and guerilla warfare 
strategy).866 Arreguín-Toft then proposed that when weak and strong actors engage in 
same-approach interactions, strong actors are more likely to win, and when they engage in 
opposite-approach interactions, weak actors are more likely to win (see Figure 22). 
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Figure 22. Arreguín-Toft’s Strategic Interaction Thesis867 
He went on to conclude that weak actors seeking victory should rely on an indirect 
strategy implementing guerrilla warfare techniques, as it would be difficult to defeat. 
Arreguín-Toft closed with two recommendations for future U.S. conflicts: “(1) preparation 
of public expectations for a long war despite U.S. technological and material advantages, 
and (2) the development and deployment of armed forces specifically equipped and trained 
for COIN operations.”868  
Prolific author on U.S. Special Operations, Linda Robinson describes why the 
indirect approach has the most enduring effect and makes clear that SOF are the ideal force 
to facilitate sustained political-military effects. 869 She goes on to state that the direct 
approach only achieves limited effects within an irregular conflict.870 Additionally, like 
many others, she reiterates that the prevalence and increasing probability of irregular 
threats in the future will put a high demand on SOF for years to come.871 In an attempt to 
demystify the problem that policy and strategy makers have regarding direct and indirect 
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special operations, the army adopted surgical strike and special warfare to distinguish 
between direct and indirect approaches (see Figure 23).872 
 
Figure 23. Characteristics of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike873 
Author of Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, 
Susan Marquis explains that, since its inception, SOF have spent years fighting to earn a 
positive reputation with conventional forces and the U.S. government. SOF’s ability to 
showcase their flexibility and variety of mission sets eventually led to USSOCOM being 
funded to grow and support the SOF community.874 Low-intensity conflict and instability 
have increased throughout the years, and since the fall of the Berlin wall, SOF has been the 
United States’ most deployed force.875 Marquis is quick to point out that what makes SOF 
such a valuable force is their ability to perform a variety of mission sets.876 However, 
despite lessons learned from previous SOF engagements, misunderstanding SOF 
capabilities led to SOF being under-utilized for indirect approaches and over-utilized for 
direct approaches, in the 1990s, a trend that persists today.877  
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When General Wayne Downing took over USSOCOM in 1993, he made it a 
priority to advertise SOF capabilities properly and transitioned USSOCOM from a simple 
unified command to a more service-like organization.878 Downing’s mission was to create 
special operators who were ready to fight both in today’s wars and the wars of the future 
in support of national security objectives.879 Downing acted to increase interagency 
cooperation through SOF providing “reliable and, in most cases, low visibility support 
for…regional programs” with the Drug Enforcement Agency, National Security Agency, 
and Central Intelligence Agency.880 With Downing’s leadership, USSOCOM secured its 
future by working with Locher, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low-Intensity Conflict, to have SOF participate in the DoD planning and resource 
allocation process as well as by providing, at the recommendation of Locher, “peacetime 
engagements” that addressed “national security policy for the arena outside of global major 
regional war.”881  
Marquis warns that SOF must fight the urge to become more like the four services; 
it must remain flexible and innovative.882 She recommends that SOF break away from 
their respective services in some ways, such as joint basing, citing the operational 
command structure advantages and quick response time allowed by being stationed 
together.883 She also offers a potential solution being “joint, regionally orientated 
permanent task forces,” similar to, but more permanent than, the Theater Special 
Operations Commands the U.S. military has today.884 
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B. SOF’S RELATIONAL MANEUVER ADVANTAGES IN IRREGULAR 
WARFARE 
It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapons systems: we 
must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper 
strategy, necessary planning, and the full warfighting capability.  
—David C. Jones, 1982885  
At its core, relational maneuver depends on understanding the threat operational 
environment, identifying vulnerabilities, and adapting to exploit those vulnerabilities to 
achieve strategic objectives. Section B outlines eight general SOF characteristics that better 
enable SOF to be effective in highly uncertain and political irregular operational 
environments. Many of these eight characteristics blend between the four relational 
maneuver components that enable understanding, identification, and exploitation of threat 
vulnerabilities. Comprehensively, these eight elements provide a special adaptable 
capability well suited to achieving success in irregular warfare. 
1. Intelligence/Special Activities Capabilities 
Intelligence drives operations. The importance of accurate and timely intelligence 
cannot be overestimated. There are many examples of operations that failed not because of 
tactics or executions, but because of inaccurate or old intelligence. That being said, one of 
SOF’s greatest advantages is their integration of intelligence collection and operators. SOF 
not only have the ability to generate intelligence through similar means as general purpose 
forces, but also through special activities capacities that can enhance their organization’s 
ability to generate timely intelligence that is difficult to attain via traditional means. 
The U.S. Air Force in the Korean War displayed SOF’s ability to leverage special 
activities to generate intelligence that led to successful operations. USAF special 
operations units conducted all manner of special operations during the Korean War, 
principally organized by MSgt. Donald Nichols, who was responsible for the 6004th Air 
Intelligence Service Squadron deemed “the most successful special operations unit of the 
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[Korean] war.”886 Their inclusion of various SOF mission sets gave them the versatility 
they needed to be successful in their environment. The USAF worked unilaterally and with 
the CIA to conduct intelligence, counter-intelligence, sabotage, espionage, demolition, and 
guerrilla operations.887 Nichols referred to the intelligence, counter-intelligence, and 
human intelligence he led as “positive intelligence,” only possible via deep penetration and 
political contacts throughout North and South Korea.888 The Air Force units coordinated 
and shared information with UN intelligence agencies.889 
The Air Force Special Activity Units started training programs, run by American 
and Korean personnel, that focused on interrogation, intelligence gathering, guerrilla 
warfare, and paratrooper basics.890 The Special Air Mission Units accepted the challenges 
of working in an amphibious theater and used both Naval and Air Force seaborne and 
amphibious vessels to penetrate North Korean and Chinese Seas to launch saboteurs, spies, 
partisans, and psychological warfare teams.891 
Special activities played a significant role in Vietnam as well. The Phoenix 
Program, run by the CIA and Army SF, was responsible for espionage and intelligence 
operations. The Phoenix Program enabled the CIA and SF to have a force operating in a 
grey zone between legal and non-legal military-style operations.892 
Richard Shultz’s book, The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s 
Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam, details how the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations sought to play the game using “Hanoi’s rules.”893 He outlines 
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how the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group 
(MACVSOG) was used to conduct covert-action operations that played a significant role 
in the strategic plan for Vietnam. MACVSOG operations included inserting spies for 
deception operations, psychological warfare (fabricating a North Vietnamese guerrilla 
movement, propaganda, kidnapping), covert maritime interdiction, and cross-border covert 
reconnaissance (identifying future targets, wiretapping, rescuing POWs).894 
MACVSOG’s core missions became to collect intelligence and employ deception against 
enemy networks, perform covert maritime operations, “black” psychological warfare, and 
covert operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.895 Shultz points to the warning/guidance 
of former OSS Chief Bill Donovan that “covert operations must be carried out under the 
auspices of senior military leadership and integrated into the overall strategy for fighting 
the war.”896 
SOF train and fully integrate with their own organic intelligence capability and, 
over time, have developed into permanent groups of forces able to conduct operations and 
provide intelligence and support.897 Lucien Vandenbroucke, author of Perilous Options: 
Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, calls attention to the synergy 
created by the intel-ops fusion that “achieve[s] the cohesion and teamwork indispensable 
for success.”898 He postulates that the Sontay Raid (Operation Ivory Coast 1970), or the 
Iran hostage rescue attempt (Operation Eagle Claw 1980), may have turned out differently 
had they not been ad hoc groups of forces put together for a single mission.899 The 
breakdown among these operations’ leadership, and in particular their connection with 
integrated and familiar intelligence cells, displays just how important SOF’s intelligence 
capability is. 
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2. Proponent for Transregional Threats 
SOF’s flexible organizational design is well suited to respond to the transregional 
threats that the United States faces today. In his 1943 edited book, Makers of Modern 
Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Edward Earle suggests that modern 
strategists must consider economic, political, social, and technological phenomena to 
analyze military conflicts critically.900 Multiple other scholars and authors, such as Walter 
Lippmann and Walter Mills, suggest that modern strategists must consider the whole of the 
environmental picture when planning for conflict. This concept has endured time, dating 
back to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and at least 100 years of American thought. Many American 
authors have weighed in on this concept. Walter Lippmann wrote that “diplomacy and 
strategy, political commitments and military power, are inseparable; unless this be 
recognized, policy will be bankrupt.”901 American military historian Walter Mills 
simplifies Lippmann, writing “[war] challenges virtually every other institution of 
society.”902 Earle calls attention to the fact that “Under modern conditions, military 
questions are so interwoven with economic, political, social, and technological phenomena 
that it is doubtful if one can speak of a purely military strategy.”903 
Many SOF organizations were intended to be able to operate both in the political 
and military spectrums at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Bridging the 
political-military gap has consistently been difficult for American strategy. Today’s threats 
have been more complex and demand a force that is capable of understanding and operating 
in the political and military domain. Just as the U.S. needs a force capable of producing 
political and military effects within nations, the U.S. also needs a force capable of waging 
war against transregional threats in transregional environments.  
                                                 
900 Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), vii-xi. 
901901 As quoted in: Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, vii. 
902 As quoted in: Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, x.  
903 Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, xi. 
215 
Terrorist organizations without conventional borders, proxy threats, and the rise of 
the 4+1 (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremists) demand a “trans-
regional, multi-domain, and multifunctional approach”904 from the United States. Chad 
Pillai brought attention to this problem in his 2017 article “Reorganizing the Joint Force 
for a Trans-Regional Threat Environment.” Pillai wrote that “unless reforms are 
implemented, the United States will remain a global power that thinks and acts regionally, 
while our state challengers are regional powers that think and act globally.”905 According 
to the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) publication, “Global Trends: Paradox of 
Progress,” the rise of the information age and global trends are making it easier for 
organizations and nations to connect and interact with one another while simultaneously 
making it more difficult for governments to provide the security and prosperity that citizens 
expect.906 The National Intelligence Council explains that “growing global connectivity 
amid weak growth will increase tensions within and between societies.”907 The 
availability, ease of use, and ubiquity of social media platforms have allowed like-minded 
individuals across the globe to connect and share ideas on a much larger scale than ever 
before. Connected organizations will make governing more difficult around the world.  
Not only do countries today have to be concerned with what is happening inside 
their borders, they now also have to manage the security of their citizens from global 
threats. The NIC points out that “managing global issues will become harder as actors 
multiply.”908 It is becoming easier for international actors to form organizations, and to 
scale the size of their organizations. If these organizations do not align with the values of 
their nation, or nations globally, they can cause problems and lead to instability, 
particularly in already weak states.  
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With USSOCOM being the designated lead for countering violent extremists, the 
SOF community already has the authority to operate across Geographic Combatant 
Commands (GCC) and has begun its focus on transregional threats, whereas the general 
purpose forces who still rely on GCCs lag behind.909 Kelly McCoy suggests in his article, 
“The World the Combatant Command was Design for is Gone,” that GCCs no longer meet 
the demands of the current operating environment and should be replaced with functional 
threat-based commands similar to but even more robust than the current USSOCOM 
construct.910 Pillai imagines McCoy’s functional commands to be titled Counter-Russia 
Combatant Command, Counter-China Combatant Command, and Counter-Iran 
Combatant Command and would be able to prioritize their forces geographically how they 
deem fit to counter their respective threat.911 General Dunford, current Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has emphasized that current collaboration and integration between 
combatant commanders is inadequate regarding combating transregional threats.912 
Regional GCCs efforts to preserve the sanctity of their respective commands undermine 
transregional coordination. Future approvals from policymakers will continue to make 
SOF’s advantage in transregional environments stronger. 
3. Authorities and Financial Capabilities 
Colin Gray has pointed out that “SOF prosper when conventional operations are 
prohibited by political factors, ruled out as too expensive, or otherwise are deemed 
inappropriate.”913 SOF are encouraged to operate within the political and military domains 
simultaneously, which has led some to use the phrase ‘warrior diplomat’ when referring to 
SOF. Authorized to work as advisor-diplomats and warriors, SOF are able to directly 
impact the political space as well as the battlespace.  
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Specialties that differentiate SOF from general purpose forces include conducting 
counterguerrilla, unconventional and psychological warfare in irregular environments. 
Based on the reports of then Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, it was noted that 
counterguerrilla forces and social reform programs were needed in Vietnam. The idea was 
to counter NVA/VC using their own tactics against them. Lansdale had experience running 
this type of campaign in the Philippines and was able to convince the Kennedy 
administration that “special warfare,” in particular, counterinsurgency, unconventional 
warfare, and psychological operations, was the solution.914 The Kennedy administration 
made “several bureaucratic and policy moves in order to be able to ‘make every possible 
effort to launch guerrilla operations in North Vietnam territory.”915  
By the end of 1962, the CIA’s efforts to perform covert operations against North 
Vietnam were moving slowly and did not meet President Kennedy’s standard.916 The 
Pentagon stepped in and by January of 1964, had created a new covert division of MACV 
called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), which would be tasked with what 
Kennedy had envisioned for covert operations in Vietnam.917 Although SOG was initially 
intended to advise, assist, and train South Vietnamese, this never truly materialized. Instead 
of planning operations for the South Vietnamese, SOG began planning and executing 
covert operations of their own against North Vietnam.918 Author Richard Shultz points out 
the numerous problems that MACVSOG faced while conducting covert operations during 
the Vietnam War; however, his recommendation remains that the United States should 
strive to fix those issues and continue to utilize all aspects of special warfare in future 
conflicts, including covert-action missions.919 
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Training authorities have also proven to be a unique advantage to SOF. Initial OSS 
training authorities allowed them to conduct mock espionage and sabotage missions on 
‘live’ U.S. targets such as local bridges and dams.920 Some OSS operators were caught in 
the act during training missions and ended up in the hands of lawmen. Today’s SOF 
authorities keep operators out of the hands of local law enforcement and the FBI but allow 
for greater flexibility overseas than do those of general purpose forces. 
Financial authorities for SOF have changed over the years and derive from both 
their parent service and from SOCOM. SOF has had a history of acquiring funding 
differently than general purpose forces. This began with Delta in late 1977, whose funding 
was unique within the Army. Colonel Bob Mountel, who worked closely with Colonel 
Charles Beckwith, procured funding directly from Department of the Army to Delta for 
weapons, ammo, equipment, transportation and other technologies they deemed necessary 
for their missions.921 Today, SOF organizations receive their funding both from their 
respective service as well as from SOCOM. 
4. Economy of Force/Low Footprint (Political Viability) 
Adaptability and flexibility share a close correlation with economy of force. Forces 
that possess a wider variety of skill sets are force multipliers capable of reducing the need 
for manpower on the ground. Having a small footprint while providing operational success 
in the military and political spectrum is ideal for irregular conflicts, where a large footprint 
can create unnecessary political disruptions and will not necessarily lead to greater success. 
If the appetite for military presence is extremely low or nonexistent, SOF can operate as 
low-visibility intervention force capable of covert and clandestine operations for which 
general purpose forces are not built.922 
Today, and dating back to at least the 1950s, politicians have been concerned about 
the costly nature of small wars. President Eisenhower once recounted, “I saw no sense in 
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wasting manpower in costly small wars that could not achieve decisive results under the 
political and military circumstances then existing.”923 This was before adequate doctrine 
existed for fighting small or irregular wars. Unfortunately, today, U.S. leadership continues 
to make costly strategic errors, both in terms of finance and effectiveness. Small wars need 
not be overly costly when employing a strategy that utilizes SOF appropriately. 
As discussed previously, irregular warfare’s criteria for victory are based on intra-
state political control and influence from indigenous partners, not attrition like the 
territorial or border disputes of traditional wars past.924 SOF focus specifically on being 
able to generate popular support in irregular warfare. Cohen points out that the qualities of 
general purpose soldiers, even in an all-volunteer force, may not be suited to irregular 
warfighting.925 Cohen, like Luttwak and others, identifies the necessity of a purpose-built 
irregular warfare force differentiated from a general purpose force. Cohen claims that 
conventional forces are specifically trained to fight as an element of a large conventional 
machine and are not trained to disaggregate into the smaller units that are required to fight 
in guerrilla or revolutionary conflicts. Cohen also notes that small units of professional 
soldiers (SOF) are capable of performing ‘deniable’ missions that large conventional units 
are too cumbersome to perform. 
In Donald Fiske’s 1993 assessment of the OSS selection process, he noted that the 
goal of the OSS program was such that “the (i) amount saved plus (ii) the amount of harm 
prevented plus (iii) the amount gained is greater than the cost of the assessment 
program.”926 A successful OSS training pipeline would result in an organization that 
provided a net gain both financially and temporally. This net gain is what SOF continue to 
deliver. While the success of clandestine and covert operations is inherently difficult to 
measure, history has shown that small numbers of specially trained personnel can 
accomplish tasks equal to or unachievable by larger numbers of general purpose forces.  
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Colin Gray has publicized the need for Americans to “plan and act smarter,” citing 
the cost-effectiveness of adequately waging irregular operations when compared to the 
conventional American way of war.927 With the current focus on decreasing the quantity 
of general purpose forces available during peacetime, SOF play a critical role in containing 
small wars in Phase 0 and beyond. 
As pointed out by Francis Kelly in U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Special 
Forces were conducting unconventional operations, such as prisoner recoveries, while 
simultaneously conducting counterinsurgency operations, such as the CORDS program.928 
The authors’ experiences and observations of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
shown similar displays of SOF’s economy of force. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF 
elements are tasked with the full spectrum of special operations core activities, illustrated 
in Figure 24, and have achieved results beyond their organizational size. 
 
Figure 24. Special Operations Core Activities929 
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Tactical-level SOF elements are expected to conduct a combination of these core 
activities throughout their employment in a country. When compared to general purpose 
forces, SOF require orders of magnitude less manpower to conduct the gamut of their core 
activities. A general purpose force conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) can easily 
number in the hundreds and be solely dedicated to that mission, whereas SOF teams of two 
to twenty can sustain training of thousands of foreign personnel while simultaneously 
conducting numerous other mission sets.  
Admiral William McRaven’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis, much of which 
would later be republished in Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 
Theory and Practice, had a strong focus of SOF’s ability to leverage economy of force via 
the concept he coined as relative superiority. McRaven defines relative superiority as “a 
condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage 
over a larger or well-defined enemy.”930 McRaven wrote that relative superiority is the 
unique component that allows SOF to achieve victory over larger adversaries. McRaven 
lists six principles of special operations that he deems “unique elements of warfare that 
only special forces possess and can employ effectively.”931 Although many general 
purpose forces can likely conduct special operations and employ McRaven’s principles, 
the time and preparation required to be mission ready will likely far exceed established 
special forces.
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Figure 25. Relative Superiority and Principles of Special Operations, McRaven932
                                                 
932 Source: McRaven, Spec Ops, 7 and 11. 
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Admiral McRaven’s concept of relative superiority and principles of special 
operations apply the principles of relational maneuver to direct action commando-style 
operations (See Figure 25). The concept of relative superiority depends on exploiting 
vulnerabilities within an enemy’s physical and cognitive defenses. Success occurs when 
these vulnerabilities are exploited through the principles McRaven outlines even though 
the SOF unit executing the mission is likely much smaller and possesses far less firepower 
than the defending force. Within irregular warfare, McRaven’s theory and principles still 
apply, but should be support a larger indirect strategy and approach that applies similar 
relative superiority principles with and through indigenous partners using both politics and 
violence to achieve the strategic mission.  
5. Integration with Joint and Interagency Partners 
In March of 1944, Admiral Ernest King ordered a Joint Strategic Survey Committee 
to evaluate an army plan recommending a single Department of National Defense.933 The 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee’s evaluation noted that “the outstanding lesson of 
[WWII] is that modern warfare is made up of…‘unified’ operations, [and] all military 
elements should be closely interlocked and interrelated that the concept of one whole is 
preferable to articulated units.”934 
While SOF excel working independently, their success is not limited to unilateral 
operations. Colin Gray wrote that “SOF benefit from a supportive strategic context, 
particularly one in which regular forces need assistance.”935 SOF can be used to accelerate 
progress or delay defeat in a supporting role to general purpose forces. SOF do not rely on 
a particular roadmap or doctrine to achieve mission success. Instead, in irregular warfare, 
as Gray points out, they must maintain “a state of mind that can innovate nonstandard 
solutions to problems” particularly focused on turning an enemy’s strength into 
weakness.936 
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SOF’s ability to work jointly combined with their authority and capability to 
conduct a multitude of mission sets is another aspect that separates them from general 
purpose forces. The Goldwater-Nichol Act, considered the most sweeping military reform 
in nearly 40 years, approved the operational reorganization and joint leadership role that 
SOF needed.937 Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, no one entity had enough authority to 
adequately lead joint operations.938 The Joint Army-Navy Board’s official 
recommendation regarding inter-service action during and before WWII was “mutual 
cooperation,” a method that was seldom heeded.939 In his book, Victory on the Potomac: 
Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon, James Locher discloses that skeptics felt that 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act would “rob the service chiefs of their proper authority, 
denigrate their role, and complicate their administration of the services.”940 The services 
were more interested in preserving their independence than in developing a joint force 
capable of winning modern irregular wars.941 In fact, Goldwater-Nichols streamlined the 
chain-of-command and reduced some of the bureaucracy that persisted post-World War 
II.942  
Operation Eagle Claw, the failed 1980 attempt to rescue U.S. Embassy hostages in 
Tehran, marked the tipping point of necessity for organizational change within the DoD. 
Military historian Richard Gabriel wrote that in the eyes of global spectators, Operation 
Eagle Claw “clearly marked the decline of American military prestige and confidence.”943 
Despite Delta being ready to conduct the hostage rescue in Iran, the lack of joint planning, 
coordination, and execution, in addition to the aircraft mishaps, led to mission failure.944 
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Around the same time, Luttwak expressed his disdain for the confusion and absence 
of unity caused by the lack of adequate joint organization.945 General David C. Jones, then 
Chairman of the JCS, briefed both the Senate and House Armed Services Committee in 
February of 1982 regarding the need for organizational change and a more unified joint 
force. It was at this briefing where the Chairman made it clear that organizational change 
was imperative. Jones declared that “we do not have an adequate organizational structure 
today…. To be able to fight in today’s environment…will require concerted efforts of all 
four services. The services can’t operate alone.”946 
Despite providing an incomplete problem description and recommendations, the 
message was clear; strengthen the position of joint officers, especially the chairman, 
unified commanders, and members of the Joint Staff, to improve interoperability among 
the services.947 This would alleviate some of the issues that the leaders of Operation Eagle 
Claw and other joint operations faced. The JCS and mission commanders would no longer 
have to create an ad hoc Joint Task Force from scratch for future joint operations, enabling 
the unity SOF needed to maximize their integration capabilities. 
Operation Eagle Claw serves as a reminder of possible failures resulting from a 
lack of adequate integration and communication among partners. Delta had intelligence 
specific to the location of the American hostages within the building and had constructed 
a model to conduct planning and rehearsals.948 Delta centered their focus on training to 
the target area without proper integration with the CIA or with the Navy aircraft chosen as 
their delivery method.949 Despite tactical readiness for the politically sensitive mission, 
joint planning failure led to mission failure. SOF have come a long way since 1980 
regarding integration with each other, general purpose forces, and interagency and local 
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partners. Through these difficult lessons, integration as both supporting and supported 
element has become one of the SOF community’s most beneficial strengths. 
Without discounting SOF’s unilateral successes, scholars like Cohen point to 
interoperability as one of SOF’s chief advantages. Cohen describes how counterinsurgency 
and covert operations pose problems for SOF because they overlap with and may be better 
suited to intelligence operatives.950 However, SOF have a long history of integration with 
intelligence agencies, particularly the relationship between Green Berets and the CIA 
during Vietnam. Throughout Vietnam, SOF were less restricted in their mission set relative 
to general purpose forces, allowing them to conduct combined and joint operations with 
the CIA, Navy, and Air Force.951 For example, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
(CIDG) program was planned and funded by the CIA, but executed by Army Special 
Forces beginning in 1961.952 
In Laos, SOF personnel worked hand in hand with the CIA to train the Laotian 
Army in counterinsurgency and created the ‘Armee Clandestine,’ comprised on Laotians 
and North Vietnamese to subvert the Pathet Lao guerrillas and North Vietnamese 
government.953 Additionally, the Mobile Strike Force Command (MIKE) Force, which 
operated under MACV, came into high demand because of the extensive training they had 
received from U.S. Army SOF and often became supporting elements of conventional 
operations.954 This displays SOF’s ability to not only integrate with other agencies 
themselves but also to preach integration to their partners while conducting FID.  
 In reference to irregular environments, Tucker and Lamb state that “SOF are a 
good hedge against uncertainty because their skills allow them to work well with 
impromptu allies and counter unconventional threats.”955 This capability differentiates 
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SOF from general purpose forces. Being able to quickly and effectively integrate with 
partners is a key relational maneuver advantage in irregular environments. 
6. Indirect Approaches 
For SOF to be effective in circumstances where they need to work with 
civilians at immediate risk to the enemy, it is essential that the locals believe 
both that our side will be the inevitable victor and that they, the locals, will 
be on the winning side. 
—Colin S. Gray, 1999 956 
In his postgraduate thesis, The Utility of Freedom: A Principal-Agent Model for 
Unconventional Warfare, Tyler Van Horn writes about the difficulties surrounding proxy 
warfare, which he equates to unconventional warfare. He states that “the successful 
employment of surrogate forces depends to a significant degree on the relationship 
cultivated between the sponsor and the insurgent, and the various actors between the 
two.”957 SOF are designed to be capable of cultivating those strong relationships and 
provide training and employment of indigenous forces to conduct their own operations. 
Van Horn explores potential solutions for “counterinsurgents to indirectly topple the 
insurgency by destabilizing the relationships between the principal and its agents.”958 Van 
Horn’s case study analysis of the CIA-supported Tibetan insurgency from 1956-1974 
revealed that supporting the Tibetan insurgency was a cost-effective way to sufficiently 
inflict damage to and create a significant distraction for the Chinese military.959 While this 
case study was of a CIA-led unconventional warfare campaign, the SOF community is 
trained to conduct similar operations. 
The OSS selection process deliberately sought foreigners and first-generation 
Americans for their “familiar[ity] with the language, people, and territory of their 
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respective lands of origin.”960 SOF operators most familiar with an environment can 
provide beneficial insight to the other operators with whom they work as well as to strategy 
makers. The impact environmental experts can have, particularly on the more nuanced 
indirect approach, should not be underestimated. 
The advantage of the SOF’s FID mission, including advise, or advise and assist, is 
a true force multiplier. Special Forces units in South Vietnam had the unique capability to 
conduct operations with locals inside territory dominated by the enemy. The Special Forces 
trained to conduct unconventional warfare via advise and assist operations of mobile 
guerrilla forces and provided logistical and administrative support through the CIDG 
program.961 This was a crucial capability in their unconventional operations, which, with 
few exceptions, were most frequently conducted in enemy-controlled areas.962  
The Special Forces learned many valuable FID and combat lessons in irregular 
environments during their beginnings in the Pacific theater of operations. That experience 
became the foundation for future SOF success in irregular environments.963 At the 
beginning of the Vietnam War (in early 1956) the 14th Special Forces Operational 
Detachment (SFOD) was activated to lead an Asian resistance force in conducting 
unconventional warfare against Sino-Soviet forces in the event of general war. Author and 
military historian Shelby Stanton sums up the Special Forces’ role: 
The Special Forces was composed of a small number of specially selected 
and highly trained soldiers…able to master critical military skills needed to 
train and lead guerrilla warriors…. In order to control and lead irregular 
partisan fighters, they had to understand people, languages, and foreign 
cultures. Most important, Special Forces warriors had to possess the 
intelligence, knowledge, tact, and acumen to successfully transform 
ordinary civilians into an effective military threat to a strong and cunning 
occupation army.964 
                                                 
960 Fiske, Selection of Personnel, 11. 
961 Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971, 134. 
962 Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971, 134. 
963 Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956–1975 
(London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), 1–34. 
964 Stanton, Green Berets at War, 3. 
229 
Working under the cover of the 8251st Army Service Unit, they would develop 
mobile training teams to organize and task indigenous Asian civilians in Taiwan, Thailand, 
and South Vietnam.965 Special Forces arrived in 1959 and created four training sites for 
the Laotian forces.966 U.S.-Asian strategy relied on Laos as a buffer between communist 
North Vietnam and friendly Vietnam.967 The U.S. supported Laotian forces, but 
unfortunately did not adequately train them. In December of 1960, the Special Forces led 
a Laotian countercoup force that was ultimately defeated, resulting in the capture and death 
of U.S. and Laotian forces.968 Despite the Special Forces training, the Laotian forces had 
low esprit de corps caused by the language barrier, hasty assignment of team members, and 
rapid turnover of U.S. personnel (many of whom served 6-month tours).969  
Special Forces continued to spread their mobile training teams across Taiwan, 
Thailand, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and China to provide proximity to areas of interest, 
a diversity of cultural influence, and access to diversified training locations.970 The 
demand for the Special Forces skillset grew rapidly through 1961, so much so that they 
were unable to keep up with the training needs of their own personnel.971 While the Special 
Forces did not achieve all of their goals in Laos, the frustrations and complexities of leading 
indigenous forces in irregular environments, as well as the experience they gained in 
establishing relationships with other U.S. military and government agencies, would 
constitute the lessons that would set them up for future success.972 
In the modern context, the United States should wish to avoid indefinite occupation 
in regions where it fights irregular wars. No colonization will take place, and as such, the 
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only way to enable enduring long-term success is via the indirect political approach through 
indigenous partners. 
7. Competence and Capability  
As mentioned previously, Eliot Cohen remarked that undoubtedly, SOF provide 
“superior quality and performance” and serve as symbols of military strength.973 The 
selection process of SOF organizations has more rigorous standards of performance when 
compared to that of general purpose forces. Proficient SOF operators allow the formation 
of ad hoc groups while retaining competence and capability across mission sets. In July 
and August of 1950, Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) and Marine 
Reconnaissance operators were combined in an ad hoc joint Special Operations Group 
(SOG) with little time to train, yet they exemplified SOF’s ability to perform at high levels 
despite non-ideal circumstances. 
Their performance in Korea during that time “provided an impressive display of 
navy-marine professionalism… [and] performance far beyond that which could reasonably 
have been expected for its drastically abbreviated joint-training schedule.”974 Putting 
together an ad hoc group of general purpose forces who are not specifically selected and 
trained for the ability to adapt and overcome would likely result in disaster, particularly if 
given minimal time to plan, train, and rehearse for the upcoming mission. Yet this is exactly 
what SOF are able to provide, particularly is irregular warfare. SOF are specialized to 
overcome obstacles in the irregular environment and are able to rely on the principles of 
relational maneuver for guidance. The competence, capability, and credibility of SOF also 
creates fear among U.S. enemies and allows SOF to be used as a deterrent in future low-
intensity conflicts.975 SOF’s competence and capability must be maintained in order for 
them to be feared and used as a deterrent. 
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8. Adaptable, Flexible, and Unorthodox 
In general, Americans overemphasize the military’s technical skills, engineering, 
and science, overlooking the idea of a military profession.976 SOF are selected specifically 
for their ability to be adaptable, flexible, and unorthodox. Dating back to the OSS, these 
traits were prioritized to give SOF an advantage in all types of conflicts. The diversity of 
skillsets paired with ingenuity of operators allow SOF to overcome unexpected obstacles 
not previously faced in conflict or training. 
Bill Donovan is credited with formulating OSS training to involve so many 
different types of enterprises that require more diverse skills than any general or special 
purpose force in U.S. history.977 He preached the importance of unorthodox warfare, 
particularly prior to assigning OSS operators to serve as advisors in Greece from 1942-
1944.978 Anthony Cave Brown’s book, Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero provides 
Donovan’s list of units and reasons for the formulation of a force specifically designed to 
perform unorthodox warfare (what some today may call unconventional warfare):979 
His Morale Operations organization existed to destroy the will to resist of 
the enemy forces 
His Secret Intelligence branch was there to keep the commander-in-chief 
informed of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions 
His Special Operations existed to destroy or disturb the enemy’s lines of 
communication before, during, and after the main attack 
His Operational Groups would prepare the way for the main forces 
Cave Brown explains why this concept of unorthodox warfare was so special: “the 
novelty of this conception existed in two factors: (1) Nobody in the United States had 
thought to adopt such “ungentlemanly” practices as a weapon of war and, if anyone had, 
nobody in the United States had the political power necessary to persuade, or force, the 
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President…and Chiefs of Staff to adopt the concept and (2) the entire organization was 
under one roof.”980 Instead of opting for a European model of maintaining small 
departments with single, specialized functions, Donovan strived to create a wholesale 
package of specialized capabilities. Employing this unorthodox warfare practice in Greece 
in 1944 allowed a small number of American “special troops” working in partnership with 
former Greek Army personnel to tie up a large number of German soldiers for many 
weeks.981 Donovan’s unorthodox approach and willingness to defy conventional U.S. 
military practices is what allowed him to prove the advantages of a special operations force. 
The tradition of small units utilizing a multitude of military specialties under one roof 
started with Donovan and continues to this day.  
The histories of the OSS neglect the challenge of training individuals selected into 
America’s first central intelligence and covert operations agency, but Donovan was able to 
overcome these issues.982 OSS records indicate that training was focused on the 
individual’s “initiative, personal courage and resourcefulness” and that the goal was the 
“development of [an] agent as an individual and not as a fighter who is only effective when 
under close leadership. The guerrilla concept of warfare will be the guiding principle.”983 
OSS training strived anticipate the unknown and unknowable. How do you train a special 
force for a mission that does not yet exist? The OSS pipeline focused on selecting the 
individual based on a diverse variety of skills and traits that would achieve successful 
results despite the circumstances.984 Delta considered selecting for these traits by 
recruiting solely out of infantry but instead chose once again to model after the SAS, who 
found good candidates throughout all service components.985 More so than general 
purpose forces, training for SOF is both physical and psychological.986 Psychiatric tests 
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were given particular gravity as it was known that what was asked of OSS personnel would 
be stressful and one could not rely on intelligence and skill alone.987 The OSS selection 
process and training was a defining factor for their eventual success and laid the 
groundwork for the selection that continues today. 
Because of their unique and diversified training and operational experience, SOF 
have acted as both “tactical laboratories” and “leadership nurseries” for the military writ 
large.988 SOF have been able to provide tactical guidance and testing and evaluation of 
equipment and practices that provided benefit to general purpose forces. Historically within 
the Army and Marine Corps, special operators also routinely cycle back into the general 
purpose forces, bringing with them a wealth of knowledge and experience to better the 
force. 
In Vietnam, the Army Special Forces displayed their ability to operate across the 
spectrum of warfare. By the end of 1968, the Special Forces’ core missions had become: 
advise and assist Vietnamese SF, advise their respective geographic sectors, provide 
intelligence to MACV, conduct special operations, run MACV Recondo School, running 
the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), the action arm of the Phoenix Program and 
man, train, and equip the MIKE Force. 989 
Naval Special Forces have also been employed throughout modern U.S. military 
history to provide SOF expertise in the maritime and amphibious domain. While there had 
been previous ad hoc naval special forces previously, in March of 1961, the SEALs were 
permanently established to “develop a naval guerrilla/counterinsurgency capability, 
develop elements of tactical doctrine, and help to develop special equipment to support 
these roles.”990 
SEAL Team ONE was initially assigned to Vietnam to survey how the unit could 
best provide maritime and amphibious support to Vietnamese and other U.S. forces’ 
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advisors. Initially, they focused on riverine operations but would expand their utility 
throughout the war. When SEAL Team TWO arrived, they focused on instructing the 
Vietnamese in clandestine maritime operations. SEAL Teams ONE and TWO eventually 
combined to run a Mobile Training Team (MTT) that would train South Vietnamese naval 
commandos in a periodic rotation. They would conduct commando raids with the 
Vietnamese they trained in order to dismantle North Vietnamese highway and rail 
systems.991  
The above examples of SOF’s adaptability and flexibility exemplify the key 
attribute of SOF that connects them to relational maneuver. Using relational maneuver SOF 
organizations are able to leverage both the responsive nature of reactive agility and the 
shaping nature of proactive agility. Responding to unknowns and unknowables in irregular 
environments will typically be related to violent interactions whereas shaping the 
environment is a proactive, primarily political endeavor. SOFs advantages collectively 
allow SOF to understand, adapt, and overcome complex, dynamic, and uncertain irregular 
warfare operational environments. 
C. SOF’S DISADVANTAGES 
Faulty intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation and 
coordination, provision of inadequate advice to decisionmakers, wishful 
thinking, and overcontrol of mission execution by officials far removed 
from the theatre of operations have repeatedly jeopardized the ability of the 
United States to conduct [Special Operations] missions successfully. 
—Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, 1993992 
Not all of the disadvantages below are inherent to SOF; some are due to the 
understanding and improper employment of SOF by senior political and military 
leadership. Colin Gray’s 1999 article, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When 
do Special Operations Succeed?,” points out that the path to successful SOF operations is 
dependent on the type of warfare and hinges on a competent understanding of what SOF 
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are capable of, as well as a consistent strategy throughout a given conflict.993 Not all 
politicians and military leaders understand how to employ SOF properly. For example, at 
the expense of their core UW mission set, SF was routinely integrated into conventional 
operations during the war in Vietnam.994 
Misunderstanding of SOF combined with SOF’s character flaw of not turning down 
a challenge can and has created dangerous situations in the past. When SOF are tasked and 
accept an inappropriate mission, it creates an irresponsible and unmitigated risk to the force 
and the mission. Gray details the need for “an educated consumer, political and military 
patrons who appreciate what SOF should, and should not, be asked to do.”995 Gray 
provides the conditions for successful SOF operations (See Figure 26): 
 
Figure 26. Colin Gray’s Categories of Conditions for Success996 
Until consumers can adequately understand the importance and relevance of the 
above conditions for success, SOF will continue to struggle with wrongful employment. 
Linda Robinson correctly points out that policymakers still have questions regarding “who 
                                                 
993 Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes,” 2–24.  
994 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 78–115. 
995 Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes.” 
996 Source: Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes.” 
236 
SOF are?” and “what does SOF do?”997 She writes that “most Americans are not aware of 
how widely and intensively SOF have been employed, or of how diverse their missions 
are.”998 However, she notes that civil affairs, informational, and advisory roles are not 
frequently enough included in the indirect approach that SOF should maintain.999  
Eliot Cohen contends that while SOF are essential units of a strong military, they 
come with significant costs and risks of which politicians and military leaders must be 
aware.1000 Cohen lists some SOF risks as damaging civil-military relations by subverting 
the chain of command, courting favor with politicians, and distorting perceptions of 
military affairs for politicians.1001 Politicians having direct access to SOF leadership 
truncates the chain of command and can be equally tempting and dangerous for higher level 
SOF leadership as well. When SOF are able to circumvent the normal chain of command, 
there is a greater risk of non-compliance or even coups. Cohen warns to be wary of this 
depending on the security environment of the given nation.1002 Cohen asserts that SOF are 
subject to “undue prominence when politicians support them for either romantic or political 
reasons” and this prominence can undermine military efficiency and civil-military 
relations.1003 As he points out, people often fear military involvement in politics, but the 
problem is often the reverse.1004 Technology often encourages politicians to skip chain of 
command and interact directly with the local commander, limiting their autonomy.1005 It 
is politicians’ duty to help develop strategy and maintain awareness of military action, but 
this should only occur at the appropriate strategic level and avoid micromanagement. 
Cohen advocates for the de-politicization of SOF in order to preserve their effectiveness. 
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SOF must also be wary of growing out of control and of increased publicity, as this 
demoralizes non-elite troops.1006 
SOF can potentially lead politicians and strategy makers into a grandiose sense of 
military capability. Cohen suggests that more military capability can potentially lead 
politicians into precipitous conflicts.1007 Some politicians may feel that if the military has 
a particular capability, it should be continuously employed, when in fact it may be more 
advantageous to avoid conflict or pursue it via other means. Politicians and military leaders 
alike should not feel obliged to employ all available assets constantly. This will merely 
lead to wasted resources and an exhausted, overworked force.  
The internal hubris of SOF organizations has also led them to make mistakes of 
their own. Culturally, the SOF community has a tendency to run toward the sound of 
gunfire and focus on mission sets that do not drive conflict resolution. While direct action 
raids do play an important role in beating back enemy organizations, it is political 
competition that will determine the outcome of the conflict. In order to maintain relevance 
in future conflicts, the SOF community should shift from a tactical, direct approach, to an 
indirect approach that focuses on long-term enduring political-military effects.1008 
Neglecting the indirect approach remains SOF’s most severe operational shortfall.1009  
Additionally, the history of distrust between SOF and other organizations has 
limited and continues to limit cooperation, joint operations, and information sharing. For 
example, during the Vietnam War, the CIA fought to keep MACVSOG out of Laos because 
it feared anyone intruding on its “damn near all-powerful” position in the country.”1010 
Lucien Vandenbroucke points to excessive secrecy and wishful thinking that negatively 
impact special operations.1011 Vandenbroucke also cites “inappropriate intervention in 
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mission execution” by the White House and senior military headquarters that limits the 
mission commanders’ ability to make decisions how he, the expert, deems fit.1012 He also 
notes that perceived ‘elitist’ attitudes of SOF creates distrust among general purpose 
forces.1013 
Hy Rothstein's article “Less is More: the problematic future of irregular warfare in 
an era of collapsing states,” details the inverse relationship between success against 
irregular threats and the priority attached to the conflict by senior U.S. officials. Rothstein 
cites two case studies, the current Global War On Terror effort in the Philippines and the 
Salvadoran Civil War during the 1980s. Both in the Philippines and El Salvador, U.S. 
forces operated with minimal budgets and oversight, yet achieved lasting success; whereas, 
in Iraq, with nearly unlimited resources, they have yet to affect similar success.1014  
In spite of all SOF’s advantages, risk and disadvantage will always exist. Both SOF 
and politicians must be keenly aware of these advantages and risks while planning. 
However, what can be certain is the importance of SOF’s role in irregular warfare. As noted 
previously, relational maneuver combined with SOF’s advantages allows them to deliver 
positive results across the entire spectrum of irregular warfare, but the United States must 
still be careful to employ SOF appropriately and mindful of potential pitfalls in 
employment.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Both SOF and general purpose forces have advantages and disadvantages that lend 
toward them playing the lead role in a given conflict. Where to draw the line of roles and 
responsibilities in a given conflict is an exercise in relational maneuver. The eight 
characteristics this chapter detailed demonstrate SOF’s relational maneuver advantages 
over general purpose forces in irregular warfare. In irregular environments, relational 
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maneuver’s principles of understanding, identifying, and exploiting the adversary to 
achieve strategic objectives align with SOF’s advantages. 
The environment will dictate whether SOF should be the supporting or supported 
element. The strategy, organizational design, and warfare approaches will follow. 
Whichever element is in the supported role should chair the chain of command and assign 
responsibilities as to achieve success throughout the conflict. There are appropriate times 
for both SOF and conventional leadership to assume command. More often than not, SOF 
are better-suited leadership in irregular conflicts. The State and Defense Departments 
should analyze each conflict together to determine who should take the commanding role. 
Additionally, leadership should remain for a long enough period to ensure adherence to 
strategy, creating a reasonable chance of taking effect. 
The United States is geared toward fighting large-scale wars and has failed to 
adequately adapt to the ever-increasing low-intensity warfare.1015 The United States failed 
to learn valuable lessons of low-intensity warfare during Vietnam and other conflicts.1016 
However, the United States has a force that is capable of overcoming these errors. Luttwak 
suggests the United States provide SOF with more strategic autonomy in order to more 
effectively wage low-intensity conflict.1017  
Politicians and policymakers need to be wary of the temptations of elite units. They 
must understand the capabilities and consequences of using elite units before considering 
their use for operations.1018 In addition, they should heed Cohen’s advice that future 
success depends on secrecy, not publicity.1019 
SOF should also be kept small. Cohen advocates for SOF units to maintain a size 
too small to be deployed as regular infantry units, citing that they should remain smaller 
                                                 
1015 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 335. 
1016 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 333-335. 
1017 Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” 333-342. 
1018 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, Ch.5, 95–102. 
1019 Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 101. 
240 
than a brigade, roughly 3000-4000 personnel.1020 The U.S. political and military leaders 
should furthermore heed the SOF Truths as advertised by USSOCOM (See Figure 27). 
Adherence to these truths can ensure readiness, capability, and performance when SOF is 
called upon to act.  
 
Figure 27. SOF Truths1021 
While SOF’s advantages demonstrate their relational maneuver abilities to 
understand, identify, and exploit the enemy to achieve strategic objectives over general 
purpose forces in irregular warfare, SOF may not be the appropriate solution in every 
irregular environment or conflict. Relational maneuver should be applied to each individual 
conflict to determine the best strategy in each case. As Neustadt and May illuminate in 
their book Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, while historical 
study provides the great benefit of case studies with similar circumstances, each case 
remains unique and nuanced and must be assessed with both the past and present in 
mind.1022  
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A stable long-term war strategy, particularly in irregular conflicts, allows SOF to 
make their most significant impact.1023 This, however, must be balanced with the concept 
of relational maneuver. Using relational maneuver, strategy should be continually 
reevaluated and adapted to ensure it is feasible and will achieve the overall objectives. 
SOF’s inherent advantages enable the conceptual agility to inform, influence, and 
implement adaptive strategy. Regarding irregular warfare, Tucker and Lamb point out that 
the U.S. has failed to recognize SOF’s role and has “paid repeatedly over the course of its 
history.”1024 Recognition of SOF as the appropriate choice for irregular warfare should no 
longer be in question given their inherent relational maneuver advantages.  
Recognizing SOF alignment with irregular warfare now enables an internal 
organizational design analysis of MARSOC. Based on the advantages of SOF in irregular 
warfare and MARSOC’s current design, subsequent chapters will conduct analysis and 
provide detailed recommendations for how MARSOC can better confront irregular threats. 
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VII. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND MARSOC 
Analysis until now has focused on understanding and constructing a relational 
maneuver framework for irregular warfare; using that framework to analyze the U.S. 
military’s efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan; and describing the general 
Special Operations Forces’ relational maneuver advantages within irregular operational 
environments. This chapter transitions from an external examination outside Marine 
Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to internal organizational analysis to identify 
organizational inhibitors of relational maneuver effectiveness in irregular warfare. An open 
systems analysis assists in identifying specific inhibitors within MARSOC’s inputs, 
throughputs, and outputs. These inhibitors prevent the employment of relational 
maneuver’s requirements to develop a deep understanding of the operational environment; 
inform, influence, and implement political-military strategy; adapt unit organizational 
design to the operational environment; and implement operational approaches that 
ultimately identify and exploit threat vulnerabilities in the irregular operational 
environment. 
To identify misalignment to the irregular operational environment, this chapter is 
broken into two primary sections. Section A describes the basics of organizational design 
and organizational theorist Richard Daft’s goal approach to determine effectiveness using 
an open systems model. This study’s relational maneuver analytical framework gauges 
effectiveness through adherence to its four main enabling principles. Together, these 
elements enable a military organization to identify threat vulnerabilities and adapt to 
exploit those vulnerabilities to achieve strategic objectives. Section B then conducts an 
open systems analysis of MARSOC’s operational elements. The conclusion forecasts the 
following chapter’s recommendations to address and overcome the identified 
organizational inhibitors of effectiveness. The conclusion ties together Part 2’s effort “To 
Know Oneself” and forecasts the synthesized analysis and recommendations in Part 3: 
“Success in Irregular Warfare.” 
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A. ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND OPEN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS  
Subject matter expert Richard Daft defines organization design theory as “a way of 
thinking about organizations and how people and resources are organized to collectively 
accomplish a specific purpose.”1025 Daft further explains that “organizations are (1) social 
entities that (2) are goal-directed, (3) are designed as deliberately structured and 
coordinated activity systems, and (4) are linked to the external environment.”1026 These 
definitions of organizations and their design enable an open systems analysis of MARSOC. 
Richard Daft explains that “organizations are open systems that exist for a 
purpose.”1027 An open system has inputs from an external environment, transforms those 
inputs into throughputs within the organization, and produces outputs back into the external 
environment to achieve the organization’s purpose and goals.1028 Each open system can 
possess a significant number of sub-systems. An open systems analysis requires drawing 
boundaries around the organization of interest or focal organization to distinguish between 
the environment’s inputs, the organizational system’s throughputs, and evaluate the 
organizational outputs that produce outcomes within the environment.1029 For this chapter 
and study, the focal system for analysis are MARSOC’s operational elements that most 
directly command or wage irregular warfare in deployed irregular operational 
environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the focal system for analysis is 
MARSOC itself; however, its primary sub-systems included for analysis consist of the 
MARSOC Component headquarters, the Marine Raider Regiment (MRR), Marine Raider 
Battalions (MRB), Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOC), and Marine Special 
Operations Teams (MSOT). 
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As depicted in Figure 28, an organizational design open systems analysis 
holistically examines how an organization internally functions and interacts with the 
external environment to achieve its purpose and goals. This interaction occurs across the 
organizational system and sub-system’s environmental inputs and throughputs, and 
produces outputs back into the environment. Figure 28’s red call-out box depicts the 
primary design elements for this open systems analysis of MARSOC. 
 
Figure 28. Adapted Dotterway Open Systems Model1030 
1. Environment, Environmental Uncertainty, and Context 
The system’s environment and context consist of the focal organization’s general 
and task environment over time.1031 For this study, the task environment includes 
everything that most directly impacts MARSOC in irregular operational environments. The 
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task environment, here, is further categorized between internal U.S. factors; those elements 
that directly support, enable, or command the organization in training for and deployment 
to the task environment; and foreign factors within the operational environment itself. The 
general environment describes anything that more indirectly influences MARSOC outside 
of the task environment both internal and external to the United States. The context consists 
of MARSOC’s history up to the present. Analysis of the environment identifies how well 
MARSOC understands its task operational environments. The relational maneuver 
analytical framework and the three previously analyzed historical case studies (During Part 
1) provide MARSOC’s irregular warfare task environment for this chapter, which will 
emphasize the environmental characteristics in terms of organizational theory and design. 
Determination of how well an organization fits its task-environment depends on the 
task environment’s complexity, instability, and uncertainty and how internal design fits 
that level of uncertainty. According to Daft, uncertainty in the environment is a function of 
complexity and instability, as depicted in Figure 29.1032 Complexity pertains to the number 
and inter-relation of factors within the environment.1033 Instability is related to complexity 
and pertains to how dynamic or how often and much the environment changes.1034 Since 
uncertainty is a function of complexity and instability, the greater the complexity and 
instability, the higher the uncertainty will be. Determining the level of environmental 
complexity, stability, and resulting uncertainty is important to understand how an 
organization should function and align to its environment. MARSOC faces complex, 
volatile, and uncertain irregular warfare task environments around the world. 
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Figure 29. Interrelation of Complexity, Instability, and Uncertainty1035 
2. Mission, Strategy, and Key Success Factors 
An organization’s mission and strategy contain key success factors that translate 
the environment to the internal organizational design elements and provide the guidance 
necessary to succeed in that environment.1036 Together, the organizational mission and 
strategy should outline the purpose of the organization as well as the ways and means the 
organization will employ to reach its purpose within the task environment.1037 
Organizational key success factors are the internal measures of performance that guide how 
an organization plans to ensure that its strategy accomplishes the mission in the task 
environment.  
3. Internal Design Elements: Tasks, Structures, People, and Constraints 
The most critical internal design factors for assessing effectiveness in irregular 
warfare include organizational tasks, structures, and people. Additionally, this chapter 
describes important constraints that limit design decisions and interactions within a focal 
organization. Although technology is also represented in Figure 28, and is an important 
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general internal design element, the study’s focus on irregular warfare excludes technology 
from its analysis of the most critical factors for effectiveness. Therefore, this study will not 
analyze technology’s role within MARSOC, leaving it instead for future research. 
Design tasks represent the work, skills, and capabilities that MARSOC conducts to 
achieve the organizational mission in the task environment.1038 Examples of 
organizational tasks range from educating, training, and deploying each operational unit to 
an operational environment. The stated and implied tasks within a focal organization are 
how an organization reaches its mission and implements its strategy.1039 This analysis 
discusses the most pertinent education, training, and deployment tasks within each focal 
organization. 
Structure is how a group or system organizes itself to accomplish its mission and 
strategy within its task environment.1040 An organization that fits its task environment 
effectively communicates, coordinates, and accomplishes its mission in the task 
environment. Conversely, organizational misfit with the environment creates conflict, 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness.1041 Henry Mintzberg analyzes organizations as four 
primary configurations, depicted in Figure 30: Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, 
Professional Bureaucracy, and Adhocracy; with a fifth, Divisional, that can contain the 
other four configurations.1042 Since organizational agility and adaptability are necessary 
to employ relational maneuver in irregular operational environments, MARSOC’s 
structural analysis will assess departmentation, division of labor, formalization, 
specialization, and levels of centralization to find inhibitors to agility. The analysis on 
structure and its relationship to agility also discusses the differences between global 
responsiveness and proactive shaping of operational environments within the context of 
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U.S. SOF.1043 Structural analysis will particularly focus on identifying structural 
redundancies within MARSOC that inhibit employment of relational maneuver. Further, 
analysis will examine MARSOC’s personnel, billet, and unit assignments to determine 
impacts on professionalization and mission accomplishment in the operational 
environment.  
 
Figure 30. Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations in Relation to Environmental 
Uncertainty1044 
The analysis of MARSOC’s people will focus on the professionalization and the 
incentive rewards system. Professionalization represents the level of skills, experience, 
and education of the personnel and units tasked with accomplishing the organizational 
mission. The incentive rewards system assesses how each organization incentivizes 
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individual behavior. This chapter analyzes MARSOC’s balance between internal, 
administrative, and external factors from the operational environment that drive its 
performance and behavior. Environmental focus is a key determining factor to assess 
MARSOC’s attrition versus relational maneuver organizational style of warfare. 
Significant constraints govern how MARSOC can structure, incentivize, and task 
its personnel. While constraints represent an input into the system, constraints also interact 
with the structure, tasks, and people and significantly affect decisions within MARSOC or 
any U.S. military organization. This section analyzes the most pertinent constraints 
imposed on MARSOC and differentiates between constraints that can be internally 
influenced or removed and those that require external assistance to influence or remove. 
MARSOC’s primary organizational constraints are imposed by the Department of Defense 
(DoD), the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), and Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) 
administrative and operational manpower assignment, promotion, and deployment orders 
and policies. 
Technology in organizational design represents the technical systems for 
accomplishing tasks. This can include information technology, communications systems, 
weapons, methods of transportation, and other tools. This chapter will not assess the 
impacts of technology within each organization and recommends that further research 
examine the extent of its impacts on MARSOC. Clearly information and communication 
technologies and their place in command and control is changing rapidly and affecting 
organizational design of the future. Addressing these topics would seem to deserve a thesis 
all to itself. 
4. Outputs: Culture, Outcomes, and Analysis 
An open system transforms inputs into outputs that interact with the system’s 
environment. For this section, outputs are represented by organizational culture and 
outcomes with the external environment. Richard Daft defines culture as the “set of values, 
norms, guiding beliefs, and understandings that are shared by members of an organization 
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and taught to new members as the correct way to think, feel, and behave.”1045 Richard 
Daft depicts culture as an iceberg, as illustrated in Figure 31.1046 Below the surface lies 
the true organizational culture. These values, beliefs, and ways of thinking are not so easily 
recognized unless something challenges the underlying elements. The manifestations of 
those underlying elements exist above the surface and include behaviors and practices such 
as ceremonies, rituals, and rites of passage.1047 Organizational culture is an output 
manifestation of the interaction between inputs interacting with internal design elements. 
The resulting cultural output can be a powerful force multiplier that unifies and drives an 
organization if properly aligned with the environment, or it can detract or impede if 
significant organization misfit exists. Here, cultural analysis discusses the core subsurface 
and visible behaviors that represent MARSOC’s culture. The subsurface and visible 
elements of culture include shared values and beliefs; behaviors, ceremonies, rituals, and 
rites of passage; and mental models.1048 
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Figure 31. Organizational Culture1049 
Organizational culture and task-related outputs produce outcomes in the external 
environment.1050 The goal approach, visualized in Figure 32, for determining 
organizational effectiveness provides the best option for determining areas of misalignment 
inhibiting effective outcomes because task performance in an irregular operational 
environment ultimately determines U.S. military success or failure. According to Daft, “the 
goal approach to effectiveness consists of identifying an organization’s output goals and 
assessing how well the organization has attained those goals.”1051 MARSOC’s 
effectiveness ultimately depends on measuring outcomes within an operational 
environment and aligning itself internally to achieve strategic success. 
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Figure 32. Goal-Based Approach to Assessing Effectiveness1052 
This chapter superimposes the four principles of relational maneuver in irregular 
warfare as MARSOC’s measures of effectiveness, depicted in Figure 33. By superimposing 
relational maneuver as MARSOC’s measures of effectiveness in the task environment, this 
chapter measures how well MARSOC’s inputs, throughputs, and outputs align to the 
principles necessary to achieve success in irregular warfare. These measures of 
effectiveness expose areas of organizational misalignment and inhibitors to employing 
relational maneuver and achieving strategic outcomes in the irregular operational 
environment. This examination especially emphasizes MARSOC’s alignment of its 
organizational mission and strategy, tasks, structure, and people to determine whether the 
organization is producing relational maneuver outputs.  
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Figure 33. Measures of Effectiveness 
Ultimately, a goal approach through open systems analysis provides insight as to 
how well MARSOC’s inputs, throughputs, and outputs fit the irregular warfare task 
environment. Henry Mintzberg describes organizational fit as how well an organization’s 
goals, internal design, and outputs align to the intended environment. Organizational misfit 
occurs when there are internal inconsistencies and a lack of alignment of goals and internal 
design elements with the external environment. Relational maneuver provides the 
framework to compare each of MARSOC’s inputs, throughputs, and outputs to assist in 
identifying areas of misalignment and misfit with irregular operational environments. 
B. MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (MARSOC) 
The MARSOC Headquarters, the Marine Raider Regiment (MRR), Marine Raider 
Battalions (MRB), Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOC), and Marine Special 
Operations Teams (MSOT) represent the cumulative focal organization for analysis. 
Section B analyzes MARSOC’s inputs, throughputs, and outputs to identify areas of 
organizational misfit with MARSOC’s irregular task environment. The conclusion 
consolidates these misfits and contrasts with the identified relational maneuver MOEs 
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required for successful strategic outcomes in irregular warfare. Figure 34 depicts 
MARSOC’s current task organization. 
 
Figure 34. MARSOC Table of Organization1053 
1. Inputs 
a. The Environment, Environmental Uncertainty, and Context 
(1) MARSOC’s Environment 
MARSOC’s environment consists of all factors that directly or indirectly impact 
the organization’s ability to complete its mission. This study simplifies the environment by 
                                                 




distinguishing between the task and general environment as well as the U.S. internal and 
external foreign factors that impact the environment in relation to the United States as 
depicted in Figure 35. The most critical sectors that impact MARSOC’s mission 
accomplishment lie within the internal and external task environment. The internal U.S. 
task environment provides inputs—later described as missions, strategies, and key success 
factors—to guide and transform organizational throughputs into outputs that confront the 
threats, neutrals, and friendlies that MARSOC encounters in deployed irregular task 
environments. MARSOC’s general environment consists of everything else that more 
indirectly affects its success in the task environment. 
 
Figure 35. MARSOC’s Internal and External Task and General Environment 
(2) Environmental Uncertainty 
MARSOC’s deployed task environments tend to be complex, dynamic, and 
uncertain environments. In these uncertain task environments, illustrated by analyses of 
Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan in Part 1, higher-level guidance from the U.S. and 
coalition chains of command can quickly become complex. Command guidance directly 
from the U.S. president, U.S. Ambassador-led Country Teams, U.S. Military Conventional 
and SOF chains of command, coalition partners, and partner nations quickly create a 
complex web of guidance that must be untangled to understand the task operational 
environment and ensure unity of vision and strategic effort. In addition to the number of 
friendly participants both internal to the United States and among foreign partners, the 
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number of relevant neutral and threat participants, as well as the factors influencing their 
decision-making processes, can exponentially elevate the complexity of MARSOC’s 
deployed task environment. 
Moreover, MARSOC also faces a highly dynamic external task environment. Prior 
to deployment MARSOC’s internal task environment tends to be more stable than on 
deployment. This internal stability is still subject to changes from U.S. political and 
military leaders and commanders who can alter training, education, and deployment. 
Furthermore, MARSOC’s general environment can also contribute to instability within the 
task environment. The global political and economic environment can evolve rapidly 
between or internal to nations. The intersection between internal and external task and 
general environmental conditions results in rapidly changing and unstable environments. 
MARSOC’s deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq over the last ten years illustrate the 
dynamic nature of the irregular foreign task environment where allegiances of villages and 
populations have changed, like in western Iraq during the Al Anbar Sunni Awakening, or 
in Afghanistan where changes in Afghan presidential, provincial, and district leadership 
often created unstable effects within a geographic, social, and political area of 
operations.1054 
Since uncertainty is a function of complexity and instability, MARSOC faces the 
greatest uncertainty in its deployed task environments. Case study analysis of Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan reveal this uncertainty. Established in 2006, MARSOC’s 
experiences since then in both Afghanistan and Iraq are evidence of the uncertainty of these 
irregular operational task environments. In Afghanistan, the significant number of relevant 
actors, including the Afghan central government, provincial and district leaders, regular 
and irregular Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), local tribal leaders, external 
Pakistani and other regional neighbors, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
coalition partners, the tribal and ethnically diverse local population, Taliban, al Qaeda, 
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local warlords, and drug traffickers, presented a complex political and military challenge. 
The complexity in number of participants was then exponentially exacerbated by their 
interactions, which dynamically shifted allegiances’ political objectives. The cumulative 
effect has created highly uncertain irregular environments for MARSOC’s operational 
elements.  
MARSOC’s internal and external environmental threats to accomplishing its 
mission in the task environment elevates complexity, instability, and uncertainty. 
MARSOC’s internal U.S. threats pertain to its ability to provide relevance to SOCOM, the 
USMC, DoD, and U.S. Congress to retain funding. MARSOC faces four significant 
internal threats. First, within SOCOM, MARSOC will always face competition from other 
similar SOF organizations to bid for relevant and highly desirable combat-related missions. 
Second, like any organization, MARSOC must sustain its manpower to support its 
missions. One example of this resourcing challenge includes the lack of qualified U.S. 
Navy medical personnel to meet the designed organizational requirements for its units. The 
lack of manpower resources, in this case Navy medical personnel, has threatened 
MARSOC’s ability to deploy units to the task environment.1055 Third, MARSOC’s annual 
budget considerations represent a reoccurring internal threat that must be managed like any 
military organization. Fourth and finally, MARSOC faces uncertainty within the rest of the 
Marine Corps and within SOCOM as to MARSOC’s utility to the Marine Corps, SOCOM, 
and the DoD in comparison to like-units.1056 One author and former member of MARSOC 
stated in 2014 that “MARSOC’s principal issue [is] — to what ends does the organization 
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serve?”1057 This uncertainty of purpose and utility threatens MARSOC’s organizational 
existence, epitomized by one anonymous author on a reputable online journal arguing in 
2018 that MARSOC should be disbanded completely.1058 
Externally, MARSOC’s threats come from the task environment in two primary 
forms. First, like any combat unit, MARSOC units confront enemies and adversaries on 
the battlefield. Second, and more broadly, MARSOC, like any military unit, must prove 
that it can accomplish its stated mission in the task environment. Failure in mission 
accomplishment will result in the removal of organizational leadership, or potentially, the 
entire organization. 
(3) MARSOC’s Context 
One cannot understand MARSOC without understanding its historical context. As 
with any organization, its history has led to MARSOC’s current Mission, Strategy, and 
organizational design. This section briefly discusses MARSOC’s historical lineage but 
focuses predominantly on the immediate events that led to its birth in 2006 up to the 
present. 
The U.S. Marines have a long and storied history dating back to 1775. Established 
as soldiers from the sea serving aboard ships and as landing parties, the Marines evolved 
over the years to fighting irregular conflicts against the Barbary Pirates, Seminole Indians, 
and revolutionaries in China, Central America, and the Philippines. Their participation in 
these numerous small wars even gave the Marines a reputation for being the nation’s State 
Department or colonial troops.1059 The Marine Corps condensed the doctrinal output of 
these experiences in the Small Wars Manual of 1940, which outlined lessons learned in 
fighting irregular warfare.1060 In World War I, the Marines began to solidify their 
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conventional warfighting reputation through a combination of competence and public 
affairs acumen.1061  
Prior to 2001, MARSOC’s direct lineage began in 1942 during World War II, when 
President Roosevelt directed the Marine Corps to form a “commando” style unit mirrored 
after the British model.1062 This creation met internal resistance within the Marine Corps, 
which opposed the concept of having an elite force within what Marine leadership 
advertised as an already elite force.1063 The Marine Raiders only lasted for two years and 
were disbanded in 1944 after conducting several commando-style raids but being 
predominantly conventionally employed as Marine infantry battalions.1064 Additionally, a 
relatively significant number of Marines served in the precursor to the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Army Special Forces, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS). These 
OSS Marines served, often with distinction, across Europe, North Africa, and South East 
Asia in support of clandestine and irregular efforts against both Germany and Japan.1065 
Throughout its history, the Marine Corps faced repeated organizational attacks, 
especially from the Army, aimed to amalgamate the Marine Corps into the Army.1066 The 
Marines survived and continued to serve in Korea, Vietnam, and other limited contingency 
operations around the world. During this time, the Marines employed specialized 
Reconnaissance Marines in a direct support role of conventional Marine units, and a limited 
number of Marines operated under external organizations such as Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG). These 
Reconnaissance Marines received specialized training and were considered ‘elite’ within 
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the Marine Corps, but rarely operated outside of the Marine Corp’s direct operational chain 
of command. 
In 1987, when Congress created SOCOM, the Marines chose not to establish a 
contingent within SOCOM.1067 Instead, the Marine Corps chose to establish its own 
concept of a special operations capability separate from SOCOM.1068 This choice occurred 
due to multiple reasons, but a significant contributing factor included the Marine Corps’ 
strongly protective internal culture and fear that “non-Marine image may take hold of 
MARSOC Marines without the direct supervision by the Marine Corps.”1069 The Marine 
Corps’ culture espoused that all Marines are elite and special.1070 The Marine Corps, 
therefore, resisted external attempts to alter this culture by diluting the Marine brand or 
creating a unit outside of the organic chain of command.1071 
Instead of joining SOCOM, the Marines created the concept of the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF), which remains its guiding organizational concept to this 
day. The MAGTF is an internally self-sufficient and scalable task force that maintains its 
own support, ground combat, aviation, and command components that come in three 
standard packages: the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Brigade (MEB), and Force 
(MEF), respectively centered on an infantry battalion, regiment, and division. Additionally, 
the Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) enables the Marine Corps to doctrinally task-
organize to specific missions and environments. The MAGTF is designed to be a general-
purpose expeditionary force that can respond to a range of contingencies, from an embassy 
evacuation to major combat operations. Furthermore, to prove that basically trained 
Marines could conduct special operations, the Marines created the concept of the Special 
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Operations Capability (SOC). The Marines argued that the MEU (SOC) could conduct a 
wide range of special operations missions due to a unique certification process.1072 
Following al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11th, 2001, the new level of demand 
and reliance on SOF caused a chain of events that forced the Marines to join SOCOM.1073 
Although the Marines moved multiple MEU-SOCs within striking position of Afghanistan 
following 9/11, the Marines were not as rapidly employed as SOF.1074 Once actually 
employed early in the conflict, the Marines were often not employed as designed—as 
organic units—but were parceled out, often in support of SOF units.1075 
In the aftermath of 9/11, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the 
Marine Corps and SOCOM to explore the feasibility for a permanent Marine unit within 
SOCOM.1076 This directive produced a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the 
Marines and SOCOM to test the concept.1077 The result, Detachment One (Det 1), formed 
between 2002 and 2003 by a combination of reconnaissance and other Marines 
consolidated from units across the Corps. Det 1 deployed to Iraq in 2004 within a larger 
Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG).1078 
Following this deployment and assessment of Det 1 as a successful proof of 
concept, Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak recommended that the Marine 
discontinue the experiment and not provide a permanent contribution to SOCOM.1079 
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Officially, the Marines referenced funding concerns, yet, undoubtedly, a major factor for 
the open resistance to a permanent SOCOM unit was resentment toward the idea of creating 
a special class of Marines that would operationally report external to the Corps. In 2005, 
ignoring the Marine Corps’ resistance, Rumsfeld directed that the Marines form a 
permanent Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC).1080 Inexplicably, after 
Rumsfeld’s directive, the Marines deactivated Det 1 and distributed its members across the 
Marine Corps in the same manner as the original Raiders in 1944.1081 Instead of using Det 
1 as the nucleus of MARSOC and by incorporating the previous two years of lessons 
learned, the Marine Corps opted to start from scratch. 
In 2006, 1st and 2d Force Reconnaissance Companies reflagged as 1st and 2nd 
Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB) and MARSOC was born.1082 In addition 
to the battalions formed from the Reconnaissance community, MARSOC also merged the 
previously formed Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU) into MARSOC from the rest 
of the Marine Corps.1083Shortly thereafter, MARSOC reflagged FMTU as the Marine 
Special Operations Advisory Group (MSOAG).1084 By 2009, MARSOC again reflagged 
MSOAG as the Marine Special Operations Regiment (MSOR) to operationally command 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd MSOB.1085 
Although Det 1 deployed to Iraq, MARSOC was born and forged in Afghanistan; 
from 2006 through 2014, MARSOC deployed primarily to Afghanistan. While 
MARSOC’s core activities include Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and Counterterrorism (CT), 
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its primary missions have mostly fallen underneath the umbrella of COIN and FID.1086 
Between 2012 and 2013, as the U.S. and SOF presence in Afghanistan drew down, 
MARSOC transitioned into a regional deployment model with 1st MSOB aligned to the 
Pacific Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), 3rd MSOB, toward Africa, and 2d 
MSOB focused on the Middle East. In 2014, Headquarters Marine Corps approved the 
alignment of MARSOC with the Marine Raider heritage from World War II. Between 2015 
and 2017, MARSOC’s Regimental and Battalion commands reflagged as the Marine 
Raider Regiment, Marine Raider Battalions, Marine Raider Support Group, and the Marine 
Raider Training Center.1087 
Culturally, MARSOC’s history merges the general Marine infantry heritage, 
Marine Reconnaissance heritage (which provided many of its initial senior enlisted and 
officer leadership), and SOCOM’s influence, particularly from the Army Special 
Forces.1088 Most notably, MARSOC has forged a unique culture blending SOCOM with 
the Marine Corps. Due to its organizational youth, this blend of cultures has produced 
internal cultural tensions within MARSOC. 
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b. Mission, Strategy, and Key Success Factors 
(1) Mission and Strategy 
MARSOC’s organizational mission, strategy, and key success factors are best 
examined through MARSOC official unit mission statements, MARSOC Publication 1: 
MARSOF, a recent official command presentation, and its newly published strategic vision, 
MARSOF 2030. 1089 MARSOC’s official mission statement represents its official 
organizational end goal: 
MARSOC recruits, organizes, trains, equips and deploys task organized, 
scalable, expeditionary Marine Corps special operations forces to 
accomplish the full spectrum of special operations missions assigned by the 
commander, USSOCOM and/or the geographic combatant commanders via 
the Theater Special Operations Commands.1090  
Virtually identical to its sister SOF command’s general mission statements, this 
mission statement provides little useful information, other than to say that MARSOC forces 
need to be prepared to do any SOF missions directed by SOCOM and the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders. Slightly more useful in understanding MARSOC’s practical 
mission and strategy, in 2014, Author Dick Couch reported that MARSOC’s official core 
activities included DA, SR, FID, COIN, CT, as well as support to unconventional warfare 
(UW), support to counterproliferation, and support to information operations.1091 More 
recently, within the SOCOM’s 2018 Factbook, however, MARSOC limits its advertised 
capabilities to FID, SR, and DA.1092 Furthermore, a 2018 Congressional Research Service 
Report adds both CT and Information Operations to MARSOC’s repertoire of 
capabilities.1093 Lastly, the Command’s official recruiting pamphlet includes Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), Support to UW, and Security Force Assistance 
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(SFA) to the list of MARSOC’s core activities.1094 Aside from confusion over MARSOC’s 
exact official capabilities, official core activities provide little useful insight for analysis, 
since equivalent SOF organizations, Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, perform the 
same core activities.1095  
Somewhat dated based on MARSOC’s rapid organizational development since 
2006, in 2011, MARSOC published MARSOC Publication 1: MARSOF.1096 MARSOC 
published this booklet as a “foundational publication for MARSOC” to guide its vision 
moving forward.1097 While MARSOC has evolved since 2011, MARSOF provides insight 
into the organization’s development within the Marine Corps. MARSOF emphasizes the 
value of traditional Marine ethos, an expeditionary MAGTF heritage, the traditional 
Marine emphasis on doing more with less and fighting “above our weight class.”1098 
Figure 36 encapsulates the key components of the strategy, philosophy, and vision 
articulated in MARSOF. 
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Figure 36. MARSOF 2011 Organizational Vision1099 
MARSOC’s official command brief to Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in July 
2017 more clearly outlines what MARSOC considers as its strategy for success in the task 
environment.1100 This command brief outlines that MARSOC provides a variety of 
capabilities listed in Figure 37. The same brief states that “our value to the SOF enterprise 
is our Marine ethos, C2 capability, and MAGTF approach to operations and organization,” 
and that MARSOC’s “preferred unit of employment is the MSOC (Rein).”1101 Essentially, 
the primary way that MARSOC distinguishes itself from the other SOF services is through 
the Company-level command led by a Major, O-4, as well as the self-assessed benefits of 
the Marine ethos.1102 The MSOC contains four MSOTs as well as uniquely robust 
logistics, intelligence, and communications sections within the headquarters element. The 
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simplest way to understand the MSOC and its difference between a Special Forces 
Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) or SEAL Troop is that the MSOC essentially 
contains the same capabilities of a traditional SOF battalion-level Special Operations Task 
Force (SOTF) within a smaller force package.  
 
Figure 37. MARSOC’s Focus Areas1103  
The MSOC is designed to mirror the conventional Marine MAGTF concept to 
produce an organic, self-sustaining SOF command that operates in a task-force like 
operational capacity at a lower level than its sister services. While MARSOC has and 
continues to deploy regimental- and battalion-level commands, MARSOC advertises the 
MSOC as its organizationally distinguishing feature. In essence, the MSOC represents 
MARSOC’s primary structural bid for success similar to the MAGTF-like expeditionary 
packages. Similar as to how the larger Marine Corps presents the MAGTF, MARSOC 
advertises that the MSOC can be tailored to any mission SOCOM desires. 
Below the component level, commanded by a Colonel, the Marine Raider 
Regiment’s (MRR) mission states that: 
The Marine Raider Regiment consists of a Headquarters Company and three 
Marine Raider Battalions (1st, 2d and 3d). The Regiment provides tailored 
military combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign 
forces in order to enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the 
environment as directed by USSOCOM as well as the capability to form the 
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nucleus of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Marines and Sailors of 
Marine Raider Regiment train, advise, and assist friendly host nation forces 
- including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces - to enable 
them to support their governments' internal security and stability, to counter 
subversion and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external 
threats. Regiment deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through 
USSOCOM, in accordance with engagement priorities for Overseas 
Contingency Operations.1104  
The MRR’s stated official mission favors the indirect FID or COIN mission sets 
more specifically than any other official MARSOC strategic mission or document.  
Each of the three subordinate Marine Raider Battalions (MRB) use a variation of 
the following mission: “2d Marine Raider Battalion is organized, trained and equipped to 
deploy globally for missions as directed by MARSOC. Each Marine Special Operations 
Company (MSOC) is task-organized with personnel and equipment capable of executing 
the full spectrum of special operations in support of the geographic combatant 
commanders.”1105 Currently, each MRB deploys an MSOC on six-month rotations as part 
of a 24-month rotation cycle to each Battalion’s respective geographic area of 
responsibility. 
(2) MARSOC’s Key Success Factors 
The DoD and SOCOM, and Headquarters Marine Corps, provide relevant guidance 
and success factors to MARSOC. MARSOC then takes this guidance and produces its own 
internally developed factors for success. 
Department of Defense: The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) currently 
provides the DoD’s primary strategic guidance to all U.S. military units. The 2018 NDS 
explains that the U.S. military faces the primary challenge of competition with 
“revisionist,” “rogue,” and violent extremist organizations (VEO) that seek to undermine 
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and attack America’s interests, allies, and the current global order.1106 While the NDS 
explains that revisionists and rogues are the primary threats to U.S. interests, it also 
explains that these powers are employing competitive means and methods less than open 
warfare and below the level of armed conflict with the United States to achieve their goals. 
These efforts under the threshold of direct armed conflict with the United States often take 
place within environments such as Syria, Ukraine, Iraq, and Yemen, where local, regional 
forces are involved in direct and proxy warfare with the U.S. military and its partners. 
Therefore, while the 2018 NDS guides the military to refocus on great power competition, 
it also describes how this competition is taking place within irregular warfare 
environments. While the NDS does not expressly guide SOCOM to focus on these irregular 
threats, SOCOM’s access, placement, and skills make SOF more ready and relevant to 
confront U.S. irregular threats than the rest of the military.1107 
SOCOM: SOCOM’s key success factors include its mission, core activities, and 
its most recent 2017 and 2018 Posture Statements before Congress.1108 SOCOM’s mission 
states that “USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides 
special operations forces to support persistent, networked and distributed global combatant 
command operations in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.”1109  
SOCOM’s 12 core activities, depicted in Figure 38, represent the capabilities that 
SOCOM provides to the United States for its defense.1110 From a training and deployment 
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standpoint, these core activities comprise the skills that MARSOC and the rest of SOCOM 
currently prepare for, execute, and provide as options for DoD priorities. 
 
Figure 38. SOCOM Core Activities1111 
The 2017 and 2018 SOCOM posture statements provide insight into the current 
SOCOM commander’s view of SOF’s strategic utility to the DoD and the key factors that 
enable SOF success. In 2017, SOCOM Commander General Raymond Thomas 
emphasized four key pillars of SOF’s strategic utility to national defense. First, he 
explained that SOF provides the greatest value in pre-crisis, “left of bang” situations.1112 
Second, he stated “that specialized application of SOF alongside partner nations, the Joint 
Force, and the Interagency conducting activities across the spectrum of conflict allows us 
to present options that best serve our national interests.”1113 Third, SOF provides a 
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transregional and networked capability unlike any other military capability. Fourth, SOF 
is continuously forward-deployed, and in conjunction with the global SOF and partner 
network, “assists us in rapidly repositioning and focusing–providing enhanced options and 
effects.”1114 
In his updated posture statement in 2018, General Thomas incorporated guidance 
from the 2018 NDS and reaffirmed that SOCOM’s highest priority remains countering 
irregular VEOs.1115 General Thomas also affirmed SOF’s strategic utility in its 
transregional networked approach to counter VEOs, CWMD proliferation efforts, and 
revisionist and rogue efforts to compete under the threshold of armed conflict. He stated 
that “SOF is uniquely capable of effectively competing below the level of traditional armed 
conflict and across the spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.”1116 General 
Thomas’ 2017 and 2018 posture statements provide a vision predominantly oriented 
toward irregular operational environments against both state and non-state threats and 
emphasize SOF’s proactive and forward-deployed forces, organizational agility, and 
globally networked relationships. 
The Marine Corps: The Marine Corps’ recipe for strategic success is found within 
three primary organizational documents: the 2016 Marine Operating Concept (MOC); the 
Commandant’s 2017 Message, “Seize the Initiative”; and the Commandant’s 2018 
Message, “Execute.”1117 The Marine Operating Concept (MOC) published in 2016 
outlines the current path and measures of success for the Marine Corps. It states that: 
As a warfighting organization, we must recognize the challenges of the 
future and develop an operational approach to fight and win. The MOC 
                                                 
1114 Thomas, III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United 
States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities May 2, 2017,” 10. 
1115 Thomas, III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United 
States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Feb 15, 2018,” 2. 
1116 Thomas, III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United 
States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Feb 15, 2018,” 4. 
1117 General Robert Neller, Message to the Force 2018: “Execute,” (Washington, DC: United States 
Marine Corps, 2018). 
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embraces our naval character, expeditionary mindset, and professional 
approach to constantly improve and build on our foundations of maneuver 
warfare and fighting as a combined arms force. The challenges of the future 
will impact how we organize our Corps and ultimately fight our Nation’s 
battles. The MOC describes the steps we will take to design, develop, and 
field a future force for the 21st century. The success of this concept depends 
on our Marines and Sailors. Our people have always been the Marine Corps 
center of gravity and the key to our success as warfighters. Their ability to 
think critically, innovate smartly, and adapt to complex environments and 
adaptive enemies has always been the key factor we rely on to win in any 
clime and place.1118 
The Commandant’s 2017 Message outlines a number of priorities, but its essence 
is best captured when General Robert Neller states:  
Remember, our enemies will never rest. In our business, there’s no prize for 
2nd Place. That’s why we must remain a “Gold Medal Organization.” And 
that’s why we all need to bring our A-Game every day. Learn your job, and 
do it with maximum intensity and skill. The next fight will evolve rapidly, 
and it will force us to be more agile, flexible, and adaptable. To win, we 
need Marines who are smart, fit, disciplined, resilient, and able to thrive in 
the face of uncertainty and the unknown.1119  
The central tenets of both documents outline the core principles necessary for the 
Marine Corps to succeed as the nation’s maritime expeditionary force in readiness that 
employs maneuver warfare and adapts to defeat the nation’s enemies. Ultimately, the 
Commandant, General Neller, articulates the Marine Corps’ principle element for success 
in his January 2018 message to the Marine Corps when he encapsulated all other principles 
by stating: “We are warfighters within a warfighting organization. Our Corps performs two 
important functions for our Nation—we Make Marines and we Win Battles.”1120 The 
central message expressed across all three guiding Marine Corps documents center on 
warfighting competence, adaptability, expeditionary character, and mission success. 
                                                 
1118 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in 
the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Department of The Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 
2016), i. 
1119 Robert B. Neller, Message to the Force 2017: “Seize the Initiative” (Washington, DC: United 
States Marine Corps, 2017). 
1120 Neller, Message to the Force 2018: “Execute,” (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 
2018), 2. 
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MARSOC Component: MARSOC’s most current desired measures of 
performance are found within its recently published organizational vision, MARSOF 2030. 
MARSOF 2030’s success factors are the “Cognitive Raider,” “MARSOF as a Connector,” 
“Combined Arms for the Connected Arena,” and “Enterprise Level Agility.”1121 Each one 
of these concepts contain a distinct, but interconnected, set of principles that MARSOC 
sees as required for current and future success. The ‘Cognitive Raider’ describes an 
individual or unit able to blend experience and education and to adapt across any 
environment to effectively influence and overcome. ‘MARSOF as a Connector’ builds on 
the ‘Cognitive Raider’ by articulating a vision where MARSOC integrates, coordinates, 
and partners with joint, combined, interagency, partnered and civilian entities to overcome 
operational challenges. The ‘Combined Arms’ principle mirrors the ‘Connector’ principle 
across information, weapons, cyber, and technology to synthesize capabilities. Lastly, 
‘Enterprise Level Agility’ articulates an adaptive and innovative culture that identifies and 
evolves to meet requirements in complex environments.  
To oversee the quality of MARSOC units, MARSOC uses its Training and 
Education Section G7-led “RAVEN” exercise to assess and evaluate all deploying units. 
This deployment occurs shortly before each MSOC and MSOT deploys, and the 
performance results for each deploying unit has been traditionally briefed up to the 
MARSOC Commanding General, MRR Commander, and other senior leadership. This 
culmination exercise and assessment is the primary significant driver of MARSOC unit-
level training. 
A major cultural measure of success for MARSOC is to retain a distinctive Marine 
cultural identity. Base on MARSOC’s history, a major concern from senior Marine 
leadership when standing up MARSOC was the impact of creating ‘special’ Marines upon 
the general Marine culture. Therefore, MARSOC doctrine, MARSOC recruiting, and 
command guidance letters issued by commanders consistently reinforces the tradtitional 
Marine cultural identity.1122 The most recent guidance from MARSOC Commander Major 
                                                 
1121 Marine Special Operations Command, MARSOF 2030, 10. 
1122 Marine Special Operations Command, Publication 1: MARSOF, 8–1. 
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General Daniel Yoo states, “Remember, “Marines are who we are – Special Operations is 
what we do.”1123 This cultural measure of success is typically officially stated within 
guidance from Component down to the MRB. 
Regiment and Battalions: At the MRR and MRB levels in MARSOC, success 
factors can be considered measures of performance. MARSOC measures of performance 
for the task environment is officially based on the MARSOC Training and Readiness 
Manual, which lists performance steps for each MARSOC official core activity, as of 
2011.1124 While the official handbook for all performance steps for core activities, the 
manual does not provide the detailed, necessary information to actually apply in training 
in general. Therefore, although the manual is used to fiscally justify training, in practical 
application, MARSOC units do not typically actually use the Training and Readiness 
Manual to train, preferring to rely on personal experience, official schools training, and 
contracted subject matter experts.1125  
Aside from MARSOC’s broad mission statements already listed, specific additional 
guidance is personality- and mission-dependent and issued by individual commanders, 
typically upon assumption of command. The personality-based guidance rotates with new 
command leadership every two years, and mission-specific guidance varies based on 
individual missions. Essentially, the MRRs and MRBs oversee and prepare MARSOC’s 
primary deploying units at the MSOC and below. Because the MARSOC component 
traditionally conducts all primary direct coordination with SOCOM to allocate missions, 
the regiment does not typically influence the deployment process until after the primary 
decisions are made by the component and when deploying units move into final planning, 
preparation, and deployment.1126 Guidance at the regimental level is dependent on the 
individual Regimental commander and his stated priorities.  
                                                 
1123 Major General Daniel Yoo, “Philosophy of Command,” (unpublished). 
1124 “NAVMC 3500.97: MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TRAINING AND 
READINESS MANUAL,” (Headquarters Marine Corps, January 2011). 
1125 Major Bailey’s observations as a MSOT Commander, MSOC Executive Officer, and 
Headquarters Company Commander between 2013–2017. 
1126 Inteview with Undisclosed Senior Military Officer, Phone, September 2018. 
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Guidance at the battalion level is similar to the Regimental guidance. Battalion 
commanders outline individual priorities to staff and subordinate leadership within the 
constraints emplaced by the component and regiment headquarters. Stylistically, individual 
guidance differs based on the commander as well as the assigned missions and required 
skillsets depending on deployment location. Aside from assigning personnel to individual 
MSOC’s or MSOT’s, the Battalion level’s guidance influences the culture of the battalion 
but does little to influence deploying units’ missions other than rotating MSOCs and 
managing personnel and logistics support. Overall, the guidance from the Regiment and 
Battalion vary little and are mostly designed to enable the direction from the component 
and to support and oversee each unit’s deployment.  
MSOC and Below: At the MSOC and below, the guidance varies based on the 
leadership, the assigned mission, and the analysis and planning for each deployment. 
During training, performance is measured by internal MRB, MSOC, and MSOT level 
training as well as the final G7 RAVEN exercise. On deployment, success depends on the 
individual mission and chain of command and varies significantly.  
Analysis: When comparing MARSOC’s mission, strategy, historical context and 
primary stakeholder’s performance measures, four major trends emerge. First, MARSOC 
is a relatively young organization imposed on the Marine Corps by external political forces. 
This history remains a significant factor to this day and has created underlying tensions 
between a Marine Corps cultural identity and a SOCOM or SOF identity. Second, up to 
now, MARSOC has chosen a broad mission and strategy, which mimics the broader Marine 
MAGTF strategy, to confront its task environment. This concept is designed to provide the 
greatest level of organic capability at a low level of command, the MSOC, which is 
designed to act as a self-contained operational command in deployed environments. Third, 
MARSOC has avoided specialization and instead advertises that MARSOC can execute 
nearly any SOCOM mission. Uncertainty, however exists as to what MARSOC’s core 
missions are and what differentiates MARSOC from other SOF units. Fourth, all relevant 
stakeholders examined, namely the DoD, USMC, SOCOM, and MARSOC, highly value 
agility, adaptability, and innovation.  
277 




At MARSOC’s Component level, the Commanding General primarily drives unit 
tasks through the G3, Operations Division. This staff section’s work involves the 
coordination and selection of specific MARSOC missions in conjunction with SOCOM, 
oversees the planning for future missions, as well as provides the guidance to the MRR for 
the planning and execution of assigned missions. The execution of this work is centralized 
at the Component level. The Component receives feedback from the MRR and uses that 
feedback, as well as the staff’s analysis, to make recommendations to the commander for 
future missions and guidance.1127 The Component takes this guidance to annual 
coordination meetings with SOCOM to bid for and coordinate future missions.1128 Finally, 
the Component provides the assigned missions and guidance to the MRR for execution. 
With unique exceptions, the component does not actively deploy personnel or units to the 
task environment. 
Within the Component, the G7 directly oversees the final training certification 
exercise for all primary units’ deployments to the task environment. This control is 
centralized, and the G7 receives input and feedback from the MRR and subordinate units 
but retains control and authority for the organization and execution of the exercise. This 
certification exercise, RAVEN, assesses all deploying units and individuals to provide the 
Component Commander and subordinate leaders an indication of quality control and 
maintenance of standards across the force.1129  
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1128 Inteview with Undisclosed Senior Military Officer, Phone, September 2018 
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The MRR is the first deployable unit in MARSOC’s chain of command and 
provides oversight and guidance to the MRBs either directly or through the Regimental 
Operations Section, the S3. The MRR conducted its first operational deployment in 2016 
to lead Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Iraq (CJSOTF-I) within Operation 
Inherent Resolve (OIR). Outside of deploying as a CJSOTF, the primary tasks for the MRR 
includes the oversight of the primary deployable elements from the MRBs.  
(3) MRB 
The battalions directly oversee MARSOC’s primary deploying elements, the 
MSOC and subordinate MSOTs. MARSOC also regularly deployed complete battalion 
headquarters to Afghanistan as Special Operations Tasks Forces (SOTF) between 2006 and 
2014. Following 2014, MARSOC has deployed reduced, task-organized command 
elements from its battalions in support of OIR. These task-organized command elements 
have been emplaced on top of an existing deployed MSOC headquarters in northern Iraq. 
In garrison and training environments, battalion headquarters assigns personnel and 
establishes the rotation cycle for deploying MSOCs. The MRBs follow the Component and 
MRR’s guidance for maintenance of standards and rules and regulations for both training 
and deployments. Each battalion operates slightly differently, but the RAVEN exercise, 
and the MRR’s formal and informal guidance, acts as the standardization mechanism for 
tasks in pre-deployment training environments. 
In the deployed task environment, the battalion’s role depends on the assigned 
mission, the personality of the command leadership, and the higher chain of command. 
Generally, in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq, the MRB headquarters appeared to 
predominantly focus internally on the management of subordinate units and the 
coordination with higher headquarters and adjacent U.S. and coalition forces. While not 
restricted from partnering with and advising host nation forces, MARSOC SOTFs, with 
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exceptions, have often focused internally on command and control rather than partnering 
with indigenous forces.1130 
(4) MSOC/MSOT 
The MSOC represents MARSOC’s primary bid for success in the task environment. 
Unlike Army Special Forces and SEAL equivalent levels of command, the MSOC is 
designed, and enabled in training and deployment, to function as an operational unit with 
operational command authorities, equivalent to a Battalion Command, over forces in the 
deployed operational environment.1131  
The MSOC is designed to integrate the support assets and command and control 
capabilities normally associated with a SOF battalion. This approach is designed to employ 
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force’s (MAGTF) self-contained concept down to a lower 
level than comparable SOF organizations, which place similar administrative, intelligence, 
logistics, and communications resources at the battalion level. Furthermore, this concept is 
intended to enable flexibility and adaptability to the MSOC and below due to the allocation 
of supporting assets and capabilities, typically critical within irregular operational 
environments.1132 These support capabilities are then designed to better enable the 
subordinate MSOTs to meet their mission in the task environment in the execution of 
MARSOC’s primary core activities. 
In training environments, the MSOC coordinates with its parent MRB and the MRR 
to provide guidance to MSOTs to develop an 18-month training package in preparation for 
six-month rotational deployments. Each MSOC’s training pipeline varies depending on 
mission analysis and planning, headquarters’ guidance, and individual leadership 
personalities. The Component’s overall strategy to interact with the task environment is 
                                                 
1130 Major Bailey’s observations between 2013–2017; Interview with LtCol Ronald Norris, 
September 6, 2018. 
1131 Major Paul Bailey’s experiences in MARSOC; Webber, “U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special 
Operations Command,” 5; LT David Woods’ experiences in Naval Special Warfare Command; Dirk H. 
Smith and Kirk E. Brinker, Operational Detachment-Bravo an in-Depth Analysis of the ODB’s Advisory 
Role in Support of FID/COIN Operations (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
1132 Webber, “U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command,” 5. 
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based on a MAGTF-like general purpose capability across all core activities. Therefore, an 
individual MSOC and MSOT training cycle often includes a wide variety of standard 
training packages to cover the spectrum of requirements, including special reconnaissance 
exercises, DA helicopter raids, parachute or dive insertion techniques, standard light 
infantry fire and maneuver training, FID with an exercise partner force, and maritime visit-
board search seizure (VBSS) training. Ultimately, since the RAVEN exercise heavily 
focuses on holistically assessing the MSOC, MRB and MSOC training exercises tend to 
mimic the full spectrum SOF skills assessed at RAVEN. 
On deployments, depending on the mission, the MSOC’s tasks vary significantly. 
In Afghanistan, depending on the year, the MSOC exerted various levels of operational 
control, though overall the MSOC assumed a predominantly administrative and logistical 
support role in Afghanistan.1133 In Iraq between late 2015 and early 2016, the MSOC 
exercised limited operational control within a politically constrained task environment.1134 
This limited control consisted of planning, coordination, and administrative movements 
within the area of operations, but did not include employment of combat-related authority 
like kinetic strike approvals. This limited control then disappeared after approximately six 
months when a battalion level headquarters was emplaced on top of the MSOC 
headquarters element in the spring of 2016. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the MSOC 
exercised little direct operational command and control as intended and designed. 
Starting in February 2017, MSOCs from 1st MRB assumed the lead U.S. SOF 
advise and assist role for the Philippine armed forces in a role aligned to the designed 
purpose of the MSOC. In an interview with this study’s authors, Former MSOC B 
Commander, Major Steven Keisling recounted how MARSOC has assumed primary 
mission lead and U.S. advise and assist activities with the Philippine armed services in 
                                                 
1133 Major Bailey’s observations between 2013–2017; Interview with LtCol Ronald Norris, 
September 6, 2018. 
1134 Major Bailey deployed to northern Iraq between January and July, 2016. He assisted in 
establishing the Special Operations Task Force North (SOTF-N) as the Operations Officer. He assumed this 
position from the MSOC G, Executive Officer. MSOC G had operated independently in the North but was 
commanded by SEAL Team THREE Headquarters (SOTF West) based out of Baghdad. MSOC G only 
possessed administrative and logistical control of its subordinate elements in Northern Iraq. All operational 
missions were approved by SOTF West. 
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support of their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) expansion 
into the Philippines.1135 In May 2017, ISIL- affiliatedmilitants seized control of the city 
of Marawi prompting a five-month long effort to recapture the city.1136 In the lead for U.S. 
military, SOTF 511.2, led by MSOC B provided the primary U.S. assistance to help the 
Philippine forces retake the city by October 2017.1137 To the present, MSOCs continue to 
advise and assist Joint Task Force level commanders and forces consisting of 
approximately 20,000 indigenous members of the Philippine armed forces in their fight 
against ISIL. The scope of the tasks assigned to each MSOC includes operational level 
planning, command and control, limited training, and technical support. The assistance 
provided through 2018 has not included accompanying Philippine forces in combat, 
although other assistance which MARSOC forces have provided exceeds the classification 
of this study. 
The MSOT’s task is to plan and conduct core activities and operations within its 
assigned task environment. MARSOC’s core activities form the basis for the skillsets to 
effectively confront threats and interact with the environment based around the specific 
assigned mission. Since 2006, these specific missions have gravitated toward irregular 
warfare FID and COIN missions.1138 Within these missions, CT, DA, and SR skillsets 
have been employed to varying degrees, but typically teams have supported a partner or 
host nation military force in advise and assist roles ranging from training to combat. With 
limited exceptions, MSOTs have not operated unilaterally.1139 Instead, MSOTs have 
predominantly worked with indigenous partners to conduct and advise training and 
planning, advise local political leaders, and operate in coordination with joint, combined, 
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and host-nation military and civilian personnel across the spectrum of kinetic operations. 
MSOTs have advised partner forces across the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific theaters 
of operations between 2006 and 2018. Examples of these partners range from sister service 
SF, SEALs, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as U.S. interagency, 
coalition SOF, U.S. conventional forces, and indigenous conventional, irregular, and SOF 
military units.1140 
In summary, a task analysis of MARSOC’s operational organizational design 
closely overlaps with its structure. MARSOC currently maintains a wide range of skills 
across all primary core activities using a MAGTF-like concept based on the MSOC 
deployment model. For quality control, MARSOC employs a centralized process led by 
the Component to determine what missions MARSOC will pursue and to drive training 
through the RAVEN exercise. MARSOC’s missions have mostly occurred at the MSOC 
and below and have typically involved advise and assist style missions in FID and COIN 
environments, and predominantly with indigenous partners at the MSOC and below. 
b. Structure  
To assess MARSOC’s organizational configuration and fit for its mission and 
environment, this section assesses its departmentation, division of labor, formalization, 
specialization, and centralization. MARSOC possesses a divisional structure that gravitates 
toward machine and professional bureaucracy configurations above the MSOC, while the 
MSOT tends more closely to a simple structure or adhocracy.  
(1) Departmentation and Division of Labor 
Previous sections have already outlined MARSOC’s operational departmentation. 
In military terms, departmentation consists of MARSOC’s task organization among the 
component, MRR, MRB, MSOC, and MSOT. The division of labor pertains to the roles 
where the component, MRR, and MRB provide oversight, guidance, and supervision to the 
primary deploying units, the MSOC and MSOT. MARSOC’s units above the MSOC are 
primarily administrative and focused internally to MARSOC’s bureaucracy. The MSOC 
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balances between an administrative focus and preparation for the external task 
environment. The intelligence assets at the MSOC level specifically enable a better external 
focus on the operational environment than other levels of command. MSOTs should be 
focused on the task environment; however, as later sections reveal, lack of personnel 
continuity within MSOTs creates a continual requirement to focus on building basic skills 
through qualification schools and training. The net outcome results in MSOTs also 
primarily focused internally on training, with less time dedicated to preparing for specific 
operational environments. 
(2) Formalization 
The component, MRR, and MRB strongly emphasize formalization of rules, 
regulations, and standards. Official formal message traffic is enforced by the component 
and used by all levels of command to request support equipment and personnel prior to 
deployment. The MRR employs a formal tracker of individual and unit training 
proficiency, that is maintained by each deploying MSOC. The MRR also enforces a pre-
deployment checklist of major events and milestones that each deploying unit updates 
throughout pre-deployment training cycles. The MRB level of command mostly enforces 
the timelines and requirements from the Component and MRR and supervises and supports 
training and readiness. 2d MRB uses a training cell cadre to manage and execute a basic 
skills training package for each deploying MSOC. These basic skills packages evolve based 
on guidance from the battalion and MSOC leadership but remain mostly consistent to 
establish basic levels of proficiency in shoot, move, and communicate skills within each 
MSOC. At the MSOC level and below, formalization reduces. In MSOTs, basic standard 
operating procedures are often formally written, but many procedures are also more 
informally disseminated and followed. 
(3) Specialization 
At the higher levels of command, functional specialization dominates. At the 
component, MRR MRB, and even MSOC, each command possesses specialized functional 
departments including standard military administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, 
and communication sections. These functions require interoperability to achieve most 
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operational missions in the task environment. At the MSOT, specialization still occurs, 
including medical, communications, weapons, and other skills, but interoperability is even 
more important due to each MSOT’s small size and the necessity for each individual to 
execute a wide range of skills. Overall, MARSOC is a divisional structure, but each 
division contains functional elements that require interoperability and coordination to 
operate effectively, especially in deployed task environments.1141  
For deployable units, MARSOC employs a broad approach to unit specialization. 
MARSOC seeks to build skills and capabilities to produce a MAGTF-like capability to 
accomplish any core SOF activity. Although each MRB currently regionally specializes in 
the Pacific, Middle East, or Africa theater of operations, aside from language training and 
some differences in battalion internal pre-deployment theater-specific training, MARSOC 
has chosen to rotate individuals between MRBs and throughout regions with no discernable 
effort to produce tailored threat or regional expertise. This approach has produced a more 
general-level experience base but has prevented area or threat specialization across the 
organization. Although its regionalization model has not changed, MARSOC is currently 
exploring other deployment models.1142 
(4) Assignment and Rotation 
MARSOC’s structural assignment and rotation policies are based on the Marine 
Corps’ promotion system outlined for officers and enlisted in Marine Corps Orders (MCO) 
P1400.31C and P1400.32D as well as the Marine Corps official Assignment Policy found 
                                                 
1141 MARSOC’s divisional structure is self-evident from its traditional wire diagram by unit 
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1142 Interview with MARSOC G3, Colonel Travis Homiak, 20 July 2018. 
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in MCO 1300.8.1143 Because MARSOC is a relatively small command, with 2,742 active 
duty Marines assigned as of March 2018, and MARSOC pipeline graduates receive a 
primary military occupational specialty (MOS), the organization tends to have internal 
flexibility for 0370/0372 Special Operations Officers (SOO) and Critical Skills Operators 
(CSO) who make up approximately 1000 of the 2700 personnel.1144 Support personnel 
assigned to MARSOC that are not 0370/0372 have far less flexibility and will typically 
spend a standard three- to five-year assignment at MARSOC. 
MARSOC rotates its personnel based on ‘key’ command billets that are essential 
to remain competitive for promotion. For officers, these key billets are MSOT Commander, 
MSOC Commander, either MRB or Marine Raider Support Battalion (MRSB) Command, 
MRR, Marine Raider Support Group (MRSG), or the Marine Raider Training Center 
(MRTC).1145 For enlisted CSOs, key billets parallel the officer key billets as each 
commander’s senior enlisted advisor. To advance and remain competitive, officers and 
enlisted typically serve in each key billet.1146 
Since at least 2013, MARSOC operational units at the MSOT, MSOC, and MRB 
have experienced high levels of turnover.1147 Every two years, every officer billet at the 
MSOC and MSOT experiences a 100% turnover rate, and enlisted personnel turnover at 
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approximately 75%.1148 The reasons for this high turnover are related to a variety of 
factors outside of the scope of this research, except for the assessment that MARSOC 
contains too much bureaucratic structure for its organizational size and missions.  
(5) Centralization 
MARSOC possesses a high degree of centralization from the component through 
the MSOC levels of command. A single component, the unit’s strategic apex, sits directly 
on top of the single operational regiment, which sits on top of three operational MRBs. The 
component controls all direct coordination with Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and 
SOCOM to plan and arrange future personnel movements, budgets, and operational 
missions. The MRR is left with little choice but to turn over the guidance to the MRBs 
along with additional guidance by the MRR Commander and staff to enforce training and 
readiness standards. The MRB remains predominantly internally focused on working with 
the MRR and MSOCs to arrange and oversee future deployments and to arrange personnel 
and equipment to support those deployments. 
The Component, MRR, and MRB direct the accomplishment of established 
administrative and operational requirements that the MSOC must complete to deploy. 
These constraints tend to drive the MSOC toward operating in a centralized manner so that 
it can ensure that it meets all standards to execute the wide range of core activity skills that 
will be tested at the RAVEN exercise. Especially with the exceptionally high turnover rate 
of leadership and personnel, this leads to MSOCs spending a significant amount of time to 
achieve proficiency in basic shoot, move, and communicate skills before training to more 
SOF-specific skills. Because all MSOCs are expected to achieve basic proficiency at all 
the same skills across the component, and due to the high personnel turnover, deploying 
MSOCs focus on generic basic skills and proportionally less training and preparation 
directly in preparation for their deployed mission. 
At the MSOT, the level of centralization depends on its MRB, MSOC, and team 
leadership as well as the internal experience, cohesion, and competence within the team. 
                                                 
1148 Interviews with LtCol Norris; MGySgt Shawn Disbennett, 17 October 2018; MSgt Master 
Donovan Petty, July 19, 2018; MSgt (Ret) Jon Jett, July 19, 2018; Major Bailey’s personal experience. 
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Depending on these interrelated factors, an MSOT will often take Mintzberg’s simple 
structure approach to provide direct supervision to ensure that rules and standards are 
followed and capabilities produced. If more flexible approaches are encouraged, teams can 
also gravitate toward the professional bureaucracy model that enables each individual to 
execute his/her specialized skill-set independently but with less effective teamwork 
overall. The most successful teams blend direct supervision and professionalization to 
organically collaborate and creatively adapt and innovate solutions to complex problems 
in an adhocracy model. This level of collaboration typically requires experienced, mature, 
and talented MSOT leadership to avoid centralization or disaggregated specialization. The 
high rate of turnover within MSOTs degrades the level of experience and continuity that 
contribute to collaborative teams. 
(6) Horizontal/Vertical Communication 
Since authority in MARSOC is mostly centralized, the majority of communication 
occurs vertically between levels of command. However, since each unit also contains 
functional departments, effectiveness for each respective unit also depends on effective 
horizontal communication. At the MSOC and below, horizontal communication becomes 
more necessary and prevalent. The highest degree of horizontal communication occurs 
within the MSOT. 
Deployed operational environments require greater horizontal communication. In 
deployed task environments, this horizontal communication occurs among partner nation 
forces, coalition partners, interagency relationships, and adjacent joint forces, and within 
the U.S. chain of command. The high requirement for horizontal communication in 
deployed environments contrasts with the primarily vertical communication in pre-
deployment training and preparation. 
(7) Assessment of MARSOC’s Structural Configuration 
Overall, MARSOC is a divisional structure with mostly machine bureaucracy 
characteristics. MARSOC gravitates toward a machine bureaucracy structure enabled by 
centralized procedures and standardization at all levels of command. Each division at the 
Component, MRR, MRB, and MSOC levels also possesses significant characteristics of a 
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professional bureaucracy. Each staff section specializes according to its section’s purpose: 
administration, intelligence, operations, etc. At the MSOC and especially the MSOT, the 
level of collaboration increases, with MSOTs blending characteristics between simple 
structures, professional bureaucracies, or adhocracies. 
Structural analysis also reveals potential bureaucratic redundancies between the 
Component and MRR as well as between the MRB and MSOC. Given its relatively small 
size, the levels of hierarchy, and associated manpower requirements, appears to have 
resulted in high turnover within and among units to fill key billets. The overlap in tasks 
and responsibilities, especially between the Component and MRR indicates that the MRR 
provides little to the organization in its current structure. Apparent redundancies also exist 
between the MSOC and MRB level of command. Although designed to be an operational 
element with full spectrum command and control, the MSOC has largely not operated in 
this manner, and has been superseded by O-5 and O-6 level commands in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq as well as the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) in Africa. Since 
February 2017, However, MSOCs in the Philippines have conducted a mission and tasks 
in line with the MSOC’s structural design purpose, however, this mission has also 
contained significant limitations on combat related authorities and permissions. It appears 
that redundancies in bureaucracy and high turnover has further contributed to producing 
mechanistic standards and rules to ensure a stable output of deployable, basically trained 
MSOCs and MSOTs.  
MARSOC’s structural configuration indicates misfits with its task environment and 
desired goals. MARSOC desires to be agile, adaptive, and innovative within its task 
environment. MARSOC currently possesses significant levels of machine and professional 
bureaucracy characteristics at all levels of command, which inhibits the agility and 
adaptation required for success in uncertain operational environment. Furthermore, 
MARSOC possesses a ‘tall’ vertical structure and hierarchy that also inherently reduces 
agility. To more effectively confront its uncertain irregular task environments, MARSOC 
needs to review redundancies in bureaucracy and hierarchy, and interrelated high turnover 
of personnel, which contributes to centralization, prevents continuity in experience and 
capabilities and ultimately inhibits agility. 
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c. People  
Analysis of the people in MARSOC’s organization focuses on “human resource 
policies of…training and development.”1149 This section discusses these elements in terms 
of MARSOC’s professionalization and rewards system. Overall analysis indicates that 
MARSOC’s structural configuration and high turnover is degrading its professional ability 
to build and maintain capability as well as apply the principles of relational maneuver. 
Furthermore, the Marine Corps rewards system incentivizes an internal bureaucratic 
orientation across the organization and degrades the employment of relational maneuver. 
(1) Professionalism 
MARSOC’s developmental program is tied to a semiformal career track for enlisted 
and officers. This includes training that is mostly managed by the MRR and below, and 
professional military education (PME) that is controlled by Headquarters Marine Corps 
and influenced by the Component. MARSOC heavily depends on Headquarters Marine 
Corps to provide formal education to its personnel. For example, unlike other SOF services 
who send dozens, or hundreds, of officers to receive dedicated SOF and irregular warfare 
education at NPS each year, MARSOC currently sends 1-2 individuals every two years. 
While service PME enables broad education, PME’s primary goal is to prepare “future 
leaders for greater responsibilities,” or, in the case of an O-4, to be a staff officer who is 
prepared to participate in or lead the Joint Planning Process (JPP).1150 Little time in these 
general PME courses is spent specifically studying irregular warfare since these courses 
cover the wide range of military activities, operations, and planning processes necessary 
for education as a well-rounded staff officer and commander. 
Efforts to professionalize MARSOC’s personnel start in the Individual Training 
Course (ITC). ITC is a nine-month qualification pipeline where individuals are trained and 
certified in basic special operations skills in line with SOCOM’s core activities. For 
                                                 
1149 Jay Galbraith, “The Star Model” (Galbraith Management Consultants, June 2016), 4, 
https://www.jaygalbraith.com/services/star-model. 
1150 Austin Duncan and Adam Yang, “Exploiting the Wellspring: Professional Military Education 
and Grassroots Innovation,” War on the Rocks, July 19, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/
exploiting-the-wellspring-professional-military-education-and-grassroots-innovation/. 
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officers, ITC has traditionally included a Team Commanders Course (TCC) to prepare 
special operations officers for their future responsibilities as a Team Commander. In 2013, 
the TCC prepared officers by holding lectures from guest speakers on negotiations, 
mediations, public speaking skills; conducted small planning vignettes; and held other 
decision-making exercises to encourage and evaluate critical thinking and mental agility. 
MARSOC also partners with the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) to host 
special operations courses for MARSOC personnel. MARSOC senior enlisted leadership 
also attend the Joint Special Operations Forces Senior Enlisted Academy (JSOFSEA) as 
PME for E-8/E-9s.1151 Outside of education and PME opportunities, MARSOC sends its 
Marines to internal MARSOC training courses, general Marine Corps training schools, and 
other SOF service schools. These training courses provide certification in specialty skills 
ranging from combat diver, sniper, joint tactical air controllers (JTAC), military freefall 
(MFF), and many other technical or tactical skill-based schools. Lastly, the MARSOC 
Component will sometimes invite relevant guest speaker from academia, business, or the 
military to spur critical thought and discussion within the command. 
The MRR and MRBs facilitate training opportunities but do not regularly formally 
professionalize their units or individuals. The MRR informally professionalizes its force 
through commander-led training and discussion groups and supervision of training. 
Similarly, the MRB oversees training of MSOCs and MSOTs to a greater degree than the 
MRR but does not formally professionalize its deploying units. To varying degrees, MRBs 
use internal training cells to oversee and instruct training of deploying MSOCs and 
MSOTs. 
The MSOC and MSOTs formally and informally professionalize their personnel. 
Formally, virtually each deploying MSOC hosts a pre-deployment academics week where 
guest and internal speakers hold training and discussion to prepare the unit for the deployed 
operational environment. Each MSOC and subordinate MSOTs design detailed individual 
and unit training plans to meet the requirements of higher headquarters and their own 
                                                 
1151“Senior Enlisted Professional Military Education Opportunities” (United States Marine Corps 
Marine Corps University Enlisted Professional Military Education, April 20, 2012), 11–12. 
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internal requirement for the deployed operational environment. How this professionalism 
occurs through training and education varies per MSOC based on the command climate 
from the MRB, MRR, and Component. If the MSOC operates in a centralized manner, 
centralization can often leave the MSOT with little ability to control its training and 
education schedule except within the plan created by the component, MRR, MRB, or 
MSOC.  
The extraordinarily high turnover rate among personnel between deployments is a 
challenge to professionalism within MARSOC. The high turnover rate means that MSOCs 
and MSOTs must continually train to achieve proficiency in baseline shoot, move, and 
communicate skills.1152 The demand to re-establish basic skills proficiency every 
deployment cycle leaves proportionally less time for theater-specific training and 
education.  
Even though significant professionalism concerns exist, MARSOC pipeline has 
produced intelligent, mature, and talented Raiders who meet expectations in difficult 
environments. One particular retired special forces SOTF commander spoke highly of the 
subordinate MSOTs assigned to his command between 2013 and 2014 stating “your teams 
[MSOTs] got it.”1153 He explained that the Marine Raiders under his command understood 
the operational environment as well as or better than their Army and Navy SOF 
counterparts and matched that understanding with effective performance. This 
commander’s assessment of MARSOC’s performance is reinforced by side-by-side 
comparisons of Marine Raiders and SOF counterparts deployed around the world.1154 
                                                 
1152 MSOC and MSOT training cycles are driven predominantly by building team level core activity 
basic skills and less by the unique requirements of the deployed operational environment. This is a broad 
generalization, and some units will better tailor their pre-deployment training and preparation for the 
deployed environment than others. Ultimately, the RAVEN exercise, which assesses basic skills, is mostly 
not tailored to each unit’s future operational environment. 
1153 Interview with LTC Joseph McGraw, 31 Jul 2018. 
1154 Couch, Always Faithful, Always Forward, 291–294. 
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(2) Rewards and Incentives 
The MARSOC rewards system primarily incentivizes behavior based on internal 
organizational considerations and not based on the external operational task environment. 
Key billets and promotion cycles, especially among officers, drive assignments.1155 
Furthermore, because the Marine Corps values well-rounded MAGTF-like officers and 
leaders, this mindset has transferred over to MARSOC. The most recent internal MARSOC 
guidance on the officer career path states:  
Experience/trends show that those deemed best and most fully qualified for 
promotion have successfully served within their PMOS at each rank and 
have a broad base of MAGTF experience from which to draw from while 
in more senior ranks. This creates a dilemma for some non-infantry SOOs, 
or other non-infantry officers desiring to focus a career within the MARSOF 
network/SOF enterprise. On the one hand it is advantageous to do well in 
each and every assignment regardless if within your PMOS or not, but on 
the other, it’s generally not advantageous to focus a career within a narrow 
specialty. MARSOC and PO-SOD are actively advocating HQMC to 
acknowledge and enforce recurring SOF related tours. When deciding your 
career track balance these issues to achieve a career that includes both 
PMOS credibility and broad-based MAGTF experience.1156 
While performance in the operational environment is expected, performance 
evaluations for MARSOC leaders in deployed distributed environments are often written 
by superiors far away from the area of operations who have little direct oversight on actual 
performance or effectiveness. Therefore, as long as a MARSOC commander does not get 
fired while deployed, it appears that deployed operational experience is what matters, with 
little weight placed on performance from measures of effectiveness in the deployed 
environment. Some MARSOC units and commanders appear to have spent more time 
managing a public affairs campaign directed toward their MARSOC superiors in North 
Carolina than in leading an information warfare campaign within the operational 
environment and against the threat networks.1157 
                                                 
1155 MARSOC, “MARSOC SOO Career Path PME,” Slide 3 Notes. 
1156 MARSOC, “MARSOC SOO Career Path PME,” Slide 3 Notes. 
1157 Major Bailey’s personal observations within MARSOC between 2013–2017.  
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Overall, the demands of MARSOC’s hierarchy of key billets perpetuates high 
turnover rates within units and billets and reduces overall professionalism, which is further 
compounded by an incentive structure focused internal to the organization. Individuals are 
rewarded for occupying key billets, deploying, and gaining a broad range of experience. 
The cumulative effect results in gaps in continuity and a short-term perspective that 
perpetuates individual and organizational interests but does not emphasize effectiveness in 
the operational environment.  
d. Constraints  
MARSOC, like the larger Marine Corps, is the smallest military service with a 
corresponding relatively small set of financial and personnel resources.1158 Therefore, it 
is especially important for MARSOC to recognize and account for organizational 
constraints and risks in determining how and where to use its limited resources. 
MARSOC’s constraints directly influence its internal organizational design and its 
interaction with the deployed task environment. 
(1) Component 
The primary constraints affecting the component level consists of MARSOC’s 
budget, its Marine Corps Driven Manpower promotion cycle, military Authorities and 
Permissions, Service level Chain of Command and Culture, and SOCOM’s Chain of 
Command and Culture. At the component and every level below, the financial budget 
enables MARSOC to man, train, equip, and deploy its forces. Since expanding the Marine 
Corps and MARSOC’s budget exceeds the scope of this analysis, this study’s analysis 
focuses on adaptation within current financial constraints.  
Currently, MARSOC’s manpower promotion and assignments follow HQMC 
policies along with the rest of the Marine Corps. Official policies follow three to five-year 
assignments before rotating to another assignment. Since MARSOC is a specialized unit 
with its own enlisted and officer Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), there is a 
generally greater latitude to assign personnel within MARSOC for those MOS. The 
                                                 
1158 Seck, “MARSOC Poised to Grow Despite Personnel Caps.” 
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promotion process, however, remains the same as the rest of the Marine Corps, where board 
members from across the Marine Corps determine promotions for individuals eligible for 
a set number of MOS slots each year.1159 Currently, there is no deviation within the Marine 
Corps and general military up-or-out promotion cycle.  
Legislated U.S. military authorities provide a stable set of rules that ordain what a 
Title X military organization can and cannot do. While there are special circumstances and 
exceptions, MARSOC falls underneath standard Title X Authorities.1160 Unique 
permissions to execute Title X authorities on deployment, however, vary significantly 
based on assigned missions, the chain of command, and especially the U.S. interagency 
partners.1161  
MARSOC is also constrained by the Marine Corps’ chain of command and culture. 
Administratively, all Marines in MARSOC still fall within the traditional Marine chain of 
command. This chain controls pay, the awards system, uniforms, service-wide training and 
education, as well as the manpower management system. In addition to the formal chain of 
command, Marine Corps culture provides an informal set of expectations as well. Since 
the Marine Corps possesses a uniquely independent culture, any MARSOC attempts to 
adapt must frame adaptation in a way that fits within its service culture. Since the Marine 
Corps, and military at large, manpower system is an up-or-out promotion system, the 
futures of all Marines, and especially Marine officers, are tied to the manpower system. 
Past the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, officers have limited command opportunities within 
MARSOC. For command, they can lead the MRR, MRTC, or the MRSG. Among the staff, 
there are several non-command opportunities as well some joint service billets. As with 
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any U.S. military unit, these senior ranks become highly competitive and are carefully 
screened and controlled by HQMC. Performance in key command billets at all ranks and 
completion of all required PME are typically baseline requirements for promotion.1162 
While the Marine Corps provides the majority of MARSOC’s administrative 
related constraints, SOCOM’s chain of command and culture more significantly constrains 
MARSOC operationally. Since Admiral McRaven expanded SOCOM’s authority as a 
global combatant command with associated authorities in 2013, SOCOM’s operational 
influence has expanded.1163 Outside of JSOC nation mission force units, other SOF units 
primarily continue to deploy in support of the Theater Special Operations Commands, 
which reports to both the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and SOCOM.1164 
Although authorities and permission in this environment can often become complex, 
MARSOC units have primarily deployed underneath a SOCOM chain of command. In 
theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, these SOCOM chains of command have consisted 
of Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF), and SOTFs commanded by a MARSOC, SF, or SEAL officer as in Iraq 
or Afghanistan. Or in the case of units deploying to primarily training and non-combat 
related missions, deployed MARSOC units will often report directly to a Special 
Operations Command Forward (SOCFwd) Commander, who is often a Colonel. In the 
recent past, these SOF task forces have been normally led by an O-5 or above. These SOTF 
or SOCFwd commanders typically retain all major operational decisions above the team 
level ground force commanders (GFC). These decisions include the authority to establish 
or move a forward operating base (FOB), non-defensive aviation kinetic strike authorities, 
and approval of movements and operations outside of preapproved operations boxes.  
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(2) MRR/MRB/MSOC/MSOT 
Until deployment, the MRR and lower operational units are primarily constrained 
by internal MARSOC Component controlled considerations. While deploying units have 
the latitude to develop their own training outside of the RAVEN exercise, a unit’s task 
organization, deployment location, budget allocation, and manpower assignments are 
ultimately controlled by the Component and MRR. At the subordinate level, each unit 
commander exerts a reduced level of influence and control in non-deployed environments. 
However, the latitude to make significant changes is relatively small. 
On deployment, constraints are completely dependent on the operational 
environment. At the regimental level, the two MARSOC deployed CJSOTF level 
commands have formally reported directly to the one-star Special Operations Joint Task 
Force (SOJTF) command in Iraq but have also been heavily influenced by the conventional 
force Battle Space Owner Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command 
(CJFLCC).1165 For an MRB headquarters in both Iraq and Afghanistan, MARSOC SOTFs 
have reported to a CJSOTF level command. Similarly, in Iraq and Afghanistan, each 
MSOC has reported to a SOTF headquarters that, with limited exceptions, maintained 
direct operational control over the MSOTs. Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, MSOCs 
deploying to Africa have embedded within Special Operations Command Africa and have 
not maintained operational control over their organic MSOTs.1166 In the Pacific, MSOTs 
have primarily conduct joint and combined training exercises with partner nation forces as 
well as sister service SOF units in bilateral training exercises and reoccurring missions, 
like those advising Philippine security forces.1167 In the Philippines beginning in 2017, 
MSOC’s from 1st MRB assumed command of the SOTF responsible for advising and 
assisting Philippine armed forces in combatting internal insurgency and terrorism.1168 
While the operational environment is highly restrictive in terms of the authorities and 
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permissions available to MARSOC personnel, this mission most closely aligns to the 
intended purpose of the MSOC since MARSOC’s birth. 
Overall, the primary constraints affecting the MARSOC component includes the 
Marine Corps administrative and cultural considerations, legislated authorities and 
operational permissions, and SOCOM’s operational command. For subordinate MARSOC 
units, the primary constraints come from the component. Although these subordinate units 
possess varying levels of flexibility to tailor their training, MARSOC’s operational budget, 
manpower assignments, promotions, future deployments, and task organization are all 
controlled at the Component or Headquarters Marine Corps.  
Operationally, given its intended purpose, the MSOC does not maximize efficiency 
or effectiveness within the Marine Corps or SOCOM’s administrative or operational 
constraints. Although MARSOC presents the MSOC as its base unit and bid for success, 
both in deployed and non-deployed environments, it has not, with the exception of the 
Philippines since 2017, been provided the authority or permissions to achieve its purpose. 
Even within the Philippines, the MSOC’s operational authority is restricted and does not 
extend to combat authorities.1169 This misfit between the MSOC’s purpose and 
employment has significant implications for MARSOC’s organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness and creates redundant bureaucracy without significant operational advantage.  
3. Outputs: Culture and Outcomes  
MARSOC’s inputs transform into organizational culture and task-related outputs 
that interact with the task environment to produce outcomes. This section analyzes both 
outputs and MARSOC’s outcomes compared to the principles of relational maneuver. 
a. Culture 
MARSOC’s culture is an amalgamation of traditional mainstream Marine Corps 
culture, Marine Reconnaissance subculture, and SOCOM cultural influences. This 
amalgamation has produced cultural divisions that will likely evolve over time into a 
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unique unified MARSOC culture. The evidence suggests that MARSOC currently 
possesses a fragmented organizational culture due to its organization youth, lack of unified 
purpose, and sub-cultures.  
(1) Shared Values and Beliefs 
MARSOC’s fragmented culture can be most clearly observed through its 
organizational context, which produced the current seams in organization culture. Each of 
MARSOC’s subcultures share many similarities. At the heart of the Marine Corps; values 
are the values of honor, courage, commitment, and a tenacious desire to succeed and win 
regardless of the mission. Both the sub-cultural reconnaissance and SOCOM cultural 
influence align with these traditional Marine Corps values. In addition to these shared 
values, the reconnaissance cultural influence particularly values the individual competence 
of enlisted personnel with reduced direct supervision in a more professional bureaucracy 
model that expects individual autonomy. SOCOM, while possessing similar values to 
Marine Reconnaissance units, adds a greater emphasis on teamwork and blends the strict 
hierarchy of the traditional Marine Corps and the professional model of Marine 
Reconnaissance into a more diffused adhocracy-like power-sharing structure.1170 SOCOM 
values further emphasize flexibility, creativity, and innovation in working with indigenous 
partner forces, whereas the Reconnaissance community traditionally executes unilateral 
reconnaissance tasks or direct-action missions.1171 At its core, with some variation, 
traditional Marine, reconnaissance, and SOCOM values align well with each other. 
Conflicts between subcultures begin to occur due to the interaction between established 
beliefs and ways of thinking driven by separate historical contexts, missions, and 
organization structures. 
Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has developed an internal culture as elite 
warfighters.1172 The Corps has used this elite culture to distinguish itself from the Army 
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to ensure organizational survival throughout its history.1173 Furthermore, the Marine 
Corps retains a strong sense of its warfighting history, which has served as a powerful 
narrative to recruit future Marines. This history is ruthlessly reinforced through strict 
external practices relating to appearance, customs, ceremonies, and education, such as the 
ritualistically celebrated Marine Corps Birthday, reinforced during Marine Corps PME. 
The formal adherence to tradition conflicts with reconnaissance and SOCOM cultural 
influences. The Marine Reconnaissance community created a sub-culture within the 
Marine Corps that placed a higher value on individual-level task competence and 
developed a belief of eliteness above the general Marine Corps.1174 Unlike MARSOC, 
however, the Marine Corps maintained administrative and operational control by rotating 
officers in and out of the community and by keeping the Reconnaissance community to the 
O-5 command. This rotation of officers enabled a decentralized enlisted-led culture within 
Reconnaissance units. 
SOCOM-infused culture integrated Army Special Forces ways of thinking, 
structure, and missions into MARSOC that required organic, flattened communications and 
interoperability to accomplish its missions. Traditional Special Forces missions are best 
encapsulated through the Army internal doctrinal term Special Warfare: “The execution of 
activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially 
trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, 
proficiency in small‐unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous 
combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.”1175 The 
requirement to understand and work with indigenous partners and populations, notably, 
specialized understanding of the operational environment beyond the enemy, transformed 
the type of professionalization for success. Along with Special Warfare, SOCOM culture 
also elevated the status of national mission force units as the pinnacle of SOF organizations, 
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missions, and culture. The national mission force cultural influence, however, does not 
emphasize the indirect approaches of Special Warfare, but rather more closely aligns to the 
direct cultural influence of the Marine reconnaissance community. 
Aspects from traditional Marine Corps, Reconnaissance, and SOCOM beliefs and 
culture are all present within MARSOC. While the underlying beliefs are similar across all 
subcultures, the outward cultural manifestations significantly distinguish the traditional 
Marine Corps from the Recon- and SOCOM-based beliefs and cultures. MARSOC’s 
historical context produces pressure from within the Marine Corps to ensure that traditional 
Marine beliefs and culture dominate MARSOC. Many Marines in MARSOC view the 
mantra ‘Marines are who we are, special operations are what we do’ as internal propaganda 
that does not reflect why they joined a more selective and specialized unit.1176 This does 
not mean that MARSOC Marines are not proud to be Marines, but it reflects normative 
perceptions of the Marine ideal versus the SOF ideal. For example, although the Marine 
Corps advertises itself as America’s elite expeditionary force in readiness that is the First 
to Fight, after the attacks on 9/11, SOF is clearly the force of choice as the first to fight. 
1177 
(2) Visible Behaviors, Ceremonies, and Rituals 
MARSOC’s fragmentation in beliefs plays out through visible behaviors. The 
Marine Corps places a significant emphasis on visual indicators of culture such as 
traditional promotions, awards, and change of command ceremonies. Wherein the larger 
Marine Corps these events contain large formations that range from a hundred to more than 
a thousand Marines at a time for a regimental change of command ceremony, at MARSOC, 
a comparable regimental change of command might contain a tenth of a comparable 
conventional Marine regiment. Aside from structural size, MARSOC’s greater emphasis 
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on individual work standards and competence conflict with the Marine Corps’ wide 
emphasis on traditional military ceremonies and formations. 
In the reconnaissance community, the nature of the missions contributed to a culture 
where enlisted leadership led mission execution while officers tended to manage from a 
remote command and control location. Reconnaissance officers typically rotated out of a 
unit after a standard 3- to 5-year assignment, leaving the core of the primary-MOS enlisted 
leadership to maintain continuity and lead the organizational culture. The SOCOM 
influence on MARSOC’s behaviors have resulted in changes in structure, tasks, and people 
that created significantly different culture for either the larger Marine Corps or 
reconnaissance community. SOCOM’s culture brought a more significant blend in roles 
between officers and enlisted who screen, train, deploy, and remain in the same 
organization together. This culture became solidified in MARSOC once the Marine Corps 
approved the primary MOS for both enlisted and officers.  
Both Marine reconnaissance- and SOCOM-based cultures gravitate toward more 
informal outward symbols and behaviors. In MARSOC, typically the highest symbol of 
respect and admiration occurs when an individual is recognized privately by other team 
members with legacy symbols, such as an individually wrapped paddle or stiletto modeled 
after items issued to Marine Raiders in World War II and later within the Reconnaissance 
community. Symbols from the World War II Raiders are the most unifying symbol within 
MARSOC. Elements from the traditional Raider ‘Jack’ patch with a white skull and 
Southern Cross are found both formally and informally across all MARSOC current units. 
Recent developments, such as including ‘Raider’ within unit names and providing the 
Marine Special Operations Insignia (MSOI), represent significant deviations from the 
traditional Marine culture and are indicative of a distinctive MARSOC culture.  
(3) Mental Models 
MARSOC gravitates toward an internally focused culture. Recently, the MRTC 
proposed a “sample MARSOC ethos” statement to represent the internal mental model:  
MARSOC’s competitive advantage is our people, who are first and 
foremost Marines that are specially assessed, selected and trained to 
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conduct our nation’s most demanding missions. We are a team of teams 
who are committed to our profession of arms and an uncompromising 
pursuit of excellence. We embrace the concept of “team” and are 
characterized by consistent professionalism and tireless work ethic. 
Our philosophy is Spiritus Invictus – an unconquerable spirit – and through 
hustle, grit and commitment to professionalism we will accomplish any 
mission. We are a small organization that does more with less. 
MARSOC values people, quality over quantity, and mission 
accomplishment. We honor our legacy and Marine Corps values. We master 
the fundamentals, consistently display integrity, and pursue excellence with 
the utmost professionalism.1178 
This sample represents the operational environment as general mission 
accomplishment, and is little different than what the larger Marine Corps advertises as its 
ethos in the Marine Operating Concept, and Commandant Neller’s messages, Seize the 
Initiative, and Execute!.1179  
The Marine Corps has successfully confronted its historical bureaucratic threat 
environment by creating a unique Marine Corps culture through indoctrination, structure, 
and outward symbols that attracted support of Congress. While the Marine Corps advocates 
for warfighting effectiveness, this effectiveness is practically accomplished through 
training and self-improvement with an internal orientation on tactical capabilities. This all 
produces what Daft classifies as a Mission or Bureaucratic cultural focus.1180 According 
to Daft, a Bureaucratic or Mission culture assumes a stable external environment and only 
focuses on the environment enough to gain efficiency within the organizational inter-
workings to enhance its ability to focus on its defined mission. In traditional warfare against 
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Iraq in the 1990s and 2003, this Marine culture appears to have produced effective 
outcomes in combat on the battlefield.1181 
The Reconnaissance mental model focuses more externally but retains the stability 
of standardized task-related reconnaissance or direct-action activities. The mental model is 
most similar to Daft’s mission culture. Recon’s relatively small size and selectivity and 
competence of its people decreases the level of bureaucratic focus and enables a more 
external focus on the environment and work-related tasks. Reconnaissance units are still 
designed to operate underneath Marine Corps command and control to meet the relatively 
stable needs of the traditional warfare operational environment in training and deployment. 
In contrast, SOCOM influenced MARSOC by providing different mission-related 
tasks and different unit structure, which added training and professionalism requirements 
due to the emphasis on irregular operational environments. These changes required more 
maturity to work with partner forces and added irregular warfare related tasks, which all 
required a more externally focused and flexible culture. The complexity of advisor-related 
missions within highly complex, dynamic, and uncertain operational environments 
required adaptability. The infusion of SOCOM culture and mental models, which place 
less rigid emphasis on defined roles and responsibilities and more emphasis on 
collaboration and mutual adjustment to accomplish tasks, has shifted MARSOC toward 
what Daft defines as a more entrepreneurial culture. As depicted in Figure 39, an 
adaptability culture strategically focuses externally on the task environment and demands 
a high degree of flexibility due to the level of complexity, instability, and uncertainty in 
that environment.1182 
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Figure 39. Organizational Culture and the Environment1183 
b. Outcomes: Assessment of Relational Maneuver Effectiveness 
(1) Inputs: Organizational Mission, Strategy, and Success Factors 
MARSOC’s organizational strategic inputs expose a tension between its guidance 
to adapt to any environment and the requirement to understand and adapt to specific 
operational environments. Constraints out of MARSOC’s control (threats to U.S. interests, 
U.S. domestic politics, and other service SOF capabilities) and the requirement to 
understand specific operational environments for strategic success suggests that MARSOC 
should gravitate toward strategically chosen operational environments to balance reactive 
agility to readily conduct any military mission and proactive agility to employ relational 
maneuver within irregular operational environments. Currently, MARSOC’s 
organizational inputs are too unfocused to produce organizational unity, capability, or 
alignment with irregular operational environments to be strategically successful or achieve 
MARSOF 2030’s stated intent.  
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MARSOF 2030 effectively describes the complex, dynamic, and uncertain current 
and future operational environments, and provides guiding concepts that align to those 
environments, but needs to better orient and focus its broad guiding principles within 
MARSOC. Given its small organizational size and limited available resources, MARSOC 
must carefully focus its personnel and resources, or it runs the risk of not achieving 
strategically desirable outcomes. The complexity of the operational environment demands 
focused understanding of that environment to adapt and develop strategy and approaches 
to overcome the environment.  
The underlying principle within MARSOF 2030 is the “imperative to change” and 
adapt.1184 This principle aligns with the overarching concept of relational maneuver and 
the needs of the irregular operational environment. MARSOF 2030 explains that “to 
succeed organizations will be required to change their modes of thinking about problems, 
how they see themselves, and their willingness to pursue adaptations.”1185 MARSOF 2030 
encapsulates change and adaptability as a core guiding concept, Enterprise Level Agility: 
“with a component that can rapidly orient, focus, or retool capabilities to meet emerging 
requirements or work a discrete transregional problem set with full spectrum SOF from 
onset through resolution.”1186 An underlying tension, however, in MARSOF 2030’s 
guidance to adapt and change is the distinction between reactively adapting to any 
operational environment, and proactively adapting within specific operational 
environments. MARSOF 2030 states that: 
Success will require SOF that is adaptable to changing environments and 
versatile across a diverse range of challenges. An institutionally agile 
MARSOC provides USSOCOM with a component that can rapidly orient, 
focus, or retool capabilities to meet emerging requirements or work a 
discrete transregional problem set with full spectrum SOF from onset 
through resolution. This tactical adaptability and operational agility will 
enable MARSOC to contribute more meaningfully within USSOCOM and 
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be a bid for strategic success against rapidly emerging and changing 
threats.1187 
The tension in MARSOF 2030’s desired agility is that proactively adapting to 
specific threats requires a deep understanding of the complexities of unique operational 
environments across the range of political, military, economic, social, information, and 
infrastructure (PMESII) considerations, which requires dedicated resources over a long 
time period in which technology cannot substitute for human understanding. In contrast, 
reactively adapting to any threat requires broad knowledge and analytical frameworks to 
adapt. A force that gravitates toward reactively adapting to any new threat will be less 
effective in specific environments, but a force dedicated to specific environments used to 
react to threats outside of its specialty will also be less effective. While MARSOC’s path 
forward should balance reactive versus proactive agility, it must decide which side to 
gravitate toward or run the risk of providing a mediocre capability in all forms of agility. 
Environmental constraints outside of MARSOC’s control, in the form of enduring 
stable national threats, U.S. domestic politics, and other military capabilities, suggest that 
MARSOC could more narrowly focus its broad desired guidance to adapt to any threat as 
well as to understand any threat. The United States’ current top five adversarial threats 
(Russia-Soviet Union, China, N. Korea, Iran, and jihadist VEOs) have existed since at least 
1979 when Islamist radicals overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah in Iran. While other threats, 
such as Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, have come and gone, the primary threat actors have 
mostly remained constant. This stability in national strategic threats could translate to a 
relatively stable focus for MARSOC. 
The U.S. presidential and congressional election cycles can significantly influence 
the employment of SOF around the world. U.S. presidents deploy or withdraw SOF around 
the world due to a host of foreign and domestic considerations outside the sphere of 
influence of individual SOF units. Over the last several decades, U.S. general purpose 
forces and SOF have been withdrawn from scores of countries, including Somalia in the 
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1990s, Iraq in 2011, and Yemen in 2015.1188 The shifting tides of domestic and 
international politics can quickly alter or end direct SOF involvement within a particular 
area of operations.  
Other SOF services’ orientation toward reactive versus proactive agility should also 
inform how MARSOC views and pursues its own organizational agility. Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) national mission force units possess the legislative 
authorities and operational command structure to reactively deploy anywhere in the world 
more responsively than any other SOF to conduct high-priority direct-action hostage rescue 
and counterterrorism operations. Some in MARSOC even argue that the force should 
reorganize under JSOC to realize its potential agility. For more proactive agility, Army 
Special Forces Group commands are regionally aligned and primarily deploy their forces 
to their specialized region and combatant command. Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPECWARCOM) has previously been regionally aligned, but its most recent 
Organizational Strategy, “Force Optimization,” gravitates toward reactive agility to 
quickly respond to any crisis across the globe.1189 The reality of these other SOF current 
capabilities is that MARSOC will not be able to compete with JSOC national mission 
forces in terms of reactive agility to respond to emerging crises. Furthermore, the Special 
Forces regional alignment give them an edge for proactive agility within their specific 
individual regions to understand and adapt to specific regional operational environments. 
MARSOC has been regionally aligned to the Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa, but is in 
the midst of reassessing this alignment.1190  
Overall, external to MARSOC, the primary threats to U.S. interests are strategically 
stable; whereas, the domestic and internal politics in relation to SOF deployments are often 
dynamically unstable, and the adjacent SOF units’ organizational strategies are stable. 
Recognition of these external factors should influence how MARSOC views and pursues 
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implementation of its own strategic agility and how it should organizationally orient on the 
operational environment. 
Analysis of the U.S. military’s historical irregular warfare efforts in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan reveal the necessity for understanding the specific operational 
environment, and the consequences for failing to develop the necessary understanding. In 
Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, shallow and ineffective understanding contributed 
to poor strategy, flawed operational approaches, and strategic ineffectiveness. The 
evidence revealed through case study analysis, during Part 1: “To Know One’s Enemy,” 
suggests that the U.S. military gravitates toward an attritional style of warfare that does not 
pursue a deep understanding of specific operational environments, preferring instead to 
prepare for any traditional warfare contingency. Within the military, the only unit that 
orients on specific operational environments is the Army Special Forces. Operational 
experience and academic literature illustrate that the Army Special Forces approach has 
enabled better understanding and agility and has been more effective within irregular 
warfare environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan.1191 Focusing on specific operational 
environments and threats better supports strategic outcomes by meeting the requirement to 
wage political and violent competition across all levels of warfare.1192 
Since (1) understanding specific operational environments is essential for strategic 
success, (2) the U.S. military historically struggles to develop an effective understanding 
of those specific operational environments, and (3) the U.S. adversaries are strategically 
stable, MARSOC should pursue organizational agility relative to specific operational 
environments and threats within a long-term strategic transregional outlook. This study’s 
specific recommendations will further discuss potential models to balance MARSOC’s 
pursuit of agility while correcting deficiencies within the U.S. military’s approach to 
agility. 
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Better aligning MARSOC’s organizational inputs to irregular operational 
environments requires nuanced understanding of those environments. Conceptual 
understanding represents the foundational enabling element for MARSOF 2030 and its 
other guiding concepts to adapt to current and future operational environments. MARSOF 
2030 states that “the Raiders we send into such environments must be able to understand 
them and then adapt their approaches across an expanded range of solutions.”1193 
MARSOF 2030 encapsulates conceptual understanding as a guiding organizational 
principle, the “Cognitive Raider,” defined as the ability “to seamlessly integrate a wide 
range of complex tasks; influencing allies and partners; developing an understanding of 
emerging problems; informing decision makers; applying national, theater, and 
interagency capabilities to problems; and fighting as adeptly in the information space as 
the physical.”1194 MARSOC simply cannot achieve its desired Enterprise Agility, 
Combined Arms for the Connected Arena, and MARSOF as a Connector without 
comprehensively understanding specific operational environments.  
Overall, MARSOF 2030’s objective to equally adapt to any environment, and 
“orient, focus, or retool capabilities” to “work a discrete transregional problem set” are 
admirable but will not likely “ensure that MARSOF are the premier forces to meet 
tomorrow’s challenges.”1195 Other SOF units possess more reactively agile forces or 
regionally aligned forces more attuned to specific operational environments. Attempting to 
be the best of both worlds will likely produce something less than a ‘premier force.’ 
The complexity of the operational environment and lack of strategic success in 
irregular warfare should drive MARSOC to achieve a balance between agility relative to 
general versus specific operational environments. The next chapter will present specific 
recommendations for how MARSOC can achieve this balance, while the remainder of this 
chapter assesses MARSOC’s organizational throughputs. 
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(2) Throughputs: Task, Structure, and People 
MARSOC possesses organizational design inhibitors that consist of misaligned 
tasks, redundant bureaucracy, and misaligned incentives, which produce high personnel 
turnover, reduced professionalization, and hierarchical centralization. These inhibitors 
restrict organizational agility, cognition, and the ability to implement operational 
approaches that connect partners and combine capabilities to effectively influence the 
operational environment. MARSOC should address each deficiency to achieve the guiding 
principles of relational maneuver and MARSOF 2030, and to achieve effective outcomes 
in irregular operational environments. 
Currently, MARSOC’s internal tasks focus on building “tactical excellence” but do 
not adequately prepare deploying MARSOC units to: 
thoughtfully combine intelligence, information, and cyber operations to 
affect opponent decision making, influence diverse audiences, and counter 
false narratives. Furthermore, we must be able to synchronize operations, 
activities, and actions in the information environment with those across 
operational domains and, when necessary, fuse cognitive and lethal 
effects.1196 
The actions, ascribed to principles of ‘Combined Arms for the Connected Arena,’ 
describe the activities necessary to develop operational approaches that use political and 
violent competition in irregular warfare. MARSOC’s high turnover of personnel and 
resulting insufficient individual and unit professionalism causes MARSOC to internally 
focus on basic tactical unit capabilities in preparation for RAVEN and to build necessary 
tactical capabilities to employ violence. Forced to primarily focus internally, MARSOC 
units deploy without effectively understanding the operational environment and without 
the fundamental understanding or capability to politically compete against irregular threat 
networks.  
Furthermore, although MARSOF 2030 effectively describes the character of the 
future operational environment, it does not adequately define its nature, which is 
intrinsically political. Effectiveness in future irregular operational environment across 
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physical and information domains requires recognition of the political implications of the 
use of information, economics, and violence in the operational environment. The 
environment described by MARSOF 2030’s ‘hybrid warfare’ and the ‘Gray Zone’ represent 
synonyms for the mixed tactics, participants, and murky political environment in irregular 
warfare. MARSOC should better align its tasks by placing the use of information, 
economics, and violence within the context of political competition. This context better 
allows for understanding why and how MARSOC should act as a connector and employ 
combined arms across all domains and capabilities. 
MARSOC tasks its individuals and units with building general tactical capabilities, 
not with directly producing or influencing strategic outcomes in specific operational 
environments. This lack of strategic alignment is likely a result of confusion between levels 
of warfare and the role of SOF “to both ‘sense’ and ‘make sense of’ what is happening in 
diverse and multi-dimensional environments” and to inform and influence strategy.1197 
Although, most MARSOC units fall within the tactical level of warfare, political 
competition at all levels of warfare in the ‘Gray Zone’ or irregular warfare requires that 
MARSOC not only inform military strategy, but also inform the political strategy of 
indigenous partners and of the United States. Furthermore, friendly force strategy should 
exploit political and military vulnerabilities through both MARSOC’s use of political and 
violent competition, unilaterally and through harnessing external capabilities. 
Internal design inhibitors have created second-order effects that undermine 
MARSOC’s organizational agility, understanding, and ultimate effectiveness. Broad 
organizational tasks, internal incentives, and redundant bureaucracy has contributed to a 
high level of personnel turnover within MARSOC. The high turnover rate, throughout all 
operational units, has exacerbated short billet assignments, decreased the level of 
experienced officer and enlisted leadership at each level of command, reduced unit 
proficiency and capabilities, and undermined the ability to understand uncertain 
operational environments. The net effect of these implications mirrors this study’s analysis 
of the larger U.S. military’s failures in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. In fact, the 
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internal examination of MARSOC’s design and high turnover is representative and 
revelatory of the wider problems that exist across the military. Ultimately, high turnover 
degrades professionalism, which forces MARSOC to take a hierarchical and centralized 
approach to ensuring the maintenance of foundational tactical skillsets across the force. 
This explains, in part, why MARSOC employs its RAVEN exercise to ensure basic quality 
control across the force even though it does not prepare deploying units for their 
operational environment. The complexity, instability, and uncertainty of the operational 
environment necessitates reducing this cyclical process of misaligned tasks, internal 
incentives, and redundant bureaucracy that drives high turnover and produces degraded 
professionalism and centralization. 
Another significant design inhibitor consists of MARSOC’s redundant bureaucracy 
between the Component headquarters, MRR, MRB, and MSOC operational levels of 
command. MARSOC’s Component sits on top of a single operational regiment. The 
component manages the MARSOC deployment assignments as well as the RAVEN 
exercises. This control of authority leaves the MRR with little meaningful additional 
authority or influence.  
Below the MRR, the MSOC has largely not achieved its intended design purpose 
within its task environment. Instead, administratively it is redundant within the Marine 
Corps promotion system and adds an unnecessary set of billets that makes the organization 
less agile while adding additional bureaucratic requirements. Operationally, the MSOC has 
also proven to be redundant and its contributions do not justify its tax on personnel and 
resources. Designed to conduct organic operational command and control for its own 
MSOTs as well as other SOF teams, with limited exceptions, the MSOC has not received 
the permissions on deployment to meet this intent.1198 The SOCOM deployment model 
focuses on the team level, the O-5 led SOTF, and O-6 led CJSOTFs and SOCFwds. 
Although the MSOC provides capabilities at a level that other SOF units do not, this 
capability does not effectively fit within its environment. Instead, the MSOC employs the 
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majority of MARSOC’s operational manpower and equipment. This resourcing further 
tends to result in MARSOC attempting to deploy large SOF formations, and MSOC of 
approximately 120 personnel, into environments that potentially requires less manpower 
and resources.  
When the MARSOC-led CJSOTF in Iraq had the opportunity to employ the MSOC 
as designed in early 2016, it opted to emplace an O-5 on top of the MSOC due to the 
requirements of the operational environment as well as the bureaucratic incentive to create 
opportunity for operational battalion level command deployments. Based on its 
organizational size, MARSOC could potentially compress its vertical organizational 
structure to reduce its manning requirements and improve organizational agility. Given the 
constraints from the Marine Corps and SOCOM, the only logical place this transformation 
could happen is at the O-4 command level. The next chapter’s recommendations to 
MARSOC will more closely explore options for flattening MARSOC’s structural design 
by creating a second regiment, defusing certain current responsibilities in the MRB up to 
the regimental level, and transforming the intent behind the MSOC model into an O-5 
command better aligned to the administrative and operational environment.  
What the MSOC has successfully demonstrated is that pushing typical SOTF level 
support capabilities down to the team level has produced an advantage for MSOTs within 
their complex task environments. This advantage should be maintained and enhanced. 
While other SOF units employ an O-4 level command largely in an administrative, support, 
and mentorship role, MARSOC should examine whether this level of command maximizes 
its advantages and whether it should exist at all. The future structural recommendations 
will outline an alternative to gain efficiencies internal to MARSOC and maximize its 
advantages to gain operational effectiveness. 
(3) Outputs: Culture and Outcomes 
MARSOC’s inputs and internal design inhibitors have produced an internally 
focused organizational culture and centralized machine-like bureaucracy that is not 
optimized for its operational environment, which requires agility, nuanced cognition, and 
operational approaches that connect partners and combine capabilities. Traditional Marine, 
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reconnaissance, and SOCOM cultural influences have primarily produced MARSOC’s 
current culture. Due to its youth and infusion of cultures, MARSOC’s culture is still 
solidifying and possesses internal conflicting subcultures. During the height of 
MARSOC’s involvement in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2014, continuous combat 
deployments focused the organization. Starting in 2013, however, as MARSOC’s 
engagement in Afghanistan diminished, MARSOC’s broadly framed mission and strategy 
has not sufficiently fused its internal subcultures. Along with organizational maturity that 
will occur naturally over time, MARSOC should seek ways to actively bridge its internal 
cultural seams and align that culture with the Marine Corps, SOCOM, and irregular 
operational environments to produce a cohesive culture.  
MARSOC’s internally focused, machine-like bureaucratic tendencies do not align 
well with the operational environment. MARSOC’s redundant levels of command, 
centralization, and internal orientation undermine its ability to understand and effectively 
adapt to its environment. The fact that MARSOC functions as well as it does, given its 
misfits, is a testament to the leaders and individuals within the organization, but it also 
suggests perhaps why so many of its most talented leaders become frustrated and choose 
to leave the organization.1199 
The larger Marine Corps’ machine bureaucracy better fits its environment and 
mission, which prepares brand new Marines for traditional warfare. In contrast, MARSOC 
confronts more complex, dynamic, and uncertain irregular task environments. To achieve 
the goals articulated in MARSOF 2030, which are largely aligned to the principles of 
relational maneuver, MARSOC needs to rebalance away from its machine-like tendencies 
optimized for internal efficiency and toward a team-like adhocracy model optimized for 
greater effectiveness in the operational environment. Transformation should start by 
recognizing that this machine bureaucracy is still necessary in certain aspects of the 
command, most likely at the component level and in functional areas where standardized 
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tasks, like armory maintenance, should operate like a machine. For those units that must 
interact directly with the task environment, however, this machine needs to morph more 
into a more structural adhocracy where commanders and leadership collaborate and have 
the authority to adapt structure, training, and approaches to achieve effectiveness in the 
deployed environment.  
C. CONCLUSION 
An Open Systems Analysis of MARSOC reveals organizational inhibitors to the 
employment of relational maneuver in irregular operational environments. MARSOC’s 
broad mission and strategy, hierarchical and centralized organizational structure, and high 
turnover of personnel inhibit the institutional development of a deep understanding of 
irregular warfare in general and of specific threat operational environments, such as in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Furthermore, this gap in understanding irregular warfare is exacerbated 
by an internally focused organizational culture that does not incentivize understanding the 
external operational environment.  
MARSOC’s current level of institutional understanding of irregular operational 
environments does not effectively enable its units to inform, influence, develop, or 
implement political-military strategies in irregular operational environments. This gap in 
determining MARSOC’s role in political competition in the operational environment is not 
unique to MARSOC. As modern strategist Colin Gray explains, the predominant 
traditional American Way of War is apolitical, which does not align with the requirements 
of irregular operational environments.1200 
Driving these inhibitors, MARSOC’s organizational design possesses a highly 
centralized structure that can be better aligned to the operational environment. 
Redundancies between the component and MSOC reduce efficiency and effectiveness and 
inhibit organizational agility. MARSOC’s endstate for the MSOC, specifically, does not 
effectively align with either the Marine Corps’ administrative constraints or SOCOM’s 
operational constraints. Furthermore, the bureaucratic requirements create incentives for 
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high turnover across the force that decreases professionalization, capabilities, and 
understanding of the operational environment. The net effect of these internally focused 
organizational misfits and redundancies reduces MARSOC’s relational maneuver 
effectiveness within the operational environment.  
A flawed understanding of the operational environment produces flawed strategy, 
which, enabled by flawed organizational design, produces flawed operational approaches. 
MARSOC’s and the U.S. military’s bias for action leads to the execution of machine-like 
attritional approaches, tactics, or activities to use in the operational environment. 
MARSOC would be better served by tailoring its organization to adapt to specific strategic 
threats that will enable MARSOC’s limited resources to understand, strategize, and 
implement effective approaches. In irregular warfare, working with and through 
indigenous partners as advisors, both militarily and politically, creates operational 
approaches that achieve strategic outcomes. 
MARSOC’s recent organizational vision, MARSOF 2030, seeks to implement the 
principles of relational maneuver and recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of 
MARSOC’s predominantly irregular operational environments. At the same time, 
MARSOC possesses significant internally and externally imposed constraints and misfits 
that will severely limit MARSOC’s ability to achieve agility and effectiveness. At the heart 
of these misfits lies an internal bureaucratic focus. Paradoxically, to improve itself 
internally, MARSOC should stop looking inward and focus externally. MARSOC’s small 
size, which could be an organizational strength, does not automatically translate into 
agility; MARSOC should closely review the areas of misfit identified in this analysis and 
use these recommendations and others to pursue strategic effectiveness. General (Ret) 
Stanley McChrystal’s book, Team of Teams, provides insight on what an externally focused 
unit can accomplish when it learns from its environment and adapts itself to enhance 
effectiveness.1201 General McChrystal explains in his book how he guided his unit to adapt 
the way they shared information, their tasks, and their structural processes to gain 
effectiveness in Iraq’s irregular operational environment.  
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A common misperception within MARSOC right now is that, to achieve agility, 
MARSOC should align itself under JSOC. While likely true in terms of responsive agility, 
the evidence suggests that success in irregular warfare does not derive from complex 
authorities or the latest high-tech weaponry and equipment, but rather from understanding 
the operational environment and proactively using political and violent competition to 
adapt and shape the operational environment through indigenous partners. Instead of 
reorganizing under JSOC, MARSOC could adapt internally to obtain the agility necessary 
to achieve strategic success in irregular warfare. Through identifying where MARSOC can 
focus its strengths within the task environment and reorganizing to enhance effectiveness 
and efficiency, MARSOC can transform itself and, organizationally, apply the principles 
of relational maneuver to succeed in irregular warfare with no additional external 
authorities or funding. Even if MARSOC does align under JSOC, it should not seek to 
replicate existing responsive agility characteristics, but instead, better infuse the ability to 
shape strategic outcomes. 
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VIII. SYNTHESIS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The history of past military campaigns, of past military innovation in times 
of peace, and of the very nature of war is the only reliable source on which 
we can draw, if we indeed do want to understand what warfare or combat 
may look like. Thus, any one who wishes to understand the profession of 
arms must study history. History does suggest a number of things about war. 
The first is that it is always about politics.  
—Williamson Murray, 20061202 
To this point, in Part 1: “To Know One’s Enemy” this study explored the nature 
and character of warfare, irregular warfare, irregular operational environments, and 
produced and used a relational maneuver analytical framework to analyze U.S. military 
efforts in three of the most consequential irregular conflicts since World War II. Part 2: 
“To Know Oneself” turned the focus of study internally to assess SOF’s general relational 
maneuver advantages in irregular warfare and conducted an open systems organizational 
design analysis of MARSOC’s operational elements. Following Sun Tzu’s sage wisdom 
that success in war depends on knowing yourself and your enemy, Part 3: “Success in 
Irregular Warfare” synthesizes Part 1’s and 2’s comprehensive analyses to illuminate some 
of the fundamental flaws in the U.S. military’s and MARSOC’s record in waging irregular 
warfare. This illumination produces important insights that can aid MARSOC in more 
effectively confronting irregular threats, waging irregular warfare, and achieving 
strategically successful political objectives. These insights and their utility begin in 
recognition of the enormity of the problem confronting the U.S. military; that politically-
centric irregular warfare conflicts will likely dominate the U.S. military’s future 
operational environment indefinitely.  
Intelligence predictions of the future and current wars across Syria, Yemen, 
Ukraine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, the Philippines, Somalia, and others support this 
                                                 
1202 Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue: The Importance of 
History to the Military Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 87. 
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conclusion.1203 In fact, even as the United States, as described in the 2017 National 
Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, reorient on great power 
competition with Russia and China, the Defense Strategy also explains that America’s 
adversaries are predominantly using irregular approaches, while also bolstering their 
conventional power, to subvert U.S. interests around the world.1204 The history of great 
power competition since World War II further supports the premise that competition 
“below the level of armed conflict” and irregular warfare, through supporting and using 
proxies, will be the most likely venue for this competition.1205 In these irregular conflicts, 
regional adversaries, such as Iran as well as Salafi Jihadist Violent Extremist Organizations 
(VEO), will likely provide the opportunity, fuel, and leverage for great power competition 
just as Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Soviet-Afghan War did during the Cold War.  
                                                 
1203 Szayna, Et al., Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers; Moran, ed. “Global Trends and the Future 
of Warfare 2025”; Dupuy and Rustad, “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017”; National Intelligence 
Council (U.S.), Global Trends 2030; “State-USAID-DoD Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR),” U.S. 
Department of State, accessed October 27, 2018, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283334.htm. 
1204 National Security Strategy of the United States of America; Mattis, Summary of the National 
Defense Strategy. 
1205 National Security Strategy of the United States of America; Mattis, Summary of the National 
Defense Strategy, 6. 
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Figure 40. Trends in Conflict between 1946–20171206 
Conflict during the Cold War appears to support the idea that irregular conflict will 
provide the primary venue for great power violent competition. Following the end of World 
War II, depicted and described in Figure 40, intrastate irregular conflict has increased in 
prevalence and in duration, especially during the Cold War era.1207 After a substantial 
decline in military conflict after the end of the Cold War, the general trend of conflict is 
again increasing and the prevalence of irregular warfare is significantly higher than 
interstate, traditional warfare, conflict.1208 After the Vietnam War, some United States 
political-military leaders wishfully believed that they could avoid indecisive irregular 
conflict in the future.1209 In the following few decades, however, the United States became 
involved in an array of irregular conflicts, including El Salvador, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, 
                                                 
1206 Source: Dupuy and Rustad, “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017,” 2. 
1207 Dupuy and Rustad, “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2017,” 2. 
1208 Center for Systemic Peace, “CSP Conflict Trends, Figure 3”; Center for Systemic Peace, 
“Codebook: Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPVv2016),” accessed October 27, 2018, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2016.pdf. 
1209 Gentry, How Wars Are Won and Lost, 199; Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 269. 
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the Philippines, Somalia, Haiti and others. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, great power 
competition fueled many of these conflicts. 
The high probability for the continuation of irregular warfare should ring warning 
bells within the U.S. military, its Special Operations Forces (SOF), and within Marine 
Special Operations Command (MARSOC). This study’s analysis of three of America’s 
most significant irregular warfare conflicts since World War II, and internal analysis of 
MARSOC, indicates a need to better understand, adapt, and exploit irregular threats’ 
vulnerabilities through political and violent competition. 
At best, the U.S. military’s record of successfully meeting national political 
objectives in irregular warfare is mixed. The U.S. military’s efforts throughout most of the 
Vietnam War were strategically ineffective, and later adaptation occurred too late after the 
United States was politically defeated by the North Vietnamese. The U.S. military’s 
experience in El Salvador represents a mixed bag, but also the most successful strategic 
experience with the least incurred cost. Interestingly, the overall outcome was perhaps the 
most strategically successful in terms of an increase in favorable stability toward U.S. 
interests—the end of destabilizing violence and a strategic ally.1210 Before too much credit 
is afforded to the U.S. military in this conflict, however, the simultaneous collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of their moral, financial, and material aid may have more 
decisively tipped the balance of conflict than the U.S. military’s successes.1211  
The U.S. military in Afghanistan has seen a wide range of successes and failures, 
but overall, the outcomes of these conflicts are not resolved, and certainly not in the United 
States’ favor given the level of residual instability and violence that threatens America’s 
interests in the region.1212 Like in Vietnam, in Afghanistan the U.S. military adapted its 
approaches over time to better employ the principles of relational maneuver through 
political and violent competition; however, the flagging level of national political will, 
                                                 
1210 Department of State, “El Salvador,” accessed October 27, 2018, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
2033.htm. 
1211 Linda Robinson, “The End of El Salvador’s War,” Survival 33, no. 5 (September 1991): 388–89, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339108442608. 
1212 Arquilla, Perils of the Gray Zone, 119. 
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expressed through President Barak Obama’s publicly announced timeline for withdrawal, 
retracted many of the resources and ended the approaches that were improving the situation 
in Afghanistan.1213 Although the strategic outcomes in Afghanistan, and Iraq, are still 
uncertain, the educated observer will have a difficult time arguing that America’s strategic 
position across the Middle East is better than on September 10th, 2001.1214 
For the U.S. military, this study links ineffectiveness in irregular warfare to 
ineffectively employing relational maneuver. Case study analysis indicates that the U.S. 
military, including SOF generally and MARSOC specifically, gravitates toward an 
attritional style of warfare and the employment of relational maneuver in largely a 
traditional military sense through the use of violence. This gravitational pull is especially 
evident within the military’s conventional forces in Vietnam and Afghanistan. SOF, 
however, also tend toward attrition in irregular warfare. Experience in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan reveal that SOF generally and MARSOC specifically can and 
should improve their application of relational maneuver to more effectively wage irregular 
warfare and produce better politically strategic outcomes against irregular threats.  
Chapter VIII is composed of two sections. The first section synthesizes the seven 
primary areas degrading effectiveness in irregular warfare. These challenges are rooted at 
the conceptual level and must be addressed to adapt and implement the changes necessary 
to produce better outcomes. Section B takes these challenges, incorporates the general SOF 
advantages and MARSOC’s organizational design, recommends seven implementable 
relational maneuver recommendations to overcome the identified challenges. The most 
important element of this chapter is recognizing the strategic problems and endstate-related 
challenges that SOF and MARSOC face to enhance efforts contributing to national defense. 
The specific implementable recommendations are merely options, grounded in the research 
of this study, to overcome the identified challenges, but this study does not claim that other 
effective solutions do not exist. This study merely offers these recommendations as a 
                                                 
1213 Coll, Directorate S, Part 4; Robinson, One Hundred Victories, Ch. 12–13. 
1214 Arquilla, Perils of the Gray Zone, 119. 
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platform to spur discussion, debate, and ultimately adapt to better overcome the threats 
facing the United States. 
A. INHIBITORS TO RELATIONAL MANEUVER 
SOF’s primary strategic value is not their ability to support conventional 
forces in major combat operations but their ability to produce strategic 
effects through the highly discriminate and proportional use of force that 
avoids politically unacceptable collateral damage or escalation in ways that 
conventional forces cannot duplicate.  
—Christopher Lamb and David Tucker, 20071215 
There are seven general challenges, depicted in Figure 41, inhibiting the U.S. 
military’s, SOF’s, and MARSOC’s ability to recognize vulnerabilities in threat networks, 
adapt internally, and exploit those threat vulnerabilities to achieve strategic success. The 
foundation for these inhibitors is conceptual. As General (Ret) A. M. Gray expressed, “you 
must out-think your enemy before you can out fight him.”1216 
                                                 
1215 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 197. 
1216 Interview with General Alford Gray interview, July 17, 2018. 
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Figure 41. Challenges Inhibiting SOF’s Application of Relational Maneuver in 
Irregular Warfare 
1. Failure to Study War and Irregular Warfare  
The conceptual foundation for the failures inhibiting effectiveness and the 
employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare derive from a lack of broad and 
deep professional understanding of war and warfare. In 2006, military historians 
Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich commented that “few current civilian and 
military leaders seem willing to indulge in systematic reflection about the past.”1217 
Throughout each case examined in this study, the military, at the institutional level, poorly 
understood the general character of irregular warfare as well as the principles that tend to 
apply to these conflicts. By the time the U.S. military invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and 
Iraq in 2003, an exhaustive amount of literature and first-hand experience had revealed 
lessons from El Salvador, Vietnam, the post-colonial era, and even further back to 
                                                 
1217 Murray and Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue, 1. 
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Thucydides’ epic, The History of the Peloponnesian War.1218 Instead of reaping the 
benefits of drawing upon the study of war, the U.S. military tended to revert to what it 
institutionally valued—traditional warfare and the direct employment of violence against 
a clear enemy. 
However, drawing too narrowly upon history and past experience and robotically 
applying lessons from one context and operational environment to another can be equally 
dangerous. The history of irregular warfare teaches that generic application of principles 
from previous conflicts is doomed to fail. Instead, history and theory of previous conflicts 
provide an analytical framework on which to assess the particular circumstances and 
threats currently confronted. History and theory provide no silver bullet and adapting to an 
actual situation using a shallow understanding or rote application of specific lessons 
without current contextual knowledge can be worse than not studying at all. 
The U.S. military, writ large, has demonstrated a lack of an appreciation of the 
history of irregular warfare.1219 This lack of professional understanding of war, and 
especially of irregular warfare, leaves the military professional a prisoner of narrow 
personal experience and doctrine that, while valuable, does not show the precise path to 
success particularly in the complexities and uncertainty of irregular warfare. Without a 
historical study, every problem is completely new and more complex than previously 
encountered without realizing that similar patterns and experiences have occurred since the 
beginning of warfare. Operational complexity, fueled by technology that proliferates 
information and compresses decision timelines, elevates the criticality for understanding 
history and theory even more. Without a foundation and appreciation of the past that 
connects to the present, the military is left intellectually unprepared, as Part 2’s analysis of 
the U.S. military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan revealed. As the U.S. military 
reorients on great power conflict, as it did in the aftermath of Vietnam, and attempted to 
                                                 
1218 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. 
Robert B. Strassler and Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996). 
1219 Murray and Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue, Ch. 1,6,8,14; Williamson Murray and Peter R. 
Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Gray, “Irregular Enemies.” 
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do in 2011 with a “pivot” to the Pacific, the history of warfare especially since World War 
II and projections of the future indicate that irregular warfare will likely continue to 
indefinitely represent the primary mode of warfare.1220  
Clausewitz taught that war is an extension of politics through violent force.1221 
While the U.S. government legally defines war only when it is formally declared by 
Congress or, in more often than not, under an official congressional authorization of 
military force, regardless of the legal descriptive title, war exists when political competition 
overlaps with organized violence. War, therefore, can range from barely discernable 
violent protests through nuclear confrontation. The U.S. military is charged with meeting 
political objectives across all forms of war and warfare; however, the U.S. military’s 
slowness to understand and adapt to irregular warfare suggests that its leadership at every 
level of command, and especially SOF’s leadership, should more broadly and deeply study 
its history to influence and achieve better outcomes. 
2. Failure to Apply the Centrality of Political Competition in Irregular 
Warfare 
The study of war and warfare reveals the centrality of political competition. Unlike 
traditional warfare, in irregular warfare, this political competition occurs at all levels of 
warfare and blends with the use of military violence.1222 Across Vietnam, El Salvador, 
and Afghanistan, U.S. military forces, and particularly SOF, were the only available or 
present U.S. government forces with the ability to influence and wage political and violent 
competition. Often, the U.S. military forces present in these situations merely waged 
competition through violence due to a lack of understanding, training, desire, or all the 
above. Not understanding the war in political terms, often the U.S. military was at best 
using relational maneuver in its most simple and overt form, against the visible enemy on 
the battlefield. 
                                                 
1220 Mark E. Manyin, et al., Pivot to the Pacific? the Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” 
Toward Asia, CRS Report No. R42448 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
1221 Clausewitz, On War, 28. 
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The failure to recognize the centrality of political competition in irregular warfare 
likely represents the single most important conceptual failure inhibiting the U.S. military’s 
success in those environments. Deployments across the Middle East have revealed that the 
military clouds the political pore of irregular warfare with overemphasizing economic 
development through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in 
Afghanistan, or with favoring overt cultural niceties such as drinking tea, believing that 
“sharing their tea, no matter how many cups, will result in a trusting relationship that is 
sufficient to lead an Afghan to tell any outsider about his son or uncle who meets at night 
with the Taliban.”1223 These elements, while important, miss the central pillar of war, and 
its application to irregular warfare: the political competition to impose one nation’s will on 
other groups or nations. The factors influencing this competition can be complex and 
uncertain across social, religious, economic, ethnic or other dimensions, but these 
variations all return to the question of who has power and how are they using it.  
Proficiency in employing traditional military violence, of course, is foundational to 
the military profession, whether among conventional forces or among SOF. Therefore, 
SOF must continue to innovate and train to be the most lethal force on the battlefield. This 
lethal proficiency, however, is not enough in irregular warfare. Although all war is 
inherently political, in irregular warfare, political warfare must be the main effort at all 
levels of war. In irregular socio-political fragmented environments, political competition 
will take place down to the village level. Within these complex and fragmented contexts, 
SOF should recognize the centrality of politics and play a critical role in advising and 
assisting indigenous political-military forces to inform and influence strategy to achieve 
political goals aligned with U.S. interests.  
Although SOF leadership might attest to the centrality of the political problem, this 
recognition often does not effectively translate down to the operational and tactical levels. 
In Afghanistan, SOF theater-strategic, operational, and tactical leadership has often 
possessed merely superficial understanding of the ethnic-religious-social-political power 
structures within their area of operations. As a result, the more junior SOF personnel often 
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lacked any understanding or appreciation of political warfare. Without this basic 
understanding, SOF have often underperformed in translating military action to political 
success. This lack of understanding and appreciation for the centrality of political warfare 
must change, or the U.S. military and SOF will continue to under-deliver the results 
necessary for strategic success in irregular warfare. 
3. Failure to Orient on and Understand Known Threats and Operational 
Environments 
The U.S. military’s and SOF’s failures compound upon each other. The failure to 
broadly study war and warfare leads to a failure to recognize the centrality of political 
competition in irregular warfare and the role that the U.S. military should play in that 
competition. Without a proper understanding of how the political nature and character of 
irregular warfare creates complexity, instability, and uncertainty, the U.S. military neglects 
to pay persistent conceptual attention at both the individual and unit levels to overcome 
that character in the operational environment. Because irregular wars tend to last longer 
than interstate wars, the U.S. military’s and SOF’s individual and unit rotational policies 
have directly undermined the understanding of uncertain irregular operational 
environments, especially in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.1224 
Although the primary U.S. enemies and adversaries have not changed significantly 
since at least 1979, the U.S. military, largely, does not focus its personnel and units on 
specific threats, regions, or operational environments. That said, some exceptions do exist. 
Army Special Forces Groups are regionally aligned to Geographic Combatant Commands 
and some Special Forces soldiers remain geographically focused on their region throughout 
their careers. MARSOC has also followed a similar path by aligning its three operational 
battalions against three different combatant commands. A closer analysis of MARSOC, 
however, reveals that its regional orientation is only surface deep. For numerous reasons, 
MARSOC has chosen to rotate its personnel throughout each battalion, reportedly to instill 
cross-regional experience and capabilities across the force. While this practice may achieve 
                                                 
1224 Although this study does not conduct a detailed case study analysis of Iraq, authors Major Bailey 
and LT Woods both deployed to Northern Iraq in 2016. Major Bailey also deployed to western Iraq in 
2009. 
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that purpose, it has also prevented functional regional specialization. Even for individuals 
and units that have deployed within a geographic region, MARSOC units have 
intentionally not redeployed individuals and units to the same locations. While this study 
does not examine internal Army Special Forces rotational practices, informal interaction 
with Special Forces officers indicates that the same practices occur in that organization. 
Therefore, even among SOF, purportedly better attuned to the specific geographic locations 
and partners, service- and unit-level policies and practices undermine strategic 
effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the U.S. military often prefers to prepare for future traditional warfare 
with another great power over ongoing irregular warfare operations. This challenge 
revealed itself within the Vietnam conflict and more recent conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq,1225 to which the military never actually dedicated individuals and units. Instead, the 
military rotated individuals and units through these conflicts as if it were a part-time job 
and distraction. Because irregular warfare conflicts are often seen by the military as 
temporary and lesser priorities than potential major combat operations against the Soviet 
Union, China, or more recently Russia, military forces often only dedicate minimal time, 
effort, and resources to confronting irregular threats.  
SOCOM’s most recent published organizational vision in 2016 even states that “we 
must guard against becoming overly focused on the skill sets of a single theater or AOR to 
the detriment of others. We are willing to accept some risk in this area.”1226 This statement, 
which is representative of the U.S. military’s larger perspective, ignores the primary gap 
in U.S. military experiences in waging irregular warfare: the lack of dedicated subject 
matter experts that understand the operational environment, possess strategic relationships 
within indigenous partners, and can adapt to the demands of the local environment to 
achieve strategic outcomes. This does not mean that the U.S. military, or SOF, needs to 
dedicate a number of threat and area specialists disproportionate to the relative strategic 
                                                 
1225 Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 114. 
1226 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2035: Commander’s Strategic Guidance, 
March 7, 2016, 11–12. 
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importance, but it does mean that the U.S. military and SOF have typically not dedicated 
enough individuals and units to solve uncertain irregular challenges. The evidence suggests 
that the military needs to dramatically rebalance its forces to gain a deeper understanding 
of specific adversaries and strategic geographic partners and locations. 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD), SOF are well suited to take the lead in 
rebalancing toward specialization against specific irregular threats and operational 
environments. The Army Special Forces (SF) have demonstrated the tremendous impact a 
force can provide when a crisis or requirement arrives to address a localized threat. In 
Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, SF forces either possessed standing relationships 
with indigenous forces or quickly developed the necessary relationships to influence their 
partners or context to confront the identified adversaries and wider threats. The regional 
focus within SF, and more recently within MARSOC, is not enough, however. SOF does 
not currently adequately prioritize the development of long-standing focused relationships 
and partnerships to confront well-known threats presented by Russia, China, Iran, Violent 
Extremist Organizations (VEO), and North Korea. Instead, SOF tend to gravitate toward 
the missions that emphasize counterterrorism and direct-action-centric tasks, accepting the 
risk of not emphasizing specific threat or regional expertise. U.S. SOF can and should 
develop threat-specific cadres with a long-term orientation on these adversaries and their 
context at a cost-effective price in terms of manpower and general resources. 
The history of U.S. irregular warfare indicates that success requires understanding 
the operational environment. This understanding can only occur through the focused 
dedication of individuals and units at the expense of broad and general experience. The 
U.S. military, and SOF, gives too much primacy toward broad experience and short-term 
focus on the most complex and uncertain problems facing the military.  
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4. Failure to Understand SOF’s Strategic Utility in Irregular Warfare 
In irregular warfare, SOF’s decisive strategic utility is in the indirect operational 
approaches working with and through indigenous political and military partners.1227 This 
is due to the fact that the achievement of long-term U.S. strategic interests typically 
depends on the indigenous partners and not on U.S. unilateral efforts. Although this fact is 
well known in the current U.S. military context, the U.S. military and SOF often pursue 
approaches that do not adequately work with and through indigenous partners. 
Case study analysis and the review of SOF’s relational maneuver strengths indicate 
that SOF are well suited and generally more effective in irregular warfare than conventional 
forces. However, U.S. SOF often gravitate too far toward the most conventional and 
attritional aspects of irregular warfare. As a prime example of attritional warfare, 
counterterrorism has become virtually synonymous with direct actions raids and special 
reconnaissance without directly connecting short-term tactical effects to an indigenous 
political strategy. After 17 years of this SOF-led counterterrorism effort across North 
Africa and the Middle East, which has many thousands of enemy combatants, the U.S. 
finds itself no closer to defeating al Qaeda or achieving politically stable outcomes than 
when it began. In fact, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), more 
recognized terror groups exist now than did on 9/11.1228 This result has occurred, in no 
small part, because of the U.S. military’s lack of understanding of the threats and their 
operational environment across Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. 
These conflicts are irregular wars where military violence and political warfare become 
blurred, and where the U.S. military should inform, influence, and implement strategy to 
achieve intermediate and ultimate political objectives across all levels of warfare.1229 This 
indirect approach requires refined understanding of politics, strategy, the operational 
environment, and the U.S. military’s role to support and achieve U.S. interests. 
                                                 
1227 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, ch. 7–8. 
1228 Coll, Directorate S, 677. 
1229 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, Ch. 4–5. 
335 
Although U.S. SOF have achieved tactical proficiency in killing and capturing 
enemy leadership and fighters, SOF have been less effective in producing strategic 
outcomes. While SOF do not solely bear responsibility, they are often the primary action-
arm of the military that operates in these environments. The popular saying goes that all 
politics are local. That mantra especially applies to irregular warfare. The greatest U.S. 
military successes achieved across Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan typically 
occurred when SOF or conventional forces integrated with and assisted indigenous partner 
forces to develop military and political solutions compatible with the indigenous 
population and powerbrokers. SOF significantly contributed to outcomes in El Salvador 
and had led the way toward similar success in Afghanistan through the Village Stability 
Operations (VSO) program. 
Greater direct SOF strategic utility in irregular warfare requires more indirect 
operational approaches that advise and assist local forces to achieve long-term political 
objectives. This rebalancing will apply differently across SOCOM’s diverse array of 
forces. This study does not advocate for abandoning the tactical proficiency gained in 
efficiently killing or capturing enemy forces. It does advocate for the clear evidence 
presented throughout history, that while attritional military violence is typically required, 
it is insufficient for producing strategically successful outcomes in irregular warfare, and 
that SOF should take a leading role in this domain. The alternative options for addressing 
irregular threats used by Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung, including state 
terrorism, genocide, and extermination, do not provide a morally or politically acceptable 
path for the U.S. military.1230 
U.S. SOF also need to explore more closely how to support or wage political 
competition against irregular threats. The overused generic call for the State Department 
to ‘do more’ is unrealistic, especially given the trend in reducing rather than increasing its 
capabilities.1231 Furthermore, regardless of whether the State Department, or the U.S. 
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Agency for International Development (USAID), possesses more capabilities, it will not 
alleviate the need for U.S. military participation in political competition in irregular 
warfare. Dating back to at least the Vietnam War, the State Department and USAID have 
been typically unable to operate in volatile irregular warfare environments without U.S. 
military security and support.1232 Since Vietnam, the State Department has never had the 
manpower or resources to politically compete below the provincial level in conflict.1233 
Even at the generic provincial level, the record is unclear on how effective their efforts 
were, or whether the State Department merely attempts to construct American-style 
democracy regardless of its suitability for the local conditions.  
USAID, on the other hand, has traditionally focused on local development projects, 
which, although a component of political competition, do not comprehensively address 
political competition.1234 Furthermore, in irregular warfare environments, it is generally 
in U.S. interests to maintain as small a footprint as possible to be able to accomplish the 
given mission.1235 Aside from desiring to avoid perceptions of occupation, conventional 
forces are not generally designed to operate effectively in these sorts of environments, and 
are not well trained to politically compete in irregular warfare, as demonstrated across 
Vietnam and Afghanistan. While SOCOM possesses specialized civil affairs forces, this 
study identifies a shortfall across SOF in effectively waging political competition or 
advising and assisting their political-military partners to compete against the relevant threat 
networks. In irregular warfare environments, SOF leadership will often be the senior U.S. 
political-military representative between the village, provincial, and perhaps up to the 
national level leadership. U.S. SOF officer and senior enlisted leadership should recognize 
the critical importance of their political-military role in these environments and understand 
the decisive role of indirect efforts to work with and through indigenous partners. 
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5. Failure to Develop Strategic Thinking That Informs, Influences, and 
Implements Strategy and Blends Political and Violent Competition at 
All Levels of Warfare 
In irregular warfare, the nature and character of operational environments require 
the U.S. military to inform, influence, and implement strategy that blends political and 
violent competition at all levels of warfare. This requirement of the military necessitates 
mature and informed professionals, especially since the U.S. policy and strategy from the 
U.S. government has been notoriously vague in irregular warfare, such as in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan. This lack of clarity, however, reflects the uncertainty of what 
is actually occurring or what is possible to achieve within the operational environment. 
This uncertainty, in turn, illustrates the need for an active role by the military, and 
especially SOF, to engage in what author Emile Simpson calls “strategic dialogue” between 
tactical-level units and strategic-level decision makers.1236 
The last 17 years of war in Afghanistan have revealed a gap in strategic thinking 
within the U.S. military and especially among SOF.1237 U.S. strategic-level leaders in 
Washington DC continue to rely heavily upon SOF to confront complex problems around 
the world, but it appears that SOF in Afghanistan and other current operational 
environments often become more focused on employing tactical direct action capabilities 
than on employing their skills in line with a broader strategic plan.1238 Exceptions certainly 
exist. In Afghanistan, theater-strategic leaders like General Stanley McChrystal, General 
David Petraeus, and Brigadier General Austin Miller worked to unify the political-military 
chain of command and effort and align military operational approaches to meet political 
objectives. At the tactical level, however, the larger strategic framework often became 
unclear and poorly understood. In its place, too often, SOF leadership reverted to overly 
simplistic attritional missions, and focused on destroying the Haqqani network in 
                                                 
1236 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, Ch. 4–5. 
1237 Robinson et al., Improving Strategic Competence. 
1238 Robinson, One Hundred Victories. 
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Afghanistan or ISIS in Iraq.1239 Of course, the attrition of the enemy on the battlefield 
plays a critical role in strategic success, but attrition will rarely be decisive in itself. In 
politically-centric irregular warfare environments like Afghanistan and Iraq, SOF 
leadership and personnel should possess an understanding of what strategy is, what the 
current U.S. political-military strategy is, what the adversaries’ strategies are, what the 
partner forces’ host nation government’s strategies are, what the local powerbrokers’ 
strategies are, and what that individual SOF unit’s strategy should be to influence the other 
strategies to achieve long-term success. 
The requirement to recognize, understand, and influence these strategies extends 
far past basic military strategy to employ violence. Instead, in irregular warfare, SOF 
require grand-strategic thinking to consider all means of power projection to appropriately 
inform and influence theater or national strategy development and adaptation as well as to 
advise partnered indigenous political-military leadership. In irregular warfare, including 
proxy warfare environments, SOF personnel will often provide the only unfiltered 
assessment of the feasibility or progress of strategy at the local level. SOF cannot 
effectively provide this analysis or assessments if their own personnel do not grasp their 
role within policy and the theater-strategic context. 
This level of strategic understanding in SOF does not currently exist to the extent 
necessary. There are many within SOF, both officer and enlisted, who believe that SOF’s 
role is merely to employ military force at a more elite level than conventional forces to kill 
or capture the enemy on the battlefield. This simplistic mindset is detrimental to achieving 
successful outcomes in irregular warfare and indicates why a direct-action approach toward 
counterterrorism has achieved only tactical results, if not worsened the strategic situation 
for the United States in much of the Middle East and around the world.  
                                                 
1239 Theater-strategic operational guidance provided to SOF in Afghanistan in early 2014 and in Iraq 
in 2016.  
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6. Failure to Adapt Organization Design to the Operational 
Environment 
This study’s analysis indicates that organizational design often acts as the limiting 
factor that prevents successful strategic outcomes in irregular warfare. Organizational 
design that does not adapt and align to the operational environment prevents identifying 
and adapting to exploit threat vulnerabilities. Finally, a design that misfits with the 
environment will find it difficult to assess the effectiveness of its own strategy and 
approaches. The evidence presented across Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan 
indicates that the U.S. military and SOF have failed to effectively adapt their organizational 
design to irregular operational environments. 
Within organizational design, three design components stand out among the others 
as the most critical elements in producing effective outcomes in irregular warfare: tasks, 
structures, and people. More than any other, misalignment of these elements with the 
operational environment have significantly degraded SOF’s, and the U.S. military’s, 
effectiveness in irregular warfare.  
In irregular warfare, the U.S. military has over-prioritized conventional or 
traditional military tasks at the expense of political competition. Proper prioritization 
should emphasize the centrality of political competition as the decisive effort for any 
strategic outcome with military violence in a supporting role. For the U.S. military, tasks 
of political competition start with understanding the local power structures, including overt 
and covert influencers. Developing this deep understanding requires a mature study of the 
general history of war, irregular warfare, and political competition as well as the specific 
social, political, economic, and military history of each unique war. Another essential task 
requires prioritizing advisor-centric missions to develop the understanding and 
relationships necessary to succeed. Finally, the tasks the U.S. military pursues must achieve 
unity of command, or at least unity of vision and effort to achieve strategic success. 
Greater effectiveness and better outcomes in irregular warfare also require adapting 
structural organizational models. In irregular warfare, an effective structural model 
dedicates specific individuals and units to specific operational environments over time. The 
U.S. military structural approach to irregular conflicts, however, typically attempts to not 
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interrupt the machine-like administrative model for personnel management and promotion 
cycles.1240 This model has prevented the continuity within leadership, personnel, and units 
that is necessary for understanding complex irregular warfare threats and for effectively 
influencing those environments. Well documented in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it is 
clear that this system has prevented the necessary understanding, vision, and effort as well 
as undermined critical relationships, and enabled adversaries and opportunistic indigenous 
partners to exploit the gaps in understanding and operational approaches to benefit their 
own survival and power.  
Furthermore, military structures in irregular warfare have often not facilitated 
effective interagency collaboration and unity of effort. The U.S. military efforts in Vietnam 
and Afghanistan provide ample evidence of inefficient and ineffective structural chains of 
command. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the U.S. military did adapt but only slowly 
and not enough to achieve desired strategic endstates. While SOF unilaterally cannot solve 
this problem, SOF are uniquely suited for better bridging divides with interagency partners 
and building constructive relationships that facilitate unity of vision and effort, if not 
command. The Vietnam Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS) program and Afghanistan’s Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghanistan 
Local Police (ALP) programs are prime examples. While neither program was executed 
long enough to ensure strategic success, both programs represent U.S. military structural 
adaptation to the realities in the operational environment and better-integrated military and 
interagency efforts. 
Irregular warfare operational environments are complex, dynamic, and require a 
high degree of structural agility to exploit fleeting opportunities. While compared to 
conventional forces, SOF are typically more agile, but improvements can still be made. 
                                                 
1240 The evidence supporting this assertion is overwhelming across the U.S. military experiences in 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Within the Marine Corps in conventional and special operations units, 
units assigned to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan trained rigorously for the months leading up to 
deployment, but upon completion of deployment, individuals rotated out of their unit based on their own 
individual career path, units rarely deployed to the same exact location, and even when they did. The units 
had often turned over and possessed little continuity. Between 2009 and 2017, it was clear to Major Bailey 
that this primary priority for the military was maintaining continuity in the personnel management and 
promotion system. 
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SOF organizations must be ruthless in identifying and reducing redundant structural 
bureaucracy that decreases organizational agility and the ability to adapt to recognize and 
exploit threat vulnerabilities. SOF should also identify ways to decentralize authority to the 
lowest levels in irregular warfare. True decentralization allows delegated authority to make 
decisions and allocate resources. This decentralization also requires properly 
professionalizing the people tasked with operating within irregular environments. 
Structurally decentralizing authority to advisors in austere environments is crucial to enable 
agility to produce strategic outcomes. While SOF typically better decentralize authority 
than conventional forces, SOF should continually search for ways to reduce unnecessary 
and redundant bureaucracy within the chain of command, which will facilitate greater 
delegation of authority and enable better communication and unity of effort. 
Along with providing the right tasks and adapting the right structures for irregular 
warfare, success requires professionalizing the SOF leadership and personnel that will 
operate in irregular environments. Professionalizing SOF for irregular warfare requires 
education, continuity, and incentives. Educating SOF for irregular warfare requires study 
and debate on the history of war, strategy, politics, economics, anthropology and religion 
to prepare them prior to operating in these environments. This education needs to inform 
the role of these factors broadly in irregular warfare, as well as narrowly in particular threat 
and operational environments, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. This education 
cannot replace the foundational requirement for tactical skills to conduct raids or major 
combat operations, but should supplement them for better implementation within strategy. 
Education enables SOF’s individual operators, leaders, and units to match the study 
of past experiences to their present situation. This match between education and 
experiences will not likely occur in a single six-month deployment rotation and will 
develop at different rates for each individual. Continuity in assignments and billets will 
mesh education and experience as well as allow the development of relationships among 
military, interagency, coalition, and indigenous partners necessary for success. 
SOF should provide incentives to individuals and units to pursue the necessary 
education and continuity to succeed against irregular threats. Analysis indicates that the 
U.S. military incentivizes a broad focus on conventional military activities, combat 
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experience, and internal organizational billets necessary for promotion. Military services 
also generally disincentivize temporary advisor structures or billets developed, outside of 
the normal career path, to confront specific threats.1241 The military promotion system 
rewards a standard career path that satisfies the major command billets, such as company, 
battalion, regimental and division levels of command. Although this system is not designed 
for highly contextual unique irregular warfare environments, SOF units can take steps, 
within the existing system, to incentivize the more regional and threat-specific billets and 
responsibilities. 
Without addressing the tasks, structures, and people within organizational design 
at an institutional level, any improvements to effectiveness in irregular warfare 
implemented by capable leadership can disappear when those leaders are no longer in 
place. For instance, a unit that decentralizes significant authority to SOF individuals who 
are not properly educated nor given the continuity or incentives to confront a distributed 
environment will most likely implement similar approaches that were used repeatedly early 
in Afghanistan and Iraq—direct action capture or kill missions—at the expense of political-
competition actions that are more decisive in irregular warfare. Temporary successes 
produced by individual leaders and units will succumb to the institutional baseline, which 
is currently detrimental to success in irregular warfare. 
7. Failure to Prioritize Embedded, Advisor-Led Operational 
Approaches 
Operational approaches are the product of the level of understanding of the 
operational environment, the policy objectives and national interests at stake, and the 
resources available. Effective operational approaches in irregular warfare depend on 
understanding the threat, developing and implementing a unified and coherent political-
military strategy, and tailoring organizational design to the threat and operational 
environment. Appropriate operational approaches are the natural byproduct of aligning the 
other elements of relational maneuver to specific threats and environments. Alignment 
                                                 
1241 Interview with LTC (Ret) Joseph McGraw on August 31, 2018; numerous other sources indicate 
that organizational structures, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and other advisor teams, 
were rarely adequately resourced or manned with the highest quality personnel. 
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requires an iterative and adaptive process of trial and error and demands time and focused 
attention. Furthermore, successful operational approaches from one environment will 
require modification before application to a different operational context.  
The two primary elements required for U.S. operational success in irregular warfare 
consist of unified political-military approaches and advisor-centric approaches that span 
the tactical to theater-strategic levels of war. Because irregular warfare is distinct from 
traditional warfare primarily due to the centrality of political competition at all levels of 
warfare, a unified political-military approach is essential. The unity in vision and effort 
required for the U.S. military to succeed in irregular warfare depends on embedded military 
advisors that can fuse U.S. strategy and the indigenous partner(s) strategy together to 
achieve U.S. national interests. 
Because the U.S. operational approach must also align with the indigenous 
partners’ operational approaches, U.S. military embedded advisors to the indigenous 
partners are the only way, short of assuming direct political and military control, to 
synchronize both U.S. and partner approaches. The United States does not seek to colonize 
or occupy other nations longer than it must. Therefore, advisory operational approaches 
that embed with the indigenous forces, and develop close relationships and understandings 
of these operational environments are decisive to strategic success. Furthermore, at a 
relatively low cost of human and material resources, embedded advisors offer the highest 
return on investment. If selected properly, these advisors can gain a deep understanding of 
the operational threat, develop strategic relationships, inform U.S. strategy, and influence 
strategic outcomes. The precise form of a unified political-military approach and how 
embedded the advisors are in a given environment will vary significantly, but both pillars 
should play a central role in U.S. military efforts in irregular warfare. For the U.S. military 
and SOF, advisors who can deftly understand and employ political and violent competition 
should lead U.S. military efforts in irregular warfare. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENT 
Irregular threats are the proper strategic focus for SOF and the area where 
SOF can provide the greatest strategic value. SOF are less a model for 
information-age transformation of conventional forces than they are a 
model for how to fight irregular warriors with discrimination, at low cost, 
and through emphasis on indirect methods.  
—Christopher Lamb and David Tucker, 20071242 
 
Figure 42. Summary of Recommendations 
In war, conceptual understanding does not matter if it is not practically applied. 
Section A outlined the seven primary challenges inhibiting the U.S. military and SOF 
community in employing relational maneuver to recognize threat vulnerabilities, adapt 
internally, and exploit those vulnerabilities to achieve realistic and desirable political 
outcomes. Section B translates these challenges directly to MARSOC’s organizational 
design. The purpose of this section is to creatively explore and offer courses of action that 
MARSOC could implement to overcome the challenges identified in Section A. These 
recommendations simultaneously address three interactive categories that 
comprehensively provide a unified strategic direction for MARSOC. First, and most 
importantly, these recommendations counsel MARSOC to address the U.S. military’s 
                                                 
1242 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 237. 
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vulnerabilities in strategic effectiveness in irregular warfare (See Figure 42). Second, these 
recommendations, from a stakeholder standpoint, seek to align MARSOC’s strategic utility 
among the DoD, the Marine Corps, and SOCOM, to produce an organizationally strategic 
vision to unify MARSOC culturally and drive MARSOC toward achievable endstates. 
Third, these recommendations seek to better implement the principles of relational 
maneuver wherever possible. Relational maneuver is merely an expanded form of 
Warfighting’s philosophy of Maneuver Warfare brought to the Marine Corps by General 
(Ret) A.M. Gray. The innovation here lies in applying tenets of Maneuver Warfare more 
directly to irregular warfare and to MARSOC organizationally. For MARSOC, these 
recommendations are attuned to the four primary guiding concepts and pathways for 
innovation established by MARSOF 2030 and depicted in Figure 43. This study assesses 
that these pathways and the guidance in MARSOF 2030 overlap with relational maneuver 
concepts and are well attuned to the current and future operating environment for 
MARSOC. In many ways, the recommendations found here also provide direct insight for 
how to focus MARSOF 2030’s distinct pathways and integrate them into a cohesive 
strategic vision with achievable strategic objectives. 
 
Figure 43. MARSOF 2030 Guiding Concepts1243 
Adapting MARSOC to achieve greater effectiveness starts with remembering the 
overall objective for the U.S. military: to overcome the threats to U.S. security in line with 
U.S. policy. Military force is merely a means to this end, and military means must align 
with as well as inform strategic goals to achieve success. The alignment of military means 
makes this challenge inherently strategic in nature. The following recommendations, 
depicted in Figure 44, outline options for implementing relational maneuver. 
                                                 
1243 Source: Marine Special Operations Command, MARSOF 2030, 9. 
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Figure 44. MARSOC’s Path to Strategically Implement Relational Maneuver 
1. MARSOC’s Strategic Utility and Organizational Strategy 
The single most important decision that MARSOC can make to enhance its 
organizational effectiveness is to focus its vision and organizational strategy. As of 2018, 
MARSOC’s strategic vision is too broad and vague to establish superior organizational 
relevance within SOCOM, the Marine Corps, or the Department of Defense (DoD). 
MARSOC currently produces a comparable capability to the SEALs and Army Special 
Forces (SF). MARSOC has yet, however, to realize its potential given the level of talent 
within its organization. Throughout the DoD, SOCOM, Marine Corps, and internally, 
MARSOC’s strategic utility and organizational strategy is vague and unclear.1244  
As depicted in Figure 45, this study assesses that the intersection of MARSOC’s 
strategic utility between its three primary stakeholders—SOCOM, the Marine Corps, and 
the DoD—lies in irregular warfare. This study has demonstrated that SOCOM could 
improve its strategic utility by moving past its predominant tactical focus to better 
                                                 
1244 Seck, “MARSOC and Recon: Does the Corps Need Both?”; MARSOC internal discussions 
between Maj Bailey and other members of MARSOC between 2013 and 2018; Sadcom Via Happycom, 
“Part Three: What’s Wrong with the Rest of SOCOM?”; Billy Birdzell, “Understanding the Marine Corps’ 
Special Operators”; Sadcom Via Happycom, “Part Four: What Can Be Done About SOCOM?”; Major 
Bailey’s personal interactions across MARSOC between 2013 and 2018. 
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understanding the nation’s threats, thinking strategically, understanding and waging 
political competition, prioritizing advisor approaches, and more directly influencing 
strategically successful outcomes in irregular warfare. Right now, the primary organization 
that focuses on irregular warfare through indirect methods to better understand unique 
operational environments is the Army Special Forces.1245 Authors David Tucker and 
Christopher Lamb, as well as author and Retired Army Special Forces Colonel Hy 
Rothstein, argue that SOF’s greatest strategic utility in irregular warfare lies in the indirect 
approach: training, advising, and assisting indigenous partners to achieve strategic 
goals.1246 These authors’ assertions align with analysis of the most strategically successful 
practices and approaches in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan.  
 
Figure 45. Intersection of MARSOC’s Strategic Utility 
                                                 
1245 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF Operating Concept 2022” (September 26, 
2014). 
1246 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces, 202; Hy Rothstein, “History of 
Special Operations,” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, class, 2017). 
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While MARSOC currently conducts the same types of missions as Special Forces 
around the world, there is still substantial debate within MARSOC regarding its current 
and future strategic direction and utility within SOCOM. The evidence from case study 
analysis and analysis within SOCOM reveals that, at large, SOCOM is unbalanced, 
gravitating too far toward direct approaches that achieve short-term tactical effects without 
long-term strategic outcomes. MARSOC can provide the greatest strategic utility within 
SOCOM to better balance indirect approaches. 
The Marine Corps possesses a long and storied history of fighting small irregular 
wars; however, organizationally, the Marine Corps general purpose forces are designed to 
provide a Marine Air Grand Task Force (MAGTF) infantry-centric capability that can fight 
accross the spectrum of conflict. While effective for a wide range of activities, these 
general-purpose, conventional forces have limited effectiveness in irregular warfare, where 
light footprints and advisory approaches are often essential. Furthermore, in practice, the 
Marine Corps does not organizationally value assignments outside of the primary 
command billets. While general-purpose force Marines may adapt faster in irregular 
warfare than other services’ counterparts, many, if not the majority of, Marines at the 
tactical level do not gain an appropriate understanding of the nature and character of 
irregular warfare to achieve effectiveness. By focusing on irregular warfare, MARSOC can 
provide and retain small, irregular warfare expertise and continuity within the Marine 
Corps as the rest of the Corps predominantly focuses on traditional warfare activities. 
Moreover, MARSOC can provide insight in competing more indirectly against China and 
Russia. 
Lastly, The U.S. military has historically oriented on preparing for fighting major 
wars through traditional warfare against peer competitors since at least World War II.1247 
Other ‘lesser’ conflicts, described as small wars, people’s wars, revolutionary wars, 
brushfire wars, military operations other than war, low-intensity conflict, or irregular 
warfare, are typically seen as distractions from the U.S. military’s primary responsibilities. 
This attitude has a degree of merit due to the necessity for the military to deter or defeat 
                                                 
1247 Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy, 42–44. 
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other great powers’ traditional military threats. However, with exceptions, the military has 
underprioritized the most prevalent form of war with correspondingly poor results. 
This study recommends that MARSOC focuses its organizational vision and 
strategy to employ indirect irregular warfare approaches to influence and support 
national level objectives against prioritized threat networks and within operational 
environments. By strategically focusing on the desired endstate, this vision enables 
employment of relational maneuver to decentralize and adapt to leverage resources to meet 
the commander’s intent. Focusing on strategic outcomes still allows MARSOC to retain its 
ability to accomplish all SOCOM core missions, but it automatically enables prioritization 
of effort and propels MARSOC toward the ultimate objective of providing capabilities that 
the nation needs but that the military has not consistently delivered. This focused 
organizational strategy contains three primary elements: a long-term focus to influence 
strategic outcomes, oriented against prioritized transregional threat networks in associated 
operational environments, and through indirect irregular warfare approaches led by 
embedded advisors. Among the DoD, the Marine Corps, and SOCOM, this approach would 
be unique and would better align MARSOC to the requirements for employing relational 
maneuver to influence and achieve strategic outcomes. 
2. Establish Expertise in Irregular and Proxy Warfare 
To implement an organizational strategy focused on achieving strategic outcomes 
in irregular warfare, MARSOC should become the Marine Corp’s proponent for irregular 
and proxy warfare and establish its institutional expertise within SOCOM. The realities of 
the growing power of China and Russia, as well as regional powers like Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, make the requirement to understand proxy warfare within irregular operational 
environments especially important. Expertise in irregular and proxy warfare requires more 
than experience in the modern operational environment; it requires studying history and 
formalizing organizational professionalism. Developing irregular and proxy warfare 
expertise directly supports implementation of the Cognitive Raider concept outlined in 
MARSOF 2030. MARSOC can take six steps that will have dramatic impacts on 
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developing its individual and institutional cognition in support of its focused organizational 
strategy. 
a. Proponent for Irregular Warfare 
First, MARSOC should establish itself as the proponent for irregular warfare in the 
Marine Corps. This proponency should include gaining and maintaining the primary 
expertise for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and 
Unconventional Warfare (UW), as well developing a non-doctrinal concept of proxy 
warfare.1248 While MARSOC already contains much of the expertise within the Marine 
Corps for these mission sets, this formal designation will assist in recognition, funding, and 
establishing utility and interoperability between MARSOC and the Fleet Marine Forces 
(FMF) for doctrine, education, and training. 
As the proponent in the Marine Corps for irregular warfare, MARSOC could lead 
the development of lessons learned, advisory practices, and other relevant considerations 
within the Marine Corps Training and Education Command. This effort could then tie into 
critical nodes of learning within Infantry Officers Course (IOC), Expeditionary Warfare 
School (EWS), and other officer and enlisted education venues.  
b. Establish an Irregular Warfare Group  
To establish MARSOC’s irregular warfare expertise within SOCOM and achieve 
institutional professionalization within the Marine Corps, MARSOC should create an 
Irregular Warfare Group from existing command structure. More specific 
recommendations for the structure of this proposed Irregular Warfare Group will occur 
within a future section, but it should be the conceptual hub for education, lessons learned, 
innovation, and adaptation that also interacts directly with the operational environment 
where MARSOC individuals and units deploy. This organizational construct should 
collaborate with joint, interagency, coalition, private sector, and academic communities of 
interest to confront prioritized irregular threats and operational environments. Ultimately, 
                                                 
1248 Department of the Navy, “Marine Corps Order 5311.6: Advocate and Proponent Assignments 
and Responsibilities” (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, December 2013), 3. 
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this construct would enable the MARSOC commander, the operational chain of command, 
and the Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) to enhance the professional cognitive 
concepts essential for confronting the complex range of irregular threats through relational 
maneuver. 
c. Initial Development and Education: Individual Training Course (ITC) 
and the Team Commander’s Course 
A decisive effort for developing the initial cognitive foundation necessary for 
confronting irregular threats begins at ITC and the Team Commander’s Course. These 
courses already provide an excellent foundation, especially for essential tactical skills, but 
a review should take place to verify that both ITC and the Team Commander’s Course are 
providing and encouraging a deep study and understanding of war, irregular warfare, 
political competition, strategy, the strategic utility of SOF, and the strategic importance of 
advisors. The Irregular Warfare Group in conjunction with the MRTC could conduct this 
review, in consultation with the faculty from the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
Defense Analysis Department, to recommend adjustments to the MRTC Commanding 
Officer. The NPS Defense Analysis Department already plays a direct role in the Naval 
Special Warfare (NAVSPECWARCOM) Platoon Leader’s Course, helping prepare future 
SEAL platoon leaders for their operational environment. This type of partnership between 
academia and the MARSOC Team Commander’s Course has occurred previously and 
reviewing opportunities for discussion and debate is essential to developing the Cognitive 
Raider and the level of understanding necessary to employ relational maneuver. 
d. Annual Irregular Warfare Symposium 
Another way to develop the Cognitive Operator and support MARSOC’s 
proponency and expertise in irregular warfare is to establish a jointly sponsored annual 
irregular warfare symposium with the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Defense 
Analysis Department. Intellectual development requires engaging in debate and critical 
thought from multiple perspectives, and an annual MARSOC-led symposium could 
establish MARSOC as a center for professional learning to make MARSOC, SOF, and the 
United States more effective, especially in irregular warfare. An annual symposium could 
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offer a research-based platform to directly interface with the rest of the Marine Corps, 
SOCOM, and academia. The proposed Irregular Warfare Group could lead this effort and 
work with NPS faculty and other communities of interest to develop the topics each year 
to apply conceptual research organizationally. 
e. Maximize Opportunities with the NPS Defense Analysis Department  
Another simple but effective way to expand MARSOC’s cognitive abilities 
includes increasing the personnel sent to study in the NPS Defense Analysis Department. 
This department allows for the flexibility in research that MARSOC requires to produce 
thorough and relevant analysis for direct application in support of command’s priorities. 
Each year, the other SOF services send dozens, or even hundreds, of SOF officers and 
senior enlisted through the Defense Analysis program. MARSOC needs to take better 
advantage of this under-utilized opportunity. This study recommends sending additional 
officer, and enlisted, Marine Raiders through this program each academic cycle.  
Additionally, the Defense Analysis department could provide a vital partnership 
with MARSOC, beyond resident degree-oriented studies to develop short courses of study 
that can be tailored to the operational requirements of MARSOC. Currently, Army Special 
Forces regularly send Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) for specially built courses 
of instruction prior to deployment or other operational assignments. These opportunities 
and more exist at NPS. 
f. Maturing beyond Doctrine and Definitions 
Becoming the Marine Corps’ and one of the DoD’s leading experts on irregular and 
proxy warfare will require more than merely knowing doctrine or basic DoD definitions. 
This knowledge is important but insufficient for deep study and expert understanding. For 
example, modern counterinsurgency doctrine outlines a basic ‘shape, clear, hold, build, and 
transition’ formula for the U.S. military to apply to an insurgency.1249 The reality is that 
this sequence, although useful, will never be exactly applied in the way it is outlined. 
                                                 
1249 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, JP.3-24 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 
April 2017), Ch. VII. 
353 
Application will always require adapting it to the actual threat context. Authoritative 
doctrine in counterinsurgency may actually provide as much hindrance as help if it is 
applied generically without taking the actual context into consideration.1250 In irregular 
warfare, where the threats and contexts are especially unique and uncertain, MARSOC 
should combine experience with a professional understanding of the history of war, 
warfare, politics, religion, economics, and anthropology to recognize vulnerabilities within 
the threat system and to employ relational maneuver to defeat that system. This level of 
professionalism will require moving past a cursory understanding of doctrine and 
definitions of irregular warfare. 
3. Develop Strategic Cognition and Capability 
To implement an organizational strategy that desires to influence and achieve 
strategic outcomes, MARSOC should improve its strategic thinking. MARSOC 
commanders and leaders in irregular operational environments should think in terms of 
grand strategy. Grand strategy is typically reserved for the policy or strategic level. In the 
United States, the National Security Council (NSC) is responsible to the president for 
recommending and implementing national or grand strategy. Hall Brands defines grand 
strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign 
policy.”1251 He further states that grand strategy requires “a clear understanding of the 
nature of the international political environment, a country’s highest goals and interests 
within that environment, the primary threats to those goals and interests, and the ways that 
finite resources can be used to deal with competing challenges and opportunities.”1252 
MARSOC individuals and units operating in fragmented social-political irregular warfare 
environments need to understand grand strategy and advise military and political 
indigenous partners on their national, provincial, district, or village level grand strategy in 
concert with interagency partners. Given the complexity within U.S. internal grand 
                                                 
1250 Simons, “Got Vision?” 15–25. 
1251 Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from 
Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 3. 
1252 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 3. 
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strategy, requirement represents the most complex possible task for a military leader, and 
one for which MARSOC is not currently adequately prepared, especially at the most 
tactical-operational levels of command. 
Transforming MARSOC into a strategic organization starts with its organizational 
vision and strategy. Making MARSOC directly strategically relevant requires recognizing 
SOF’s greatest strategic utility, focusing MARSOC’s vision on strategic outcomes as 
opposed to tactical capabilities, and aligning MARSOC’s resources and capabilities to 
those strategic outcomes. To focus its vision on strategic outcomes, MARSOC needs to 
move past the insufficient concept that MARSOC is merely a force provider. Moving past 
this concept requires MARSOC to prioritize specific threat networks so that MARSOC can 
orient its resources on understanding complex environments and influence successful 
outcomes. Obviously, MARSOC cannot influence strategic outcomes unilaterally. 
MARSOC operates within the established Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) 
structure and SOCOM and DoD force deployment model. Even without this model 
changing, MARSOC can internally adapt and align itself to the strategic needs of the 
operational environment by better understanding the threats therein and forecasting its 
needs to more effectively contribute to this model. Aligning MARSOC better with the 
operational environment, with the intent to achieve strategic outcomes, then allows 
MARSOC to internally prioritize its education, training, and missions to the threats it will 
confront. This will enhance MARSOC’s professionalization, organizational agility, and 
capability to influence strategic outcomes. 
Beyond transforming its organizational vision and strategy, MARSOC should 
educate and indoctrinate its people on what strategy is and how to employ strategic thought. 
This education and indoctrination should occur in at least four specific ways. First, 
MARSOC leadership at every level should develop strategic thought within their 
command. Second, MARSOC should familiarize strategic cognition and capabilities 
within the Individual Training Course (ITC) and should teach grand, or national, strategy 
at the MARSOC Team Commander’s Course. Third, MARSOC should make strategy a 
reoccurring theme for discussion and debate in the proposed annual Irregular Warfare 
Symposium sponsored by Defense Analysis and MARSOC. Fourth and finally, MARSOC 
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should increase its throughput in the Defense Analysis program with an emphasis on 
strategic studies as well as pursue other academic opportunities to study and research 
strategy’s relevance to SOF and MARSOC. 
4. Recognize the Criticality, and Developing the Capabilities, to 
Politically Compete 
Strategic outcomes, and operational effectiveness in irregular warfare depend on 
understanding the centrality of political competition in irregular warfare and balancing 
political and violent competition at every level of warfare. Further research should 
specifically study the most effective ways for MARSOC to engage in political competition 
and contribute to strategic outcomes, but six general implications are clearly evident. First, 
MARSOC must understand the U.S. and coalition political interests at stake. Second, 
MARSOC must seek to connect and work with interagency and coalition entities to achieve 
unity of vision, effort, and command. Third, MARSOC must gain an understanding of the 
complex distribution of power within a given conflict. Dedicated study of a specific 
conflict will slowly reveal the primary drivers of the political conflict as well as the seams 
and gaps that can be pursued and exploited to resolve the conflict in favor of U.S. interests. 
This understanding will then enable MARSOC to work with the appropriate political-
military partners to influence successful outcomes. This understanding must include local 
power interests as well as proxy warfare goals from regional and global adversaries. Fourth, 
MARSOC must understand the necessity to connect local political and military efforts to 
the extent appropriate for the given indigenous context. Fifth, MARSOC must establish 
relationships with the appropriate political and military powerbrokers to properly influence 
outcomes politically acceptable to the relevant groups and populations. Sixth and lastly, 
MARSOC should consider all tools at their disposal, including deception, negotiations, 
mediations, direct military violence, and information warfare, to balance short- and long-
term goals to effectively wage political competition and produce strategically successful 
outcomes. 
Additionally, MARSOC can take four specific steps to better wage political 
competition in irregular warfare. First, MARSOC leaders at every level should facilitate a 
better understanding of political competition’s centrality in irregular warfare and how 
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military violence should be used to set conditions for political success at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of warfare. This will likely be the most significant 
challenge. There are many in SOF, and likely in MARSOC, who have their minds made 
up that SOF’s job is to find and kill the enemy and let other people worry about political 
effects and resulting outcomes. Changing this mindset can only occur over time with 
persistence, education, and study. Second, the study, discussion and debate over 
MARSOC’s role in political warfare should begin in ITC, be researched at NPS and other 
academic institutions, and should be a reoccurring theme in symposiums and other 
educational forums. Third, MARSOC, led by the proposed Irregular Warfare Group, 
should more closely develop ongoing dialogue and relationships with U.S. interagency, 
including the State Department, CIA, USAID, coalition partners, and strategically 
prioritized threat environments. This development of institutional relationships should 
include opening up the possibility for new or additional liaisons attached to MARSOC to 
enhance dialogue. Fourth, MARSOC should sponsor research to further develop the 
concept of political competition, political-military advisors and their relevance to 
MARSOC, the Marine Corps, SOCOM, and the DoD. 
5. Prioritize and Focus on Specific Threats, Partners, and Operational 
Environments 
The most unique, and arguably the most important, element of this study’s proposed 
strategy is for MARSOC to prioritize and focus on specific threats, partners, and 
operational environments. From examining relational maneuver and the U.S. military’s 
experiences in irregular warfare, this recommendation should also be the most obvious for 
success in irregular warfare. Recognizing vulnerabilities, adapting internally, and 
exploiting those vulnerabilities requires understanding the threat and the operational 
environment. This understanding cannot occur without prioritization and focused attention 
from specific personnel and units. MARSOC has an opportunity to lead within SOCOM 
by adapting itself internally to address DoD- and SOCOM-wide problems to become more 
strategically effective. 
Prioritization requires a decision-making criterion to ensure that MARSOC does 
not waste its personnel and resources on threats, partners, and operational environments 
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that are not strategically relevant or desired. Furthermore, MARSOC provides the smallest 
contribution to SOCOM, making its decision-making process all the more important. This 
study recommends that MARSOC use a decision-criteria that synthesizes five elements 
depicted in Figure 46. First MARSOC should examine the relevant guidance from the DoD, 
SOCOM, and Marine Corps. Second, MARSOC should prioritize the list of known 
strategic adversarial threats to U.S. interests. Third, MARSOC should identify the enduring 
strategic partners essential to confronting the priority threats. Fourth, MARSOC should 
consider the operational environments and conflict zones that will allow MARSOC 
personnel and units to work with and through partners to confront the threats. Fifth, and 
lastly, MARSOC should consider its organizational culture, design, and strengths to 
identify the best fit for its missions and units as well as the principles of relational maneuver 
required for success. 
 
Figure 46. Template for MARSOC’s Strategic Threat-Network Decision Making 
Process 
To aid its decision making, MARSOC should consider guidance from the DoD, the 
Marine Corps, and SOCOM. A brief review of the broad guidance from each entity 
demonstrates differences that MARSOC should synthesize to make the best possible 
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decision where to allocate its resources. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that 
“Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. 
national security.”1253 The defense strategy further places the revisionist powers of Russia 
and China as America’s top security concerns, the “rogue regimes” of North Korea and 
Iran as the next echelon of threats, and finally non-state terrorists and irregular threats as 
the third and lowest level of threat to U.S. security interests. 
The Marine Corps has translated the guidance from National Defense Strategy to 
predominantly prepare for traditional warfare against the militaries of Russia, China, North 
Korea, or Iran.1254 Within its preparation to confront these state adversaries, the Marine 
Corps has further emphasized its direction toward the Pacific, China, and North Korea.1255 
This shift to the Pacific makes sense from the Marine Corps’ amphibious tradition and 
relationship to the U.S. Navy. In 2018, a Marine flag officer’s classified brief to the Marine 
students at NPS reinforced the Corps’ emphasis on the Pacific area of operations and 
integration with the Navy. 
Finally, while the DoD and the Marine Corps have shifted higher emphasis on 
interstate warfare, “USSOCOM’s priority effort continued to be Countering Violent 
Extremist Organizations (CVEO).”1256 Among these VEO, al Qaeda and ISIL top the list 
of SOCOM’s priority threats.1257 After VEOs, the SOCOM Commander’s most recent 
congressional posture statement shows that SOCOM is actively countering the list of 
DoD’s priority threats—Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China. 
                                                 
1253 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy 1. 
1254 Amy B. Wang, “Top General Tells Marines to Be Prepared for a Big Fight,” Washington Post, 
accessed October 28, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/23/theres-a-
war-coming-top-marine-corps-general-tells-u-s-troops/. 
1255 Seck, “Marines Want to ‘Pull Back’ From Middle East as Russia, Pacific Loom,” Military.com, 
December 20, 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/12/20/marines-want-pull-back-middle-
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1256 Thomas, III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United 
States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Feb 15, 2018,” 2. 
1257 Thomas, III, “Statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army Commander United 
States Special Operations Command before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Feb 15, 2018,” 5. 
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Although there are differences in the order of priority, what is clear from the 
guidance of DoD, Marine Corps, and SOCOM is that the primary security threats to the 
U.S. military are clearly defined, at least at the strategic level of warfare (See Figure 47). 
Although the world is complex and dynamic, in fact, the nation’s primary strategic 
adversaries have remained consistent, with Russia, China, and North Korea having been 
America’s adversaries since at least 1949. Iran became a strategic adversary in 1979, and 
global Islamic Jihadists began to mobilize and gain traction during the 1980s across the 
Middle East.1258 Therefore, strategically recognizing history and conducting a simple 
network analysis of these adversaries provides a relatively clear picture of where our 
primary adversaries are and where they will likely remain for the foreseeable future. This 
simplicity and stability can enable MARSOC’s long-term strategic planning. 
 
Figure 47. America’s Strategic Threats 
To prioritize the list of threats, MARSOC should use an interconnected level of 
understanding and approach that meshes global, regional, and local threats, partners, and 
operational environments and choose the threats, partners, and operational environments 
that best align to MARSOC’s organizational culture, strengths, and capabilities. This 
integrated understanding and approach will allow MARSOC units and personnel to provide 
strategic utility, not only advising and assisting partners in overcoming local or regional 
challenges, but also ensuring that these efforts are nested with strategic level interests. 
                                                 
1258 David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James 
Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism, 61–63. 
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MARSOC’s current culture, capabilities, and strengths best align with confronting 
threats in kinetic, expeditionary, austere operational environments. MARSOC possesses a 
Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) heritage that integrates capabilities in a 
combined arms manner across physical and cognitive domains. Particularly, MARSOC 
possesses the resources and capabilities to integrate intelligence and operations down to its 
most tactical unit, the MSOT.1259 MARSOC’s prioritization of organic intelligence 
collection capabilities and its cultural tradition of the MAGTF concept lends itself to the 
holistic approaches required to strategically succeed in irregular warfare. MARSOC’s 
culture and capabilities can likely adapt to most operational environments, but is especially 
suited to countering the threats, and working through partners, in dangerous and remote 
operational environments, especially across North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, 
and Eastern Europe. 
While many options exist for MARSOC to apply these decision-making criteria to 
identify specific threats, partners, and operational environments to strategically influence, 
this study provides three recommended courses of action to MARSOC. Due to scoping, 
only the primary recommended option will be described in detail, but the same 
methodology could be used to apply to the other recommended options. The most 
important takeaway is not the specific recommended options, but the methodology and the 
importance for MARSOC to more greatly focus its personnel and units on specific threats, 
partners, and operational environment to apply relational maneuver and influence strategic 
success. 
a. Course of Action 1: Violent Extremist Organizations, Iran, and Russia  
When juxtaposed to the array of primary threats, MARSOC’s organizational 
strengths appear most closely suited to confront VEO, Iran, and Russian threat networks 
since these networks are interconnected to operational environments that play to 
MARSOC’s organizational strengths. Furthermore, these three threat networks are 
carefully nested within the DoD, Marine Corps, and SOCOM’s prioritization of threats. A 
                                                 
1259Webber, “U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command.” 
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quick network analysis, depicted in Figure 48, of these threat networks and irregular 
warfare conflict zones indicates that they are relatively geographically aligned and may 
support a threat networked approach from MARSOC. 
 
Figure 48. COA 1 Overlapping Threat Networks 
Currently, jihadist VEOs wage irregular warfare and terrorist operations throughout 
the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. These conflict zone and infected areas, 
depicted in Figure 49, contain al Qaeda and ISIL violence and war ranging from political 
instability to outright civil war and insurgency in areas like Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
and elsewhere.1260 Across this vast space, transregional VEOs like al Qaeda and ISIL 
overlap with more locally focused jihadist insurgents and other combatants. National 
security expert Seth Jones’ 2014 congressional testimony provides an effective framework 
(see Figure 49) to identify and prioritize the sub-threat networks within the larger VEO 
threat network according to the level of threat to U.S. interests.1261 
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Figure 49. Global al Qaeda and ISIL VEO Threat Network with Corresponding 
Threat Level to the United States1262 
Across the same geographic space, Iran’s network of state-sponsored proxies 
overlap and often directly fight against local and transregional VEO networks.1263 Figure 
50 depicts some of the most significant areas of overlap where fighting is occurring.1264 
Many of these areas currently contain deployed elements from MARSOC and the rest of 
SOCOM and are vital to both confronting VEO and maligned Iranian efforts counter to 
U.S. interests. Although not directly represented, Iranian interests and influence efforts also 
overlap into neighboring Afghanistan. 
                                                 
1262 Source: Jones, The Future of Irregular Warfare, 3; Jones, Counterterrorism and the Role of 
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Figure 50. Iranian Threat Network1265 
Finally, the Russian threat network and primary sphere of influence also overlaps 
with many of the geographic regions and partners necessary to confront the primary VEO 
and Iranian threat networks. Some of the most well-known instances of Russian subversion 
and irregular warfare operations are depicted in Figure 51 in Syria, the Caucasus region in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and in the Baltic region.1266 These Russian activities and spheres of 
influence, particularly across Syria, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and perhaps Eastern 
Europe, overlap with both VEO and Iranian threat networks and provide key intersection 
points that will likely remain strategically relevant to counter all three threat networks 
indefinitely. 
                                                 
1265 Source: Council on Foreign Relations, “Middle East Battle Lines.” 
1266 James Carafano, “U.S. Comprehensive Strategy Toward Russia,” The Heritage Foundation, 




Figure 51. Russian Threat Network1267 
MARSOC’s focus on Jihadist VEOs, Iran, and Russian threat networks would 
enable development of enduring relationships with strategic partners throughout the 
Middle East, North Africa, the Central Asian States, Caucasus region, and potentially 
Eastern Europe. MARSOC should determine which partners and conflicts that it will 
prioritize for investment of forces and resources. To make these choices, MARSOC should 
assess where other U.S. military and SOF are currently operating as well as where the 
interesting key points are that allow MARSOC to simultaneously confront the range of 
prioritized threats globally, regionally, and locally. These decisions should reflect the 2018 
National Defense Strategy, Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) campaign plans, 
and coalition and interagency efforts in these areas. As Seth Jones explains in his 2014 
congressional testimony, indirect SOF assistance should also consider the level of direct 
threat to the United States as well as the internal state capacity to address the internal 
threat.1268 MARSOC could use a similar framework, depicted in Figure 52, to identify the 
most strategically relevant partners to create enduring relationships and expertise. 
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Figure 52. Framework to assess Level of VEO Threat to the United States and 
Host Nation’s Rule of Law Capacity1269 
A 2013 RAND report, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF 
Network, provides a useful visual depiction for MARSOC to guide strategic identification 
of threats and partners.1270 Using the input factors of higher-level guidance, prioritized 
threats, strategic partners and operational environments that contain key intersection points 
across the prioritized global, regional, and local threat networks and strategic partners, 
MARSOC can orient and focus its strategy against these threats, partners, and operational 
environments. As analysis throughout this study indicates, paradoxically, the lowest 
priority local threats in many operational environments, relative to U.S. strategic interests, 
will be the highest priority threat to the indigenous partners and to the political stability 
and success within the operational environment. Therefore, MARSOC and SOF must be 
able to understand strategy, threats, partners, across overlapping global, regional, and local 
operational environments. Figure 53 depicts COA 1’s prioritized threats, partners, and 
operational environments. 
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Figure 53. Analytical Tool for Prioritizing and Nesting Strategic Threats, 
Partners, and Operational Environments1271 
b. Course of Action 2: China, Russia, and Pacific VEOs 
MARSOC could also primarily focus on China, Russia, and irregular threats in the 
Pacific. This option provides several significant advantages. First, the rest of the Navy-
Marine Corps team appears to be shifting its focus and priorities toward Asia, Russia, and 
China especially.1272 MARSOC could pursue this alignment to more strongly emphasize 
its amphibious heritage and bridge the broader Marine Corps’ conventional force’s 
emphasis on traditional warfare with a more indirect, irregular warfare approach to China 
and Russia. 
Since China’s threat network overlaps with Russia and Pacific-oriented VEOs, a 
Pacific-focused MARSOC could seek to develop partnerships with allies and in irregular 
                                                 
1271 Adapted from: Szayna and Welser, Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF 
Network, 3. 
1272 Neller, Statement of General Robert B. Neller. 
367 
conflicts relevant to strategic competition with China and Russia. These opportunities 
include the Philippines, where MARSOC already operates, Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Mongolia, the Central Asian states, and other Southeast Asian partners. While 
this option potentially aligns well with the wider Marine Corps and its amphibious heritage, 
the general stability within this theater of operations will provide less direct opportunity to 
maintain kinetic combat experience within MARSOC or maximize its organizational 
advantages operating in more austere and kinetic environments. Nonetheless, MARSOC 
could significantly contribute to national, Marine Corps, and SOCOM level priorities 
through orienting primarily on China, Russia, and Indo-Pacific partners and operational 
environments. This orientation could further develop potentially groundbreaking 
opportunities for MARSOC to partner with Vietnam, Mongolia, and especially India as the 
United States seeks to expand largely untapped strategic relationships.1273 
c. Course of Action 3: Iran, North Africa, and VEOs 
As much of the DoD orients directly on competition among the great powers, 
MARSOC could provide strategic utility by prioritizing its attention and resources on the 
Iran and the jihadist VEO networks across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Although the 
United States appears to desire to marginalize these less strategically important regions in 
favor of direct great power conflict, the irregular conflict zones in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere show little signs of ending. These irregular operational 
environments will also likely continue to provide venues for proxy conflict both for 
regional powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, as well as among Russia, 
China, and the United States. Remaining focused on these destabilized areas fits well 
within MARSOC’s organizational culture and capabilities. The primary risks for a 
predominant orientation on Iran and VEOs include the gap between the primary focus of 
the most recent defense strategy as well as the Marine Corps’ orientation on direct great 
power conflict and the Pacific region.  
                                                 
1273 Department of Defense and Department of State, Enhancing Defense and Security Cooperation 
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Orienting on Iran and VEO threat networks, however, aligns well with MARSOC’s 
organizational strengths and contains the irregular mission sets within which SOCOM will 
likely continue to operate, while conventional forces return to preparing for major combat 
operations. Orientation toward Iran and VEOs also provides the opportunity to confront 
these threats with a strategic perspective through relational maneuver. 
Ultimately, regardless of the chosen course of action, MARSOC can better 
contribute to gaps in America’s defense and provide direct strategic utility by focusing its 
organizational strategy on specific threat networks, partners, and operational environments. 
At the strategic and operational levels of warfare, the threats and relevant partners are 
relatively clear and stable.1274 This clarity and stability enables MARSOC to strategically 
plan and prioritize its allocation of personnel and resources. The next section discusses the 
adjustments that MARSOC needs to make within its organizational design to implement 
this study’s proposed strategy and to implement the principles of relational maneuver and 
MARSOF 2030. 
6. Aligning Organizational Design to Adapt to Irregular Operational 
Environments 
The next step in implementing a more effective MARSOC strategy is to better align 
MARSOC’s organizational design to irregular operational environments. This alignment 
will enable the agility to adapt and implement relational maneuver to exploit threat 
vulnerabilities. Alignment should occur through adjusting MARSOC’s organizational 
tasks, structures, and people. Improving these three pillars of organizational design will in 
turn build a more cohesive organizational culture attuned to the requirements to 
strategically succeed in irregular warfare.  
a. Tasks: Focusing MARSOF 2030’s Four Guiding Concepts 
A focused MARSOC vision and strategy allows prioritization of core tasks and 
activities that will guide education, training, and resource allocation. A focus on irregular 
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threats and irregular warfare places a premium on foreign internal defense (FID), 
counterinsurgency (COIN), and unconventional warfare (UW) core activities. Other, more 
direct core activities, such as direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR), support 
the essential irregular warfare tasks of supporting or defeating an insurgency through or 
against proxies. SOCOM’s core activities, however, are necessary but not sufficient to 
effectively focus MARSOC’s capabilities to implement and achieve its revised 
organizational strategy. In addition to specialization in FID and COIN activities, MARSOC 
should also research and develop core capabilities to politically compete in irregular 
warfare and to understand counter-proxy warfare efforts by adversaries such as Russia and 
Iran in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine. 
(1) Foreign Internal Defense/Counterinsurgeny/Proxy Warfare 
MARSOC should identify FID-COIN and proxy warfare as the main effort for 
education, training, and deployment. Although, not a doctrinal SOF mission, understanding 
and specializing in proxy wars directly supports the guidance in the 2018 NDS and can 
contribute to the way SOF and the DoD understands great power conflict and irregular 
warfare. Within FID-COIN-proxy war core activities, MARSOC should further specialize 
in political warfare, counter-guerilla warfare, including local defense force missions like 
in the CAP and VSO program, as well as more direct-action centric missions such as 
partnered raids with forces like the Afghan Commando Kandaks. 
MARSOC should also seek to progress in an under-studied subset of FID, the use 
of UW methods in a larger FID/COIN irregular conflict. As described in Chapter V’s 
analysis of the U.S. military’s irregular warfare effort in Afghanistan, often times 
indigenous government forces do not have the personnel or resources to physically control 
their territory.1275 In those situations, governance is often provided by the insurgent 
political apparatus such as the Taliban, local warlords, criminal networks, or ISIL. In these 
situations, MARSOC should study and implement UW approaches in support of a larger 
FID-COIN effort. While Army Special Forces continue to take the lead in doctrinally 
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defined UW efforts, such as the Toppling of the Taliban Regime in 2001 or the 2003 efforts 
working with the Kurds to defeat Saddam Hussein, MARSOC could enhance the 
understanding and employment of UW methodology against the insurgency in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, or other similar operational environments. 
(2) Unconcentional Warfare 
As the original design function for the Army Special Forces, this study recommends 
that MARSOC not try to duplicate or replace but, rather, complement Special Forces UW 
efforts in developing and working with guerillas, auxiliaries, and underground networks. 
Since both FID and UW represent opposite perspectives on the same basic problem—
insurgency—MARSOC should develop and maintain the skills sets and understanding to 
lead a UW effort, but will likely play a supporting role in these operations to Special Forces. 
More appropriately, MARSOC should seek to take the lead in studying and implementing 
UW operational approaches in larger FID operational environments. 
Furthermore, MARSOC should expand its analysis of the required tasks to achieve 
strategic outcomes in either FID or UW environments. This expansion should include a 
prioritization of activities and practices that are historically grounded subsets of irregular 
warfare. These activities should focus on training and education, including Advise, Assist, 
and Accompany (AAA) of indigenous SOF, irregular local defense forces, police, or 
general-purpose forces. MARSOC should also explore the education and training required 
for AAA in raids, clandestine support activities, major combat operations, and traditional 
pacification activities such as Village Stability Operations (VSO). Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, MARSOC should review the requisite capabilities to effectively 
overcome the root of irregular warfare: political competition. 
(3) Support to U.S. Conventional Major Combat Operations  
Even when supporting U.S. conventional major combat operations, MARSOC 
should support primarily through and with partner forces. This study further advocates for 
the following criteria for supporting major U.S. conventional combat operations. First, as 
Major General Patrick Roberson argued in 2011, MARSOC should seek to partner with 
371 
indigenous SOF or irregular-militia forces.1276 Second, MARSOC could partner with 
indigenous general-purpose force units. Third, in situations where applicable, MARSOC 
should conduct unilateral raids or special reconnaissance missions in support of 
conventional U.S. military operational objectives. 
(4) Training 
Advise and assist missions in FID or UW environments generally require some 
level of training or instruction with their indigenous partner force. This study recommends 
that MARSOC consider training partner forces a necessary supporting, but not the main, 
effort, with two significant exceptions. First, MARSOC should prioritize training and 
advising forces on the importance of political competition and connecting military efforts 
and political efforts to achieve success. Second, MARSOC is well suited to training and 
advising partner forces on planning and integrating intelligence and operations. Training 
and advising partner forces on political competition and operations and intelligence 
integration are a natural fit for both MARSOC’s organizational strengths as well as the 
requirements for strategic success in irregular warfare. While some level of tactical training 
will undoubtedly occur, this training should be carefully tailored to the skills that the 
partner force needs to confront the threats it faces, so as to avoid merely creating a military 
in the image of the U.S. forces. 
In each case, whether conducting FID, UW, or supporting major combat operations, 
MARSOC should seek to employ as little personnel and units as possible to accomplish its 
mission. Small footprints are a hallmark of special operations within irregular warfare, and 
MARSOC’s small size should incentivize small footprints and embedded advisory 
approaches to do more with less. MARSOC’s small size and limited resources calls for 
tasks, structures and people that can do more with less to achieve greater organizational 
agility and strategic outcomes. 
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b. Structure: Achieve Enterprise Agility 
To achieve enterprise-level agility, MARSOC should address structural challenges 
inhibiting its ability to adapt to irregular operational environments. By better focusing its 
organizational strategy and tasks, MARSOC will enhance its relational agility, but this 
enhancement is insufficient. MARSOC should also reduce redundant bureaucracy, 
decentralize authority, build continuity, and rigidly institutionalize agility into its structure. 
(1) Agility 
To structure to achieve agility, MARSOC should first decide whether to prioritize 
responsive agility to react to unforeseen military contingencies, or proactive agility to 
deeply understand the operational environment and adapt to overcome political and violent 
competitive challenges. RAND’s 2013 report on options for the global SOF network 
generally categorized this agility between responsive direct-action options for 
counterterrorism, hostage rescue or other “contingencies that may erupt with little or no 
warning.”1277 On the other end of the agility spectrum, the report provided small footprint 
advising and capacity building options to proactively shape the environment in support of 
strategic objectives.1278 RAND’s analysis aligns well to David Tucker and Christopher 
Lamb’s argument that SOF capabilities can be broadly distinguished between direct and 
indirect approaches, and that in irregular warfare, indirect approaches are more 
strategically significant than U.S. unilateral direct approaches.1279 Analysis to this point, 
depicted in Figure 54, reveals that the U.S. military and SOF gravitate toward the 
responsive type of agility that focuses on responsive direct approaches.1280 Because 
strategic outcomes in irregular warfare depend on indirect approaches and proactive agility 
to adapt to the environment, this study recommends aligning with the strategic needs of the 
environment. The section on how MARSOC can rigidly structure agility will further 
discuss how MARSOC can still retain responsive agility within this approach. 
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Figure 54. Option for Better Balancing SOCOM Application of Agility 
(2) Reduce Redundant Bureaucracy 
To achieve better agility, MARSOC should ensure that it eliminates unnecessary 
bureaucracy. MARSOC has redundant bureaucracy that does not significantly contribute 
to organizational effectiveness in the operational environment. Reportedly, MARSOC is 
currently evaluating options to address the first of two major structural redundancies that 
undermine organizational agility. The first major issue is the separation between the Marine 
Raider Regiment (MRR) and the Marine Raider Support Group (MRSG). This separation 
between two O-6 commands creates unnecessary bureaucratic processes and chokepoints 
for operational commanders to receive essential support personnel and equipment for unit 
deployment. MARSOC, has already identified this as a problem and is reviewing solutions 
to create a second MRR and streamline its structure through subordinating support 
battalions under each O-6 command.1281 This adaptation will likely significantly reduce 
unnecessary formal communication, processes, and administrative approvals required for 
each deploying unit to receive known support requirements. 
                                                 
1281 Interview with Colonel Travis Homiak, July 20, 2018; MARSOC, Working Papers, “MARSOC 
Reorganization Working Group Update,” July 11, 2018. 
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The second, and currently unaddressed, major structural redundancy lies within 
MARSOC’s operational chain of command. According to organizational design theory, 
generally, more bureaucracy and vertical hierarchy leads to less organizational agility.1282 
Therefore, an organization that requires agility to confront uncertain environments should 
seek ways to eliminate redundant bureaucracy and hierarchy that inhibits agility. 
Given its organizational size, MARSOC does not need each level of its current 
operational structure and could achieve greater organizational agility through combining 
two levels of its current command. Process of elimination demonstrates that the Marine 
Special Operations Company (MSOC), in its current form, does not maximize MARSOC’s 
operational advantages and has proven largely redundant within SOCOM’s deployed 
global network as well as within the Marine Corps’ administrative environment. The 
current construct of the Marine Raider Battalion (MRB) and the MSOC should be 
combined to retain an O-5 led MSOC-like battalion modeled after the operational 
experience of Special Operations Task Force North (SOTF-N) in Northern Iraq between 
2016 to the present. 
During Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and prior to SOTF-N, MSOC-North was 
established by MSOC G in Northern Iraq to lead the U.S. SOF advise and assist effort with 
the Kurdish forces as well as the, mostly, Sunni tribes in their fight against the Islamic 
State. Six months after MSOC North was established, the MARSOC-led Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force- Iraq (CJSOTF-I) created SOTF-N by emplacing an O-5 
headquarters on top of MSOC-North, then manned by MSOC H, to better facilitate 
leadership among the coalition SOF partners, the Combined Joint Forces Land Component 
Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I), and to provide deployed command positions for MARSOC 
battalion commanders. This structure proved to be more effective for the SOCOM 
deployed structure, the Marine Corps’ administrative promotion structure, and for the 
operational environment. In this environment, SOTF-N led the coalition SOF effort in 
Northern Iraq, and the MSOT and SEAL task elements reported directly to the SOTF. 
While, doctrinally, a SOTF, does not have to be led by an O-5, in reality, the SOCOM 
                                                 
1282 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” 
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culture has embedded the concept of the O-5 led SOTF into its deployed environments, 
especially within combat areas of operation. MARSOC could better employ its resources 
by adapting to the culture of SOCOM in the area, while maintaining the best elements of 
the MSOC concept, within an O-5 Command structure. 
In the Philippines, starting in 2017, the MSOC has achieved a measure of its 
intended purpose. Led by an O-4, MARSOC MSOC’s command a SOTF responsible for 
advising a large indigenous force in their fight against violent extremist organizations. In 
the Philippines, the MSOC has demonstrated agility, however, its value is still limited. In 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the authority to employ fire support from artillery or 
aircraft has been limited to the ground force commander in combat or the first O-5, or 
higher, in the chain of command. Current fire support doctrine states that “the supported 
commander may delegate target engagement authority to the lowest level of command of 
the supported forces.”1283 In the Philippines, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq and in most 
foreseeable irregular warfare environments, except in rare circumstances, O-4 commanders 
have not been delegated engagement authority. Therefore, it is difficult to foresee an 
operational environment where O-4 MSOC commanders possess the necessary delegated 
target engagement authority to exercise full spectrum military assistance in irregular 
warfare. MARSOC can improve its operational agility by streamlining and replacing the 
O-4 command billet with an O-5 who is far more likely to receive delegated target 
engagement authority and exercise the full spectrum of military capabilities. 
Administratively, since MARSOC operates within the larger Marine Corps 
promotion system, MARSOC should ensure that it operates as efficiently as possible within 
those constraints. In the future, MARSOC should research ways to modify the basic career 
path outside of the rest of the Marine Corps to better align with its organizational needs 
and the operational environment, however, MARSOC should also seek ways now to 
become more efficient and effective within the Marine Corps’ cultural and administrative 
constraints. One of the most significant administrative constraints is the officer promotion 
                                                 
1283 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Fire Support JP 3–09 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
IV-7. 
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system, which revolves around command opportunities. In the Marine Corps, key 
commands are the platoon (O-1), Company (O-3), Battalion (O-5), and Regiment (O-6). 
Although O-4 commands do exist, they are considered as enhancing but not essential. 
Instead, key O-4s in the Marine Corps generally occupy staff positions. By eliminating a 
key command billet at the O-4 level, MARSOC could also greatly expand the operational 
opportunities and capabilities for MARSOC O-5 Command, which would create further 
opportunities for career retention and for more greatly integrating within SOCOM and the 
rest of the Marine Corps. 
An alternative is to take the operational advantages that the MSOC currently 
provides and mesh them with the SOCOM and Marine Corps’ structural operational and 
administrative command level norms at the O-5 level of command. This fusion requires 
restructuring MARSOC’s operational commands around the proposed two MRRs. This 
transformation of the MSOC-MRB command would have significant organizational 
benefits, including flattening the organization, defusing authority, reducing unnecessary 
communication, enabling task, billet, and unit continuity, and decreasing communication 
lag time across the organization. The exact model deserves additional study, but Figure 55 
provides a potential option for how this reconfiguration could work. Currently, 
MARSOC’s operational units are structured around one MRR, three MRBs, 12 MSOCs, 
and 48 MSOTs. MARSOC could shift to two MRRs, eight MRBs (SOTF-N Model), and 
5-6 MSOTs per MRB for a total of 40-48 MSOTs. Aside from the agility gained from 
flattening the organization, reducing 15 MRB/MSOC headquarters to eight headquarters 
would reduce the resources, and manpower required to fill these levels of command. 
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Figure 55. Flattening MARSOC’s Organizational Structure 
MARSOC has faced deficiencies since 2006 in providing the manpower and 
equipment to deploying MSOCs or SOTFs. One root cause for this deficiency lies in a 
quantitative shortage of material resources and support personnel to staff and supply all 
deploying units simultaneously. This shortage has forced MARSOC to rotate high demand 
equipment and support personnel between deploying units.1284 Transforming the current 
MSOC into an MRB headquarters would allow the MRR level of command to absorb many 
administrative and logistic responsibilities and allow the O-5 level of command to orient 
more directly on global, regional, and local operational environments. This structure 
adaptation would also increase the number of O-5 operational levels of command available 
within MARSOC. When accounting for the two additional support battalions under the 
proposed two MRRs, MARSOC would increase from six current O-5 commands to ten 
commands, a 66% increase of MARSOC internal command opportunities. 
Two primary counterarguments arise from this proposed transformation of the 
MRB and MSOC. First, some might argue that the MSOC provides invaluable mentorship 
and supervision of MSOT leadership. Second, some might question what to do with the 
left-over O-4s and senior enlisted leadership formerly within the MSOC structure. 
                                                 
1284 Major Bailey’s observations between 2013–2016 as an MSOT Commander, MSOC Executive 
Officer, and Headquarters Company Commander. 
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Mentorship of the MSOT-level leadership is a valid concern; however, the risks incurred 
can be surmounted. First, in the rest of the Marine Corps, an O-3 reports directly to an 
O-5 with no intervening command. If a company commander cannot handle that 
responsibility, he is relieved. Furthermore, the Battalion executive officer and operations 
officer both play a significant role in mentoring company commanders in conventional 
Marine Battalions. The same can apply to the transformed MRB/MSOC. This new 
structure could enable more, not less, mentorship more directly between both O-4s, O-5s 
and their senior enlisted leadership. The second issue of what to do with the additional O-
4s and senior enlisted leadership in lieu of MSOC command will be addressed further in 
the section on “Rigidly Structuring Agility.” 
(3) Decentralizing Authority 
Reduction of redundant bureaucracy will allow MARSOC to decentralize authority, 
a key principle to enhancing agility.1285 Condensing MSOC and MRB together will 
automatically require defusing authority in terms of manpower, resources, and the ability 
to coordinate between each level of command. MARSOC can take advantage of this 
diffusion by decentralizing authority down to the MSOT level as well as enable a more 
external operational focus for the new concept of the MRB headquarters. Right now, the 
MSOC absorbs the majority of the operational intelligence collections assets within 
MARSOC. Meshing the MRB and MSOC together would reduce the sourcing 
requirements for high-demand intelligence personnel and equipment from 15 MSOCs and 
MRBs down to 10 MRBs, a 33% reduction. Decentralization, however, requires 
professionalizing the force to effectively wield the additional authority. 
(4) Continuity in Tasks, Billets, and Units 
Professionalism requires time and continuity in tasks, billets, and units. A major 
problem in the U.S. military’s approach to irregular warfare has been the lack of continuity 
in individuals and units assigned to an operational environment, whether in Vietnam, El 
                                                 
1285 Daft, 10th ed., 30–31. 
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Salvador, Afghanistan, or Iraq.1286 This gap in continuity, and resulting lack of 
professional understanding and expertise begins at the service level, since SOF services 
provide the forces that deploy. Irregular threats and environments require greater continuity 
in assignment of leadership, billets, and units. This requirement for continuity translates to 
keeping more people in place for longer periods of time at every level of command and, 
whenever possible, applying the same individuals and units to the same missions in the 
same locations. Ultimately, this continuity will enable and incentivize long-term strategic 
thinking and effectiveness. By ‘flattening’ the organization, MARSOC can improve 
continuity throughout the Component, which could translate into better individual and unit 
tactical and strategic capabilities. These capabilities can then more effectively orient on the 
operational threats, partners, and environments, rather than on rapid rotation. The greater 
continuity and expertise will, in turn, enhance institutional capabilities and 
professionalization at all levels of command. 
(5) Rigidly Structuring Agility 
Reducing redundant bureaucracy, decentralizing authority, and enhancing 
continuity is not enough to achieve enterprise agility; MARSOC needs to also rigidly 
structure agility into its organization. Although, as Hy Rothstein explains, “there is no ‘one 
best way’ to organize,” MARSOC can build-in greater agility to adapt within operational 
environments.1287 MARSOC can structure this agility by establishing and incentivizing an 
experimental culture. This study recommends fusing existing elements within MARSOC 
to create an agile command structure and experimental culture to lead a strategy focused 
on specific threats, indirect approaches, and strategic outcomes. This study proposes 
naming this concept the Irregular Warfare Group (IWG). Experimental, or learning, 
organizations innovate through adapting and learning from success and failure.1288 They 
                                                 
1286 Chapters 3–5 discuss the gaps in continuity in the U.S. military’s experiences in Vietnam, El 
Salvador, and Afghanistan. Derek Eaton et al., Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) Operations, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2017), 13–14, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1333.html. 
1287 Rothstein, “A Tale of Two Wars,” 253. 
1288 Daft, 10th ed., 31. 
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also task-organize for missions that require adaptability and innovation to overcome 
complexity and uncertainty in the environment.1289 This experimental culture must be led 
by mature and capable individuals who can think strategically, collaborate, adapt, and 
innovate, produce and implement new approaches. This experimental concept can apply to 
technology but is grounded in the cognitive domain and can apply to organizational design 
or operational approaches. Figure 56 depicts a graphic of what the Irregular Warfare Group 
could look like to implement rigidly structured agility within MARSOC. 
This study recommends creating the Irregular Warfare Group from existing 
infrastructure that merges their functions under a single authority. The Irregular Warfare 
Group could potentially exist within each MRR or directly within the component 
headquarters. Either way, the intent and endstate would be the same, to implement a 
relational maneuver way of war and MARSOF 2030’s guiding concepts, focused on 
influencing strategic outcomes against specific irregular threat networks. 
                                                 
1289 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” 10–12. 
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Figure 56. Options for Restructuring MARSOC to include an Irregular Warfare Group
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MARSOC’s updated organizational vision, centered on confronting irregular 
threats should drive this proposed Irregular Warfare Group. For illustrative purposes, this 
section will use jihadist VEOs, Iran, and Russia as MARSOC’s prioritized threat networks. 
For this example, the IWG could orient around these three threat networks in a task-force 
cell-like structure that includes an intelligence cell, interagency and coalition force 
integration cell, lessons learned and technological innovation cell, and the, main-effort, 
advisory cell. The advisory cell would consist of tested and proven O-4/O-5 level officers 
and E-7/E-8 level senior enlisted, made available through meshing the MSOC-MRB. These 
advisors would then embed with strategically relevant indigenous partners confronting the 
prioritized threat networks through existing military and SOF exchange and liaison 
programs. Because these threat networks will have significant network overlaps, this model 
would require close collaboration between each transregional cell within the group to 
inform and influence desired national strategic outcomes. The IWG would further represent 
the central hub for developing the institutional knowledge and expertise to effectively 
confront these threats. At the component level, the IWG could fuse the intelligence 
capabilities, force development and modernization, and other functions into an mission-
focused operational construct that informs the MARSOC Commanding General, facilitates 
persistent presence against national and organizational priority threats, and connects with 
deploying MARSOC MRBs, MSOTs, conventional forces, interagency, and coalition 
partners oriented on the same threats, partners, and operational environments. This team or 
task-force like structure would better focus resources and facilitate collaboration, 
innovation, and adaptation to overcome national threat priorities. 
(6) People: Incentivizing Professionalization 
To improve effectiveness in irregular warfare, MARSOC needs to incentivize 
professionalization in three ways. First, MARSOC can significantly incentivize its people 
by focusing on the external threats facing the nation. Currently, internal bureaucratic 
considerations, rather than strategic effectiveness in the operational environment, too often 
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drive MARSOC’s decision making.1290 This internal bureaucratic focus clashes with the 
intrinsically motivated individuals in MARSOC and SOF in general. MARSOC Marines 
will generally be better incentivized to stay in MARSOC if the organization rebalances 
priorities toward confronting external threats over internal administrative concerns. 
Second, MARSOC should recognize the advantages of remaining a small organization. 
SOF’s strategic advantages in irregular warfare come, in large part, from its professional 
ability to operate in austere and dangerous environments with a small footprint. In 
organizational design terms, as organizational size increases, agility and flexibility 
decrease. MARSOC should embrace its small size and embrace the agility that small size 
enables. 
Third, and finally, MARSOC should incentivize embedded advisor billets. The 
U.S. military’s experiences in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan demonstrate that the 
military, including SOF, generally reward traditional billets in standard career paths. These 
conflicts also demonstrate that basic military structures are often tailored in irregular 
warfare to create new structures built around advisor constructs like Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), District or Provincial Augmentation Teams (DAT/PAT), or 
the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in 
Vietnam. MARSOC should recognize this trend and incentivize embedded advisor 
positions through the IWG concept, making these positions selective and elevating their 
status within MARSOC and the Marine Corps’ promotion system. 
Overall, these organizational design recommendations reflect the need for proactive 
agility to adapt within irregular operational environments. This proactive agility aligns with 
the principles of relational maneuver and will enable MARSOC to recognize threat 
vulnerabilities, adapt internally, and exploit those vulnerabilities to influence strategic 
success. Figure 57 depicts that MARSOC can be most strategically relevant by gravitating 
toward proactive agility while retaining reactive agility characteristics through its MSOTs 
and transformed MRB levels of command. 
                                                 
1290 Interview with Col Travis Homiak, July 20, 2018; Interview with LtCol Ronald Norris, 
September 6, 2018; Major Bailey’s personal observations between 2013–2017. 
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Figure 57. MARSOC’s Balance of Agility 
7. Pursuing Effective Operational Approaches 
The output of strategy is the approach implemented. Although irregular warfare and 
real-world operational environments are too unique, complex and uncertain to provide 
standardized approaches for success, what is evident from the history of irregular warfare 
in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan is that strategic success requires advisors that 
can understand and balance political and violent operational approaches. To achieve 
greater strategic effectiveness in irregular warfare, MARSOC should invest more heavily 
in the role of advisors. This section explores models that MARSOC should consider for 
more heavily investing in advisor-led approaches as well as existing military programs to 
facilitate these models. 
a. Models for Embedded Advisors 
MARSOC should consider four models for its expanded strategic use of advisors, 
including Edward Lansdale, John Paul Vann, Lieutenant Colonel Ed Norris, and the use of 
MSOTs across Iraq and Afghanistan. These models span from the theater-strategic down 
to the tactical level of war. The consistent thread across all four models is the ability to 
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embed with the partner political and military forces to develop a deeper understanding of 
the threat(s) and operational environment and develop paths to achieve strategic outcomes. 
Edward Lansdale’s advisor experiences provides a useful and powerful example of 
the theater-strategic political-military advisor. He represents an important model for 
MARSOC to consider because he recognized and prioritized political competition to 
overcome the irregular threats both in the Philippines and Vietnam. His effectiveness 
stemmed from his embedded understanding of the social-political causes of conflict, his 
ability to forge strategic relationships, and his work with the indigenous partners to pursue 
strategic political-military outcomes.1291 
John Paul Vann’s experience as a political-military advisor provides another useful 
model which spanned the tactical through operational levels of warfare in Vietnam.1292 
Initially as an Army advisor to tactical Vietnamese infantry units, Vann saw the problem 
in Vietnam as primarily military, that could be solved through the better use of 
violence.1293 Over his persistent engagement for nearly 10 years, however, Vann’s 
understanding of the threat and operational environment evolved, and he came to recognize 
the social-political roots of the threats in Vietnam. Along with his understanding, his 
recommended approaches to overcoming the threat in Vietnam adapted as well.1294 
Vann’s multiple prolonged deployments and dedicated focus contributed to the 
adjustments that U.S. military made after 1968 which assisted in stabilizing South Vietnam 
up to the U.S. abandonment of Vietnam by 1973.1295 John Paul Vann’s model reveals the 
advantages achieved through dedicated focus on a specific threat and operational 
environment, and how this enhanced his understanding and ability to adapt and influence 
strategic outcomes. 
                                                 
1291 Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale. 
1292 Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie. 
1293 Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 66, 317. 
1294 Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 66–317. 
1295 Colby and McCargar, Lost Victory, 235–58; Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, Book 7. 
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More recently, Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Ronald Norris provides MARSOC an 
internal example of the SOF political-military advisor’s role in recent irregular 
warfare.1296 As an MSOC commander in Herat Province, Afghanistan between 2013 and 
2014, LtCol Norris determined that he could best strategically contribute to the mission in 
Western Afghanistan by forging relationships with the Provincial Governors in Herat and 
Farah provinces and connecting these political leaders to his primary indigenous military 
partners, the 2nd Afghan National Army Special Operations Brigade (ANASOB) 
Commander. On his own initiative, LtCol Norris guided his subordinate MSOT 
Commanders to develop relationships with district-level governance and connect this 
governance to their partnered Afghan Commando Kandaks. This development of 
relationships enabled the MARSOC units operating across western Afghanistan to gain 
situational awareness across the provincial levels of governance. This awareness enabled 
his Marines’ ability to partner with Afghan leadership, respond to military crises across 
Farah and Herat, as well as to influence their partners to meet U.S. military objectives in 
Western Afghanistan. LtCol Norris provides a model for embedding experienced SOF 
leadership in political-military positions to effectively understand and influence the threat 
and contextual environment. 
The MSOT provides a fourth example for effective adviser practices in irregular 
warfare. The MSOT model is historically rooted in the Vietnam Combined Action Program 
(CAP) in Vietnam as well as the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). 
Like other models, the MSOT proved itself in Afghanistan and Iraq as an effective and 
adaptive model that facilitates advising across the range of train, advise, assist, and 
accompany (TAAA) missions in irregular warfare environments. The adaptability of this 
model is further demonstrated by the fact that MSOTs often subdivide into two or more 
smaller elements often for entire deployments to adapt to the challenges faced. This agility, 
and the effectiveness it facilitates, demonstrates that the MSOT should be retained for its 
versatility for both responsive and proactive agility. The professionalization advocated in 
                                                 
1296 Analysis of LtCol Norris in Afghanistan by his subordinate Team Commander, then Captain Paul 
Bailey, who served under his command in western Afghanistan between 2013 and 2014. 
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this study will only further enhance the ability of the Marine Raiders in MSOT to succeed 
in political-military complexity and uncertainty. 
b. Existing Military Programs to Implement Embedded Advisors 
To implement a great emphasis on advisor-led operational approaches, MARSOC 
should leverage the Army Special Forces Volckmann Program and existing Marine Corps 
Partnership Exchange Programs (PEP) and SOCOM liaison opportunities. In 2011, then-
Colonel Eric Wendt argued that the Army Special Forces should adopt a long-term small 
footprint strategy and indirect approaches to confront and overcome irregular VEO threats 
around the world.1297 He offered as the core of this strategy the Volckmann Program, 
named after an Army officer serving in the Philippines in World War II that organized and 
led a 22,000 man guerrilla army and waged insurgency against the Japanese occupiers 
between 1942 and 1945.1298 In the modern era, this program would consist of virtually the 
exact approach advocated in this study to MARSOC. The application of dedicated 
personnel to become subject matter experts to particular countries would advise and assist 
that country to confront and overcome the political and military threats as part of a larger 
global strategy and approach. Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Wendt explained that this 
approach would not require additional authorities, headquarters or funding since the 
program would tap into existing programs. Whenever possible, the Volckmann operators 
would live in their assigned country as part of the U.S. embassy in the Security Cooperation 
Office (SCO) as a normal PCS duty assignment. Colonel Wendt further explained that, for 
this approach to be strategically effective, it would require participation of the Joint Force 
and SOCOM.1299 
A MARSOC equivalent could perhaps be named the Carlson Program, after plank-
owning Raider Evans Carlson’s time serving in China, and the IWG could manage it by 
persistently rotating individuals through its strategically prioritized operational 
environments using selected officers and senior non-commissioned officers to source these 
                                                 
1297 Wendt, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent Strategy.” 
1298 Wendt, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent Strategy.”  
1299 Wendt, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent Strategy.”  
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billets. These individuals and billets would provide the forward-deployed personnel to lead 
MARSOC’s influence of strategic outcomes. Ideally, these individuals would then directly 
interact with MSOTs and SOTFs that deploy to the region for short duration rotations. In 
2015, Special Warfare republished Lieutenant General (LTG) Wendt’s original article 
along with a follow up article that explained that the Army Special force has begun a “pilot 
phase” implementation of the Volckmann Program.1300 MARSOC should borrow and tap 
into the concepts identified by LTG Wendt to pursue its own organizational strategy. 
To implement a Volckmann-like persistent engagement advisor-led operational 
approach, MARSOC’s IWG should integrate the available Marine Corps and SOCOM 
programs already in place. The Marine Corps currently employs Foreign Area Officers 
(FAO) and limited partnership exchange programs each year.1301 MARSOC should tap 
into and expand these programs to apply its threat-specific transregional networked 
strategy and approach. 
SOCOM also possesses several liaison programs and commands within its global 
network, well suited to enable a Volkmann-like operational approach. MARSOC could 
strategically use the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO), Special Operations 
Forces Liaison Elements (SOFLE), Special Operations Command Forward (SOCFWD), 
and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) overlaid on its prioritized threat 
networks, partners, and operational environments.1302 In 2017, RAND produced a 
research report synthesizing the lessons learned, challenges, and options for improving 
SOF’s “unity and continuity of effort to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.”1303 This report 
states that: 
                                                 
1300 Maurice Duclos and Ronald Dempsey, “The Volkmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent 
Strategy - Version 2.0,” Special Warfare 28, no. 3 (2015): 18. 
1301 William D, Chesarek Jr., “Foreign Personnel Exchange Programs: A Supporting Effort in 
Building Partnership Capacity,” (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2008); 
Department of the Navy, “Marine Corps Order 1520.11F”; Department of the Navy, “Marine Corps Order 
5700.4E.” 
1302 John Leitner, Cory Bieganek, and Phillip Madsen, Special Operations Liaison Officer: Looking 
Back to See the Future (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special 
Operations JP.3-05.  
1303 Eaton et al., Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operations, 
21. 
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With the exception of such positions as SOLOs, SOF deployments rarely 
extend to one year. SOF personnel identified short deployments with very 
few mechanisms to ensure continuity of effort as an important challenge to 
building effective, persistent presence and meeting U.S. strategic 
objectives. For phase 0 and phase 1 missions in which SOF personnel build 
on the work that previously deployed personnel have done, lack of detailed 
knowledge of past operations and future planned operations can undermine 
the long-term trajectory and ultimate achievement of GCC objectives.1304 
RAND further “identified SOFLEs, such as SOLOs and other liaison officers, as 
linchpins for improving unity and continuity of effort.”1305 Figure 58 identifies the 
mechanisms, produced by RAND, that MARSOC could use to build its threat network 
advisor led approach.1306 The bullets highlighted in yellow are especially relevant to the 
recommendations outlined in this chapter. Of particular note, the SOLO and SOFLE 
programs provide two of the potentially most critical small footprint options for MARSOC 
to establish deep understanding of the operational environment and strategic relationships 
necessary for strategic success. 
                                                 
1304 Eaton et al., Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operations, 
15. 
1305 Eaton et al., Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operations, 
21. 




Figure 58. Options to Apply Advisor-Led Operational Approaches1307 
Overall, this study advocates that MARSOC expand its advisory tasks and 
structures beyond the MSOT and make it a priority effort to emplace strategically 
embedded advisors, down to the individual level, oriented on MARSOC’s prioritized threat 
networks, partners, and operational environments. These enduring advisors can provide the 
best pathway for MARSOC to achieve enduring institutional understanding, relationships, 
and ability to influence strategic outcomes. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter consolidated seven of the major challenges that SOF faces in 
producing strategic outcomes in irregular warfare. Section A outlined these challenges 
broadly relevant to SOF as well as MARSOC. Section B then translated these seven 
challenges to MARSOC and offered specific recommendations to overcome these 
challenges. The paths to adapt and overcome these challenges all derive from the principles 
of relational maneuver, applying them to irregular threats and warfare. MARSOC reflects 
many of the challenges that confront SOF and the U.S. military writ large. The U.S. military 
shows a gap in producing strategically successful outcomes against threats in irregular 
                                                 
1307 Source: Eaton et al., Supporting Persistent and Networked Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Operations, 4. 
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warfare. At the heart of this gap lies deficiencies in understanding both the threat and the 
larger social-political context by too narrowly focusing on violence rather than politically 
centered strategic thinking, and a failure to properly wage political and violent competition 
at all levels of warfare. The unbalanced military tendencies toward internal administrative 
bureaucratic constraints drive short billet assignments, short deployment rotations, and 
degrade focused long-term attention on known strategic threats to U.S. interests. 
The guiding principles in MARSOF 2030 closely mirror the principles of relational 
maneuver applied to irregular warfare. To effectively pursue MARSOF 2030’s four guiding 
concepts, MARSOC should focus its organizational strategy. Each of the four pathways, 
“Cognitive Raider,” “Enterprise Agility”, “MARSOF as a Connector,” and “Combined 
Arms for the Connected Arena,” represent effective pathways to apply to MARSOC; 
however, left unfocused, these pathways will not be effectively realized and will leave 
MARSOC without a sense of organizational purpose, which will impede its ability to 
provide superior strategic utility to the DoD, Marine Corps, or SOCOM. MARSOC needs 
an achievable strategy and commander’s intent with a clearly defined purpose and endstate. 
If that endstate is left vague or undefined, as it currently is, MARSOC will not achieve its 
potential. 
This study concludes that MARSOC is well suited to provide strategic utility to this 
nation’s defense by better balancing the military’s short-term tactical focus with a longer-
term strategic perspective oriented toward specific transregional threats. Taking into 
account its organizational culture and design, as depicted in Figure 59, MARSOC needs to 
use the principles of relational maneuver to move away from an internal attritional focus 
and move toward an externally focused strategic warfare that understands the relevant 




Figure 59. MARSOC’s Application of Relational Maneuver
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IX. DISCOVERIES, DISCLAIMERS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Manoeuvre, by contrast, is not a familiar practice in recent American 
military operational form. In fact, in the language of the US Army, 
manoeuvre is frequently confused with mere movement, or at least 
offensive movement. Manoeuvre may well call for movement but it is very 
much more than that. It can be applied not only in ground combat but in all 
warfare, and indeed in all things military, even research and development. 
Manoeuvre describes 'relational' action - that is, action guided by a close 
study of the enemy and of his way of doing things – where the purpose is to 
muster some localized or specialized strength against the identified points 
of weakness of an enemy that may have superiority overall. 
—Edward Luttwak, 19791308 
The ultimate goal of this study has been to provide implementable 
recommendations to enhance MARSOC’s strategic utility through better applying 
relational maneuver in irregular warfare. To get to these recommendations, Part 1: “To 
Know One’s Enemy” first defined irregular warfare, irregular operational environments, 
and relational maneuver. In doing so, Part 1 revealed how the uncertainty caused by 
political fragmentation in irregular environments require relational maneuver’s nuanced 
understanding of the environment, a unified strategy that addresses politics and violence, 
adaptive organizational design, and operational approaches that balance political and 
violent competition. Relational maneuver, overall, subordinates internal organizational 
preferences to an external orientation on the threat and operational environment, identifies 
vulnerabilities in the threat system, adapts, and leverages internal strengths against external 
weakness (See Figure 60). The net effect of properly employed relational maneuver is the 
achievement of desired strategic policy objectives. However, the military’s employment of 
relational maneuver provides no guarantee of ultimate strategic success. 
                                                 
1308 Luttwak, “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance,” 57–58. 
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Figure 60. Relational Maneuver in Irregular Warfare 
Part 1 then applied the relational maneuver analytical framework to the U.S. 
military’s irregular warfare efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. The analysis 
of the military’s efforts in these conflicts validated relational maneuver’s strategic 
effectiveness in irregular warfare. These cases also revealed that the U.S. military at large 
gravitates more toward a traditional conception of warfare, more similar to attritional 
warfare, than relational maneuver. An attritional style of warfare focuses internally to gain 
efficiency, depends on technological innovation and mass production of firepower, and 
views the enemy as a “mere inventory of targets and warfare is a matter of mustering 
superior resources to destroy his forces by sheer firepower and weight of materiel 
[sic].”1309 To the extent that the military employs relational maneuver, it does so on the 
physical battlespace in combat. These attritional tendencies have prevented the U.S. 
military, including special operations forces (SOF), from gaining an understanding of, or 
adequately adapting itself to, the political and military operational environment. 
Ultimately, the U.S. military has been largely unable to inform and influence strategy or 
implement operational approaches that exploit threat vulnerabilities to achieve strategic 
success. In irregular warfare, operational and strategic success derives from the use of 
                                                 
1309 Luttwak, “The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance,” 57. 
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relational maneuver and from the understanding that irregular warfare is best considered 
as “armed politics” (See Figure 61).1310 
 
Figure 61. Zone of Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare 
Part 2: “To Know Oneself” transitioned from assessing the external irregular 
operational environment and threats to analyzing SOF’s relational maneuver advantages as 
the force of choice in irregular warfare. Part 2 then conducted an open systems analysis of 
MARSOC’s operational organizational design, viewed through the lens of relational 
maneuver and the transposed goal for achieving strategic effectiveness within irregular 
operational environments. The results of this analysis identified that MARSOC possesses 
many relational maneuver advantages, but also suffers inhibitors to the implementation of 
relational maneuver. Perhaps most significantly, the examination demonstrated that 
uncertainty, misalignment, and fragmentation exists within MARSOC’s organizational 
strategy, design, and culture, which inhibit its general cohesion, effectiveness, and strategic 
utility to the Department of Defense (DoD), Marine Corps, and SOCOM. 
                                                 
1310Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 11. 
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The external analysis of Part 1 and internal analysis in Part 2 then enabled Part 3’s: 
“Success in Irregular Warfare” synthesis of the challenges faced by U.S. military, SOCOM, 
and MARSOC and the production of specific recommendations to overcome these 
challenges. These recommendations and the study as a whole have basically produced three 
intermediate arguments that support the final objective argument. First, this study has 
argued and demonstrated that irregular warfare is primarily different from traditional 
warfare due to the existence of political competition that permeates to the most tactical 
levels of warfare. This competition produces complexity, instability, and, most 
importantly, uncertainty as to who the relevant political actors are, what their objectives 
are, and how to influence the actors and objectives to achieve U.S. interests. Second, 
because of the character of irregular warfare, strategic success requires the U.S. military to 
pursue a relational maneuver style of warfare to properly influence the environment and 
achieve strategic objectives. Third, this study demonstrated that most of the U.S. military, 
including MARSOC, needs to rebalance its attritional style of warfare to implement more 
relational maneuver, especially given the current and future prevalence of irregular and 
proxy warfare. 
 
Figure 62. MARSOC’s Path to Strategically Implement Relational Maneuver 
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These three intermediate arguments produced seven nested recommendations 
within a proposed MARSOC strategy, founded on Relational Maneuver, that seeks to 
directly align MARSOC’s utility to influence and achieve strategically successful 
outcomes in irregular warfare (See Figure 62). The seven recommendations predominantly 
require merely focusing the stated principles in MARSOC’s newly published 
organizational vision, MARSOF 2030.1311 MARSOF 2030 already properly identifies 
MARSOC’s strategic operational environment now and in the future. What it lacks is how 
to harness the Relationally Maneuver-attuned guiding concepts in MARSOF 2030 while 
focusing and directing them in a way that provides strategic utility to MARSOC’s primary 
stakeholders (DoD, Marine Corps, SOCOM) and enables MARSOC’s internal unity of 
purpose to realize its strategic potential. 
This concluding chapter synthesizes the primary points determined in this study, 
outlines the discoveries identified by this research that were not originally identified in its 
scope and purpose, provides several significant disclaimers and limitations within the 
study, and finally provides areas for further research in areas relevant to the scope of this 
study. This chapter and study conclude with a challenge to SOF leaders and operators at 
all levels to more deeply explore the historical challenges faced by the U.S. military and 
SOF at large to better balance the development of ‘special’ tactical capabilities and the 
strategic thinking and approaches that this nation needs to translate special skills into 
strategic outcomes. 
A. DISCOVERIES 
Beyond tailoring recommendations to MARSOC through case-study insights, this 
study produced three specific insights not previously considered when research began. 
First, research re-discovered the centrality of politics in irregular warfare and reconsidered 
how to frame political competition and its decisive role in irregular warfare. This study 
arrived at the conclusion that all warfare is political, and that calling irregular warfare 
political warfare in the George Kennan sense is accurate, but also potentially 
                                                 
1311Marine Special Operations Command, MARSOF 2030. 
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misleading.1312 Since, as Clausewitz taught, all war is political, calling some warfare 
political and other not, seems incomplete. Instead, using the DoD’s definitions of 
traditional and irregular warfare, this study identified that in traditional warfare, non-
violent political competition occurs primarily at the interstate strategic levels of warfare, 
whereas in irregular warfare, political competition occurs at every level of warfare. This 
distinction has important implications for the U.S. military fighting irregular warfare. It 
means that strategic-level policy-makers and military leaders are not the only ones who 
need to understand and implement strategy as well as employ political competition. 
The U.S. military, and particularly SOF, are often the only representatives from the 
United States with access to some of the remote and violent areas embroiled in irregular 
warfare. Regardless of whether another agency in the U.S. government should be 
conducting political competition with and through indigenous partners in these areas, the 
U.S. military is often the only available option to lead and conduct this effort. Furthermore, 
it is irrational to expect that policy-makers in Washington, DC, or even diplomats in a 
partner’s national or provincial capital, would understand the feasibility or application of 
strategy throughout a diverse country like Afghanistan. This reality makes political 
competition in irregular warfare a U.S. military problem in all phases of an operation. This 
study’s analysis of the U.S. military’s overall efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, and 
Afghanistan strongly supports the assertion that the U.S. military has poorly understood 
political competition’s decisiveness in irregular warfare and has struggled to translate its 
level of understanding into application and strategic success. 
Since strategic success directly depends on the alignment and balance of violence 
and politics to strategic objectives, this study recommends that MARSOC more fully invest 
in understanding and waging political competition within the bounds of its legal authorities. 
Synthesized analysis of several credible studies suggests that political competition can be 
                                                 
1312“George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare,” April 30, 1948, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, Obtained and contributed to CWIHP by A. Ross Johnson. Cited in his book 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Ch1 n4 – NARA release courtesy of Douglas Selvage. Redacted 
final draft of a memorandum dated May 4, 1948, and published with additional redactions as document 
269, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/
114320. 
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thought of as the “making or breaking of coalitions” to influence a certain “distribution of 
power.”1313 Using this framework for understanding political competition, MARSOC can 
better consider how to institutionally integrate this capability. 
Second, and based on the centrality of political competition in irregular warfare, 
this study identified the strategic nature of the challenge in irregular warfare. A primary 
thread presented in the study of the U.S. military experience in irregular warfare has been 
the problem of strategically aligning military violence to solve political problems. This 
study re-identified that strategic thinking needs to pervade all levels of command, 
especially in irregular warfare.1314 It is not merely the strategic political leaders at the 
National Security Council or the theater-strategic commander who must employ strategy. 
The most tactical-level leaders in irregular warfare must think in strategic terms to 
understand the complex array of U.S., coalition, local partner, and adversarial strategic 
interests. Military leadership, including within MARSOC, is underprepared for this level 
of strategic thinking. This strategic thinking, in fact, is closer to national, or grand, strategic 
thinking than it is to military strategy in traditional warfare, which primarily considers the 
use of military violence to achieve an objective. This study concludes that MARSOC needs 
to better develop strategic cognition and capabilities, especially at the most tactical levels 
of command. 
Third, and finally, this study rediscovered the extent to which flawed organizational 
design can constrain a military from employing relational maneuver in irregular warfare. 
Misaligning tasks to the operational environment undermines the military’s ability to 
succeed in irregular warfare. Furthermore, organizational structure, which includes 
individual and unit rotations and assignments, has significantly inhibited strategic 
effectiveness in irregular warfare and could continue to do so. If there is misalignment to 
the operational environment, individuals and units do not have the continuity of 
understanding or unity of effort to overcome complex and uncertain irregular warfare 
                                                 
1313 Madden et al., Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, xiii and 22; Department of the Navy, 
Warfighting, 23. 
1314 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 120. 
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challenges. Across each case study, the military, including SOF, rotated individuals and 
units through the conflict in a manner that made sense bureaucratically but not strategically. 
This lack of structural continuity must be corrected to produce more effective outcomes in 
irregular warfare. 
B. DISCLAIMERS 
The size and scope of this research study were the most significant challenges, 
resulting in its most significant weakness. Since this study seeks to produce timely, 
relevant, and implementable recommendations to MARSOC, it synthesized and addressed 
a wide range of the topics deemed most relevant. This breadth of analysis enabled exploring 
a preponderance of the issues necessary to produce the recommendations, but the large 
scope also limited the depth of specific analysis in each subject. While confident of the 
synthesized analysis and recommendations, the scope of this study creates opportunities to 
debate specific interpretations within each case study and in the internal organizational 
design analysis of MARSOC. The challenge of scope and size, however, also offers an 
opportunity for MARSOC, the Marine Corps, and other SOF units to use this analysis and 
the frameworks as jumping-off points achieve greater strategic effectiveness. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The size and scope of this study provide many further research opportunities. These 
research opportunities fall into two basic categories, research to implement the 
recommendations identified in this study and relevant research opportunities that did not 
fall within this study’s scope. Between both categories, this study identifies 15 critical areas 
for additional research, relevant to MARSOC, relational maneuver, and Irregular Warfare 
(See Figures 63-64). Additionally, all future research topics can and should be applied to 
both Naval Special Warfare (NAVSPECWARCOM), Army Special Forces, and 
potentially the rest of the Marine Corps. 
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Figure 63. Future Research: Implementation of Recommendations 
First, additional study should research how MARSOC should wage political 
competition in conjunction with conventional, interagency, and indigenous partners within 
irregular warfare. Political competition, as defined in this study, represents the decisive 
effort in irregular warfare. An entire thesis should study this topic in line with the 2018 
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the interagency 2018 Stabilization Assistance 
Review (SAR) published by the Department of Defense (DoD), State Department (DoS), 
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).1315 
Second, drawing from the guidance from the 2018 NDS and the projected 
prevalence of irregular warfare, additional research should study how MARSOC should 
understand and wage proxy warfare within irregular warfare. 
Third, research should explore how MARSOC can and should wage 
unconventional warfare within a larger foreign internal defense campaign. 
Fourth, further inquiry should study how MARSOC should implement the 
transregional threat-centric model of employment recommended in this study. While the 
                                                 
1315 Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy; “State-USAID-DoD Stabilization Assistance 
Review (SAR),” U.S. Department of State, accessed October 27, 2018, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2018/06/283334.htm. 
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necessity for this approach is explained, scope did not allow for a full investigation on all 
the relevant factors surrounding its implementation. 
Fifth, and related to research Topic Four, research could examine how MARSOC 
should realign itself structurally to implement the concept of the Irregular Warfare Group 
(IWG) based on a threat, partner, and operational environment organizational strategy. This 
study provides two options for implementing the concept of the irregular warfare group 
and for flattening the organization through merging the Marine Special Operations 
Companies and Marine Raider Battalions into a single level of command. While the 
advantages for structurally realigning under two regiments, battalions, and teams is closely 
researched, the administrative implications for this realignment are not fully examined. 
Further research is needed to align the number of battalions, teams, and the IWG within 
the strategy proposed in this study. 
Sixth, discussed but not addressed closely enough, MARSOC should examine 
options for developing a more effective manpower rotation, incentive, and promotion 
system that better suits the requirements of MARSOC in irregular warfare. This research 
could examine this question through identifying how to most efficiently and effectively 
work within the current manpower, incentive, and promotion system. It may also discover 
options for creating exceptions, memorandums of agreement, or even explore the use of a 
warrant officer program within MARSOC. 
Seventh, MARSOC should more closely study how to implement the concept of 
advisor-led operational approaches through existing and new Marine Corps and SOCOM 
models and programs. This research should more fully build and expand upon the ideas 
outlined in this thesis. 
Eighth and finally, research should investigate how MARSOC can achieve 
proponenecy for irregular warfare within the Marine Corps and in what way MARSOC 
could better interface to provide strategic utility to the Corps through organizationally 
maintaining and integrating its expertise of Small Wars. A significant finding from this 
study indicates that there is still uncertainty about the strategic utility that MARSOC brings 
to the Marine Corps. MARSOC’s assumption of the responsibility for subject matter 
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expertise within irregular warfare and small wars provides that direct utility. The Marine 
Corps is largely reorienting on traditional warfare and expeditionary core competencies 
outside of the scope of irregular warfare. The Marine Corps still recognizes the importance 
and probability for future operations in irregular warfare. MARSOC can provide that 
residual expertise and maintain core advisor skills, practices, and lessons learned from its 
study and continued application around the world. 
 
Figure 64. Further Research of a Broader Nature 
First, for research topics not within the scope of this study, MARSOC should 
examine pseudo operations and determine how they are relevant to MARSOC in 
contemporary irregular warfare. This research would directly support MARSOC’s efforts 
to become subject matter experts in irregular warfare and support both better understanding 
of proxy warfare and how to conduct unconventional warfare within a larger foreign 
internal defense campaign. 
Second, building on the research and recommendations from this study, MARSOC 
should examine whether SOCOM should pursue a threat, partner, and operational 
environment centric model of employment. 
Third, in support of the relational maneuver requirement to externally orient on the 
threats, MARSOC should sponsor threat network studies on Russia, China, N. Korea, Iran 
and VEOs, and determine the ways that SOF can exploit vulnerabilities within these 
networks. This research should include how these adversaries are waging irregular warfare 
against the United States as well as historical practices these networks have employed. 
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Fourth, virtually completely left out of this study, MARSOC should examine what 
role should information technology and cyber capabilities play within MARSOC. This 
research opportunity might provide an excellent example to tap into outside research from 
the Naval Postgraduate School and connect to the rest of the Marine Corps to ensure that 
its efforts are aligned to the growing necessity to employ these capabilities in the modern 
and future operating environment. 
Fifth, using historical examples from the CIA and OSS, MARSOC should examine 
how to build an enduring female capability to ensure access and understanding across the 
entire operational environment in irregular warfare. The controversy surrounding women 
in combat and special operations should not detract from the fact that men cannot access 
segments of the operational environment without women. Research should examine how 
to build an internal enduring MARSOC capability for women outside of the Individual 
Training Course (ITC) qualification pipeline. 
Sixth, MARSOC should examine the British and French colonial experiences to 
identify the relevant implications for U.S. SOF persistent engagement around the world. 
Seventh, and lastly, this study solely conducted unclassified research to ensure the 
widest possible distribution and access. Future research from MARSOC should include 
classified studies, particularly for the implementation of recommendations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The 2018 NDS outlines a picture of the current and future operational environment. 
It is an environment where the U.S. military faces growing conventional military strength 
from peer and regional competitors; however, it is also an environment where peer, 
regional, and extremists’ networks are employing proxy and irregular warfare to undermine 
U.S. interests. Current indications reveal that this trend of irregular warfare will likely 
increase in the future. The U.S. military’s and SOF’s efforts reveal substantial challenges 
in understanding irregular warfare and adapting to overcome those challenges. The secrets 
to success in these environments are not secrets at all. These have been extensively studied, 
yet their lessons lay largely unimplemented. Relational maneuver provides the style of 
warfare and philosophy requisite for success. This style of warfare ultimately sacrifices 
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internal efficiency for the external understanding necessary to identify and exploit threat 
vulnerabilities to defeat the enemy system. In irregular warfare, this enemy system is often 
indistinguishable from the larger operational environment. 
Relational Maneuver is basically an expanded version of the Marine Corps’ 
Maneuver Warfare applied more directly to the realities of irregular warfare. Maneuver 
Warfare depends on unity of vision through a clear commander’s intent to enable 
decentralized adaptation and implement the best approaches to achieve the commander’s 
purpose and endstate. MARSOC does not currently possess a strategy and clear 
commander’s intent to apply the foundational tenets of relational maneuver. In all war, but 
especially applicable in irregular warfare, Clausewitz reminds us of the enduring truth that 
“the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never 
be considered in isolation from their purposes.”1316 For MARSOC in irregular warfare, 
this political understanding requires its forces to blend political competition and violence 
to influence complex, dynamic, and uncertain threats, partners, and operational 
environments. 
Ultimately, as the primary intended audience, this study suggests that MARSOC 
should more effectively employ relational maneuver to guide its organizational strategy to 
influence and achieve strategic outcomes. To do so, MARSOC needs to use relational 
maneuver to more externally orient on the known threats facing the U.S. to develop a deep 
understanding of strategic threats, partners and social-political operational 
environments. MARSOC must also understand that irregular warfare is armed politics, 
and strategy must reflect that political competition is the main effort. MARSOC 
should also adjust its organizational design to enable continuity, proactive agility, and 
decentralization on its prioritized threats partners and environments. Finally, MARSOC 
should give higher priority to SOF’s primary strategic utility in irregular warfare through 
advisor-led operational approaches to influence and achieve strategic outcomes. 
 
 
                                                 
1316 Clausewitz, On War, 29. 
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